WI: USN encounters IJN on 6th Dec. '41?

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...while the USN forces were polishing brass and holystoning the decks (and tipping a few ashore the previous evening). ...

Thats one version I guess, but this point is certainly valid.

Nagumo was also, despite his weaknesses as a carrier force commander, an exceptionally gifted surface warfare officer (he literally helped create IJN torpedo tactics while commandant of the Torpedo School and later as commandant of the Naval War College. He may have screwed the pooch at Midway, but in a surface engagement, with a faster surface fleet, even if it is outgunned, he would be a formidable opponent.

The Japanese can withdraw behind a screen of Long Lances under the command of the man who wrote the book on the subject.

That is not a very attractive possibility

This is why most of the US favoring scenarios start with suprise against the Japanese. Usually a US approach masked by night or rain/haze & guided by radar. The less time the Japanese have to turn away, increase speed/distance & set up the torpedo attacks. The latter are in many variants ad hoc attacks by the destroyer & cruisers rather than top down organized. It depends on exactly how much warning the Japanese have before the US fire becomes overwhelming. Independant attacks are not a large difficulty in themselves since the IJN ships captains were trained for such circumstances, but would be indicative of less time to escape the US gunfire.

A second factor in the torpedo fight is where the US small ships are. How far in the van the US destroyer are when the battle starts, and where they are in relation to the enemy. & the same for the Japanese. There are more than a few examples of the destroyer of one side or both being out of position when the brawl started, leaving torpedo attacks delayed or wasted.

A third factor is the actual hit rate. Under average conditions in the South Pacific; relatively smooth seas, night/day, haze, battle confusion the average hit rate was under 10%. Close range could increase this, long range reduced it. How the accuracy of the torpedos will be in the sea conditions of the north Pacific of 6 December I cant say.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
December in the north Pacific is not optimal for

You make a really good point with weather. It's one thing not normally taken account of (&, I'm embarassed to say, I don't normally, either:eek:).

December in the north Pacific is not optimal for carrier aviation, especially propellor driven and without radar and radios in the majority of (IJN) aircraft.

Best,
 
Yeah, but when the chips were warships and their crews and the stakes were national survival, that's insane...

"Scream and leap" is not strategy.

Interesting POD would be to have someone (Hirohito?) call Yamamoto's bluff and let him resign, and Nagano (not Nagumo) goes back to the Combined Fleet.

Best,

There's a poker strategy called the "Kill Phil" strategy. Its called so because at one point there were so many poker pros named Phil. The strategy is to be used by amateurs against pros in tournaments. Basically you either fold or go all in. The idea is the more hands you play the more opportunities for skillful play to take over. So the weaker player folds all hands except for a couple of the better ones and goes all in each time. Minimize skill/maximize luck against a superior opponent where attrition does you in, in the long-term. Sounds like Yamamoto at Pearl and Midway...
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Certainly, but they could have saved the fuel if

There's a poker strategy called the "Kill Phil" strategy. Its called so because at one point there were so many poker pros named Phil. The strategy is to be used by amateurs against pros in tournaments. Basically you either fold or go all in. The idea is the more hands you play the more opportunities for skillful play to take over. So the weaker player folds all hands except for a couple of the better ones and goes all in each time. Minimize skill/maximize luck against a superior opponent where attrition does you in, in the long-term. Sounds like Yamamoto at Pearl and Midway...

Certainly, but they could have saved the fuel if they'd simply lined the aircrew up against a wall and machine-gunned them...

Yamamoto's ability to delude himself is up there with Crassus.

Best,
 
What if (most of) the battleships of the USN Pacific Fleet are out on some sort of exercise/manoeuvres when, on the 6th of December, 1941 (east of dateline, time-zone) they encounter the IJN Carrier Fleet in international waters?
*****
Thoughts?

1) The Pacific Fleet only held maneuvers on weekdays. Holding maneuvers on a weekend required paying overtime rates to the net-tender crews. The Japanese knew this, which is why the attack was scheduled for Sunday morning.

2) The Pacific Battle Fleet held its maneuvers no more than 100 miles out, and south of Oahu, not off to the northwest. At dawn on 6 December, Kido Butai was 700 miles from Oahu (closing to about 450 miles by nightfall).

3) Air patrols out of Oahu were directed to the south and west, where the Battle Fleet exercise area was and in the direction of the nearest Japanese bases. If the Fleet had been directed to hold maneuvers 500 miles NW, it's almost certain that air patrols would comb the area first. (The USN was worried about lurking Japanese submarines.) Thus the US would spot the Japanese before they came near the Battle Fleet. In that event (IMO) Kimmel would order the Battle Fleet to withdraw to the SE. It's possible that Kimmel would direct Pye to attempt to ambush Kido Butai after dark; I doubt it.

Also, if US planes sighted Kido Butai, Kido Butai would probably know it. In which case there is no reason to maintain radio silence or refrain from scouting patrols.

So the scenario is just about impossible for a number of reasons.
 
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