WI: Union/Confederacy adopts shock/skirmish hybrid tactics?

[Saphroneth]

Based on discussions about 1850s and 1860s infantry tactics.


The conceit is:

1) The Union and the Confederacy are building up armies from very little, and are both scrambling to get modern weapons for the first year or two.
2) OTL most of both sides did not practice shooting much if at all, and most shots missed.


So - in order to recognize the limitations of the sides of the Civil War, here's a proposal for a tactical combination that could have been adopted.

Brigades formed of five battalions, in a 1+4 configuration. The 1 would be a skirmisher unit, equipped with the best rifles available at that time (Springfield, Enfield, Baker if that's all they can get) and the other four would be primarily shock-based units.

The skirmish battalion would be trained in range estimation, long range shooting, and practice intensively in this specifically - they should be able to hit targets at maximum ACW visual range with relative ease, and at best should be able to snipe out artillery from extreme grapeshot range.

In combat, the skirmish battalion would be deployed as one might expect and the line battalions in firing line - except, specifically, on the attack.

When an attack is taking place, the skirmishers would aim to suppress the defenders, and as such reduce the risk of the beaten zone which would otherwise prevent a shock attack.
The shock battalions would then close to decisive range, either for a close-in firefight or at the point of the bayonet.


This has the advantage that it economizes on the good target rifles which both sides were scrambling to produce and purchase, so could have good results on either side of the line, and it also means that only one battalion in five has to undergo the intensive shooting training which it takes to hit a long ranged target. (This could be further aided by giving the skirmish battalion the men who've handled a gun before, since this shortens the time it takes to become a superb shot.)


So, among the places this could have an effect, I can see...


1) The Union attack at Fredricksburg. (When the British did a similar kind of thing at the Alma, with rifles firing over the heads of their assault troops, they carried the hill despite it being over four times as high as at Fredricksburg.)
2) The Confederate attack at Gettysburg. (Not Pickett's Charge - the Round Tops attack. That was a close one, as I understand it...)

 

[Maniakes]

The Confederacy flirted with something along these lines for a while in 1862, with a proposal to add two companies of pikemen to each infantry regiment. From what I gather, the proposal was approved, funds appropriated, and pikes purchased, but pike companies never actually saw battle

Most of the information I can find on the logic behind the proposal is vague and speculative, but from what I gather it was similar to your idea with the proportions reversed: the pikemen would be melee specialists, dominating Union infantry in close combat, while the other eight companies (armed with rifle muskets) would provide covering fire.

I can't find hard info on why the plan was abandoned. I suspect it was largely a result of the proposal only making sense in the context of the conditions you cited as prevailing very early in the war (inexperienced marksmanship and a shortage of modern weapons relative to the number of available recruits), which was no longer the case by the time the pikes were ready in significant quantities. There was probably an additional issue related to the abandonment of pikes in European warfare quite a bit before the ACW period: regardless of the cold military logic, bringing a pointed stick to a gunfight is bad for morale.

 

[zert]

Maybe more use/training of the already trained sharpshooter companies?

Could that have an effect you are talking about?

 

[Vae Victus]

I wonder why Pikeman? If theyre not gonna comprise the main force in battle then they cant form a dense enough formation to punch through an opposing firing line before being shot to pieces, not to mention carrying long pikes/spears are cumbersome and unwieldy.

Wouldn't sword and buckler armed infantry be a better solution, if you're only gonna outfit 10-20% of the line force to melee. They can move much more quickly thus hitting an enemy formation MUCH faster than pike armed troops. Can pick up muskets and double as ad hoc shooters as needed. Sword/Buckler troops will UTTERLY devastate bayonet armed musket troops and its not like they have to run headlong into orderly pick formations or face too much cavalry threat. Basically bring back rodeleros and use em to when you expect a melee.

Essentially alot of the factors that phased out rodeleros are not present in the ACW. Just dont use em stupidly and you can get ALOT of usage out of em at decisive points in every battle.

That is if you REALLY want some melee units.

 

[larpsidekick]

Sword/Buckler troops will UTTERLY devastate bayonet armed musket troops

They didn't at Culloden...

That is, as soon as a bayonet armed force had worked out a tactic to deal with the shield, the shield / sword force was pretty much neutered

 

[Saphroneth]

Maybe more use/training of the already trained sharpshooter companies?

Could that have an effect you are talking about?

Expand it out so a fifth of the army is sharpshooter type units (it's quite doable, the British Army did it to everyone!) and the remaining four fifths uses normal ACW tactics. Basically the job of the sharpshooter battalion is to shoot the others onto their objectives, by suppressing the base of fire that otherwise causes trouble to an attacker.

 

[Kome]

I wonder why Pikeman? If theyre not gonna comprise the main force in battle then they cant form a dense enough formation to punch through an opposing firing line before being shot to pieces, not to mention carrying long pikes/spears are cumbersome and unwieldy.

Wouldn't sword and buckler armed infantry be a better solution, if you're only gonna outfit 10-20% of the line force to melee. They can move much more quickly thus hitting an enemy formation MUCH faster than pike armed troops. Can pick up muskets and double as ad hoc shooters as needed. Sword/Buckler troops will UTTERLY devastate bayonet armed musket troops and its not like they have to run headlong into orderly pick formations or face too much cavalry threat. Basically bring back rodeleros and use em to when you expect a melee.

Essentially alot of the factors that phased out rodeleros are not present in the ACW. Just dont use em stupidly and you can get ALOT of usage out of em at decisive points in every battle.

That is if you REALLY want some melee units.

The pikes made during the ACW were only 6-10ft making it more like a spear or pretty similar length to a rifled musket with a bayonet. A stick with a knife bayonet (the one I've seen had a retractable switchblade design, which is kind of neat I guess). The pikes you're likely thinking of were usually around 15ft or more.

So not as unwieldy as a proper pike or as you're thinking of. But its still just a stick with a bayonet at the end. Imagine a rifled musket and bayonet without the musket part being actually functional.

The Confederacy flirted with something along these lines for a while in 1862, with a proposal to add two companies of pikemen to each infantry regiment. From what I gather, the proposal was approved, funds appropriated, and pikes purchased, but pike companies never actually saw battle

Most of the information I can find on the logic behind the proposal is vague and speculative, but from what I gather it was similar to your idea with the proportions reversed: the pikemen would be melee specialists, dominating Union infantry in close combat, while the other eight companies (armed with rifle muskets) would provide covering fire.

I can't find hard info on why the plan was abandoned. I suspect it was largely a result of the proposal only making sense in the context of the conditions you cited as prevailing very early in the war (inexperienced marksmanship and a shortage of modern weapons relative to the number of available recruits), which was no longer the case by the time the pikes were ready in significant quantities. There was probably an additional issue related to the abandonment of pikes in European warfare quite a bit before the ACW period: regardless of the cold military logic, bringing a pointed stick to a gunfight is bad for morale.

Theoretically it (the pikes) might actually have been usable looking at it only from the view point of tactics. In reality no one actually wanted to try it.

 

[zert]

With increased sharpshooters per regiment, the CSA might lose more officers and sergeants. This might add to Union wins.

 

[robcraufurd]

The Union actually did this, to an extent- the Confederacy may have done as well, but I happen to have the Union information to hand. During the first year of the war, before the foreign rifle imports started coming in bulk, there was a vogue for arming battalion companies with smoothbores and flank companies with rifles. For instance, 10th and 11th Wisconsin; 41st, 46th, 52nd, 54th, 60th, 64th, 65th, 69th, 80th and 85th New York, etc. The problem was that they never got round to training the flank companies in using their rifles, so it didn't have any real effect on the battlefield.

This is a generally solid tactic for making the best use of a large number of semi-trained troops. The French adopted something similar in the Revolutionary wars; the Austrians adopted it in 1866; and Major G.L. Willard advocated its adoption by the Union in 1863. You can also flex the balance between fire and shock: the musket troops either charge with the bayonet, or deploy into line and use their muskets at short range.

It's probably the Union who have the best chance of adopting this tactic successfully. The Confederacy didn't have access to enough rifles to hand out a 1:4 proportion, and the Union also have the regular army to act as a nucleus for the light infantry force. On the other hand, it implies a much greater level of State and Federal control over the organisation and equipment of units- no haphazard and sometimes politically-motivated allocations of weapons. It might have been easier to organise it in the field, by confiscating and re-allocating weapons, than from the start of the war. In fact, one general might have done it of his own accord and had his example adopted as standard.