WI: US annexed Spain's African colonies

The US won the Spanish-American war, and forced Spain ti give up their Pacific and Caribbean colonies.

What if the US got the African colonies as well?
 
I'd imagine if the took it they would sell it on asap. Not worth the trouble of upsetting the colonial powers. The cost of defending/creating infrastructure would be not worth it.

Are we including Ceuta and Melilla? Or are they considered core too?

Now who would be allowed to buy is the question.
 
At the time Spain only had Guinea

At the end of the Spanish-American War Spain's African possessions were what is now Equatorial Guinea as well as Western Sahara.


They were core provinces and taking them would not be acceptable

I recall reading somewhere that initially one of the plans had been to capture the Canaries, with the intent to annex them, though ultimately IOTL the plan to capture the Caribbean and maybe harass Spain's Pacific holdings (and thus spooking them) was adopted, with said plan ending-up being ridiculously successful (most European governments as well as the American government at the time did not think capturing the Philippines was a real possibility).
 
Were you considering the Canary Islands/Islas Canarias to be African?

They are african, but they aren't a colony, or to avoid complicated terrain, their population feels themselves like any other spaniard and are seen like any other spaniard. Some would prefer to be independent (I doubt those existed in 1898) so, just like any other spanish region.

Now, there is no way Spain is going to cede the Canary Islands without a fight, even after Cavite and Santiago. And in this scenario the roles are somewhat reversed. Spain plays nearer home and with sympathetic population, while the USA plays far from its bases and with hostile population. Equatorial Gunea...maybe if the americans really press for it, though you have the treaties establishing the scramble of Africa, so other powers won't be happy. Also, I don't think 1898 USA had either the will or even the power projection to enforce a claim there by military means.
 
Germany would probably quite happy to buy Equatorial Guinea, or even to swap it with some Pacific possession, if given the chance, with either the US or Spain. They sort of bought Micronesia from Spain in that timeframe IIRC.
 

Driftless

Donor
Were you considering the Canary Islands/Islas Canarias to be African?

They were core provinces and taking them would not be acceptable

Taking Equatorial Guinea would be hard, because the Europeans wouldn't stand for it

They are african, but they aren't a colony, or to avoid complicated terrain, their population feels themselves like any other spaniard and are seen like any other spaniard. Some would prefer to be independent (I doubt those existed in 1898) so, just like any other spanish region.

Now, there is no way Spain is going to cede the Canary Islands without a fight, even after Cavite and Santiago. And in this scenario the roles are somewhat reversed. Spain plays nearer home and with sympathetic population, while the USA plays far from its bases and with hostile population. Equatorial Gunea...maybe if the americans really press for it, though you have the treaties establishing the scramble of Africa, so other powers won't be happy. Also, I don't think 1898 USA had either the will or even the power projection to enforce a claim there by military means.


That all makes sense. Since you folks have a better grip than I do (by far), about the political status of the Canaries, what do you make of the contingency plans the US had for using the Canaries as a base for cruiser attacks against Spain, post-Santiago?

*edit*
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/spanam.htm

....Rear Admiral Francis M. Ramsay, chief of the influential Bureau of Navigation, had long been an strong opponent of the Naval War College, and it is likely that he was the one who persuaded Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to convene a board in the summer of 1896 to draft a separate plan for war with Spain. Like the Kimball plan, the Ramsay Board focused on the a naval blockade, but added the deep water ports of Puerto Rico to those of Cuba. The destruction of crops in Cuba by both sides led the Board to believe that the Spanish garrison needed to import food in order to survive. A relief force from Spain would consume most of its coal simply in crossing the Atlantic and thus would be in no position to engage American naval forces. Although the present strength of the U.S. Navy was sufficient to meet and defeat any fleet arriving from Spain, the Board called for the purchase of a number of small fast steamers to enforce the blockade. Finally, the European Squadron should be reinforced by ships from the U.S. and the Asiatic Squadron, and together operate against the Spanish coast after capturing the Canary Islands as an advance base. Captain Taylor strongly dissented from the views of the Board stating that large operations in Spanish waters were too dangerous, and that a naval blockade would not be sufficient to subdue Spanish forces in Cuba.9

Perhaps confused by the different positions in the existing plans, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Long, convened his own War Planning Board under Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Station, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in June 1897. Chief Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright was the only member who had served on the previous board. The Sicard Board endorsed the War College idea that joint operations against Havana would be necessary to end the war. Therefore, the plan called for the early seizure of Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, to serve as a base of operations against the latter, and to deliver arms to the Cuban insurgents. Purchased or chartered merchant steamers were to be armed and sent to the Caribbean to enforce a swift and strong blockade. This would also free the heavier ships to intercept a relief force from Spain. The members emphasized the need for colliers to refuel the fleet on blockade rather than forcing vessels to return to coaling stations. Although the Board rejected the idea of trying to capture the Canary Islands, it recommended the formation of a flying squadron consisting of two armored cruisers and two commerce destroyers to operate on the coast of Spain in order to detain Spanish ships in home waters. .......
 
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The land borders of Rio Muni, in what would become Spanish Guinea hadn't even been defined yet and wouldn't be until 1900 with the Treaty of Paris. Spanish presence on the mainland was minimal. The islands of Fernando Poo and Annobon were really the extent of Spain's colonial presence in sub-Saharan Africa.

Spanish Sahara was technically Spanish but with just a fishing dock at Villa Cisneros (Dakhla), this wasn't much of a colony either. In Morocco they had Ceuta, Melilla and a few uninhabited islets. Further south they had Ifni (Sidi Ifni) in Morocco but this too was in a deserted region.

The most valuable prize would be of course the Canary Islands, but these were better defended and more populous, and considered a part of Spain.
 
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