WI: United States Keeps the Pacific Fleet in San Diego

Japan attacks Pearl Harbor but flattens the repair yards and the oil storage yards.

The bomb weight the six carriers could deliver, even expending everything in three rounds of sorties was not remotely enough to 'flatten' the support facilities. Yes there would dry dock gates to repair, fuel tanks to rebuild, sunken cargo ships and a destroyer or two to remove from the harbor bottom, but even a maximum effort is not going to put PH out of action for six months or even three.Then there is the Japanese losses, a single round of sorties resulted in a permanent loss of 28 aircraft. Two attacks is liable to see that up 50% vs a alerted defense, so 70+ aircraft permanetly lost & at least half of the irreplaceable pilots. Since the Japanese did not think in terms of attrition warfare against support facilities the strike is liable to expend a lot of bombs on operational targets, like the airfields and any ships in the harbor. Plus Nagumo & his staff are unlikely to consider a second strike against what they see as a empty target area as worthwhile.
 
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Putting industrial facilities out of action for long by bombing required a lot of tonnage to be delivered, well beyond the capabilities of 6 carriers worth of strike aircraft over 2-3 sorties. As far as the oil facilities, tanks were separated by berms/blast barriers so while some of the storage could be destroyed, getting all or even most of this is unlikely. The Japanese can't know in advance that Short will conveniently line up all the aircraft, so he has to expect there will be land based aircraft attacks on his TF - and there are submarines at Pearl, and again the torpedo problem is unknown. Nagumo knows he will lose pilots/aircrew and aircraft, he can only hope the losses are low. As long as his TF is in range of Hawaii he risks air attacks on his carriers.

It is simply not worth the risks to the IJN to attack PH simply to damage the infrastructure. The damage will be limited and short lived, at best.

No PH, the war starting by Japan attacking the PI, won't necessarily make any difference to Midway. Unfortunately Wake was going to fall absent defenses being finished and rapid reinforcement. Guam was toast. The US can forward deploy the fleet to PH pretty quickly, and absent the damage from OTL PH to the base, as well as the land based air, the US will be in a better position to build up Midway, build up in Australia etc. IMHO the main losers ina no PH are the British and Dutch as there will be more force sooner to attack Malaya, DEI.
 
No. The Philippines HAD to be taken. They sat squarely on the IJN supply routes for oil from the DEI. The US could interdict oil shipments at will from there. There is no way the Japanese would try and occupy HI with the Philippines free to go after their supply lines

Maybe not. It would be risky to leave the Philippines in American hands but it has possible advantages as well

First, the Americans are faced with a political problem. Do they declare war over British and Dutch colonies being attacked? If not, big payday

Second, the Americans will take time to intervene and the Philippines can be attacked later if the Americans do move towards war. It will be harder to take them but Japan can still do it

Third, the American fleet can't be destroyed so what are you giving up


The other option is to capture Hawaii. With the American fleet out of the way it should be possible
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Second, the Americans will take time to intervene and the Philippines can be attacked later if the Americans do move towards war. It will be harder to take them but Japan can still do it
The real danger is simple - a US buildup on the Phillies, to the tune of several extra divisions and plenty of modern equipment. Several dozen Stuart tanks?
 
The real danger is simple - a US buildup on the Phillies, to the tune of several extra divisions and plenty of modern equipment. Several dozen Stuart tanks?

Even if the Americans declared war over Burma being attacked, that would take time. When the Japanese detect the American movements, they can attack the Philippines all the same. American suppy lines would be hopelessly stretched

Still, there is option 2 of conquering Hawaii
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Even if the Americans declared war over Burma being attacked, that would take time. When the Japanese detect the American movements, they can attack the Philippines all the same. American suppy lines would be hopelessly stretched
If there's enough warstocks present in the Phillies, then the territory can supply its own food. It is a (modern) country.
 
Even if the Americans declared war over Burma being attacked, that would take time. When the Japanese detect the American movements, they can attack the Philippines all the same. American suppy lines would be hopelessly stretched

Still, there is option 2 of conquering Hawaii

Are you joking about Hawaii or is this satire because the issues with a Hawaiian invasion are enough to probably get someone to lose their job if they proposed it. Also attacking the Philipines while they currently have their armies fighting in Malaya and the DEI and a hopefully more alert American garrison praying to God Dug out Doug gets the B17s in the air combined with the almost certain presence of American reinforcements and accelerated construction of defenses plus the dropping of the peacetime attitude once Japan starts fighting the Brits effectively means Japan is going to have a tougher time with the US this time around
 
...
First, the Americans are faced with a political problem. Do they declare war over British and Dutch colonies being attacked? If not, big payday

...

There are a number of books that examine the US politics of this period and the slow acceptance of the US voters/leaders of inevitability of war. Three on my shelf are: 'The Warhawks; American Interventionists before Pearl Harbor' by Mark Chadham, 'The Borrowed Years 1938 - 1941; America on the way to war' by Richard Ketcham', 'Secret Allies in the Pacific' by Roland Worth. Costellos 'The Pacific War' has a few paragraphs on the subject. Some of the core points in these are:

The US had started a very expensive mobilization in 1940, expanding the US Army from 200,000 to 1,600,000 men in fourteen months, and starting construction that would double the combat power of the US navy in a bit over two years.

The US had led in establishing the embargos against Japan. These did have a reverse economic and political effect on the US. The embargos were not pain free as Japan had become the largest trading partner of the US in Asia, cutting those sales off and imports was far more than anoying. It also pissed off many nuetrals in Latin America creating a whole new set of political complication for the US there.

At the end of November 1941 Roosevelt had caused the Sec of War & Sec Nav to issue a War Warning message to all US forces in the Pacific. This message directed that any Japanese military forces sighted near US territory were to be considered hostile and were to be attacked. This last was all but a DoW on Japan. Given the necessity for Japanese naval and air forces to skirt past the Phillipines to attack Maylasia, Sumatra, Celebes, Java, ect... It made combat between US and Japanese forces nearly inevitable. Naval and air patrols out of PI would have been tripping over Japanese warships and cargo shipping transiting to the battle front. Were the Pensacola Convoy dispatched to PI in December as planned it would have been nearly impossible to route it away from Japanese mandate islands, or Japanese forces attacking south.

Bottom line is the US voters had accepted the economically challenging mobilization starting in 1940, accepted the embargos, and increasingly accepted the probability of war with Japan. In the autum of 1941 the majority polled accepted that the US and Japan would be at war within a few months. Opposition in Congress had eased and the America First organization & the isolationists in general were rapidly weakening and losing support. Skirmishes between US naval & air patrols would inflame things, & if the Japanese interfere with the Pensacola convoy to PI the Congress may give up a DoW before the end of December. Alternately Japan may cast their half of the vote and make a show of force or preemptive attack on PI.
 
Japan attacks Pearl Harbor but flattens the repair yards and the oil storage yards.
Uh, no. Japan had no expectation of a long war, so without BBs or CVs present, there's no target. So...
with Pearl nullified for a period
...is also mistaken.
no significant reinforcements at Wake or Midway in late 41...Both of these fall by May 42 with minimal Japanese losses.
Wake probably falls as OTL. Midway was beyond Japan's capacity in any event. And just because the Fleet isn't in Hawaii on 7/12 does not mean no reinforcement of Midway or Wake.
or the Aussies in New Guinea without the resources to do Coral Sea
:confounded: You do understand the Coral Sea was fought by USN, not RAN, don't you?
That butterflies away Watchtower
:confounded: Why?
The other option is to capture Hawaii. With the American fleet out of the way it should be possible
:rolleyes::rolleyes: That's a fantasy even IJA leadership didn't believe.
 
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If Japan takes Midway along with Wake (and they probably could) then they have what looks like a good defensive perimeter. Now the ships used to keep the garrison supplied can be whittled down by air and submarine attack.
 
Regarding the US carriers, remember what they were doing in OTL, namely reinforcing various bases (Wake, Guam), so the carriers might still be (even if as temporary detachments) in those waters like OTL (but if any of them are in port it will be a disaster for the americans). As to the battleships, OK they are based at San Diego, but perhaps it's possible a division might de deployed to hawaiian waters for exercises, "support" and what not? Did the US BBs ever operated like that prior to the OTL permanent deployment to Pearl?

Imo the attack on Pearl still makes sense as destroying the shore facilities would hinder the expected advance of the US fleet from San Diego, as is deploying the subs but perhaps minus the futile midget sub attack (but they might still carry it trying to sink whatever ships are in port to again hinder operations), just waiting for the arrival of the fleet and do their attritioning according to doctrine. Because most or all the US BBs and their escorting ships are not at Pearl, the japanese might actually face less AA fire, so their losses might be less, also they may not deploy any torpedo planes, just using all the B5Ns for level bombing.

With the absence of the US fleet at Pearl, perhaps the IJN might just send four carriers to attack the shore facilities (says the elite Cardiv1 and 2), leaving two (greener Cardiv 5) to either support the invasion of the Phillipines, replacing the IJAAF contribution there (which can be then used to bolster the IJAAF forces in Burma, Malaya etc.), or support the invasions of Wake and perhaps Midway, which again makes sense in using it as an avanced scouting base to warn of the incoming US fleet.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Regarding the US carriers, remember what they were doing in OTL, namely reinforcing various bases (Wake, Guam), so the carriers might still be (even if as temporary detachments) in those waters like OTL (but if any of them are in port it will be a disaster for the americans). As to the battleships, OK they are based at San Diego, but perhaps it's possible a division might de deployed to hawaiian waters for exercises, "support" and what not? Did the US BBs ever operated like that prior to the OTL permanent deployment to Pearl?

If you want to see what the other set of war plans, you should read Admiral Richardson, the person fired for arguing for San Diego too much. It is a generalization, but the BB in San Diego were being used as training ships as much as anything else. In a rapidly expanding navy, there was a constant need for officers and NCO's to man the newly built ships. Most BB lost officers on weekly basis to new ships. Aggravating this training issue, was prewar staffing pattern of 1/2 of engineering section and 1/3 rest of ship.

There would probably be a few cruisers at Pearl. Maybe a single carrier, since carriers are scout ships. If you look at the Asiatic Fleet and beef it up 2-4 non-capital ships, this is probably about right for Pearl. You could also look at the early 1938 forces levels in Pearl. IMO, Richardson plan was much better since you can move the fleet from San Diego to Pearl several times faster than you can get the remaining supplies to Pearl.

Imo the attack on Pearl still makes sense as destroying the shore facilities would hinder the expected advance of the US fleet from San Diego, as is deploying the subs but perhaps minus the futile midget sub attack (but they might still carry it trying to sink whatever ships are in port to again hinder operations), just waiting for the arrival of the fleet and do their attritioning according to doctrine. Because most or all the US BBs and their escorting ships are not at Pearl, the japanese might actually face less AA fire, so their losses might be less, also they may not deploy any torpedo planes, just using all the B5Ns for level bombing.

With the absence of the US fleet at Pearl, perhaps the IJN might just send four carriers to attack the shore facilities (says the elite Cardiv1 and 2), leaving two (greener Cardiv 5) to either support the invasion of the Phillipines, replacing the IJAAF contribution there (which can be then used to bolster the IJAAF forces in Burma, Malaya etc.), or support the invasions of Wake and perhaps Midway, which again makes sense in using it as an avanced scouting base to warn of the incoming US fleet.

Japan was thinking in terms of the decisive battle. Destroying docks and lesser ships by risking carriers does not fit into this doctrine. The most likely place for the carriers is to spend much of the first 6 months of the war with the main battleline, awaiting the decisive battle. You may see one section of CV or the CVL detailed to help the attack towards the oil. And with the USA fleet intact, we probably don't see the carriers actions in the Indian Ocean of OTL.
 
The OP has the pacific fleet in San Diego which means no carriers to attack

Yes but if Pearl is rendered unusable- &
destroying the oil & repair facilities there
would have done it- then the USN loses a very important forward base. This makes
fighting the IJN twice- maybe even three
times- more difficult than it was IOTL.
 
Yes but if Pearl is rendered unusable- &
destroying the oil & repair facilities there
would have done it- then the USN loses a very important forward base. This makes
fighting the IJN twice- maybe even three
times- more difficult than it was IOTL.

That certainly makes sense from your PoV. But try to understand the Japanese naval leaders flat out did not think that way & thought it a waste of combat power.

... There would probably be a few cruisers at Pearl. Maybe a single carrier, since carriers are scout ships. If you look at the Asiatic Fleet and beef it up 2-4 non-capital ships, this is probably about right for Pearl. You could also look at the early 1938 forces levels in Pearl. ...

In that situation they might make a rid with one, or maybe two, carriers & sink a couple cruisers. That would fit the doctrine as it would be damaging the enemy scout forces.
 
That certainly makes sense from your PoV. But try to understand the Japanese naval leaders flat out did not think that way & thought it a waste of combat power.



In that situation they might make a rid with one, or maybe two, carriers & sink a couple cruisers. That would fit the doctrine as it would be damaging the enemy scout forces.


Understood Carl- & though I think it might
have been a good idea if they didn't, chang-
ing the assumptions of any group of people
is of course often as easy as trying to budge
The Empire State Building single- handed.
 
Could we please kill the mythology that the Kido Butai had the firepower to shut down the base at Pearl Harbor for an appreciable period of time. They could have done damage, even some significant damage to specific facilities but without constant revisits and restrikes, the base will probably be back up and running within a couple of months. Pearl Harbor represents a massive set of targets and even in this day and age of PGMs, doing serious long term destruction requires a great deal of concerted effort.

WRT the Japanese invading Oahu. With what troops and shipping? The carrier raid on PH was a stretch of their capabilities, taking a slow moving invasion fleet across the Pacific and then sustaining the operation is essentially the Pacific Theater's version of the Sea Mammal.
 
Could we please kill the mythology that the Kido Butai had the firepower to shut down the base at Pearl Harbor for an appreciable period of time. ...

No we can't. Its something folks cling to despite the evidence, or rush to when not knowing the facts about the capability of carrier aircraft & the damage it actually takes to do this. I remember a thread a couple years ago where a couple people would not turn loose of the idea the fuel tanks for the fleet could be instantly turned into a sea of flame, consuming every bit of fuel in a hour or two. A few strafing aircraft and a handful of 120kg bombs is all it would take. The evidence they kept presenting continually backfired and on examination proved otherwise. There are people who are obsessed with the silver bullet, the golden BB, the panacea action that will reduce the enemy to impotence in a single simple sure action.

...
WRT the Japanese invading Oahu. With what troops and shipping? The carrier raid on PH was a stretch of their capabilities, taking a slow moving invasion fleet across the Pacific and then sustaining the operation is essentially the Pacific Theater's version of the Sea Mammal.

Be fun to game that one.
 
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