WI: USN encounters IJN on 6th Dec. '41?

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TFSmith121

Banned
Yep...The Battle Force would have had

Battleships vs Carriers in bad flying weather?

Bye-bye Kido Butai...


Yep...The Battle Force would have had 16 16 inch rifles, and 44 14 inch, in the main batteries of the six battleships, as discussed above; the IJN CBs would have had 16 14 inch guns.

60 to 14, or 4 to 1 odds...and depending on time of day/night, relative locations, and a host of other factors, the largest obvious targets could very well be one or more of the IJN's carriers...which are fast, but not that fast, and loaded with several hundred very combustible aircraft.

Basically, it probably becomes a melee, with the US battleships forming a line, the cruisers and destroyers from both sides mixing it up in the middle, the Japanese battlecruisers "trying" to hold off the Americans battleships, and the IJN carriers - less any that get hit in the initial encounter, hauling out for points north at top speed.

If the wind is from the "wrong" quarter, the ability of the IJN to launch aircraft and/or withdraw from out of gunnery range is going to be hampered, to some degree, or even absent; likewise, if the USN and IJN start using smoke, who knows if anyone can hit much of anything? The Komandorskis would be the closest equivalent, and there were no carriers involved...

And that was in the daytime. If it is a night action, the IJN carriers have nothing to contribute beyond getting the h out of Dodge.

Given the set-up, there are so many potential deltas the end result could be a clean sweep for either combatant.

Best,
 
Actually no. The Pacific fleet and US Army units in the Pacific had been issued a order to consider any Japanese encountered as hostile and to attack on sight. I cant recall the exact date this order was issued, but it came shortly after negotiations collapsed in November. This order was similar to the 'attack on sight' order given to the USN for enforcing the Atlantic nuetrality zone against Axis warships. Hence the attacks on German submarines previous to the German DoW on the US in 1941.

Yeah, the idea being that having a surprise discovery of what compromises Japan's entire fleet carrier force that close to Oahu can be considered a legitimate Casus Belli. Its the equivalent of the USA discovering a major Soviet amphibious invasion force off the coast of Norfolk during the Cold War. ASB, I know. But then wouldn't the raid on Pearl Harbor have been considered ASB by the contemporaries of 1941?

And if the Japanese are floating really close to American waters, wouldn't that raise a flag of alarm in the American mind?

Yes, to the point of a wolf pack being caught at the mouth of the lion's den.

So in this scenario, the US will be the aggressor? Would it be only a show-of-force "border skirmish" or will US declare war on Japan?

The Japanese have ZERO excuse for having their main carrier fleet getting so close to America's main fleet base in the Pacific. What you describe would apply if the Kido Butai was found by a US submarine 100 nmiles off of Truk and the USN "decided to teach them a lesson".

Two possibilities here that could occur.


  1. Nagumo decides surprise has been lost and turns the attack force around. There is no day of infamy. [1] On the plus side the U.S. does not enter the war at this point, whether it would later is open for debate. [2] The Japanese move into Malaysia, Burma, Hong Kong, etc. goes ahead minus the attacks on the Philippines which are aborted in order to prevent the entry of the U.S. into the war. [3] This delays U.S. entry into World War II by several months. Given anti-war sentiment at home FDR would probably not declare war to save British interests (the anti-war faction claimed that Britain was willing to "fight to the last drop of American blood"). [4] Eventually it is likely German submarine attacks force FDR to finally request a declaration of war but the war doesn't receive anything like the support it does in OTL since we have no outrage from a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and no approx. 3,000 servicemen and civilians dead. Lack of U.S. support means the British have to endure several months more of a crippling submarine blockade and Russia likewise has no Second Front until later in the war. This will probably mean a prolonged World War II [5].
1] The war is already on.

2] Aborting the Pearl Raid doesn't stop the raid on the PI. And US entry into WWII means Total Mobilization, far better for Britain that the loss of what the US would expend in the Pacific.

3] That'll get the assassinations going in Tokyo. By the end of 1942 the PI will be invulerable to Japanese assault, by 1943 FDR can cut off the DEI/Malaya oil convoys at will, by 1944 the Two Ocean Navy will be complete and Japan will be helpless beyond a first few rounds of seeing its fleets destroyed.

4] Isolationist sentiments were waning over time, not growing. Even following your scenario, at best OLL will be flowing to both the USSR and the UK. And Japan can't go to war with the British without sparking a war with the US.

5] WWII is not Vietnam, much less the various wars in the Middle East.

1. Nagumo decides to attack the U.S. force rather then totally waste the moment. Since the U.S. force has no carrier support the attack by Nagumo is successful. Most of the U.S. force is sunk, this time with no chance of recovery of any of the ships lost, and possibly a much larger loss of life. As indicated earlier the planes at Pearl Harbor are not destroyed which means the U.S. still has an air strike force. It is possible they could be readied and launched if word got back to PH that an attack was under way. How successful they would be remains to be seen. In any case FDR gets a "day of infamy", just in a different way from OTL. How things go from here I leave to further discussion.
Geon

Since the Kido Butai was flying NO aerial reconnaisance (for fear the aircraft themselves would be sighted and blow strategic surprise) Nagumo has no better prospect of tactical surprise in this scenario than do the Americans, especially in a night engagement. IIRC, the Americans have some radar, while the Japanese have none.

Task Force 1 (the Battle Force) is not going to get wiped off the face of the sea without sending warnings to Pearl.

If the Americans are in sight of the Japanese Carriers

And the Americans have orders to treat them as hostile

The Carriers are toast......

If its Japanese spotter planes that locate the American Battleships they are toast....

No spotters in flight, as OTL

IMO, the most likely outcome.

He MUST continue at this point, and the Japanese had already calculated for the loss of a third of their force...

Unlikely, since the P.I. were a clear threat to SLOCs for the Southern Op, hence the need to attack the U.S. in the first place.:rolleyes:

Exactly. The whole basis of the Southern Strategy was built upon safe LOCs

<snip> IMO, the best outcome for Britain is the U.S. not entering the war at all. That way, all the supplies otherwise destined for U.S. forces are available for Brit/Commonwealth...:cool:

The UK needed the US in the war all out more, unless you're looking for a Warsaw Pact that extends to Portugal!:eek:

Given U.S. involvement cost Coastal Command dozens of precious VLR Liberators OTL, this scenario, by making them available, is better for Britain, not worse.

Having 15000:eek: Liberators built overall for the war effort is even better!:D


And many obsolete & obsolescent aircraft remain in U.S. service that were otherwise replaced by P-38s, so not an unvarnished good.:rolleyes:

Not likely, as you will have a number of pilots who will survive OTL, plus except for the P-40s these were VERY obsolescent fighters, which was not totally unknown OTL. Though I'll admit that the employment of the Brewster Buffalo at Midway suggests otherwise.:eek:

In case it's pertinent to the outcome, let's say that the admiral in charge of the U.S. Force encountering the IJN carrier fleet is vice-admiral William S. Pye, who as far as I can determine was the commander of the USN Pacific Fleet 'Battle Force' at the time. (Will update the opening post with this.)

Pye's brief command of CincPac prior to Nimitz's arrival does not inspire confidence. Then again, that was OTL post-Pearl.:(

NOT "good flying weather"... certainly not the farther north one is, even today, and more so in the 1940s.

Depending upon when this encounter takes place during the Japanese approach to Oahu (on Dec. 6 they were probably within ~400 miles nne of Kauai), and (huge IF) the US force is truly ready to shoot on sight (as the Atlantic Fleet was at the time of the Kearny and Reuben James incidents), the Japanese could suffer heavily ... carriers rarely did well in gunnery actions, after all. Just ask Glorious and Gambier Bay...

The only defense Nagumo had was speed, but does he turn tail and put his carriers into the wind before his lookouts can determine what may be nothing more than a Coast Guard cutter or fishing boat?:confused: Otherwise, his own escorts could easily deal with such a threat, and Pearl would still only have at best a minimal (and brief) radio warning.

IIRC, Nagumo's orders were to abort if the IJN task force was discovered east of the deadline up to a certain date; I do not recall if it was the date of the attack, or prior, however.

Best,

By the time of this scenario (within 400 nm?) he's committed.

Battleships vs Carriers in bad flying weather?

Bye-bye Kido Butai...

Especially if its before they can refuel. If the tankers are lost before then, Nagumoo's whole fleet is lost.

Yep...The Battle Force would have had 16 16 inch rifles, and 44 14 inch, in the main batteries of the six battleships, as discussed above; the IJN CBs would have had 16 14 inch guns.

Nagumo had all of 9 destroyers (3 covering the tankers), 1 light cruiser (Abukuma), 2 heavy cruisers (Tone & Chikuma), and 2 battlecruisers (Kirishima & Hiei) covering his carriers. ITTL he's up against (IIRC) at least four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 20+:confused: destroyers, plus the Battle Force (7 battleships-California, Oklahoma [6], Arizona, Nevada, Maryland, Tennessee, West Virginia).

IOW, :eek:

6] Pye's flagship:cool:

As said, Colorado is on the West Coast and Pennsylvania is in drydock

60 to 14, or 4 to 1 odds...and depending on time of day/night, relative locations, and a host of other factors, the largest obvious targets could very well be one or more of the IJN's carriers...which are fast, but not that fast, and loaded with several hundred very combustible aircraft.

Depending on your POV, it all depends on whether you:

go to the extremes of a night action in which the USN has spotted the enemy by radar, crossed the enemies' T, sent in destroyer attacks to disorganize the enemies' screen, and then pull a Surigao Strait,

OR

Have Nagumo spot the enemy in daylight, instantly determine who they are, turn into a favorable wind while the screening force sacrifices itself launching a deadly torpedo attack against Pye, who is confused and falls into indecision, then the Battle Force is disorganized as the Kido Butai's strike force has the time to escape, arm for flight, launch, and nail the USN's battleline, resulting in total loss on the high seas. Only the 7th US Air Force is spared, as a strike on Oahu itself is now superfluous.

Basically, it probably becomes a melee, with the US battleships forming a line, the cruisers and destroyers from both sides mixing it up in the middle, the Japanese battlecruisers "trying" to hold off the Americans battleships, and the IJN carriers - less any that get hit in the initial encounter, hauling out for points north at top speed.

Agreed. Though the Japanese carrier's high speed is very good, its not like they can instantly "go to warp" either. Events showed in the Mediterranean what could happen when lightly protected but very fast warships ran into tougher but slower enemy vessels. Methinks ITTL the Kaga and Akagi will have slightly a harder time of escaping than the newer ships.

If the wind is from the "wrong" quarter, the ability of the IJN to launch aircraft and/or withdraw from out of gunnery range is going to be hampered, to some degree, or even absent; likewise, if the USN and IJN start using smoke, who knows if anyone can hit much of anything? The Komandorskis would be the closest equivalent, and there were no carriers involved...

At the Komandorskis the Japanese outnumbered and outgunned the USN forces two to one, yet thanks to the Japanese commander's caution he never closed in and destroyed the American force. Which is why Hosogaya got canned out of the IJN by Yamamoto when he got back, while the American admiral and his crews were treated to a ticker-tape parade when they returned to Washington State!:D

So I guess it depends on who is the more agressive...:confused:

And that was in the daytime. If it is a night action, the IJN carriers have nothing to contribute beyond getting the hell out of Dodge.

In which case Pearl Harbor becomes a national humiliation of retreat for Japan, with their primary strike force doing a brief Hawaiian Excursion while the rest of the navy (and Army:mad:) do all the fighting. Who gets a trip to the Imperial Garden? Nagumo or Yamamoto?:eek:

Given the set-up, there are so many potential deltas the end result could be a clean sweep for either combatant.

Best,

Yep
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
One other thing to remember:

So I guess it depends on who is the more agressive...:confused:



In which case Pearl Harbor becomes a national humiliation of retreat for Japan, with their primary strike force doing a brief Hawaiian Excursion while the rest of the navy (and Army:mad:). Who gets a trip to the Imperial Garden? Nagumo or Yamamoto?:eek:



Yep

Nagumo - who was a destroyer/torpedo specialist, not an aviator - was (generally) known for his caution...

Pye was not the most aggressive commander during the Wake Relief operation, but as you say, that was after the Oahu raids...

Now, if Halsey has both fleet carriers and is OTC as commander, Air Battle Force?

It really speaks to just how far out of the edge of operational reality and risk assessment the IJN was in the autumn/winter of 1941. The entire operation was basically nuts, and its most senior advocate, Yamamoto, despite the hagiography, was a gambler of the worst stripe.

Calculated risk, it was not...

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yeah, but when the chips were warships and their crews and the stakes

Eh, he did well at poker.

Yeah, but when the chips were warships and their crews and the stakes were national survival, that's insane...

"Scream and leap" is not strategy.

Interesting POD would be to have someone (Hirohito?) call Yamamoto's bluff and let him resign, and Nagano (not Nagumo) goes back to the Combined Fleet.

Best,
 
Eh, he did well at poker.

Remember the classic film "Hotel Berlin"? Made IN WWII and set in Berlin as the war has finally come crashing down upon the Third Reich? The Great Actor Raymond Massey played a member (still surviving by the late winter/early spring of 1945, when the film was set in) of the Valkyrie Group. When asked about the plot and it's motives (considering that the members weren't exactly anti-war themselves), he famously retorted:

"When you find yourself losing at cards, you get up and leave the table and hope you do better the next time! Only naive fools and political upstarts keep playing and playing and playing until you've lost your chips, your shirt, your pants, and the country as well!":mad:

You can't get up and leave the table after the Battle of Britain, Barbarossa, and Pearl Harbor. A fact most of the Axis (except curiously, the Italians) never seemed to be able to get their heads around.:rolleyes:
 
To add to the confusion, I consulted 2 sources (Prange and Layton) on the actual conditions on 6 Dec 41.

By noon, refueling operations had been completed and the tankers and their escort had departed the Japanese fleet. While the sky was overcast, the wind had dropped and the sea was not particularly rough. Cmdr Fuschida and his men wore their flying togs, in preparation to scramble if any U.S. warship or plane appeared. At this point the Kido Butai was SE of Midway Island, 500-700 miles N of Oahu (depending on the source and when the fleet began their high speed approach). Air observers were posted and on alert, but there was no CAP.
 
Clarifying the meeting scenarios - or confusing them?

To add to the confusion, I consulted 2 sources (Prange and Layton) on the actual conditions on 6 Dec 41.

By noon, refueling operations had been completed and the tankers and their escort had departed the Japanese fleet. While the sky was overcast, the wind had dropped and the sea was not particularly rough. Cmdr Fuschida and his men wore their flying togs, in preparation to scramble if any U.S. warship or plane appeared. At this point the Kido Butai was SE of Midway Island, 500-700 miles N of Oahu (depending on the source and when the fleet began their high speed approach). Air observers were posted and on alert, but there was no CAP.
By air observers I assume you mean recce planes (float planes from the Cruisers or battleships) operating as spotters close to the fleet but able to spot ships OTH - say to 50-80 miles away?

If so, the US Battle Fleet won't be able to 'creep up' undetected during daytime. Of course, it should have spotter planes out too - is that USN doctrine at this time? Certainly it will if it has a carrier or two in attendance, as would where possible be RN doctrine even pre-war.

So the two fleets ought to observe each other outside gunfire range in daytime. Advantage Japan, if Nagumo decides he has to strike at the target of opportunity

At night? I don't think the USN had good radar or doctrine for night fighting at this point while the Japanese had practised it more than any other navy, including the RN - which had the lesson of Jutland to incentivise it. Up to early 1943 I think the IJN got the better of most night actions. I'd view the IJN as likely to see the US ships first. Given how greatly its battle line is outgunned however, in this case it would IMHO seek to evade contact and put enough distance between it and the US fleet to launch airstrikes after dawn.

Things would get messy if the US spotted the Japanese fleet first and decided to engage.

Be interesting to game these scenarios out with a modern version of "Fast Carriers". Or even the original.

Hmm,

:)
 
By air observers I assume you mean recce planes (float planes from the Cruisers or battleships) operating as spotters close to the fleet but able to spot ships OTH - say to 50-80 miles away?

NO! I mean sailors with sharp eyesight and maybe a pair of binoculars! I couldn't think of the proper term...lookouts. The Japanese fleet didn't launch any aircraft prior to the pre-dawn cruiser recce float planes on 7 Dec. So, 10-20 miles max, well within naval gunfire range, and given the larger number of U.S. BBs with spotters high in the masts, advantage goes to U.S.

Plus, California had CXAM radar installed in Sep 40 and West Virginia got the more advanced CXAM-1 in Oct 41, along with most of the Pearl Harbor based heavy cruisers.
 
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TFSmith121 said:
IIRC, Nagumo's orders were to abort if the IJN task force was discovered east of the deadline up to a certain date; I do not recall if it was the date of the attack, or prior, however.
You're right. Nagumo had orders to abort if discovered any time up to reaching the launch point, or until 7 Dec, can't recall which; IIRC, it was the date.
usertron2020 said:
The UK needed the US in the war all out more, unless you're looking for a Warsaw Pact that extends to Portugal!:eek:
We disagree here, based on how much the Brits really needed U.S. manpower, against how much U.S. material gets diverted from Britain to AFUS. IMO, the diversions are worse than the benefit of manpower. The change in convoy deliveries alone changes how the ETO comes out, & when the Brits go ashore. (No, I haven't looked at it in detail, but IMO, it's at best a wash against OTL.)
usertron2020 said:
Having 15000:eek: Liberators built overall for the war effort is even better!:D
No argument. Having every single one go to Britain beats extended wrangling over giving a few dozen to Coastal Command.:confused::mad:
usertron2020 said:
Not likely, as you will have a number of pilots who will survive OTL, plus except for the P-40s these were VERY obsolescent fighters, which was not totally unknown OTL. Though I'll admit that the employment of the Brewster Buffalo at Midway suggests otherwise.:eek:

True, & I'm not strongly wedded to my argument. (It was a bit flimsy...:eek:)
 
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So in this scenario, the US will be the aggressor? Would it be only a show-of-force "border skirmish" or will US declare war on Japan?

No. There is only possible explanation for a Japanese fleet close to (and heading toward) Hawaii, surprise attack.

Roosevelt would note both Japanese military history (China in 1931 and 1937, Russia 1904) as examples of Japanese aggression, including without bothering to declare war first, this combined with their choice of allies, ie the Nazis, would leave the intent of Japanese actions clear in the minds of everyone. If the American fleet is then destroyed after "bravely fighting to save Hawaii from a massive surprise attack" I really don't see the US reacting any differently, and quite possibly worse if more people die.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
This sort of meeting engagement is really the worst of

You're right. Nagumo had orders to abort if discovered any time up to reaching the launch point, or until 7 Dec, can't recall which; IIRC, it was the date.


This sort of meeting engagement is really the worst of all possible worlds for the IJN; to be found this far east means they are clearly the aggressor, but they are not in a position to launch a truly devastating attack - it is worth noting the IJN carrier-based torpedo and dive bombers, although effective enough against ships at anchor, did not do well against surface combatants at sea...

Best,
 
This sort of meeting engagement is really the worst of all possible worlds for the IJN; to be found this far east means they are clearly the aggressor, but they are not in a position to launch a truly devastating attack - it is worth noting the IJN carrier-based torpedo and dive bombers, although effective enough against ships at anchor, did not do well against surface combatants at sea...
You make a really good point with weather. It's one thing not normally taken account of (&, I'm embarassed to say, I don't normally, either:eek:).
 

CalBear

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Nagumo would have attacked, per his operational orders. From Post war interviews/investigation by the USSBB/Pacific


If discovered prior to "X"-minus-2-day, the Task Force was to return to Japan without executing the attack.

If discovered prior to "X"-1-day, the decision as to what action to take was the responsibility of the Task Force Commander.

If discovered on "X"-minus-1-day or the morning of "S"-day the Task Force was to continue with the attack.

If at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the negotiations with the United States had been successful the attack would have been cancelled.

If, at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the American Fleet attempted to intercept the Japanese Task Force, the Japanese planned to counterattack. If the American Fleet advanced into Japanese home waters in pursuit of the Task Force it was planned to commit the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet as a support force.

If, after arriving in Hawaiian waters, it was found that the American Fleet was at sea and not in Pearl Harbor, the Japanese planned to scout a 30-miles radius around Oahu and attack if contact was made; otherwise they were to withdraw.
 
Damm. Now I cant find it. There is a thread from this year discussing a chance encounter between a British BB & the KB early morning 7th Dec. some Brit BB or other, I cant recall which, had been making port calls on the North America west coast in November. it was scheduled for Oahu & then across the Pacific in December to Singapore, with port calls in the DEI & perhaps the Phillipines. the thread proposed this ship & pair of escorts head off for oahu a bit early and...
 
Damm. Now I cant find it. There is a thread from this year discussing a chance encounter between a British BB & the KB early morning 7th Dec. some Brit BB or other, I cant recall which, had been making port calls on the North America west coast in November. it was scheduled for Oahu & then across the Pacific in December to Singapore, with port calls in the DEI & perhaps the Phillipines. the thread proposed this ship & pair of escorts head off for oahu a bit early and...

The only British BB I can think of is HMS Warspite, which was undergoing repairs at Puget Sound Navy Yard.

http://www.battlestations.eu/index.php/en/our-encyclopedia/british-warships/228-hms-warspite

USS Colorado was also at Puget Sound, undergoing refit.

I don't think there could have been another British BB on the West Coast at that time.
 
Warspite - that was it. Another variation on this comes from some PH conspiricy theorists. The claim was a Soviet freighter transiting from US west coast ports to Vladivostock sighted the Kido Butai & sent a report home. Soviet maritime dept records showed the last freighter to make the route departed at the end of October & was past any possible intersect point when the KB left port.

Either of these non events are useful as hypotheticals on what Nagumos decision would be were a Soviet freighter to be encountered making radio transmissions, or a BB & escorts to appear out of the haze....
 

CalBear

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Something that is being missed in this discussion regarding an actual engagement. Assuming the seas are so bad that the Japanese can't launch aircraft they simply leave. They are a 28 knots force (actually, except for Kaga, they are a 32+ knot force) being engaged by a 20 knot force. If an engagement was to happen it would be at their discretion.


In addition, the Japanese have the same advantage they had at Savo, namely that they know the capabilities of the Type 93 Torpedo and the Americans don't. They are also better drilled at this point, having been expecting to fight from the moment they left port while the USN forces were polishing brass and holystoning the decks (and tipping a few ashore the previous evening).

Nagumo was also, despite his weaknesses as a carrier force commander, an exceptionally gifted surface warfare officer (he literally helped create IJN torpedo tactics while commandant of the Torpedo School and later as commandant of the Naval War College. He may have screwed the pooch at Midway, but in a surface engagement, with a faster surface fleet, even if it is outgunned, he would be a formidable opponent.

The Japanese can withdraw behind a screen of Long Lances under the command of the man who wrote the book on the subject.

That is not a very attractive possibility
 
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