WI: USN torpedo problems resolved pre-war?

It seems the torpedo problems were largely solved by low tech solutions by switching to contact fuses and compensating for swimming to low, etc. These could easily be solved pre-war by moderately competent testing methods.

How big an effect would this have on the war?
 
Not much effect on the war in the Atlantic, but the war in the Pacific would change dramatically. Now, perhaps as much credit for the lack of effect of US subs in that theatre early on was due to poor comanders, but a lot does come down to the torpeadoes being faulty. Japan was a nation consisting of several islands, with a newly aquired empire of islands (plus her mainland holdings, but those weren't terribly resourc4e heavy). She depended on her merchant marine, but never seemed to realize it. Even as the US Navy subs cut it to pieces IOTL, Japan's ASW remained terrible, and even things like convoying were hard due to obselete and ineffective buerocratic structures.

Without her merchant marine, Japan starves and her soldiers and ships can't be properly used due to lack of fuel, ammunition, and other equipment. Fix the torpeados pre-war, and you probably shorten the war by at least six months. Still have to weed out deadwood comanders and bad practices, but this will make the US Pafici Fleet's sub arm into a lean mean merchant marine-sinking machine earlier.

Of course, I'm no expert. Once CalBear or PacificHistorian posts, I yield to them anywhere our facts differ.
 
Agree with e of pi. There were many documented cases of torpedoes that would have hit/sunk targets not working. Assuming those torps had worked that's a fair number of merchant and IJN ships that are counted out early in the war. This moves up the collapse of the Japanese effort. Additionally, since aggressive action/skippers are rewarded with actual sinkings not just the "thunk" of a dud hitting, deadwood may get cleaned out faster - a win-win.
 
Midway would have ended up an even bigger catastrophe for Japan than it was OTL.

Yeah, the torpedo bombers are still lost in terrible caualty counts, but instead of their torpedos missing the mark or failing to detonate, they're tagging Japanese ships and doing massive damage.

One trickey part about Midway though.

A torpedo launched by Nautalus hit a Japanese destroyer and failed to detonate. The detroyer turned back to look for the sub that fired it. When the destroyer called no joy and headed back for the fleet, it was by following that destroyer back that Yorktown's dive bombers were able to find the Japanese fleet and hammer the carriers.

If Nautalus tags that destroyer with a direct hit that cripples or sinks her, Yorktown's dive bombers have nothing to follow in to the Japanese fleet and, low on fuel, are forced to return to ship before finding the carriers and mauling them.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Pacific War COULDN'T have been a bigger catastrophe for Japan even if it was fighting TODAY'S U.S. military, it could just be a faster one.

In this case the biggest difference would be an earlier beginning of the starvation of the Japanese civilian population as American sub attacks become far more effective earlier in the war. Overall, however, the U.S. still has to build the fleet that it had begun in July of 1940 in order to move across the Pacific. That was going to take time so the actual difference in ending the war is negligible.

BTW: The American torpedoes did not all have the same problem. The sub launched Mark 14 weapons had the magnetic exploder problem, issues with its contact exploder as well as the depth holding issues while the Mk 13 aircraft torpedo had a serious fragility issue, a depressing tendency to drop cold (i.e. dead), as well as some issues with the contact exploder. The surface ship launched Mark 15 had some of the contact exploder issues found in the air & sub launched weapon, but were actually a fairly solid weapon, even in early stages of the war that just kept getting better as the war progressed (one of the best examples of this was the Battle off Samar where the weapon was used to terrific effect by Taffy 3's escorts).

The problems and fixes for the Mark 14 are well know so there is no point in rehashing them here. It is interesting, however, to note that later versions of the Mark 14 remained in USN service until the 1970s (when the last of them was finally driven out of service by the excellent Mark 37, which was the standard USN fish of the '60s) while the Mark 15 remained in service until the U.S. stopped equipping surface ships with 21" torpedo armament.

The Mark 13 was the result of a radically different tactical doctrine that that followed by virtually every other navy. It was a slower speed, vastly longer ranged weapon than those in use elsewhere (frex: 33 knots/6,300 yards vs. the 42 knots/2,200 yards of the IJN Type 91) and had to be dropped at very low speed to avoid breaking up. It was effectively the same weapon as had been issues in 1935 despite the incredible changes that the launching aircraft had undergone. These issues were fixed to the point that by 1945 the weapon that would break up if dropped from more than 50 feet and 120 mph was rated to be dropped at up to 410 knots and from 2,400 feet with at least one series of attacks made from 5,000'+ resulting in five of six weapons operating in a nominal manner. By late 1944 the Mark 13 was unquestionable the best air launched torpedo used in WW II, perhaps the best ever used in combat against surface shipping.
 
Top