WI: US Army Ballistic Missiles?

IOTL, between WWII and about 1960 there was an extended debate on which military service ballistic missiles ought to "belong to" in terms of procuring, maintaining, and operating these vehicles. This was largely between the Army (ballistic missiles as very long range artillery) and the Air Force (they go through space, man, and space is like...above the atmosphere and stuff!). The Air Force ended up "winning" the debate IOTL, which had a lot of later unintended consequences, mainly on the space program.

However, this was far from preordained. The Army's claim that ballistic missiles are basically just really, really long range artillery makes more sense (when you get down to it) than the Air Force's rather incoherent reasons for giving them control. More importantly, the Army until 1958 had the services of what was undoubtedly the most experienced ballistic missile design team in the world, namely von Braun et. al. So...suppose that things go the other way. Maybe Eisenhower remembers being an Army man, or perhaps he acts out of a desire to balance the military's nuclear delivery systems (Navy bombers, Air Force strategic bombers, and Army missiles). In any case, the Army, not the Air Force, is responsible for R&D on ICBMs, IRBMs, and other types of ballistic missile (except for SLBMs, which as per OTL become Navy-controlled, probably with less fuss). What happens?
 
The Army did operate ballistic missiles: the Sergeant and Corporal systems, along with Pershing I and Pershing II. The AF did operate the Jupiters in Italy and Turkey, while Thor was under a dual-key arrangement with the RAF (RAF owned the missiles, while the AF had custody of the warheads until release authority granted). In the late '50s, unless you can get around the idea that an ICBM strike from CONUS to the Soviet Union is strategic warfare, not long-range artillery, SAC will get into the ICBM business. And SAC started doing basic R&D on ICBMs while LeMay was in command, and Power continued, getting more funds, resources, etc. after 4 Oct 57 (Sputnik). The Army could control medium-range and shorter weapons, but anything past 1500 miles is definitely a strategic weapon, and thus the AF's responsiblity. It's very unlikely that the Army would operate ICBMs.
 
The Army did operate ballistic missiles: the Sergeant and Corporal systems, along with Pershing I and Pershing II.

Well yes, I am aware that the Army created and operated the Sergeant and Corporal, and other types of (strictly speaking) ballistic missile. The point was Army ICBMs. The other kinds of ballistic missiles are not interesting for my ulterior purposes.

In the late '50s, unless you can get around the idea that an ICBM strike from CONUS to the Soviet Union is strategic warfare, not long-range artillery, SAC will get into the ICBM business.

This seems a bit of backwards projection, to be honest. Nowadays, the Air Force does strategic warfare, sure (although the Navy still runs the SLBMs and may or may not have aircraft-mounted warheads which could effectively be used in some strategic scenarios). Back then? The nuclear bomb had barely even been invented and everyone was pushing to have a piece of the nuclear pie. The Army just lost out, IOTL. There are plenty of political reasons to let them win.

And SAC started doing basic R&D on ICBMs while LeMay was in command, and Power continued, getting more funds, resources, etc. after 4 Oct 57 (Sputnik). The Army could control medium-range and shorter weapons, but anything past 1500 miles is definitely a strategic weapon, and thus the AF's responsiblity. It's very unlikely that the Army would operate ICBMs.

Yeah, and the Army had started doing basic ICBM R&D almost immediately after Germany fell. Redstone Arsenal was activated as a ballistic missile research center at almost exactly the same time LeMay took command of SAC. The first ABMA missile, the Redstone, predated the Thor considerably, and was later developed into the Jupiter. Hell, development work on the Atlas wasn't even started until 1953, by which point Redstone production work was starting. Now, obviously the Atlas and Redstone are in no way comparable, but the Army was moving along almost as fast as the Air Force was. And of course, as I said before, they have the Germans. A different Secretary of Defense, Truman losing in '48, LeMay having an unfortunate accident--any number of things could have tipped the balance the other way.

In any event, the crucial point is that the decision needs to be made in the early 1950s, especially before anyone is sure that intercontinental ballistic missiles will work. By the late 1950s, of course it's too late--they'd been assigned to the Air Force in 1956.
 
The Army did have its nukes: at theater level and below. Anything past the MRBM level was considered to be strategic and thus the purview of the AF. Though the AF operated the Matador and Mace cruise missiles, not the Army, and were theater-level assets (TAC operated, not SAC).
 
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