WI: UN Line Holds North of Pyongyang

Could the 8th Army hold north of Pyongyang?

  • Yes

    Votes: 33 82.5%
  • No

    Votes: 7 17.5%

  • Total voters
    40
Say MacArthur's ego explodes and kills him after the Incheon landings. Walker takes over as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, and Ridgeway takes command of the 8th Army in Korea. As UN units advance into NK, they begin to receive reports, as in OTL, of captured Chinese troops among the North Koreans. Ridgeway takes this to mean the PRC has committed to the war, and consolidates his forces along the narrow neck of the Korean Peninsula, north of Pyongyang. This is one of the narrowest points on the peninsula, around 100-110 miles as the crow flies. Accounting for some natural defensive features and key roads, it might zig-zag about 120-140 miles.

Can the 8th Army hold this line and defeat the Chinese offensive? A few problems I see facing the 8th Army:

  • The US and her allies were committed to Europe, and saw Korea as a sideshow, even during the route of the 8th Army in 1950-1951
  • The US only had a token force manning the front line - something like 7 divisions at the peak if my memory is correct, along with 1-2 divisions worth of troops from European/Commonwealth allies
  • There was little political will in Washington to send a few hundred thousand American boys back into Asia only five years after WWII
  • The quality of the troops was abysmal early in the war. Morale fluctuated between nonexistent in the retreat and arrogance in the advance. Units were missing experienced NCOs/officers, and the soldiers had either forgotten basic soldiering skills or were thrown into the meat grinder without a chance to learn them

With all that said, I think the UN has a fair chance of holding the line if action is taken in September-October. The Chinese took quite a beating attacking disorganized UN troops in OTL. After the front stabilized in March 1951, the UN held its own quite well against the Chinese, and the front line never moved far enough to threaten the UN's position on the peninsula. With an early effort to get organized and lobby Washington for more troops, the front could stabilize much earlier, and much farther north.

Here's an excellent article written by SLA Marshall in September 1953 on US failures during the war, and how just four more divisions could have made all the difference: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1953/09/our-mistakes-in-korea/376243/

 
Yes, holding that line includes all the important parts of North Korea. North of there its mostly wilderness anyway.

I suspect if the UN stops there, the Chinese may choose not to engage, would remain in the northern parts. An attack on prepared forces (such as they were) would be costly for the Chines vs the strung out easily ambushable columns moving north. The Chinese would be happy enough with a buffer zone under their control even if it wasn't economically useful.

What happens after:
a) Probably something similar to our time line, except with a further north DMZ, the North would really be little more than another province of China.
b) Its hard to imagine another scenario, but maybe Korea becoming like Austria under a regime favorable to the west but no USA (or other UN) troops.
 
I think Mac’s biggest blunder was the liberation of Seoul by US troops. By tying up US forces in the city, he failed to block the NK army retreat north. Based on this POD, Seoul is liberated by ROK troops allowing the Inchon forces to block the NK retreat north. The NK are then destroyed between the the northern and southern UN forces. Then the unified UN force advances north of Pyongyang and creates a “DMZ” across Korea. The result is Mao sees a strong unified UN force, that has soundly defeated the NK forces and captured their capital and surrounding territory as reparations. The remainder of NK will be officially considered neutral territory monitored by the UN. South Korea becomes simply Korea. However diplomatic back channels tell Mao, what’s left of NK can become a “protectorate” of China, with the option to become Chinese territory, at a future date.

Ric350
 
According to the article, another 4 US divisions would've been enough to turn it from a stalemate into a war of maneuver. Say the failed Chinese offensive emboldens the US government, and they authorize the formation of a maneuver corps. With a front of over 100 miles, as well as hundreds of miles of coastline, how could the war develop after the Chinese offensive is blunted? Any chance of pushing up to the Yalu?
 
With enough resources, sure the US/UN could go to and stop at the Yalu. The problem, IMHO, is that Mao was not willing to see that happening and would be unlikely to accept a cease fire there. So now even if the US/UN don't want to go beyond the Yalu, there will have to be attacks even just artillery and air attacks across the river. Mao may eventually accept a unified Korea under US tutelage, or...it can go very sideways.
 
With enough resources, sure the US/UN could go to and stop at the Yalu.

I think you are a bit confused on your geography: the Yalu was where MacArthur intended to stop OTL and where they got their teeth kicked in by the Chinese because, as it turned out, the US/UN forces couldn't hold the Yalu River line. Here, the proposal is to stop at the "neck" of the peninsula with the line anchored on the Taedong River in the west and Hungnam or Wonsan in the east, which is still well to the south of the Yalu. Of course, as pointed out, the fundamental problem is that MacArthur wouldn't do it because MacArthur discounted the Chinese as a serious threat.
 
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The problem is, there was simply no other US forces available for deployment. The 1st Inf Div is deployed in West Germany, the 82 Airborne is strategic reserve in the States, the 2nd Armored is not suitable to be used in hilly Korea, so only one division (5th Inf) is available, but that would also mean no reinforcement for Europe.
 

longsword14

Banned
Of course, as pointed out, the fundamental problem is that MacArthur wouldn't do it because MacArthur discounted the Chinese as a serious threat.
Doubt he is talking about MacArthur doing so. Under Ridgway might be a possibility, with the Chinese getting their teeth kicked in instead, which however must demand a better performance from the beginning (so that the entire UN force does not get pushed back to the starting line).
 
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Md139115

Banned
I was at the funeral of one of John Wainwright’s grand-nephews just a few weeks ago.

It’s a shame, I never got the chance to tell him what a better world we would have had if his great-uncle had been evacuated and the Almighty God’s Boss (as Robert Conroy once so aptly described him) been left to the Japanese.
 
According to the article, another 4 US divisions would've been enough to turn it from a stalemate into a war of maneuver. Say the failed Chinese offensive emboldens the US government, and they authorize the formation of a maneuver corps. With a front of over 100 miles, as well as hundreds of miles of coastline, how could the war develop after the Chinese offensive is blunted? Any chance of pushing up to the Yalu?

A front of 100 miles, in mountainous terrain, across a peninsular with both flanks anchored on the coast and the UN forces controlling the sea sounds very familiar - it's Italy all over again. Advancing to the Yalu would be possible, but it would require massive reinforcement and would be very bloody - just look at Cassino.
 
I understand the OP's post, and agree that a line across the neck of Korea would have been quite defensible and would have resulted in a better long terem result. I was answering another post about could the US/UN gone to the Yalu given some extra resources. If they had the resources, which I admit would have had to have been created, if they had had a better tactical plan, had they used the intel they had, they could have ended up there. It would have cost a lot of extra US/UN blood and a huge amount of Chinese blood, and also required at least air and artillery strikes across the Yalu in to China. That could have led to very bad things.
 
I think you are a bit confused on your geography: the Yalu was where MacArthur intended to stop OTL and where they got their teeth kicked in by the Chinese because, as it turned out, the US/UN forces couldn't hold the Yalu River line. Here, the proposal is to stop at the "neck" of the peninsula with the line anchored on the Taedong River in the west and Hungnam or Wonsan in the east, which is still well to the south of the Yalu. Of course, as pointed out, the fundamental problem is that MacArthur wouldn't do it because MacArthur discounted the Chinese as a serious threat.
I think he was referring to my last post, where I asked if the UN forces could advance to the Yalu after blunting the Chinese offensive at the 'neck'
 
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