An alerted Pearl may suffer fewer casualties, as the IJN first wave is heavily outnumbered and the second wave would abort if the first encountered heavy resistance.
However, the Far East Air Force had radar contact with the Japanese airstrikes on Manila on Dec 8th OTL, and still (through inexperience at GCI) failed to get three pursuit squadrons that were available to manage to intercept the Japanese bomber raids that destroyed much of the FEAF on the ground.
A cautious Kimmel would send the fleet to the southwest, where they will not be spotted at all, and let the USAAF defend empty docks.
A Kimmel who feels confident and aggressive will try for a night action before dawn, where the Standards may be able to cripple Hiei and Kirishima before they can outrun the slow USN capital ships, after which the USN cruiser element outguns the rest of the IJN force and is fast enough to run down the carriers.
The risk of such a strategy is that if the Pacific Fleet fails to find Kido Butai in the darkness, come dawn they will be beyond the range of Hawaiian land-based fighter cover. While the air strikes will find maneuvering ships a more difficult target, also US casualties from any sinkings will be higher, any losses will not be made good as most of the BBs were OTL.
If there is a night battle, IJN training and torpedoes are likely to cause significant losses to the USN. Having said that, if it results in Kido Butai being sunk in a surface engagement, the tenor of the Pacific War will be very different. Pye's reinforcement of Wake can proceed; Japanese attacks on Rabaul, Palau, and Ambon may be postponed. Darwin will not be raided with the light CV strength remaining to the IJN.
