WI: US doesn't enter WW1?

Cryhavoc see my last post. Tell me what you know that the Entente leaders did not know.
You provided an opinion - not fact.

Britain and France did not suffer a turnip winter Germany had - the 2 Empires had access to the worlds trade and that would include the USA who would still want to trade with them.

While the defeat of Russia had taken the pressure off it - both Britain and France had by 1917 built their industries and Britain had finished building its continental army

Either side could have blinked for sure - but the Entente did not want to seek terms with the disadvantage of having French and Belgium territory in German hands and Germany could not force the issue from 1915.

So we have an impasse and its my opinion that things would drag on into 1919 before the 2 sides sought terms.
 
Cryhavoc a couple of things here.

1 I did not offer an opinion I stated a fact. The sources to this are all in the other thread. The UK and French government pleaded with the USA to continue trading otherwise they‘d be forced to come to an unfavorable peace agreement until summer 1917. Fact!

2. Fact. Congress in 1917 had already voted twice that no uncollatetized loans shall be given to the Entente. No uncollaterized loans means no loans means no more trade

3. Fact. The amount of oil, food and steel that the Entente did buy from the USA could not be obtained anywhere in the world. Even if an ASB had granted the UK the needed additional shipping and anybody would have been willing to sell they simply could not because nobody, not even the rest of the world combined had the physical ability to sell.

4. Fact. The turnip winter would have been a joke compared to what the UK would have to go through without food imports from the USA. Germany was down 30% on calories on that winter, the UK would have been down 50%.
 
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And what I still do not get. Everybody in favor of an Entente war argues that the war without the USA would continue as OTL. It would not.

Without the trade with the USA the Entente air forces would have to curtail operations by 85%, the French and UK army to fire 30% less shells, find a way to save 70% of the oil consumption and the UK would have to make do with 50% les food.Plus some more items.

So assuming the war goes on as OTL without the deliveries from the USA is not only implausible it is impossible. And as there simply were no other sources for those materials in the world saying they could be bought somewhere else....

And that is still without anyone even trying to adress the question how does one quell the French mutiny without the promise of the US troops coming.

Or how do you keep Russia in the war as OTL while Kerensky made it clear that without a billion dollar loan he would have to ask for terms before summer 1917.
 
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I know this question has probably been asked an innumerous amount of times on this site but it seems to be the most popular POD for a Central Powers victory in WW1 or a stalemate. What if the United States didn't join WW1 on the side of the Entente? How could this be avoided? Was American involvement inevitable? And even if America doesn't join the war, do the Central Powers even have a chance at victory? What would that victory look like?
It depends how long the war would be waged. If the Entente are able to stall the Spring Offensive of 1918, than they may be capable of at least forcing Germany to the peace table. (This is because the British blockade was really starting to bite the German economy by the time the offensive was launched although I don't know if Ludendorff was aware of this when he ordered the offensive to be commenced, even with the Gains from B-L Germany may not have been capable of enforcing a Kaiserreich style situation) I don't think the terms would be as severe in OTL though. As for if America joined the war on Germany's side then they might be capable of bringing down the Entente.
 
Cryhavoc a couple of things here.

1 I did not offer an opinion I stated a fact. The sources to this are all in the other thread. The UK and French government pleaded with the USA to continue trading otherwise they‘d be forced to come to an unfavorable peace agreement until summer 1917. Fact!

2. Fact. Congress in 1917 had already voted twice that no uncollatetized loans shall be given to the Entente. No uncollaterized loans means no loans means no more trade

3. Fact. The amount of oil, food and steel that the Entente did buy from the USA could not be obtained anywhere in the world. Even if an ASB had granted the UK the needed additional shipping and anybody would have been willing to sell they simply could not because nobody, not even the rest of the world combined had the physical ability to sell.

4. Fact. The turnip winter would have been a joke compared to what the UK would have to go through without food imports from the USA. Germany was down 30% on calories on that winter, the UK would have been down 50%.
Nothing happens in a vacuum - the Entente was the USAs biggest customer and the US government was 'Atlantist' in outlook and stopping trade with the Entente would wreck the US economy so while the USA was neutral it was so in a pro Entente fashion - I do not accept that the USA would ultimately stop supplying them and unlike in a computer game the 'tap' would not simply be turned off.

There are other ways to pay for things and having access to the Empires and the worlds trade the Entente and USA had lots of options

I do not accept your facts - it certainly would have been an issue if it happened - but I do not accept that it would happen.

You seem very desperate to reverse the supply situation which was largely driven by large discrepancies in Geography and the massive difference between British and French Empires access to leverage world trade including the USA and that very limited ability of Germany to do the same.

I understand why, because its vital to do so to allow for any reasonable German/CP Victory from Jan 1915

The problem is it requires an improbably tall 'If' tree to happen.
 
Cryhavoc do you have any specific arguments? You simply say the USA would continue to trade even though the Congress had said twice that they won’t. The Congress of the USA fully knowing what a stop of trade would mean declared that unsecured loans to the UK are out.
And other means to pay. No at least not to the knowledge of the UK treasurers at the time.
Again this is all sourced ad nauseam in the other thread still the CP will lose fraction continues with „somehow“.

If you think my facts are wrong prove it. Wishful thinking does not change economic reality. If you think the UK did not get 70% of it‘s oil 50 of it‘s food and 30 of it‘s steel from the USA prove it. If you think those could be obtained elsewhere prove it. If you think the USA would suddenly allow unsecured loans without entering the war show quotes of politicians who thought so. If you think the UK could pay by other means name those means and how to get this knowledge to 1917.

„Somehow“ is not an answer in economy. Especially not in war economy if you are 400 million dollar short.

And even if you could solve all those problems good luck getting the French army to fight again.
 
I do believe that without the US, the war can go both ways, But i must digress, and say I lean towards the Entente as well. Why? Well.

First let us look at German export and import tables.

Billion marks at current prices
Billion marks at constant prices (i.e. gold marks)
ExportsImportsBalanceExportsImportsBalance
191310.110.8-0.710.110.8-0.7
19147.48.5-1.17.58.5-1.0
(Aug. to Dec.)1.42.1-0.71.52.1-0.6
19153.17.1-4.02.55.9-3.4
19163.88.4-4.62.96.4-3.5
19173.57.1-3.62.04.2–2.2
19184.77.1-2.42.84.2-1.4
Aug. 1914 to Dec. 191816.531.8-15.311,722.8-11.1
The Blockade of Germany seems to have been actually more tighter before america came into the war. The economic data shows this.

In regards to the German food population:-

Aggregate figures are important but not sufficient to understand the physical effects of the scarcity and inaccessibility of basic goods.[16] Hundreds of thousands died in direct and indirect consequence of these shortages.[17] They contracted tuberculosis, pneumonia and other lung conditions that thrived in underfed, under-heated and overworked bodies, forced to live in overcrowded apartments; Recklinghausen authorities explicitly acknowledged the connection.[18] This susceptibility also informed the uncontrollable spread of influenza in 1918, as well as cholera and typhus epidemics. Approximately 175,000 German civilians died of flu during the final months of the war.[19] Older Germans who suffered these conditions were particularly likely to die from them.[20] Among those most susceptable to illness were women and children from the urban working class and also of the urban lower middle class. (Contrary to contemporary and long-lived claims, however, the latter did not suffer more than workers, in absolute terms.) Deaths among female German civilians rose from under 468,000 in 1916, to over 523,000 in 1917, to over 644,000 in 1918, which marks a significant rise in absolute terms, and also in relation to the increased mortality of civilian men, though their mortality rate also increased significantly.[21] Altogether, the mortality rate rose from 1.5 percent to 2.6 percent per annum in the course of the war among Bochum residents; death on the front line accounts for only about 0.6 percent of these numbers.[22] In turn, this does not differentiate those whose deaths on the front line may have been hastened by malnutrition, along with other debilitating conditions they faced in the trenches.

Dying from scarcity-related conditions was not the only serious consequence. Children particularly suffered long-term direct and indirect mental and physical effects from the scarcities. Vitamin D deficiencies caused widespread bone deformations among children. Questionable food sources outside of rural areas caused a host of enduring intestinal disorders, cynically termed “turnip disease” after the swede turnip (or rutabaga) the hated fibrous tuber that was sometimes the only easily available food. Many disorders were the result of willful malice, whether in the form of watered-down milk or adulterated and even poisonous substances sold as egg powder.

Although it seems most Germans demanded some government control of foodstuffs and although most had limited “connections” (“Vitamin B,” for Beziehungen) - a Christian trade unionist in Wuppertal defiantly declared to officials, “Wir alle leben vom Schleichhandel, weil wir sonst verhungern würden.”[23] While it was impossible for most to survive on the open market alone, it was rarely any easier to live off the controlled economy. Publisher Helmut von Gerlach (1866-1935) points out the inate paradox of the situation: “Der Schleichhandel ist die normale Form des Warenverkehrs geworden.[24] In relatively well-off Herne, “normal rations” in 1916 covered only a quarter of the daily dietary fats required by an average adult, according to scientists’ new findings.[25] There is evidence that some people, for example those who were institutionalized and were living entirely off official and available rations actually starved.[26] In April 1917, a medical officer in Wiesbaden found that a loss of sixty pounds in healthy adults since August 1914 was “no rarity,” even among those who made use of every means possible.”[27] The dire circumstances were a consequence not only of the inefficacy official measures: rather, they emerged in part as a result of the measures themselves. Initially heralded as the “dictator of the pantry,” General von Hindenburg divided the population according to a “productivity principle,” measured in relation to direct military contribution. In 1916, he stated: “Wer nicht arbeitet [for the new military requisites] der soll nicht essen.”[28]
Female deaths of over 600,000 and male deaths were largely unreported but are considered to be the same, so around 1.2 million. Such amount of death of starvation in great powers is unheard of. Even Russia did not have such a situation. Russians were undernourished, but they weren't dying from a lack of food, at least in ww1. To highlight this point, this is a graph of food inflation,

1610164111222.png

Graph 3: Estimations of (Official) Food Inflation in Germany, 1914 to 1918

In regards to the British food situation: https://www.nfuonline.com/the-few-that-fed-the-many-ww1-report/. Britain introduced rationing in late 1917 to early 1918 and had only the lightest of rationings. If Britain went to full rationing as per Germany had done, Britain would have probably been able to ration food till late 1919 to early 1920.

In 1914, the proportion of the British population engaged in agriculture was lower than in all of the other belligerents. Contemporary observers perceived that this placed Britain at a disadvantage in the event of a protracted war. As nations like Russia, pre-war exporters of food with large peasant populations able to feed themselves, redirected exports to service the demands of the home market, Britain would quickly starve.[23] In practice, the pre-war contraction of British agriculture meant that plentiful reserves of underused land existed across the country. The availability of land combined with higher prices offered to farmers for their goods, which incentivised production to replace decreases in imports.

According to Peter Dewey, “the most striking feature of wartime agriculture was its stability”.[24] Whereas in continental Europe, agricultural production fell by about one-third during the war, the supply of food in Britain was maintained almost intact. This was achieved despite the loss to British farmers of two essential factors of production from 1914: alongside men from the agricultural sector, the army required colossal numbers of horses. Following military impressment, the number of horses available for agriculture in Britain fell from 926,820 in 1914 to 858,032 the following year.[25] Supplies of fertiliser and animal feeds were also heavily affected by the dislocation of trade, but the government was initially reluctant to label agriculture as an “essential” war industry and thereby acquire control over its direction.

In the opening two years of the war actual food shortages were localized and of relatively short duration. Nevertheless, complaints about increased food prices and accusations of profiteering were prevalent throughout the war: “as the war progressed, shortages and inflationary pressures increased, and demands for state intervention became more persistent”.[26] The Food Production Department was constituted in January 1917, with a policy to utilise Britain’s underexploited land for arable cultivation, guarantee prices for farmers, and provide minimum wages of 25s per week for farm workers.[27] Farmers demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with directives issued by the Food Production Department, but were restricted by shortages of labour, horses, machinery, fertiliser, and animal feeds.

Attempts to relieve the shortage of labour included the formation of Agricultural Companies, comprised of soldiers in medical category C3, the temporary return of skilled farmworkers (most notably ploughmen) from the front, prisoners of war (POWs), women, and children. By the end of the war, 60.5 percent of POWs available for work in Britain were employed in agriculture, whilst the Women’s Land Army provided a maximum working strength of 16,000 to complement the approximately 180,000 village women employed in agriculture. Across Britain, increasing numbers of children obtained exemptions from school to engage in agricultural work during the harvest season and worked part-time on farms outside of school hours.[28] Their contributions, in Dewey’s estimates, reduced the fall in the agricultural labour supply from 9 percent of the pre-war total in 1916 to around 4 percent by 1918.

Their endeavours meant that home food production was restored to pre-war levels, but output in meat and milk decreased in the final year of the war for want of animal feed. However, each ton of home-grown food reduced the stress placed on British shipping for imported goods, and nationwide rationing in Britain was implemented late in the war compared to other European countries. It was not until early 1918 that rationing was instituted in Britain, and British consumers did not suffer the same decline in nutritional standards as their counterparts overseas. The content of the British diet changed more than its nutritional value. At its lowest point, in 1917, the calorific value of the average British diet was only 4 percent lower than in 1913, and across the war as a whole the diets and health of women and poor children improved.[29] To maintain the calorific consumption of the population, meat was replaced with bacon, brown bread substituted for white bread (but bread itself was not rationed, unlike elsewhere), and margarine replaced butter.[30] The British diet may have become more bland and monotonous as the war progressed, but Britain did not come close to succumbing to the starvation predicted by pre-war commentators. Ultimately, British agriculture performed well between 1914 and 1918.



Now real GDP data:-

Real GDP
Real GDP per capita
Population
Country
Millions of dollars (1990 prices)
Dollars (1990 prices)
In millions
Austria-Hungary
100,515​
1,986​
50.6​
France
144,489​
3,485​
41.5​
Germany
237,332​
3,648​
65.0​
Italy
95,487​
2,564​
37.2​
Russia
254,448​
1,488​
171.0​
United Kingdom
224,618​
4,921​
45.6​
Even without Russia, the Entente have 463,000 million dollars vs CP 337,000 million. That is a huge advantage of over 25%

1610180011764.png


Now let's talk about france.
RESOURCESEXPENSESMISMATCH
FISCALSHORT-TERM LOANSLONG-TERM LOANSTOTALCIVILMILITARYOTHERTOTAL
In billion francsFiscal resourcesCentral banks advancesTreasury and Defense BillsLong-term loans (rentes and Crédit national included)Foreign loansTotal resourcesOrdinary expensesMilitary expensesOther expensesDebt chargeTotal expensesTotal resources minus total expenses
1911
4.7​
4.7​
4.5​
4.5​
0.2​
1912
4.9​
4.9​
4.7​
4.7​
0.2​
1913
5.1​
5.1​
5​
5​
0.1​
1914
4.2​
3.9​
1.9​
0.5​
0.05​
10.55​
2​
6.5​
0.5​
1.4​
10.4​
0.15​
1915
4.1​
1.2​
8​
6.7​
2.8​
22.8​
2.5​
14.7​
3.1​
1.8​
22.1​
0.7​
1916
4.9​
2.4​
12.4​
5.8​
8.8​
34.3​
2.8​
23.9​
6.8​
3.3​
36.8​
-2.5​
1917
6.6​
5​
12.6​
5.7​
11.9​
41.8​
4.1​
28.7​
7​
4.8​
44.6​
-2.8​
1918
7.2​
4.8​
3.7​
22.5​
8.7​
46.9​
5.4​
36.1​
8.1​
7​
56.6​
-9.7​
1919
11.6​
8.4​
26.2​
7.3​
11.3​
64.8​
9.2​
18.2​
18.9​
7.9​
54.2​
10.6​
1920
20.1​
0.8​
3.5​
35.5​
-0.5​
59.4​
11.4​
7.6​
27.4​
11.7​
58.1​
1.3​
1921
23.1​
-2​
10.3​
9.1​
2.7​
43.2​
9.9​
6​
24.1​
11.1​
51.1​
-7.9​
1922
24.2​
24.2​
7.7​
5​
22.6​
13.6​
48.9​
-24.7​
1923
27.7​
27.7​
6.5​
4.8​
21.7​
12.8​
45.8​
-18.1​
1924
31.1​
31.1​
40.2​
-9.1​
Fiscal resources in France grew whilst 50% of their industrial area was occupied. Need i say more?

1610165658448.png

Graph 1: Estimations of Economic Activity (GDP, GNP) in Germany, 1913 to 1918

Now the spring offensive.
Other than the battle of the 2nd Marne, all other battles were all Entente victories against Germany.
France suffered 433,000 casualties, Britain 418,000, Portugal 7000, Italy 5000 in the offensive to Germany's 650,000 casualties. Again on the 100 days, France suffered 531,000, Britain 400,000+ and America some 100,000.
Let's see the 100 days offensive again shall we?
Battle of Amiens: 1 American division, 31 Entente Divisions
Battle of the 2nd Somme: 2 British Armies, only 1 American Corps
Battle of Saint Mihiel: 1 American Army, 2 French Corps
Battle of St. Quentin Canal: 30 British divisions, 2 American divisions
Battle of Meuse-Argonne: 2 American Armies, 2 French Armies, 1 Siamese Expeditionary Army
Battle of Sambre: 17 French Divisions, 11 British Divisions, and 1 American Division

These were the battles in which America took part in and only the bolded are any significant contribution,


Britain burned through 10% domestic assets and 24% of their international assets. Britain was capable of raising it to 20% domestic and 35% international assets as well.

To show how much room Britain had to add more funds:-

1610180075952.png


Again, Germany has a greater chance of winning without America, that i do not dispute, however the advantage is still decisively in favor of the Entente.

also, summoning jutsu @TDM ! I need thee knowledge in this thread.
 
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"Britain burned through 10% domestic assets and 24% of their international assets. Britain was capable of raising it to 20% domestic and 35% international assets as well."

You keep bring this up and it dosnt matter, the only thing that matters is that the UK did not have any assets left in the US, those other assets are in places like Argentina and China, which were already producing as much as they can. Ones the UK runs out of assets in the US its done.
The UK treshery weren't dumb, they where buying from everyone, its gust a simple fact that the only nations in the world outside of Europe that was industrialized is the USA and Japan. The UK simply couldn't get what they needed from anybody else and what they could have they where already getting (for example all of Britains beef came from Argentina because that was all they could get for there) and gust showing there overall numbers dosnt actually show anything.
 
"Britain burned through 10% domestic assets and 24% of their international assets. Britain was capable of raising it to 20% domestic and 35% international assets as well."

You keep bring this up and it doesn't matter, the only thing that matters is that the UK did not have any assets left in the US, those other assets are in places like Argentina and China, which were already producing as much as they can. Ones the UK runs out of assets in the US its done.
The UK treasury weren't dumb, they where buying from everyone, its gust a simple fact that the only nations in the world outside of Europe that was industrialized is the USA and Japan. The UK simply couldn't get what they needed from anybody else and what they could have they where already getting (for example all of Britain's beef came from Argentina because that was all they could get for there) and gust showing there overall numbers doesn't actually show anything.
you misunderstand.
People keep bringing up the question of collateral for loans and equipment, particularly for America, and to a lesser extent other countries like Japan, and Spain during ww1. I simply showed that Britain did have extra collateral as well.
 
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I can't puzzle out the economics particularly well, but in terms of force levels, is anyone thinking about colonial troops on the Western Front? Britain in particular has huge theoretical reserves in India, Canada and the ANZACs (the latter two already being deeply involved by 1916 and getting one hell of a reputation in the process), and the French could increasingly tap North Africa for men and materiel. Resource exports from the colonies to the Entente powers shouldn't be underestimated either, there's plenty of wood and iron to be shipped out of Canada, and Australia still has coal to spare.
 
you misunderstand.
People keep bringing up the question of collateral for loans and equipment, particularly for America, and to a lesser extent other countries like Japan, and Spain during ww1. I simply showed that Britain did have extra collateral as well.
Except I gust showed you that there is no collateral, the only collateral Britain could use was the collateral inside the US, the rest of the collateral dosnt mader.
 
Except I gust showed you that there is no collateral, the only collateral Britain could use was the collateral inside the US, the rest of the collateral dosnt mader.
er no, you didn't. You just said:-
UK did not have any assets left in the US, those other assets are in places like Argentina and China, which were already producing as much as they can. Ones the UK runs out of assets in the US its done.
This is not economically true. For example, the UK in 1915 paid in £ with the Colt company using convertible assets from the UK (namely buying Colt Shares, and setting up Colt shares in the UK as well)
Granted this is more complicated. It really depends on the private companies, on whether or not they are willing to take convertible assets.
 
er no, you didn't. You just said:-

This is not economically true. For example, the UK in 1915 paid in £ with the Colt company using convertible assets from the UK (namely buying Colt Shares, and setting up Colt shares in the UK as well)
Granted this is more complicated. It really depends on the private companies, on whether or not they are willing to take convertible assets.
Thats not what that means at all!
Look i know you don't believe me but the UK treshury literally said to the cabinet that the UK had used up all its assets (and all its pounds it should be noted) and could not continue importing from the us after April 1917, and quite frankly I trust there analysis to some one on the internet (especially sense they ran there ship quite well unlike the rest of the uks perqurment system).
I would suggest reading "to proud to fight" writen by a member of the UK treshury who worked there at the time.
 
Thats not what that means at all!
Look i know you don't believe me but the UK treshury literally said to the cabinet that the UK had used up all its assets (and all its pounds it should be noted) and could not continue importing from the us after April 1917, and quite frankly I trust there analysis to some one on the internet (especially sense they ran there ship quite well unlike the rest of the uks perqurment system).
I would suggest reading "to proud to fight" writen by a member of the UK treshury who worked there at the time.
1. Baron Devlin did not work in the treasury in 1914-18.
2. The book mentions a reduction of 20% to 40% trade with US with British reserves running out, not a total stoppage in its entirety. In Chapter 17 and 19 it mentions a forecast of reduction of 40% imports to Britain at maximum and 15% to 25% at minimum.
3. It is a biography, not an economic book or data list, to take its words properly as an economist.
4. The book also just so happens to mention that American retails were being encouraged to buy british treasury notes to stave off the economic effects on both sides.
5. Frankly, you have brought up anecdotal opinions, and have not refuted any of the economic data given to you.
6. I admit that without the us, the chances of a german victory are way higher, and the chances for a negotiated peace are also wayyy higher, i am simply stating that the economic data, and material data remain extremely in the Entente's favor even without the us, still giving them a good chance at winning.
7. Economic databooks tend to be more reliable than biographies as economic sources.
 
1. Baron Devlin did not work in the treasury in 1914-18.
2. The book mentions a reduction of 20% to 40% trade with US with British reserves running out, not a total stoppage in its entirety. In Chapter 17 and 19 it mentions a forecast of reduction of 40% imports to Britain at maximum and 15% to 25% at minimum.
3. It is a biography, not an economic book or data list, to take its words properly as an economist.
4. The book also just so happens to mention that American retails were being encouraged to buy british treasury notes to stave off the economic effects on both sides.
5. Frankly, you have brought up anecdotal opinions, and have not refuted any of the economic data given to you.
6. I admit that without the us, the chances of a german victory are way higher, and the chances for a negotiated peace are also wayyy higher, i am simply stating that the economic data, and material data remain extremely in the Entente's favor even without the us, still giving them a good chance at winning.
7. Economic databooks tend to be more reliable than biographies as economic sources.
I haven't refuted any to the economic point you have bought up up because non of those points is in any way refuting my point and are quite frankly much more of a opinion then objective fact, or gust strat up not saying anything.
 
Cryhavoc do you have any specific arguments? You simply say the USA would continue to trade even though the Congress had said twice that they won’t. The Congress of the USA fully knowing what a stop of trade would mean declared that unsecured loans to the UK are out.
And other means to pay. No at least not to the knowledge of the UK treasurers at the time.
Again this is all sourced ad nauseam in the other thread still the CP will lose fraction continues with „somehow“.

If you think my facts are wrong prove it. Wishful thinking does not change economic reality. If you think the UK did not get 70% of it‘s oil 50 of it‘s food and 30 of it‘s steel from the USA prove it. If you think those could be obtained elsewhere prove it. If you think the USA would suddenly allow unsecured loans without entering the war show quotes of politicians who thought so. If you think the UK could pay by other means name those means and how to get this knowledge to 1917.

„Somehow“ is not an answer in economy. Especially not in war economy if you are 400 million dollar short.

And even if you could solve all those problems good luck getting the French army to fight again.

When you say 'congress' did this or that are you referring to Wilson in Dec 1916 instructing the Fed to tell private investors to stop giving loans - such as the planned $1.5 Billion by JP Morgan?

If so then again we cannot look at this in a vacuum - because Wilson knowing that the USA was going to enter the war (which they formally did 4 months later) wanted to do so with as much control as possible and as much as possible on USA's terms and wanted to formalise the loans as Federal loans and not those of 'private individuals' as had been the case with far less oversight and control. Hence the orders to stop 'private loans'.

Had this planned declaration of war by the USA not been the case then unless the POD is the USA simply 'stops' allowing any loans from the likes of J P Morgan etc 'for reasons' which I consider to be ASB then the loans are allowed to continue.

The international Financial systems of the day were largely based and controlled from London and London also controlled the worlds largest source of raw materials from around the world and the majority of the shipping to move them about and the supply of coal to fuel this vast fleet and much of the rest of the worlds merchant fleets.

This 'grip' on the worlds finances and control of the worlds raw materials was almost a monopoly and while WW1 loosened said grip, it would take an even bigger and more tragic 2nd world war to finally end it.

The French army did launch attacks in 1917 - how its new leaderships - Petain - sought to address his men's concerns by choosing the operations with far greater care, more limited gains and massing artillery and using AFVs for example.

I am not trying to dismiss the issues facing the French army from May 1917 but the 'mutiny' is often overblown - it impacted by the end of the year 49 Infantry Divisions out of 113 and of those 49, 24 were seriously affected at some point and the other 25 only suffered isolated if not repeated cases of mutiny.

The Cavalry units and Artillery were not impacted.

That being said would Germany have launched the more desperate campaigns such as the Spring offensive with out the pressure of the USA entering the war?

I don't think it would - what I think would happen is it would sit on the defensive as far as possible and as and when problems from the home front started causing too many problems then would be obliged to seek to an end the war probably some time in early 1919.
 
Now let's talk about france.

I found Table 4 interesting in that regard. From 1916 on, the Russian and French economies seem to be following similar downward paths, but with France a year behind. Thus her GDP (relative to prewar) in 1916 is virtually identical with Russia's in 1915, while that for 1917 is within about a percentage point of Russia's in 1916, and that for 1918 is actually several points *less* than Russia's in 1917, despite the latter's troubles that year.
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Is this mere coincidence, or does it imply that France, if not propped up by the US (either directly or via GB), is headed for a similar crack-up?
 
I don't think it would - what I think would happen is it would sit on the defensive as far as possible and as and when problems from the home front started causing too many problems then would be obliged to seek to an end the war probably some time in early 1919.
Besides, even if the Germans stayed on the defensive in 1918 I can still see them moving their divisions ouf of the Balkan front because of the pressure in northwestern France. In that case, the Entente offensive that happened in 1918 is still likely to happen and enjoy a similar success, and in that case it's pretty much game over for the Alliance: Bulgaria left, A-H too and there are simply no reserves to contain the Entente in time, plus the fact that the German government will hear of that OTL and start getting really worried.
 
I found Table 4 interesting in that regard. From 1916 on, the Russian and French economies seem to be following similar downward paths, but with France a year behind. Thus her GDP (relative to prewar) in 1916 is virtually identical with Russia's in 1915, while that for 1917 is within about a percentage point of Russia's in 1916, and that for 1918 is actually several points *less* than Russia's in 1917, despite the latter's troubles that year.
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Is this mere coincidence, or does it imply that France, if not propped up by the US (either directly or via GB), is headed for a similar crack-up?
Hmm... Soviet France? :p
 
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