deathscompanion1
Banned
Just a thought but what if when moving the Pacific Fleet closer to Japan to show he meant business FDR moved it to the Philippines instead?
WI: US Pacific Fleet was based in the Phillipines.
- Thread starter deathscompanion1
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Does the Philippines have the support facilities (dry-docks, ammunition storage, fuel storage or supply, etc, etc) at that time to host the main Pacific Fleet?
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was never going to happen - for many reasons.
1. The PI were always considered too vulnerable, too close to Japan and too far from the USA.
2. The PI simply did not have the infrastructure to support the US fleet. Remember the fleet was only moved to PH not too much before 1941, before then it had been in San Diego and there were some in the navy who were not happy with it being moved to Pearl as it was.
3. Diplomatically, moving the fleet to Pearl from SD was a "signal" to Japan, moving it to the PI would have been very provocative, which was a signal the USA did not want to send, and also would have not been supported by public/Congress which wanted to avoid conflict.
1. The PI were always considered too vulnerable, too close to Japan and too far from the USA.
2. The PI simply did not have the infrastructure to support the US fleet. Remember the fleet was only moved to PH not too much before 1941, before then it had been in San Diego and there were some in the navy who were not happy with it being moved to Pearl as it was.
3. Diplomatically, moving the fleet to Pearl from SD was a "signal" to Japan, moving it to the PI would have been very provocative, which was a signal the USA did not want to send, and also would have not been supported by public/Congress which wanted to avoid conflict.
The USN did develop a submarine base on Manilia bay, and the Asiatic fleet was withdrawn to that same base when the US withdrew its military from China in mid 1941. The destruction of the Army Air Force defense of Luzon made the naval base useless. The torpedo magazine was successfully attacked reducing the effectiveness of the submarine squadron. The docks became vulnerable to repeated Japanese air attack, and the sucessfull Japanese Army advance from their landing sites on Luzon ended any possibility of long term use of the naval base.
The reduced Asiatic squadron rebased to Java & spent the next two months escorting cargo ships into the Dutch East Indies. In March the threat of Japanese air attacks & a sucessfull landing on Java caused the remaining US war ships to depart.
The reduced Asiatic squadron rebased to Java & spent the next two months escorting cargo ships into the Dutch East Indies. In March the threat of Japanese air attacks & a sucessfull landing on Java caused the remaining US war ships to depart.
Driftless
Donor
Not as a primary base, but were there other locations, in that time frame that could have been used or developed for use with submarines or other smaller craft? Somewhere in the Visayas or Mindanao?
*edit* The Philippines covers a very large area - 300,000 sq. km - 1850 km North to South & 1062 km East to West. That's big....
*edit* The Philippines covers a very large area - 300,000 sq. km - 1850 km North to South & 1062 km East to West. That's big....
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Driftless said:
Have you considered Tawi Tawi? IIRC, it was suggested after the evac from Manila.
As for moving the Fleet there, no, it's both impractical & diplomatically risky. Not to mention likely to lead to a massacre worse than P.H.
It would mean Kimmel & Short don't get fired, & MacArthur does...
All true. To address problems regarding vulnerability and infrastructure at Manila, the British offered in the 1939-40 to let the US base a large forward detachment of the Pacific fleet at Singapore. This offer was never seriously considered, and given what we know now about the supposed invulnerability of Singapore, that is a good thing.
Driftless
Donor
Whatever US ships that might have been at Singapore, at least survive Dec 7; but would be a long way from home. Maybe they would have gone on to fight with Force Z or ABDA?
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Exactly.
It's virtually ASB to have this happen, barring some very, very remarkable antecedent developments.
As it was, moving to Oahu resulted in one CINCPAC departure. You'd have a full-on admirals revolt if you move the cream of the U.S. Navy all the way out to the Philippines.
My own guess would be ABDA and that they would eventually redeploy to Australia. Of course, with forward deployment of a significant segment of the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese may not even have struck at Pearl Harbor ...rather a sudden surprise strike at Singapore (a bit trickier to keep it a surprise, though) considering how travelled the sea lanes were in the South China Sea.
'Sneaking up' on Singapore a different proposition
(And as a side note, I assume that in any scenario which saw a long-term USN deployment to Singapore, the USN would also move a significant number of their planes there to protect said ships...)
This. Trying to get the carrier fleet into position for a 'surprise attack' on a US fleet at Singapore would have likely been much trickier than the approach to Pearl Harbour.
(And as a side note, I assume that in any scenario which saw a long-term USN deployment to Singapore, the USN would also move a significant number of their planes there to protect said ships...)
All of this does create an interestingly different Pacific War: one that does not begin with a direct attack on US territory; one in which the Allies have a much more robust presence in the theatre; one in which US and British collaboration is possibly stronger, with Britain playing a more important role than in OTL - especially if Force Z survives; and one where the US may not be galvanized to quite the extent that the attack on Hawaii provided. Would Japan feel the need to deploy more of its own fleet (ie: more battleships) to the Indonesian and Solomon campaigns? Could this have led to a decisive surface naval clash much earlier...and if so, regardless of who won, how might that affect later strategies?
RodentRevolution
Banned
Feel that rumbling? Don't worry it is not an earthquake it is Alfred Thayer Mahan digging his way up from the grave to come hug you.
IIRC Singapore had a functional radar/fighter direction system, unlike Oahu & Luzon which had the equipment but not the training. A lot less likely the Japanese would suprise anyone there. Plus the Commonwealth were patroling the rather obvious and few approach routes. They spotted the Japanese invasion fleet that departed Indo China on the 6th December. Odds are the Japanese carrier fleet aiming for Singapore would be observed as it crossed the South China Sea to Maylasian waters.
Japan had some severe limits on deployment of its capitol ships, from fuel consumption. Committing to a large scale sortie runs down the fuel at the main bases like Truk. The second most important effect of the Midway battle after the loss of the aircraft carriers were the number of empty storage tanks at assorted IJN home bases. That hampered the subsequent operations in the Solomons from August through November. The six months fuel limit on the IJN was very real & the higher the operational tempo the further that is reduced.
Driftless
Donor
The US Battleships (a least the ones at Pearl) were considerably slower than either the POW or the Repulse. Would that speed difference have made a difference on how those forces might have been used? There were also a number of US heavy cruisers deployed on several operations in the Pacific in early December. Would some of them been siphoned off as part of the Singapore force, or would the cruisers still most likely stuck with the carriers?
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This isn't ASB, but the POD would have to be much, much earlier.
After conquering the Philippines and establishing the American Empire, the US Navy clashed with the Army as the Navy wanted its primary offshore Pacific base to be developed at Subic Bay. The Army argued that it could not defend a base located there against land attack, and so it argued that the Navy should center its Philippine base at Cavite. Ultimately, this argument won Presidential and Congressional support, so the Navy decided to locate only secondary units in the Philippines (at Cavite) and chose instead Pearl Harbor for its primary offshore Pacific base.
Source - Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps
After conquering the Philippines and establishing the American Empire, the US Navy clashed with the Army as the Navy wanted its primary offshore Pacific base to be developed at Subic Bay. The Army argued that it could not defend a base located there against land attack, and so it argued that the Navy should center its Philippine base at Cavite. Ultimately, this argument won Presidential and Congressional support, so the Navy decided to locate only secondary units in the Philippines (at Cavite) and chose instead Pearl Harbor for its primary offshore Pacific base.
Source - Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps
Prince of Wales and Repulse probably become the fast squadron of the joint battleline.
I think the bigger questions (for the overall scenario) would be of who is in command of what, and how well the two fleets can work together.