WI:Virginia doesn't secede?

TFSmith121

Banned
True, but it is worth noting, three of the four German professional

Just regarding the Prussians, I don't see a lot of direct continuity between American and Prussian tactical practice; in the Seven Weeks War, their cavalry made for an effective reserve and pursuit force, and in 1870, they were still pulling off decisive shock attacks, quite unlike its role in the Civil War.

I think the issue with a shorter, more decisive Civil War without VA, NC, Arkansas, and TN is that it might not be seen as a war at all, just a domestic disturbance put down by state militias. Legally speaking, Lincoln's declaration of blockade made it a capital-W War only after Virginia's secession, and professional European officers would probably note the disparity of forces (but equal early-war ineptitude) and conclude little of importance.

The tricky part is finding a way to put down the small Confederacy without triggering the secession of the rest of the South. To them, Lincoln's calling up of volunteers to suppress secession was an attack on state sovereignty, which they considered necessary to protect slavery. As long as their state governments could interpose between them and Washington, 'they could tolerate the insult the Republicans represented'. To this effect, he'd probably want to delay the calling up of volunteers until after the Confederacy has violated the neutrality of another southern state.

True (re the Germans) but it is worth noting three of the four German professionals known for service or as observers of the conflict who returned and published significant studies in Germany were in the South, and one of the three was Von Borcke, who was a serving officer with the rebellion, while another served as an engineer with the rebel forces on the Gulf Coast. There's a paper by a German officer and student at the C&GS College that is on-line and makes the point the majority of the best known German students of the conflict were all on the losing side. The one German student of the US war effort, who had served with the Army of the Potomac through much of the war, got much less "professional" attention than the three who served with the rebels and lost.

It's interesting that when Sheridan was an observer of the F-P War he noted that if the French cavalry had raided the railroad lines that sustained the German forces between the frontier and their spearheads near Paris, the Germans would have had to pull back; Sheridan also made the point that the French were well placed to do that in the later stages of the war by the size of the German salient into Central France and the positions the French had on the southern flank.
 
How well did Sheridan know the disposition of German forces as an observer? As I recall, about a quarter of the massive German army was defending their rail lines, and after Metz surrendered, the Germans had another army to campaign in the south.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
He was with the German headquarters staff in the field

How well did Sheridan know the disposition of German forces as an observer? As I recall, about a quarter of the massive German army was defending their rail lines, and after Metz surrendered, the Germans had another army to campaign in the south.

He was with the German headquarters staff in the field, met personally with the King and Bismarck, travelled with Bismarck, and surveyed battlefields from Gravelotte onwards ... He was probably better informed than most of the French and some of the Germans.

The point is that Sheridan recognized that for all the advantages of rail-based logistics, there were weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well, which the French do not seem to have even recognized or if they did, they don't seem to have tried to act upon that realization.

Best,
 
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Interesting! Will have to take a look at his observations.

The way I see it, while a ACW style mounted infantry force would have been useful in the second stage of the French-German War, it seems the French never expected, and certainly never wanted the conflict to take that form. The Empire entered the war expecting to decide the war through battlefield shock action, as the first phase indeed was, but not in their favor. With this expectation, they focused more on shock attack and pursuit as their main cavalry mission, as did the victorious Germans. As it happened, their entire pre-war field army was encircled and captured at Metz and Sedan, so I don't know that the French could create a ACW mounted infantry raiding force even if they wanted to.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
You have to hunt around, but some of Sheridan's views

Interesting! Will have to take a look at his observations.

The way I see it, while a ACW style mounted infantry force would have been useful in the second stage of the French-German War, it seems the French never expected, and certainly never wanted the conflict to take that form. The Empire entered the war expecting to decide the war through battlefield shock action, as the first phase indeed was, but not in their favor. With this expectation, they focused more on shock attack and pursuit as their main cavalry mission, as did the victorious Germans. As it happened, their entire pre-war field army was encircled and captured at Metz and Sedan, so I don't know that the French could create a ACW mounted infantry raiding force even if they wanted to.

You have to hunt around, but some of Sheridan's views are on the web.

One possibility could have been Garibaldi's division in the Vosges, which at its height had about 15,000 men in four brigades, largely light infantry and irregulars of various types, including mounted units. Finding enough horseflesh for even one brigade would have been challenging, of course, but at least it suggests an operational concept of trying to use mobility against the Germans, rather than just slogging away yet again...

Best,
 
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