WI: US delays embargo on Japan for a year

[Shaby]

If you go back to my post you'll notice that I already answered this. To summarize: A US embargo was probably inevitable at some point, but a US embargo in the summer of 1941 was actually a major mistake from the point of view of the western Allies. The more rational course for the US would have been to wait until summer or autumn of 1942 before imposing the embargo because by then they would have had a fair chance of keeping the Japanese from simply taking the Netherlands East Indies oil.

Not wanting to go off-topic, just wanted to discuss this possibility.

Way I see it, if they waited till summer 1942, the problem would have been solved by itself. In the meaning Japan would neutralize any resistance in China. I may be wrong on this, though. IIRC, taking Indochina effectively reduced help to China to insignificant amount and Soviet help dried up after their deal with Japanese. This means KMT war effort would start collapsing soon. Again IMHO.

Would later embargo serve any purpose at all?

 

[Catspoke]

The Burma road was open for supply, not near as good as the French IndoChina rail connection but still a source of supply. The flying Tigers were arriving as a volunteer force even without the Japanese attack which would put more even more pressure on the Japanese. The Americans would only have expanded this kind of covert (almost overt) aid.

The Chinese would have certainly held out until mid 42, most likely longer and it would be the Japanese that would have serious ecomomic / political issues even without the oil embargo.

Of course we have to look at these decisions in the July 41 world view in which they were made, it appeared the Soviets were going to collapse, the Germans could move through the mid east, the Germans were already fully established in North Africa. I am sure it was thought that the Japanese with their aggessive moves might join in with an attack on Singapore at any time and the USA shouldn't be supplying this very likely enemy of Britain with oil to make it easier for them.

 

[DaleCoz]

This was a tough call. In favor of waiting:

1) The longer the Japanese wait to attack south, the stronger the US, Britain and the NEI get relative to the Japanese--as long as the Soviets hold out.
2) The US and Britain correctly saw the Germans as the main enemy and the Japanese as a lesser threat and a distraction from the really serious enemy.
3) If the Japanese successfully attacked south, they would gain control of over 90% of the world rubber supply. That turned out not to be crucial because the US managed to put together a synthetic rubber industry before rubber stockpiles ran low. However, we didn't know that building a synthetic rubber industry from scratch would be possible in summer 1941.

The problems with waiting:

1) The Japanese might tackle the Soviets in Manchuria. That's not the most likely outcome, but we didn't know that at the time. The oil embargo pretty much made going North impossible for the Japanese--but also lit a fuse. The Japanese were either going to surrender or attack at least the British and NEI, and given the Japanese national character, attack to the south was pretty much inevitable once the embargo was imposed. A Japanese attack on the Soviets may or may not have shifted the course of the Soviet/German war, but whichever way it actually would have gone, US policymakers couldn't be certain based on what they knew as to whether a Japanese pile-on would be the last straw for Soviet resistance.

2) It's possible that the Japanese would have attack south in December 1941 anyway, in which case they would simply have several months additional oil supply. However, the US had a way of detecting the likelihood of that. If the Japanese decided to head south, Japanese merchant ships would head for home waters, as they did historically in the summer of 1941. The merchant ships were vital to the Japanese ability to wage war, and getting them home took months, especially if the US encountered mysterious difficulties getting them through the Panama canal, as they did historically.

3) It is possible that the Japanese would have take the opportunity to finish off the Nationalist Chinese in late 1941/42, as noted above, but the Burma road probably would have helped stave that off, as also noted above.

The embargo wasn't a foregone conclusion, and my understanding is that Roosevelt intended for it to be limited rather than total but was put in a position where he had to either make it total or look like he was going soft by harder-line underlings.

 

[Shaby]

This was a tough call. In favor of waiting:

1) The longer the Japanese wait to attack south, the stronger the US, Britain and the NEI get relative to the Japanese--as long as the Soviets hold out.
2) The US and Britain correctly saw the Germans as the main enemy and the Japanese as a lesser threat and a distraction from the really serious enemy.
3) If the Japanese successfully attacked south, they would gain control of over 90% of the world rubber supply. That turned out not to be crucial because the US managed to put together a synthetic rubber industry before rubber stockpiles ran low. However, we didn't know that building a synthetic rubber industry from scratch would be possible in summer 1941.

The problems with waiting:

1) The Japanese might tackle the Soviets in Manchuria. That's not the most likely outcome, but we didn't know that at the time. The oil embargo pretty much made going North impossible for the Japanese--but also lit a fuse. The Japanese were either going to surrender or attack at least the British and NEI, and given the Japanese national character, attack to the south was pretty much inevitable once the embargo was imposed. A Japanese attack on the Soviets may or may not have shifted the course of the Soviet/German war, but whichever way it actually would have gone, US policymakers couldn't be certain based on what they knew as to whether a Japanese pile-on would be the last straw for Soviet resistance.

2) It's possible that the Japanese would have attack south in December 1941 anyway, in which case they would simply have several months additional oil supply. However, the US had a way of detecting the likelihood of that. If the Japanese decided to head south, Japanese merchant ships would head for home waters, as they did historically in the summer of 1941. The merchant ships were vital to the Japanese ability to wage war, and getting them home took months, especially if the US encountered mysterious difficulties getting them through the Panama canal, as they did historically.

3) It is possible that the Japanese would have take the opportunity to finish off the Nationalist Chinese in late 1941/42, as noted above, but the Burma road probably would have helped stave that off, as also noted above.

The embargo wasn't a foregone conclusion, and my understanding is that Roosevelt intended for it to be limited rather than total but was put in a position where he had to either make it total or look like he was going soft by harder-line underlings.

I think Japanese would understand it pretty much the same as Italians did in 1935. They would get to finish China, while the world pretended they give China all the support. This is why I think they would go for door 3. It doesn't really help anyone if the Chinese end up cornered in Chongqing. Chiang did not recover from Ichi-go disaster in 1944, with all of the free world at his side. ITTL he may just give up.

Door number two is also a possibility if Japanese spend all of their cash reserves, as they were about too before embargo. Would they then go for US too, or just limit themselves on BCD powers, leaving A out? Tough proposition. Americans holding PI and Guam represent threat. Thus the Japanese might end up doing just what they were doing IOTL.

Door number one still offers the least reward while exposing them to greatest risk. Soviets were the sole power in Asia that could expell Japanese from the continent. I think they would attack north only if Soviet Union made overt threat against them and took more active role in China.

 

[Blackfox5]

If we assume no embargo means no Japanese attack on the Allies and USA, Nationalist China will easily hold out since we know they did so under far worse conditions historically. In this scenario, not only do the Chinese get the bomber group of the AVG, but also a second group of fighters. They not only get their normal group of supplies through the Burma Road, they also get substantial Lend Lease and goods secured by guaranteed US loans. Furthermore, with no Burma Theatre, Chiang retains his best divisions to be used as a mobile reserve.

The Chinese had shown they were able to hold their own defensively in 1939-1941. They weren't able to go on the offensive, but the terrain and extended Japanese lines would leave to Chinese defensive victories.

The Japanese victories in 1941-1942 elsewhere did not require them to move substantial units away from China or divert units intended to reinforce there. It was mostly naval units which had zero role in the China theatre anyway along with a small number of divisions. Those are not going to turn the situation around in China if not used in the Pacific.

If we assume an oil embargo in Summer 1942 leads to war at December, Japan will be facing a much more difficult situation than they did IOTL. MacArthur has an entire year to complete his plans for the Philippine Army. The US Navy will soon receive lots of new capital ships, and the US Army will be more built up. US carriers will have state of the art aircraft, not obsolete models. The British will have driven out the Axis in Africa, and will have reserves available to send to Burma and Singapore if needed. The Philippines will still not be able to be held, and Singapore will still fall - but Burma can likely be held, and a better response to the invasion of the Dutch East Indies done.

End result if the start of the Pacific War is delayed by a year is that the war ends more or less as it did IOTL, but Britain does not lose as much prestige and Nationalist China does a lot better and may even be in a position to win the postwar showdown with the Communists.

 

[Catspoke]

I think Japanese would understand it pretty much the same as Italians did in 1935. They would get to finish China, while the world pretended they give China all the support. This is why I think they would go for door 3. It doesn't really help anyone if the Chinese end up cornered in Chongqing. Chiang did not recover from Ichi-go disaster in 1944, with all of the free world at his side. ITTL he may just give up.

The flying Tigers squardron was significant support, motivated pilots and modern planes would really put some pressure on the Japanese and with the sucess of the squadron as demonstrated OTL, this kind of support would only increase. Unlike Iran-Contra no one is going to care about the mysterious way this is funded because most people are sympathetic with the Chinese.

In September 1940 the Japanese moved limited forces into the North part of Indo China because the Chinese stopped them from cutting the railway from the Chinese side so at least at that point the perception in the Japanese mind was that the war could go on for a long time.

However it is a bit of a mystery to me why the Japanese did well in 1944 in China, Chiang probably figured the Japanese were going to lose in the end anyway so had dropped his war effort against them to the nominal level required to be part of the final peace.