WI: US with Pacific War only?

1. When the torpedo problem is solved.
2. When the submarine force is built, trained and capable.
3. When the amphibious assault forces are created.
4. When the strategic bomber force is created.
5. When the battle fleet is created, trained and capable.
6. When the central and southwest Pacific campaigns are conducted to completion.
7. When it all comes together to clamp down the blockade and strategic bombardments.

Four years to do all of this. Victory in late 1944 early 1945. It is not just % of industrial production, but time to create the tools and to mount the operations to come within range of the home islands.

Yes, that is the thing. It's hard to see how the U.S. could have conducted their massive build-up any faster then what happened in OTL. A more efficient use of the Two-Ocean Navy Act funding? Maybe a slight difference maybe not. The only real way to have completed the naval and military build-up earlier would have been to have started earlier. And that wasn't going to happen because there is no realistic way would the U.S. administration have begun spending that kind of money back in 1937 or 1938 in OTL.

@fester's excellent story "Keynes' Cruisers" touches on that aspect with a believable account of bit more and different funding made available for the USN in 1936 for winning votes for the 1936 election and the butterflies that result.

Also I have seen posted in this forum the statement that about 20% of the American war spending was used for the Pacific War. Is that an accurate statement? When one considers the vast majority of the USN's huge growth was used in the Pacific as well as significant numbers of U.S. Army and Army Air Force units. Does this also include the B-29 program? The Manhattan project?
 
Does this also include the B-29 program? The Manhattan project?

Those two together was about $5B USD

The US spent around $106B USD in munitions, regular bombs, bullets and shells

Naval Spending?
1939 $673,792,000
1940 $1,137,608,000
1941 $4,465,684,000
1942 $21,149,323,000
1943 $31,043,134,000
1944 $21,796,913,000
1945 $29,190,924,000

That's around $109B

Overall, the US spent around $350B USD from '39-45
 
Army was used in the Pacific, about 25%
amphibious landings wasn't a Marine only thing
I think the point is that you don't need an army of European size until you hit Japan proper.

Even then. By the time you get there US forces are Navy and AF focused with little practice at doing anything more than storming beaches. Would the army even be able to run a competent campaign on the Home Islands without the European learning curve? Would they be capable of of boots on the ground stuff or expect air power to get them out of trouble? Starve em or nuke em may be the only realistic response that that point.
 
Would the army even be able to run a competent campaign on the Home Islands without the European learning curve? Would they be capable of of boots on the ground stuff or expect air power to get them out of trouble?
Thanks to Dugout Doug's slogging thru New Guinea, the rough spots were identified and worked out, and while Doug's local Staff were a bunch of Republican sycophants and Yes Men, he also picked Eichelberger, Kenney, Kinkaid and Krueger to do their thing, and they were _solid_ picks.

And really, Air Support was far better organized with USN and USAAF in the Pacific than was ever achieved in the Med or over France.
 
Thanks to Dugout Doug's slogging thru New Guinea, the rough spots were identified and worked out, and while Doug's local Staff were a bunch of Republican sycophants and Yes Men, he also picked Eichelberger, Kenney, Kinkaid and Krueger to do their thing, and they were _solid_ picks.

And really, Air Support was far better organized with USN and USAAF in the Pacific than was ever achieved in the Med or over France.

Murphy, yes! Kenney and 5th Air Force could even teach the RAF a few tricks. Also agree that the Sutherland Crew should have been Leavenworthed and replaced with AWC graduates from the class of *43. Would have made the Philippines campaign a lot smoother and better organized. I would not have been too disappointed if MacArthur, himself, had been put on a plane and shipped to the Aleutians to take charge of AGF Alaska, either.
 
So, what if say, Hitler for whatever reason decides not to declare war on the US after PH?
And US now has a war with Japan as in OTL??

A Gallup poll taken the day after the US declared war on Japan showed 90% saying the US should have declared war on Germany also. There was widespread belief that Germany had directed Japan to attack the US, even that Germany had provided the strike aircraft and even that German pilots carried it out. Nearly all of the US leadership regarded Germany as the real menace.

Had Hitler refrained from declaring war, the US would have declared war on Germany itself within six months. The US would have redoubled Lend-Lease aid to Britain (also at war with Japan) and expanded USN protection for Allied shipping to Britain. The resulting battles with U-boats would provide a casus belli.

So the premise as stated is impossible. However...

Suppose Stalin chose to believe the warnings of German invasion? The entire Red Army would be on full alert, with all troops dug in, ammunition distributed, vehicles fueled, aircraft ready for takeoff. The Axis would still win the battle of the frontiers, inflicting heavy casualties - but the results would not be as wildly lopsided as OTL. Axis casualties would be much higher and Axis progress slower.

So... by December 1941, the Axis offensive would clearly have failed, and not by a seeming hair as in OTL. The Schwarz Kapelle leads an Army coup against Hitler - before 7 December. No German declaration of war on the US. Within a few months, post-Hitler Germany has played Churchill and Stalin against each other to get a negotiated peace (i.e. withdrawing from Western Europe and Poland etc, also from the East), leaving Italy and Romania hung out to dry. (The US won't like it, but as not even a belligerent in Europe, won't have much to say about it.) So as of say 1 March 1941 the US is at war with Japan and not going to war against Germany.

To minimize changes from OTL - Britain is fully occupied finishing off Italy and helping De Gaulle take charge of France, and a post-war election brings Labour to power, with a big-shakeup. So they send little additional stuff to the Far East; Stalin is taking over Romania, and recovering from the war, and Lend-Lease stops, so he decides to stay out of the East until Japan is broken.

So it is basically up to the US to fight Japan almost single-handed but with no distractions.

The US Navy does get some reinforcements to the Pacific - destroyers not engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic, and many patrol aircraft. The Army has a lot more aircraft and ground troops. But the massive carrier forces won't be available till late 1943. So the Allies may concentrate on island-hopping across the South Pacific, where land-based air can provide cover. A campaign along New Guinea into Indonesia in 1943 is possible with enough logistic support. (There's not much else for the US Army to do.)

Also, the US may intervene in the Burma theater. The logistics chain will be very long, but the US should be able to put a corps there in late 1942, enough for a serious counterattack. Then if the Burma Road is reopened, the US can deploy substantial forces to China as well. The Allies can run overland campaigns against Japan in China and in SE Asia. (Again, there's not much else for the US Army to do.)

So Japan is likely to be defeated much sooner on land, with major morale impacts on the leadership.

As to the Manhattan Project - it will continue, because Germany would remain a potential threat. (The Allies won't trust the neo-German regime very much.)
 
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What is with this idea of supplying a ground war in southern China through Burma?

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I'd sooner invade Paraguay through the Amazon rain forest than try to reach Kumming through Burma. Vietnam is another cakewalk by comparison.
 
What is with this idea of supplying a ground war in southern China through Burma?...
Well my thought was that it allows FDR to justify sailing the supply convoys (under strong USN escort with authorisation to shoot any "IJN" attempts to stop them) via the North Atlantic, then through the Med stopping at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria (at each point offloading any equipment from any damaged ship and giving it to the local (British) port officer for safekeeping by the time they get to Burma I wasn't expecting much to be still on-board and naturally unavoidable convoy sailing times and schedules would mean that any damaged ships (and a few "stragglers") would sail back to US in ballast rather than carry on at each stage. The USAAF would as well also be directed to cover the convoy routes requiring the construction of a string of bases in UK and North Africa.....
 
Simple FDR will order it shipped via the two best routes,
1- Via US East coast to Glasgow then onto Murmansk and along the TSR to Northern China...
2- Via US East coast to Gibraltar, Malta, Suez and on into Burma etc.....

I cant guarantee that everything will get to the end delivery destination of mainland China and inevitably the USN might get involved in defending the convoys from disguised Japanese forces trying to hide under false flags of the other Axis members....

So you are going to ship across the North Atlantic with all the Uboats that were trying to cut off Britain? I think you will be at war with Germany whether you like it or not, or admit it or not.
How are you going to get through the Mediterranean until you kick the Italians and Germans out of North Africa?
Do you think the Soviets will allow major shipments to the ROC through their territory?

Until you open up a coastal Chinese port there is no way you can support a major effort in China. The route through India and Burma (The 'Hump', Ledo and Burma roads) cannot handle the tonnage you would need to support a large American effort.
 
Well my thought was that it allows FDR to justify sailing the supply convoys (under strong USN escort with authorisation to shoot any "IJN" attempts to stop them) via the North Atlantic, then through the Med stopping at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria (at each point offloading any equipment from any damaged ship and giving it to the local (British) port officer for safekeeping by the time they get to Burma I wasn't expecting much to be still on-board and naturally unavoidable convoy sailing times and schedules would mean that any damaged ships (and a few "stragglers") would sail back to US in ballast rather than carry on at each stage. The USAAF would as well also be directed to cover the convoy routes requiring the construction of a string of bases in UK and North Africa.....

'Strong USN escort' Where is this escort coming from? It didn't exist until mid to late 43 at the earliest. That was why the Battle of the Atlantic was so tough. Through the Med? Are you just going to ask the Germans, Italians, and Vichy French nicely? And the moment you turn over any equipment to the British along the way the entire effort becomes a target for them no matter what you say about being neutral in their fight.
 
So you are going to ship across the North Atlantic with all the Uboats that were trying to cut off Britain? I think you will be at war with Germany whether you like it or not, or admit it or not.
How are you going to get through the Mediterranean until you kick the Italians and Germans out of North Africa?
Do you think the Soviets will allow major shipments to the ROC through their territory?

Until you open up a coastal Chinese port there is no way you can support a major effort in China. The route through India and Burma (The 'Hump', Ledo and Burma roads) cannot handle the tonnage you would need to support a large American effort.

'Strong USN escort' Where is this escort coming from? It didn't exist until mid to late 43 at the earliest. That was why the Battle of the Atlantic was so tough. Through the Med? Are you just going to ask the Germans, Italians, and Vichy French nicely? And the moment you turn over any equipment to the British along the way the entire effort becomes a target for them no matter what you say about being neutral in their fight.
I think you are potentially missing the point, "Remember the Maine! Germany first!
 
From my reading, the main issue is the huge supplies needed to feed the Americans who came into China. I'd say that American military personnel within China would be limited to a handful of actual ground troops, advisors and airmen.

Following the 36-division plan proposed by Stilwell (please send him somewhere else, he was nothing but detrimental) and improved further by Wedemeyer, the Chinese would require enough small arms, 75mm pack howitzers, radios and other equipment available to Western armies to fit 36 divisions, and build their army around that.

Without the Road, things will be a lot more difficult, unless you can get the Hump to work very effectively. But it could still be done.

Regarding the mixed opinions on Nationalist China here, Western historiography on China is complicated in that it changes every few years when more and more of the archives are open. The difficulty of obtaining sources and information means that perspectives tend to skew towards US views during the war, when the disillusionment had sent in.

My current reading is the Sino-centric perspective pioneered by Rana Mitter, Richard Bernstein, Jonathan Fenby and others, that the Chinese view of their war hasn't been paid much attention, and that the KMT, while undoubtedly horribly corrupt, could and did have several areas where they did well militarily.

This is just my two cents here: arguments often break out surrounding the Second Sino-Japanese War and I'm therefore cautious to actually discuss it openly. Ironic, as it's the area of modern history I'm primarily interested in.
 
From my reading, the main issue is the huge supplies needed to feed the Americans who came into China. I'd say that American military personnel within China would be limited to a handful of actual ground troops, advisors and airmen.

I would actually agree that the maximum logistic saturation point is about two corps equivalents of US troops.

Following the 36-division plan proposed by Stilwell (please send him somewhere else, he was nothing but detrimental) and improved further by Wedemeyer, the Chinese would require enough small arms, 75mm pack howitzers, radios and other equipment available to Western armies to fit 36 divisions, and build their army around that.
Vinegar Joe and the Peanut were mutually detrimental. I would, if I were a Chinese national, not have been too happy with Stilwell, because of his racism, but I would have been happy to see both Chiang and his gangster wife stood against a wall to pay for their crimes. They, together, set China back a generation. As an American I would not have been unhappy to see both have that "accident", either.

Without the Road, things will be a lot more difficult, unless you can get the Hump to work very effectively. But it could still be done.

How? It was 50x more efficient to have 100 kgs of supplies donkey ported along the Ledo road than it was to fly it over the world's tallest mountains. THAT means it was more efficient to do logistics the 19th century way than the 20th century way because of terrain and weather through Burma. When things are that screwed up, one better take a hard look at alternatives. That drive up from eastern Australia through New Gunea toward the Philippines and Formosa starts to make a lot of sense.

Regarding the mixed opinions on Nationalist China here, Western historiography on China is complicated in that it changes every few years when more and more of the archives are open. The difficulty of obtaining sources and information means that perspectives tend to skew towards US views during the war, when the disillusionment had sent in.

I don't want to get into a "Who lost China?" sidebar. First of all, China was not anyone's to gain or lose. As it turns out, China was in one of those common warlordism eras that seems to strike the nation about every 300 years, when internal dissension weakens the Chinese to the point where the "barbarians" (野蛮) (ye'man) to use the western word to describe the outsiders who come in to exploit the chaos, had free run over the prostrate country. In this respect, the Americans and Japanese from the Chinese point of view are both interlopers. The fascistic RoC KMT, insofar as they cooperated with the Americans, used the Americans to overthrow the Japanese and to also fight off a particular nasty set of rivals, the Maoists, an effort that once the disillusioned Americans cut their losses, would fail. The Americans, in country, especially Stillwell's crew, and Claire Chennault's bunch, and later Wedemeyer, were well aware that the Peanut was using them as patsies. But it was necessary for America's own geopolitical reasons to use the rotten tools at hand (Chiang Kai Shek) to win the Japanese-American War. Naturally and rightfully the Chinese, then and now, do not see it in the same light. Their viewpoint is that the American imperialists were using their country for the foreigners' own purposes. I do not at all disagree with this Chinese viewpoint.

My current reading is the Sino-centric perspective pioneered by Rana Mitter, Richard Bernstein, Jonathan Fenby and others, that the Chinese view of their war hasn't been paid much attention, and that the KMT, while undoubtedly horribly corrupt, could and did have several areas where they did well militarily.

One should read the history of the ROCAF air force. It was not so much Chennault's pilots teaching them the tricks of the trade as the other way around.

This is just my two cents here: arguments often break out surrounding the Second Sino-Japanese War and I'm therefore cautious to actually discuss it openly. Ironic, as it's the area of modern history I'm primarily interested in.

Same here.
 
^ As always, there are some viewpoints where I disagree, but that is historiography for you. Your opinions on the subject are welcomed, as with others. Thanks for the note on the ROCAF - it's certainly one of the areas where the Nationalists actually did well in, although it was too little to make a difference.

I'll definitely agree that the stale debate over "Who lost China?" is frankly tiresome, a cliche in American historiography on Nationalist China, and there are far better questions to be asked regarding the war and China.

Seeing how bringing up China has led to bitterness again, I suggest we discuss how the island-hopping would go instead, with far more resources and manpower available.

Could the US extend its might to help retake the Dutch East Indies and Malaya? How would the Australians be handled this time round? Hopefully Doug's other worst moment doesn't kick in, bossing Blamey around and getting good men killed.

There's also the question of if Iwo Jima could have gone ideally as planned with the USN storming across the Pacific, namely ten days of shelling rather than three, although there would still be awful casualties for both Japan and America.
 
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Could the US extend its might to help retake the Dutch East Indies and Malaya?

I would prefer to strike as far north across the Japanese sea lines of communication as possible and to use blockade and bombardment. In this respect, the logic of oceanic geography and weather patterns dictate where as an American I fight.

Japanese-American-War-A.png
 
There's also the big question of if Peilulu is going to be actually used for something this time, assuming that they'll still decide to invade it.
 
There's also the question of if Iwo Jima could have gone ideally as planned with the USN storming across the Pacific, namely ten days of shelling rather than three, although there would still be awful casualties for both Japan and America.

Ten days of bombardment or 100, it would still take Marines digging the Japanese out of those caves and bunkers. The only cure for that kind of defense barring modern thermobarics or an atomic bomb was flame throwers and grenades and point blank cannon fire from tanks.

How would the Australians be handled this time round? Hopefully Doug's other worst moment doesn't kick in, bossing Blamey around and getting good men killed.

Let us not let Blamey off the hook entirely. His handling of his sorely harassed subordinates during the Kokoda campaign shows he could be less than sterling as a commander, too.

There's also the big question of if Peilulu is going to be actually used for something this time, assuming that they'll still decide to invade it.

That was not necessary if the Luzon blunder is going to be engendered. Personally I would have circle looped out of the Marianas and gone for Luzon straight in. The only reason for Leyte in the first place was because of a speeded up time table that bypassed Mindanao. If one is going to bypass Mindanao, one might as well gone for the head of the target list, which is Luzon. The central plain on northern Luzon is an ideal place to plonk airfields aside from the typhoons, volcanoes and earthquakes, all of which the Americans had to face anyway. It was not the Japanese who were the big problem at that point of the war, you know? It was the weather and the screwy geography and the usual natural disasters.
 
One "US with Pacific War only?" scenario that hasn't been mentioned yet is one where Germany's "sickle cut" invasion of France fails for one reason or another, resulting in Germany getting defeated by Britain and France by 1941-1942.

As Japan simply could not launch any major naval operation until the carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku were completed by late September 1941, any Japanese invasion would not take place until very late in 1941 at the earliest, during which time Germany would likely already be on the ropes, hence the US would not have to bother itself with them.

As it is, regardless whether Japan attacks either only the Anglo-French colonies in SE Asia, the US possessions in the Pacific, or both as in OTL, the result is the US getting into a war with Japan, along with Britain and France. Only now with Germany on the verge of defeat, the Allies - including France - can afford to devote the majority of their naval assets against them.
 
The only cure for that kind of defense barring modern thermobarics or an atomic bomb was flame throwers and grenades and point blank cannon fire from tanks.

Or other chemicals, Sulphur Mustard, Nitrogen Mustard, Lewisite and Phosgene.
US had a lot of 4.2" and 105mm shells that were dumped after the War
 
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