WI: US sits Midway out

Just an important detail that i missed last night. The premise is that the americans decline to fight at Midway, but the japanese invasion attempt still fails. Well, there is a serious contradiction here in that if the americans decline to fight, or just don't know enough to be on time, why would they reinforce Midway in the first place? Without reinforcements the Midway garrison is weaker, less troops, less guns, less planes, no tanks. If they reinforce it as OTL but decline to send the CVs, that again does not make sense as they will send their troops to certain death (they would have no idea whether the garrison will be capable or not to repulse the japanese assault, especially without any support from USN)

Good points. If the US doesn't learn of the Midway offensive, there is no reason to reinforce Midway to historical levels. We then need to look at what would have been normal reinforcements for Midway versus those sent to prepare for the expected invasion.

If the US learns of the offensive, but decline to commit the fleet, how much will Midway be reinforced? It does make sense to me that even if the US doesn't want to risk a naval battle at (what they think is) bad odds, reinforcing the garrison still happens.
 
Without the Midway carrier battle, the IJN's carriers also have the chance to rest, refit, rebuild air groups, and absorb the lessons of the last 6 months.

I'm wondering about the lessons that the USN got from Midway that they might not learn in this scenario.

The next carrier battle is probably in the South Pacific. At its biggest, that could be 8 IJN fleet carriers versus 5 USN fleet carriers, with a handful of smaller carriers running around. It would be fun to game out.
 
Would this mean that the odds that the USS Robin happens is slim? with the butterfly effects that happen along with it.
 
If that is halted then MacAurthur was still argue for the recapture of Rabaul & his S Pac campaign back to the Phillipines.

Wouldn't that end in disaster for the Americans at such an early stage?!

OTL it took months to build up to the point that the smallest early stages of the CARTWHEEL operations could be started. Mac was always in a hurry, but the reality of the 90 day cargo ship voyage to service the S Pac & lack of storage beyond Australia or Wellington meant the naval question would be resolved on way or another before MacAurthurs grand return gets underway. Other issues such as the two marine Divisions & the Americal Div being crippled from tropical disease by January, as well as the 14th Corps staff.

If Marshall buys off on at least the concept of neutralizing Rabaul & securing New Guinea to Lae it wall all be contingent on being able to contest the sea in that region.
 
Trade can continue with Australia, the ships just have to go the longer route down the Atlantic and through the Indian ocean

Or bend their route further east in the Pacific. When you measure out the distances from Port Morseby, Fiji, Samoa, ect... the idea that the Japanese could effectively interdict the possible cargo route looks very impractical.
 
Without the Midway carrier battle, the IJN's carriers also have the chance to rest, refit, rebuild air groups, and absorb the lessons of the last 6 months.

...

The pilot training program of 1942 was not capable of rebuilding the carrier groups in that short of time. That would improve, but nothing remotely like the replacement & growth in the USN aircrew ranks. Since only one carrier had suffered severe damage before June its not likely the critical damage control weaknesses would be remedied. Some of the other problems require Nagumos replacement & the accompanying staff shakeup. On the plus side the massive consumption of fuel reserves of the Midway Op would not occur, so there would be enough in place to encourage some other larges scale fuel hogging op.
 
Would this mean that the odds that the USS Robin happens is slim? with the butterfly effects that happen along with it.

If the IJN KB carrier are not sunk then we still have a situation where the IJN has more carriers until the latter half of 43 - so there is still a window of opportunity where Victorious can do her thing in the Pacific as she would still help balance the odds.

However Britain only had so many carriers at the time and the US has more so there might be less pressure to get her unless Coral sea and Guadalcanal go south.

Whats interesting is that Saratoga and Victorius where the only 2 carriers operational for about 6 months while the Big E was being repaired and waiting for the first 4 Essex class and first 4 Independence CVL - during this time Victorious sent her Avenger Squadron over to Sara and Sara sent all but a handful of her fighters to Victorius

So Saratoga acted as a Strike carrier and Victorious acted as a Fighter Carrier - both ships leveraging what they were good at.

Both fleets learned from one another with the RN using US procedure for pretty much everything and not going back after returning to UK control - the most important learning for the RN IMO was that in fleet maneuvering the Aircraft carrier 'can do no wrong' and the onus is totally on the other ships in the fleet to conform to the carrier and if necessary get the Fuc£ out of her way - rather than rely on a highly disciplined set of signals.
 
If the IJN KB carrier are not sunk then we still have a situation where the IJN has more carriers until the latter half of 43 - so there is still a window of opportunity where Victorious can do her thing in the Pacific as she would still help balance the odds.

However Britain only had so many carriers at the time and the US has more so there might be less pressure to get her unless Coral sea and Guadalcanal go south.

Whats interesting is that Saratoga and Victorius where the only 2 carriers operational for about 6 months while the Big E was being repaired and waiting for the first 4 Essex class and first 4 Independence CVL - during this time Victorious sent her Avenger Squadron over to Sara and Sara sent all but a handful of her fighters to Victorius

So Saratoga acted as a Strike carrier and Victorious acted as a Fighter Carrier - both ships leveraging what they were good at.

Both fleets learned from one another with the RN using US procedure for pretty much everything and not going back after returning to UK control - the most important learning for the RN IMO was that in fleet maneuvering the Aircraft carrier 'can do no wrong' and the onus is totally on the other ships in the fleet to conform to the carrier and if necessary get the Fuc£ out of her way - rather than rely on a highly disciplined set of signals.


Right that's the stuff under the Butterfly effect. Also interesting was the Japanese never went full out vs them when the odds was heavy in there favor.
 
... Also interesting was the Japanese never went full out vs them when the odds was heavy in there favor.

A lot of historians of the Pacific war have commented on this. My take is the Japanese leaders were divided and confused about the strategic situation and operational possibilities. One example is their reaction/s to the CARTWHEEL & ELKIN operations in the S Pacific. The tended up with a their southern base isolated, despite assorted advantages. When the US failed to capitulate in 1942 Japans leaders seem to have lost their grip. The strategy was to build a solid defense with strong reserves to crush Allied counter offensives. But, they failed to act decisively against the tentative US ops in the S Pac in early 43 or later in the summer. When Op GALVANIC was executed in November the counter attack portion of the strategy failed in most aspects.
 
The Japanese assaulting Midway and failing miserably, with no carrier battle is interesting.

I would imagine that a) the US would keep on reinforcing Midway, more and better radar, more planes, more fuel, more ammo, more revetments.

Then the Japanese would (surely) try again, and with Midway able to act even more as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, the OTL results (or better for us) are likely. So, the Japanese have wasted even more resources and even more time, and still have nothing to show for it.

This could be a very interesting line to explore.
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OTL, the US was only just starting to ramp up aircraft, etc., production when the Japanese attacked Pearl, and a failed Japanese attempt would allow LOTS more US fighters and dive bombers. For instance.
 
The Japanese assaulting Midway and failing miserably, with no carrier battle is interesting.

I would imagine that a) the US would keep on reinforcing Midway, more and better radar, more planes, more fuel, more ammo, more revetments.

Then the Japanese would (surely) try again, and with Midway able to act even more as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, the OTL results (or better for us) are likely. So, the Japanese have wasted even more resources and even more time, and still have nothing to show for it.

This could be a very interesting line to explore.
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OTL, the US was only just starting to ramp up aircraft, etc., production when the Japanese attacked Pearl, and a failed Japanese attempt would allow LOTS more US fighters and dive bombers. For instance.

I don't think a repeat Battle of Midway is likely to happen for several reasons.

First, and most importantly, Midway was not too important over the long run for both sides. It is a wonderful outer sentry for Pearl Harbor and a great intermediate sub base in 1943-1945 but it is not critical. A new set of Marine squadrons to replace the destroyed units, heavier coastal artillery, sure, but those are fairly low cost assets. If the US was not going to commit the fleet in June 1942 to defend the island, why would they do so in the future?

More importantly, the Japanese concept of operations for Midway was to use it as an excuse to draw out and destroy the major mobile elements of the US Pacific Fleet. The island itself was of minimal value even if they managed to take it. In this OP, they did not take the island. Instead they burnt an incredible proportion of their fuel reserves for a strategic failure of a mission. Why would they repeat?

The KB would either be heading to support operations to cut off the Hawaii-New Zealand-Australia supply line or staying in the Central Pacific to counter-attack US carrier raids.

By mid September 1942, PACFlt has 5 fleet carriers (Enterprise, Yorktown, Saratoga, Hornet, Wasp in order of effectiveness) with a promise of more coming. KB has 6 carriers back on strength. Now we can expect a battle of Samoa or a Battle of Fiji as a substitute decisive carrier battle instead of OTL Midway or the OTL dick-grinder near Guadacanal.
 
Just an important detail that i missed last night. The premise is that the americans decline to fight at Midway, but the japanese invasion attempt still fails. Well, there is a serious contradiction here in that if the americans decline to fight, or just don't know enough to be on time, why would they reinforce Midway in the first place? Without reinforcements the Midway garrison is weaker, less troops, less guns, less planes, no tanks. If they reinforce it as OTL but decline to send the CVs, that again does not make sense as they will send their troops to certain death (they would have no idea whether the garrison will be capable or not to repulse the japanese assault, especially without any support from USN)
Maybe the Japanese hit midway a week later but get their submarine tripwires in place rather than being too late. A submarine attack is attempted on the carriers and gets a hit on a carrier resulting in bringing the fleet to midway being called off. Once returned to Pearl it is discovered that the damage is easily fixed remaining that America have their complement of carriers restored within a couple of months.

Otherwise you are right if Midway doesn't get reinforced it falls and if it does get reinforced there will be a fleet to support it.
 
Maybe the Japanese hit midway a week later but get their submarine tripwires in place rather than being too late. A submarine attack is attempted on the carriers and gets a hit on a carrier resulting in bringing the fleet to midway being called off. Once returned to Pearl it is discovered that the damage is easily fixed remaining that America have their complement of carriers restored within a couple of months.

...

A week later the Saratoga will be present with a full air wing. So, still three carriers. Tho the Japanese would have a better idea of where they might be if the sub gets a radio message off.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Good points. If the US doesn't learn of the Midway offensive, there is no reason to reinforce Midway to historical levels. We then need to look at what would have been normal reinforcements for Midway versus those sent to prepare for the expected invasion.

If the US learns of the offensive, but decline to commit the fleet, how much will Midway be reinforced? It does make sense to me that even if the US doesn't want to risk a naval battle at (what they think is) bad odds, reinforcing the garrison still happens.

Yes we reinforce the island with land forces if we don't send the fleet. The defense might hold. Also, as the Japanese fleet closes on Midway, you have a target rich environment for the American subs. Maybe you get a carrier or BB. Maybe you can pick off a few cruisers supporting the landings. Or maybe you just focus on nice, juicy ships full of men and materials. Japan can ill afford to lose any of these.

I would also like to point out that when we authorized Guadalcanal, it was fully understood that losing an entire Marine Division was possible.
 
If the Japanese actually take the islands it is another White Elephant conquest that the Japanese couldn't afford. Assuming the US doesn't simply bypass it and leave it to rot , it uses it as a honey trap for the Japanese. Midway Island is coral atoll big enough to house a small airbase and nothing more and is in range of no islands the US needs to defend. Since the Japanese considered withdrawal a humiliating defeat they only very rarely did so. Midway turns into a mini-Guadalcanal where the Japanese get their transports attrited away, largely by subs. US torpedoes were pretty bad but that is somewhat exaggerated here, they did work once in a while. With enough "fish" in the water, transports will go down.
 
Either the codes are not broken in time or FDR simply decides that committing the carriers at that stage is too risky, and the US Fleet is not east of Midway when Yamamoto arrives.

Frustrated at the lack of US carriers, the Japanese launch their assault against the island, which fails. They recover their landing force, supplement it with regular sailors, do a little shore bombardment with their cruisers, then try again and once again fail.

At this point, they're forced to go home, and have just burned through a whole lot of precious fuel for nothing.

What happens next, in the short term? Guadalcanal on steroids ?

Question on a point of detail. What-if anything-did President Roosevelt know about the upcoming battle of Midway? Was he briefed on that?
 
Yes, he was, but he was very far from a micromanager. His style was to make only critical stratigic decisions & let his chiefs earn their pay.
 
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