WI: US accepts Walter Christie Tank Designs

Eltf177 wrote:
From everything I've read Christie was a rather antagonistic individual and not much of a salesman. His designs all had flaws and technical issues that needed work before being ready for series production.

He felt that his designs, (and theory of armored warfare) were so far ahead of everyone else that he felt most people would not understand his genius. So why bother explaining things to morons and just come out and tell them they ARE morons and should buy his designs. What’s not to like about that kind of sales pitch? :D

Russia did produce the BT series from his M1928 (which later became the A-20, T-32 and eventually the T-34). Both the T-26 and T-28 had variants with Christie suspension but were only built as prototypes (T-46 and T-29 respectively). The UK used his suspension on their Cruiser Tanks. Poland was to buy a pair but defaulted on the deal, their later (unbuilt) 14TP design was a close copy of the UK Crusader and thus had Christie influence.

In context if the US had ‘accepted’ his designs he would have avoided selling them to others as he felt they were “too” superior for other nations to have. Meanwhile the Soviets already planned to STEAL the designs if they couldn’t buy them but by then Christie needed the money enough he actively helped them export the prototypes by labeling them as ‘farm equipment’ :)

It was actually a similar story with all his foreign sales beings that he’d been ‘rejected’ by the US so it was on their heads when the US was overrun by all these foreign nations wielding his invincible tank force! He got rather snippy when they had the audacity to change and modify his designs, always claiming the ‘originals’ were vastly better. He pointed to the terrible speed of the foreign 'designs' but also used them to try and drum up renewed US interest.

I'm rather surprised Japan and France didn't purchase any of Christie's designs.

IIRC while interested in the general suspension principles the actual designs weren’t really as useful as Christie claimed and both nations already had investments in vehicles for their preferred roles and doctrine. (Having a vehicle that can drive 40mph over ‘rough’ terrain is well and good but how fast an you really go in a jungle or city when your ‘task’ and purpose is to support walking infantry?) Most nations found armored cars and trucks with a sprinkling of tankette’s more suited to the role.

If the US built his designs I see stronger armor being included which makes the design larger and slower. OTOH the original version was cheap which would thrill Congress...

The latter first but when your ‘tank’ is sheet-metal and wood it’s VASTLY cheaper than the real thing :) Citing the above “Christie M3” model I’d agree but it might have been worth it to develop. Of his designs the hardest one it seems to get good information on is his Marine tank which is described as being more of a “floating” 75mm gun carriage than an actual tank which makes sense. I’ve found some pictures on the web:
http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/10/christie-tanks-part-1.html
http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/10/christie-tanks-part-2.html

Which show it as an open topped vehicle with minimum armor, (none in the model 1 since it was mostly sheet steel and balsa flotation stuffed everywhere) and large water props. It’s still pretty narrow and even the second and third models had issues reaching the beach but it was actually a really good start. Of course I’m also one of “those guys” who liked “The Beast” in Indiana Jones so …
https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&sou...aw3fRzRoKYNmRa1g7Io9kd2c&ust=1547777182317920

And to stir things up a bit:

Robert Goddard had been contracted by the Army to develop a man-portable weapon that could be used to defeat these new-fangled “tanks” and he developed a deployable, self-propelled armor piercing rocket propelled projectile launcher, (mouthful but I don’t think the comic that inspired ‘bazooka’ was around yet) which looked like a section of stovepipe. In OTL the Army thanked him and promptly sealed his patent and tossed the whole thing into a closet, ( warehouse :::grin::: :) ) since no one was going to study war no more. This torqued Goddard off who then proceeded to have nothing to do with the Army for the next couple of decades. (Stiffing him on the final payments for the work may have been a small factor) The Navy had to beg to get him back in the saddle for WWII and the Army went frantically searching the closet/warehouse to find those plans.


Anyway, one of the main problem with Christie’s vehicles was mounting an actual armor and bunker killing weapon on it. Someone who knows about the ‘Stovepipe” weapon and (assuming the Army doesn’t piss Goddard off and someone sits on Christie) they experiment around with a rocket armed light tank in the late 20s and early 30s… (Here some might see an mid-30s version of the Ontos but I’m leaning towards a more streamlined Sheridan)

Driftless wrote:
A couple of questions:
  1. Could a Christie suspension personnel carrier have been a useful interwar alternative line of development?
  2. The mention of the Timken live rubber track brings this thought to mind: did anyone other than the French use the Kegresse rubber-band track on military vehicles?

Oddly Christie pioneered front wheel drive for vehicle in the US and I look as some of his designs and wonder why he never considered moving the engine forward and opening up the aft space of his designs? They tended to be rather narrow which would preclude use as an APC but making them a bit wider seems quite plausible. Much like using the M3 medium as a basis for an APC actually.

I’d in fact never heard of either of those so again; Learning!

Randy
 
So if you folks will check my thinking here;

To me the way to get anything from Christie "accepted" by the US Army is finding a good way to avoid the "War to End All Wars" meme from WWI AND to have people in the US generally feel they are in a less 'secure' world. A less 'roaring' 20s followed by a nervous-30s. Which to me speaks of probably a less well defined 'end' to WWI with no clear 'winners/losers' and the US being more engaged with the world post-war.

Working hypothesis is the US doesn't end up joining the Entente, (USW is held off, Zimmerman telegram is 'off' enough that a majority of Americans think it's a British ploy to drag America into the war, etc) but the sides are exhausted enough by the end of 1918 to agree to an armistice. But that's all they really get. The Americans end up having to send troops to Europe as "peace" keepers which makes NOBODY happy and everyone still have big chips on their shoulders. The Empires will need new markets and sources of income to recover so they start looking towards South America which gets America's panties in a twist and in general everybody fully expects round-two to start any day now.

This means the US can't sit back and justify the isolationism and military spending cuts it made OTL as US interests abroad will always be in danger and if the Russian Civil War, (and Communism) still happen which is likely then the US has a lot to fear both at home and abroad. No post-war armament and naval treaties as nobody is willing to give up their arms so the US can't and won't. So the US also starts off at a disadvantage due to less 'sharing' on tanks and weapons technology but the 'boys' coming home from Europe will be fully aware and telling anyone who'll listen how badly the US is currently behind in things like aircraft and tanks.

Assuming someone rides herd on Christie, the Wright interests, Billy Mitchell and some other 'issues' along the way the gist of the story is the US will be desperate to find a way to catch up and Christie's SPG's, light tanks, (assuming US BT's instead of Christie's more out there designs) and such will see funding and development. Of course to not have this become a dystopia we have to have the majority of those waiting 'problems' drop dead, have accidents, be marginalized or at least have handlers assigned to selectively muzzle said problem when needed but...

Fun times no?

Randy
 
Oddly Christie pioneered front wheel drive for vehicle in the US and I look as some of his designs and wonder why he never considered moving the engine forward and opening up the aft space of his designs? They tended to be rather narrow which would preclude use as an APC but making them a bit wider seems quite plausible. Much like using the M3 medium as a basis for an APC actually.

His competitor had the 14 ton T2 Medium
T2-4.jpg


John Browning derived semi-automatic 47mm in the Turret with a .50, and 37mm and .30in the hull, that had the Liberty Engine to the side
T2-2.jpg

But there was a good amount of interior space
T2-9.jpg
 
One thing amongst all this discussion I should probably correct from the OP is partially the assumption of the thread:

See the Army didn’t actually “reject” the m1928 as they in fact ordered an updated and improved version, (as I noted the m1928 never had armament except for mockups or even “armor”) which resulted in the delivery of the m1931 for testing. Unfortunately this was highly delayed due to ‘differences’ between Christie and the Army over the design. Once these were smoothed over, (one major point was convincing Christie to mount the 37mm gun in a fully rotating turret AND to add a minimum amount of armor) Christie delivered the first of the m1931 prototypes with a follow on order for seven more.

The crew was only two and the 37mm could not be upgraded due to the turret size and ring restrictions. While the (at this point designated) T3 was fast and maneuverable, (arguably very much more so than the other test tanks) its lack of upgradability and Christie’s final ‘break’ with the Army along with his financial insolvency finally killed any major adoption of tanks specifically made by his company.

The Army WAS still interested in the Christie design though and turned it over to another company which built a larger version with a bigger turret and crew which was the T3E2 design. As noted before though the evolving ‘doctrine’ and ‘mission’ for tanks was all over the place given the rapidly changing nature of armor capability and utility.

Marathag wrote:
His competitor had the 14 ton T2 Medium

Yep, notably less ‘maneuverable’ than Christie’s design but it also had actual armor and as mentioned below:

John Browning derived semi-automatic 47mm in the Turret with a .50, and 37mm and .30in the hull,

Significantly more armament :)

that had the Liberty Engine to the side

IIRC arguably a decent engine for the mass but since this one had actual armor and weapons and such it naturally didn’t go as fast as the Christie.

But there was a good amount of interior space

Which Christie’s design lacked, along with armor and weapons but when run side-by-side Christie’s design was rather obviously more ‘impressive’ than its competitors. And of course politics, personality, and corruption played a hand but in general while the Army was in fact interested in Christie’s tank and vehicle designs Christie himself wasn’t particularly interested in what the Army wanted or needed.

Despite all this the Army DID in fact order Christie tanks but despite the infusion of monies from this and foreign sales Christie couldn’t deliver and was essentially broke. He needed a SERIOUS commitment, (7 was not enough) but the Depression beginning made this impossible. It did not help that the environment in the run up to this point was just as toxic as it would be for defense spending post-WWII, (I’ll point out the definition of “crazy” is repeating a behavior and assuming a different outcome the second time but that’s probably something for another thread :) ) and all the participants in the ‘competition’ were assuming a ‘binary’ (either/or) outcome so that the fact that the Army Ordinance Corps was in fact ONE of the participants, (T1 light tank) pretty much meant things were going to get ugly.

Now remove that limitation/expectation and it’s likely with more funding available Christie may actually be able to meet his contract requirements and thereby avoid going under. On the other hand do we actually NEED Christie to go forward?

Despite the contract and orders Christie had still not addressed several of the more pressing concerns and issues with the m1928 with the m1931, (officially, Christie insisted it was so far ahead of its time that he dubbed it the m1940/41) and this was in fact a major reason only 7 were ordered. OTL that meant that when Christie’s company folded the Army turned the job over to another company (American LaFrance) to build an improved version of the tank. The T4 addressed the issues Christie did not having more room, better armor and weapons but lacking the extreme speed of the T3.

A more relaxed budget would allow a bigger order for the T3 and perhaps with some persuasion, (Patton was a big advocate but couldn’t convince Christie to meet the Army half way) Christie takes the Army’s suggestions seriously. Barring that Christie is going to be an issue unless you an ‘kick’ him upstairs or something and allow actual evolution to take place.

Randy
 
Back to speculation. For whatever reason the US feels vastly less ‘secure’ in the post WWI years* so that military spending is at least marginally more open. In this manner there is more money to offer for Christie’s and other tank designs. Because while some were arguably ‘stinkers’ some were not and Christie was far from the only good designer at the time.

The main speculative POD here is does someone ‘sit’ on Christie enough to get more T3’s produced of the original design, (remember, even though officials LIKED the design there were serious and justified complaints about the lack of room, armor and weapons) and likely leading to a version of the US BT like tanks.

The main question though to get here is how does the background paradigm of less limited funds and a different post-WWI US defense and foreign policy now effect US defense policy and doctrine development?

The key to defining any defense related doctrine is predicated on the general situation, the general policy and the political and social intent of the United States Government and the political will and public support to carry out and support the same.

For example OTL the post-WWI US policy was one of isolationism with minimal military intervention. (Including spending) At the same time protection of US foreign interests was still important but no major conflict was foreseen or planned. Divestment of some US “territory” was planned, (the Philippians being given independence for example) but in general US policy and interests were to be robustly supported and defended but with as little direct military power as possible. Hence OTL the Army was seen as needing to move to a more ‘defensive’ posture and makeup from the more ‘aggressive’ war-time mode. This applied to the Navy as well but in general the Navy was always expected to have some capability to ‘project’ power worldwide to places of interest to the US.

As a direct example the OTL 1920 Defense Act (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Defense_Act_of_1920) which was directly responsible for mandating the US Army restrict “Tank” deployment to only the infantry. (Leading to “cavalry” and “support” tanks to being re-designated “Combat Cars” requiring separate funding and support which killed a lot of potential projects and required major changes in the evolving armor doctrine)

In essence the Act formalized and supported de-emphasis, (including demobilization and reduction) of the military built up by the US for WWI and directed post-WWI development. (Amendment in 1933 began reversing this OTL) of the Regular Army, increased use of the Guard and reduced procurement of new weapons and systems for the next decade at least. A more ‘defensive’ US military policy would see most of the restrictive segments of the act removed since the US will need to maintain and indeed continue to build and develop its forces and doctrine.

Historically the Navy provided ‘power’ projection along with commerce and distant defense in the form of a fleet in being that would intercept and/or interdict foreign forces on the sea moving towards the US. The Army meanwhile was tasked with providing shore and near shore defense through artillery and mobile infantry to repel forces that got past the Navy. After WWI of course a third aspect was added when the 3rd dimension of ‘airpower’ was added and part of the conflict due to financial and support shortages was over which service would take a leading role in that aspect of US defense policy.

Something to note here is a larger budget and/or more concerned US defense policy has a HUGE number of effects on both services policy, doctrine and relationships. For example as part of its “near-coastal” defensive task the Army followed the Navy into experimentation with Lighter Than Air systems which lead the Army to purchase the Italian semi-rigid airship “Roma” for testing. Long story short the engines that came with the airship were difficult to work with and hard to maintain and overall the airship itself proved expensive. In order to cut some of the costs the Italian engines were replaced with American made Liberty engines which proved to be both more powerful and more efficient. This in turn pushed the airship faster than it had been actually designed for and despite extensive testing done by the newly organized NACA funding for modifications to the Roma were not available so the airship was eventually destroyed in an accident. It is very likely this would not have happened if more funding and support were available. The “Roma” accident was used by certain interests to demonize hydrogen (which was at the time the primary and most economic lifting gas available but obviously dangerous) and promote the more rare helium as an alternative. The campaign worked and Congress outlawed the use of hydrogen in ANY American airship but this meant that the Navy’s new airships had to be redesigned to use helium which in fact the noted interests could not supply in sufficient quantities for practical use on the scale originally envisioned. In a chain of events the restrictions and costs of helium directly lead to the loss of both the Akron and Macon and the abandonment of large rigid airships in US service. The utility of LTA for defensive purposes however was already well established so that continued use of non-rigid airships was continued BUT the lack of funding meant that the Army could not afford to use helium so the mission fell to the Navy instead. This itself led to an official policy change where the ‘near-shore’ defensive responsibility was modified to take away aerial services from the Army and give it to the Navy which in turn ratcheted up the inter-service rivalry to the point where the Army actively went after the Navy, (using the Army Air Corps) in an attempt to not only regain the tasking but to attempt to remove the Navy from ALL defensive duties.
(The whole “Mitchell and the Battleship” fiasco/stunt)

As has been shown many times on these forums the basic premise of attacking maneuvering ships with high altitude bombers was flawed from the start. (If one actually examines the history and time period it is clear that control of the “media” and great effort to misinform the public and policy makers to effect public/political support, to the point of willfully ignoring the militaries actual duty to defend the nation, got it start in this period. And it just kept getting uglier)

Back on track: So since the Navy had the distant defense and power projection roles and the Army near-shore and continental defense roles. This was essentially what dictated the ‘doctrine’ of the services general operations. Hence the Navy needed battleships, (though not many as major conflict was not envisioned or policy) cruisers, (more since these could both project and protect power) aircraft carriers, (again seen as a adjunct to the battle line in a scouting role mostly so few needed and they were a work-in-progress in any case) destroyers, (many needed to both provide shipping protection and anti-submarine duteis0 and submarines which were seen as support vessels.

The Army meanwhile was by overall policy focusing on “defense” of the continental US through mobility, (mostly rail transport) and pre-positioned equipment and supplies being readily available for Federalized Guard units to be deployed to trouble spots. Artillery was therefore important but mostly in the context of mobile, (railroad and towed) assets backed up by Air Corps bombing and ground attack assets. While these were assumed to mostly apply to forces that managed to make it ashore there was also a large Coastal Artillery Command with fixed emplacements to man. As noted above there had initially been plans for using Air Power to supplement the near-shore/coastal defenses but this soon morphed into a public campaign to promote the heavy, long range bomber as the sole and best means to defend the US continent.

So this is the environment where the post-WWI armor doctrine evolved and why it was both slow and painful in that growth. “Armor” was not seen as a valid ‘defensive’ arm even though that seems illogical. In essence armor was seen as an ‘offensive’ force to be used to break enemy trench systems or oppose enemy armored thrusts in large battle field operations. Neither of these was considered a defensive scenario likely to be needed in the defense of the US continent. Some of the ‘lighter’ armor elements could of course scout for and support the infantry which is where “light” and “medium” tanks, armored cars and tankette’s could be used. But these mostly had limited roles due to the assumed ‘defensive’ nature of US policy.

A change to a more broad military policy and the support to go with it would require some very different doctrine to accomplish since it would be obvious that the military would not have to both plan and prepare for offensive as well as defensive operations. (So think of what changes would be required to include PLANNED offensive as well as defensive operations into the various ‘color’ plans)

Both the Army and Navy now have to both assume and prepare for offensive as well as defensive operations which it totally opposite what was needed to meet the general “policy” of armed isolation that existed OTL. The Army now has to consider planning that includes breaking trench lines and assaulting defense points more aggressively which feeds into how and what kind of armor they require. In context there is marginally more support from this POV for Christie’s ‘exploitation’ tactics and fast, mobile tanks have a bit more operational utility. On the other hand firepower and armor protection are also more important but being able to move far and fast is definitely now a consideration.

Aside-ing again but under the circumstances IF America copies or builds some of the British WW1 heavy tanks such as the MkVIII I’ll probably get my wish since adding a turreted gun was in fact in the planning stages when WWI ended. Further both the British and American’s were working on “APC” and battle transport (supplies) versions when the war ended. As it relates to doctrine development it’s unlikely that America will produce a LOT of these but this would obviously be the basis of a “heavy breakthrough tank” to complement lighter and faster “exploitation” tanks which is what Christie advocated and designed for. The main job here is getting a reliable vehicle with far better range.

Rather than strict ‘Christie’ tanks I suspect the US would quickly adopt “BT” type light and medium tanks to capitalize on the speed and endurance of the Christie suspension and design. But like everyone else OTL eventually did they’d more to more general and practical designs

Randy
*= A very plausible way to scare/impress the Americans from joining the war was to point out they were not 'invulnerable' anymore. Maybe you've heard of the "Africa Zeppelin"?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LZ_104_(L_59)

What's hardly known but should be obvious is this airship wasn't designed or built to go to Africa it and a few other designs had a different target: New York

The Germans were obviously worried about an American entry into the war, everyone was because it would be a huge shift. In a world where the Zimmerman telegram is a dodged bullet it would be pretty clear that a way needs to be found to 'encourage' the Americans to remain neutral and instead of a forlorn hope mission to Africa a flight to America to pick up vital cargo might be just the thing to do it. There was already the precedent of Merchant submarines (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_Deutschland) so some quick paperwork adjustments and quite diplomatic preparation and America wakes up to the sight of a German Zeppelin descending to a landing outside New York. An offered tour which clearly points to the 'obvious' non--military nature of the airship, (never mind the 'cargo' bay could easily be converted to carry bombs) should clearly relieve the American government and public which will naturally be a bit anxious, (and aware) of the fact that America has no way to stop an actual MILITARY Zeppelin from raining bombs down at will such as England and London has been suffering.

Once loaded the Zeppelin peacefully departs back to Germany and maybe more come visit and maybe they don't but the point is made VERY clearly.

I'd give it about a 50/50 chance of working either way but the fact remains it would definitely show America they are not as prepared as they might think... Thoughts?

Randy
 
Top