Say MacArthur's ego explodes and kills him after the Incheon landings. Walker takes over as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, and Ridgeway takes command of the 8th Army in Korea. As UN units advance into NK, they begin to receive reports, as in OTL, of captured Chinese troops among the North Koreans. Ridgeway takes this to mean the PRC has committed to the war, and consolidates his forces along the narrow neck of the Korean Peninsula, north of Pyongyang. This is one of the narrowest points on the peninsula, around 100-110 miles as the crow flies. Accounting for some natural defensive features and key roads, it might zig-zag about 120-140 miles.
Can the 8th Army hold this line and defeat the Chinese offensive? A few problems I see facing the 8th Army:
With all that said, I think the UN has a fair chance of holding the line if action is taken in September-October. The Chinese took quite a beating attacking disorganized UN troops in OTL. After the front stabilized in March 1951, the UN held its own quite well against the Chinese, and the front line never moved far enough to threaten the UN's position on the peninsula. With an early effort to get organized and lobby Washington for more troops, the front could stabilize much earlier, and much farther north.
Here's an excellent article written by SLA Marshall in September 1953 on US failures during the war, and how just four more divisions could have made all the difference: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1953/09/our-mistakes-in-korea/376243/
Can the 8th Army hold this line and defeat the Chinese offensive? A few problems I see facing the 8th Army:
- The US and her allies were committed to Europe, and saw Korea as a sideshow, even during the route of the 8th Army in 1950-1951
- The US only had a token force manning the front line - something like 7 divisions at the peak if my memory is correct, along with 1-2 divisions worth of troops from European/Commonwealth allies
- There was little political will in Washington to send a few hundred thousand American boys back into Asia only five years after WWII
- The quality of the troops was abysmal early in the war. Morale fluctuated between nonexistent in the retreat and arrogance in the advance. Units were missing experienced NCOs/officers, and the soldiers had either forgotten basic soldiering skills or were thrown into the meat grinder without a chance to learn them
With all that said, I think the UN has a fair chance of holding the line if action is taken in September-October. The Chinese took quite a beating attacking disorganized UN troops in OTL. After the front stabilized in March 1951, the UN held its own quite well against the Chinese, and the front line never moved far enough to threaten the UN's position on the peninsula. With an early effort to get organized and lobby Washington for more troops, the front could stabilize much earlier, and much farther north.
Here's an excellent article written by SLA Marshall in September 1953 on US failures during the war, and how just four more divisions could have made all the difference: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1953/09/our-mistakes-in-korea/376243/