TFSmith121
Banned
True, but it is worth noting, three of the four German professional
True (re the Germans) but it is worth noting three of the four German professionals known for service or as observers of the conflict who returned and published significant studies in Germany were in the South, and one of the three was Von Borcke, who was a serving officer with the rebellion, while another served as an engineer with the rebel forces on the Gulf Coast. There's a paper by a German officer and student at the C&GS College that is on-line and makes the point the majority of the best known German students of the conflict were all on the losing side. The one German student of the US war effort, who had served with the Army of the Potomac through much of the war, got much less "professional" attention than the three who served with the rebels and lost.
It's interesting that when Sheridan was an observer of the F-P War he noted that if the French cavalry had raided the railroad lines that sustained the German forces between the frontier and their spearheads near Paris, the Germans would have had to pull back; Sheridan also made the point that the French were well placed to do that in the later stages of the war by the size of the German salient into Central France and the positions the French had on the southern flank.
Just regarding the Prussians, I don't see a lot of direct continuity between American and Prussian tactical practice; in the Seven Weeks War, their cavalry made for an effective reserve and pursuit force, and in 1870, they were still pulling off decisive shock attacks, quite unlike its role in the Civil War.
I think the issue with a shorter, more decisive Civil War without VA, NC, Arkansas, and TN is that it might not be seen as a war at all, just a domestic disturbance put down by state militias. Legally speaking, Lincoln's declaration of blockade made it a capital-W War only after Virginia's secession, and professional European officers would probably note the disparity of forces (but equal early-war ineptitude) and conclude little of importance.
The tricky part is finding a way to put down the small Confederacy without triggering the secession of the rest of the South. To them, Lincoln's calling up of volunteers to suppress secession was an attack on state sovereignty, which they considered necessary to protect slavery. As long as their state governments could interpose between them and Washington, 'they could tolerate the insult the Republicans represented'. To this effect, he'd probably want to delay the calling up of volunteers until after the Confederacy has violated the neutrality of another southern state.
True (re the Germans) but it is worth noting three of the four German professionals known for service or as observers of the conflict who returned and published significant studies in Germany were in the South, and one of the three was Von Borcke, who was a serving officer with the rebellion, while another served as an engineer with the rebel forces on the Gulf Coast. There's a paper by a German officer and student at the C&GS College that is on-line and makes the point the majority of the best known German students of the conflict were all on the losing side. The one German student of the US war effort, who had served with the Army of the Potomac through much of the war, got much less "professional" attention than the three who served with the rebels and lost.
It's interesting that when Sheridan was an observer of the F-P War he noted that if the French cavalry had raided the railroad lines that sustained the German forces between the frontier and their spearheads near Paris, the Germans would have had to pull back; Sheridan also made the point that the French were well placed to do that in the later stages of the war by the size of the German salient into Central France and the positions the French had on the southern flank.