WI: US Navy won over US Army on Operation Downfall

Johnrankins said:
either the bomb is dropped or a full scale invasion would be necessary.
That's been the argument postwar, & I don't believe it. Japan wasn't just on the brink of defeat, she was on the brink of an abyss. U.S. aircraft were well capable of cutting off movement of fuel & food supplies between areas of Japan, by knocking out a few key bridges & tunnels (16 in all, IIRC), or so says the USSBS summary I've seen.

And how long would it take for the B-29s to burn every Japanese city of any consequence to cinders, Bomb or no Bomb?

In short, Japan was on the edge of "starving in the dark", as winter came. How far was she from revolution? How long before even Hirohito realized he'd lost & needed to call a halt before his country, his people, saw irrevocable ruin?

The bigger question on the Bomb is the Cold War: if it isn't used, does this lead Stalin to think he can play cowboy & have the U.S. lack the nerve to use it on SU?:eek:
 
Japan's leadership, military and civilian, was in July and early August attempting to use the Soviet Union to negotiate a favorable peace. When the Sovirt Union entered the war any hope of a negotiated peace was crushed. The military's goal wasn't to commit national suicide; what it wanted was to convince the US that any invasion of the Home Islands would be so bloody that it would be better to negotiate. But by early August it was clear that;

1. The US could destroy Japan and starve it's cities without a direct invasion

2. No one was willing to negotiate with it.

3. The Red Army was on the verge of invading the Home Islands.

Under these circumstances Japan would certainly surrender.
 
After August storm, wouldn't the possibility of the USSR being the one to move into Japanese occupied real estate be a factor? Major land operations to liberate China and Korea would probably involve a major Soviet effort, with post war consequences.
 
That's interesting information from the US's viewpoint, thanks. But what were the Japanese thinking at the time?

Butows 'Japans Decision to Surrender' is one good source for that. I expect there are others to recommend. Butow draws from the minutes of the Cabinet meetings & assorted other documents left by the assorted ministers. Even after the news about the catastrophic rice harvest, two atomic bombs and the suprise of the Soviet DoW half the Cabinet still insisted with fighting on to save the empire. To understand the atmosphere in those cabinet meetings Prime Minister Suzuki still carried a bullet in his chest from a 1920s assasination attempt. Possibly ordered by one of the other ministers in the cabinet. Politics in Japan of that era was a full contact sport and assasination was not uncommon. Indeed had the coup attempted a few days later suceeded Suzuki & the other ministers favoring surrender would have been killed.

That should provide a hint of what the Japanese were thinking.
 
Really, this thread is more dedicated to the effects of such a course.

In short, while the Army advocated a straight-up invasion of the Home Islands, the Navy wished to continue their blockade and bombardment instead, while taking over parts of China (Shanghai is mentioned) and Korea to serve as additional basing grounds for the Air Force.

For the sake of further expansion of the discussion, I would like to also propose it include a successful version of the Kyujo Coup D'etat, with War Minister Anami deciding to support Hatanaka rather than remain on the sidelines, and without the General's uniformly agreeing to carry out the Emperor's will.

While it's true that the hardliners were not willing to surrender OTL, part of that was their faith in one last battle. They imagined that if the U.S. invaded Japan, then by fanatical resistance and banzai charges and kamikaze attacks there would be so many U.S. casualties that the U.S. would be shocked into negotiating a settlement that would leave them in power (which is really all they were holding out for, at that point).

If the U.S. very deliberately refuses to invade, and instead leaves Japan to collapse, while eliminating its remaining overseas holdings - then that plan is not going to work.

Furthermore, the USSR is going to declare war on Japan by the end of August, and smash the Kwantung Army. And the hardliners can't argue that Stalin is going to be freaked out by casualties.

All this assumes that the U.S. doesn't drop the Bomb, which ends the war long before the Army/Navy dispute affects anything.

Because that's a key factor - when does this change come into effect?
 
In short, Japan was on the edge of "starving in the dark", as winter came. How far was she from revolution?

This is key. IIRC, there were already incidents of civilian looting of military supplies in early August.

Too much is made of the idea that the entire populace was made up of brainwashed autamatons willing to die to the last man for the glory of the emperor. It's racist and simply untrue.

A "proper" revolution was unlikely, but a collapse of the military government was already starting.
 
Unfortunately, there are strong political forces at play since August 1945 to push the "they were about to surrender anyway" argument to the hilt. I don't want to de-rail this thread with all that, so I won't. But what those forces were and are is obvious.

And some of those forces - let me suggest - were senior Army and Navy leaders afraid that the atom bomb had just rendered much of their service branch obsolete. Or rendered largely moot their sacrifices.
 
If people want to talk about the atomic bomb and its justification in being used, please take it to Chat. Even leave a link to the new thread here if you want. It's taking discussion away from the original post.
 
I watched a documentury about Macnamara who served under Curtis Le May. Macnamara said that Le May bombed much of Japan to ashes before the bombs, and would have continued without the bomb, so it wasnt necessary according to him
 
mattep74 said:
Le May bombed much of Japan to ashes before the bombs
Indeed. The difference was not substantial, from Japan's POV, so the purported shock effect is much less than many think.
 
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