WI USAF Fighter Mafia wins debate?

The history of the military reform caucus is deeply relevant to this debate.

Lind got Spinney’s briefing presented to Congressional members and staff in December 1980. Lind also gave the movement its name, “the Reformers,” which was used publicly by Hart in a Wall Street Journal column in January 1981. That summer, Hart organized the Congressional Military Reform Caucus and soon had 45 members. Among those most receptive to the message were Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Rep. Richard Cheney (R-Wyo.).

“The Reformers who focused on money saw the F-15 as too expensive at $20 million, seven times the cost of an F-4 and 20 times the cost of an F-5,” said Clarence R. Anderegg, a veteran fighter pilot and now historian of the Air Force, in Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam. “They further argued that the airplane was so big and easy to see that the pilot of a small F-5-sized fighter could easily get inside the F-15 pilot’s OODA loop and wreak havoc. Ironically, the very argument the Reformers used proved the case against them. The Eagle was big, but its radar and superb missiles not only gave the F-15 pilot the first chance to observe, orient, and decide, they also give him the first chance to act.”
 
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“... “They further argued that the airplane was so big and easy to see that the pilot of a small F-5-sized fighter could easily get inside the F-15 pilot’s OODA loop and wreak havoc. Ironically, the very argument the Reformers used proved the case against them. The Eagle was big, but its radar and superb missiles not only gave the F-15 pilot the first chance to observe, orient, and decide, they also give him the first chance to act.”

The same thing occurred during the surface naval battles in the S Pacific in 1942-43. When the USN used its search radar correctly, that is tied it into their command and control correctly with good tactics, they identified the IJN battle groups well ahead of what the Japanese could do with visual search. The key here is 'when used correctly'. In about half the night surface battles of 1942-43 the USN did not use command and control techniques, or tactics, that took best advantage of the radar surface search capability. I cant say how good the USAF or Allied air forces were in this regard circa 1980, or 1985. The brief air battles of Desert Storm suggest they were consistently good. But the Iraqi AF was not exactly a peer opponent, & lacked a serious electronic warfare capability. Neither do I know how capable the Warsaw Pact electronic warfare was in this regard, or if they even intended to degrade the air to air search and fire control of the NATO aircraft. In the mid 1980s I did sit through briefs from the USAF describing some of the techniques the North Korean AF might use to offset the US/ROK advantage in aircraft electronics.
 
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