WI: U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor stays intact.

CalBear said:
Flight distance from Wake to Clark is 3,050 miles. Wake to the various Marshall Islands is 600-800 miles (it is 700 miles to Wotje & 680 to Kwajalein, as a comparison the range to Berlin from East Anglia is 600-650 miles) Saipan is 1,300 which the B-17 can reach with a half bomb load, the B-24 does a little better. For that matter the B-26 can reach the Marshalls, as can the B-25, although the Mitchell is a bit out on the edge of the envelope with a full 3,000 pound load-out.


I'm sure we can all agree that the B-25 can be used from less lengthy runways with 2,000 pound bomb loads
Thx. (Somehow, I always think the distances are greater, with all that ocean.:eek:)

I take it you don't disagree on the subs?:cool:
CalBear said:
Ranger[/I] was never considered to be a really combat ready asset, not in the Pacific.
AFAIK, you could delete all after "asset".;) (If I can crib Nimitz.:p)
CalBear said:
When considering Ranger it is generally accepted that she should be considered to be more of a CVE
Or AVG (a/c ferry)? Which would free Wasp from supply runs to Malta, wouldn't it?

As for the rest of your remarks, I'd say even Kimmel, not a carrier sailor, could do the math...:eek:
 
One problem is that you also need the numbers of fighters on USS Ranger. There simply were not enough F4F's available at the time and pilots capable of flying this thing. USN Carriers in the first 6 months of the pacific War usually lacked the needed numbers of fighters, as already had been mentioned. In the early months, USS Lexington even used her obsolete F2A Buffaloes, due to lack of available F4F Wildcats.

All you can achieve with USS Ranger was a carrier with no or, at best a few, aircraft, just as bait, like Ozawa's decoyforce at Leyte. This might be the same as giving away the ship to Japan, or scuttle it. USS Ranger simply had more important roles to play as training carrier in the East Coast region, just for thos new breed of aviators.

So the conclussion might be to simply forget the pacifci for the moment and focus on the real big picture of war in WW2, namely the Germany first strategy, as Germany was always the far more important foe, being much more powerful and more industrialised, compared to Japan. Japan had to wait, as it already was making things difficult for herself by not forcing her opponents to a final decission at sea. Pl;aying the Japanese hand would be considered not too smart at least, if not treason in its worse case.


So how many Wildcats could they muster assuming we're talking of a failed Pearl attack (if the fleet suvived intact in the POD the shore based F4 can be assumed to have survived also). Didn't the USN have sufficient crews and aircraft for its CAG, even with Marine Squadrons joinning in?
Lets say the deadline for a counterstrike is the last week of December, 1941. That gives them 15/20 days for carriers to sail to the Pacific through Panama, taking in aircraft en route, and for all avaiable aircraft to be deploued to the PacFleet...

Thats what I got but needs more detail... French Aircraft diverted to the RN not included here probably. Is it safe to assume that if they really tried to muster all avaible fighters they would be able to deploy 150/160 Wildcats? At the time the lack of fighting capability of the Buffalo would no be fully known, so they might consider using some of those hopeless bovines...
Production Figures
TypeYearNumbersNotes F4F-3 1940-1941 183 F4F-3A 1940-1 30 Built for Greek airforce, diverted to Royal Navy after fall of Greece 1941 61 The rest of an original U.S. Navy order of 91
 
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USS Wasp was on loan in the UK, assigned at first to the Homefleet, with the battleships USS North Carolina and USS Washington. USS Ranger was still on the East coast acting as a training ship. For that reason, Ranger never could be activated as a fightingship on short order, simply as she had at the time no airgroup available for her own. Wasp had to soldier on in the Atlantic and was selected to make ferryruns to malta, simply due to her larger elevators capable of handling spitfires with non folding wings. Ranger had smaller elevators and could not be used this way, just as the British carriers. Theoretically you could also use the Yorktown and Hornet to ferry in the Spitfires, but that would be likely less atractive to the USN.

Secondly the priority was in the Atlantic first, as the war was much harder for the USA there in the early warmonths, as German U-Boote caused more damage at "Paukenschlag", than the Japanese had created the entire period fo the first six months. (Total of tonnage sunk at the Eastcoast and Carribean Region was far exceeding the tonnage lost in the Pacific.) The USN simply had to accept the Pacific had been designated a secodnary war to the total wareffort.
 
USS Wasp was on loan in the UK, assigned at first to the Homefleet, with the battleships USS North Carolina and USS Washington. USS Ranger was still on the East coast acting as a training ship. For that reason, Ranger never could be activated as a fightingship on short order, simply as she had at the time no airgroup available for her own. Wasp had to soldier on in the Atlantic and was selected to make ferryruns to malta, simply due to her larger elevators capable of handling spitfires with non folding wings. Ranger had smaller elevators and could not be used this way, just as the British carriers. Theoretically you could also use the Yorktown and Hornet to ferry in the Spitfires, but that would be likely less atractive to the USN.

Secondly the priority was in the Atlantic first, as the war was much harder for the USA there in the early warmonths, as German U-Boote caused more damage at "Paukenschlag", than the Japanese had created the entire period fo the first six months. (Total of tonnage sunk at the Eastcoast and Carribean Region was far exceeding the tonnage lost in the Pacific.) The USN simply had to accept the Pacific had been designated a secodnary war to the total wareffort.


Sure, sure...
But in a Hypotetical scenario were Roosevelt goes Margret Teacher on the Pacific with a intact PacFleet what was the best they could do? Not should, not did, but could....

Something like...
"Winston, I know you're having trouble with the Germans now, but those dammned Japs tried (and failed) to sink my fleet, and are attacking Wake Island, wich my good friend CalBear just explained to me is vital for our Pacific Strategy, so I'm going to call my carriers and fast BB back ASAP and I'm going to organize an operation to either relieve the island or retake it if we don't get there in time."
So, with the USN reading IJN codes, and aware thatwhat they loose in 41/42 they can build back, and with good news comming from Moscow in Mid December 1941, whats the best the USN could do?
 
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Sure, sure...
But in a Hypotetical scenario were Roosevelt goes Margret Teacher on the Pacific with a intact PacFleet what was the best they could do? Not should, not did, but could....

Something like...
"Winston, I know you're having trouble with the Germans now, but those dammned Japs tried (and failed) to sink my fleet, and are attacking Wake Island, wich my good friend CalBear just explained to me is vital for our Pacific Strategy, so I'm going to call my carriers and fast BB back ASAP and I'm going to organize an operation to either relieve the island or retake it if we don't get there in time."
So, with the USN reading IJN codes, and aware thatwhat they loose in 41/42 they can build back, and with good news comming from Moscow in Mid December 1941, whats the best the USN could do?


It seems more likely FDR get's a civil war in case he would go on that direction, which clearly was un-american. US history shows the military to be bold and ready for action all the time, but not suicidal. Second and not the least, the USA had a deal with the British (and other allies), so breaking such a contract would be considered treasoneous and it would blame the USA for loosing the war, if worse came out of it. FDR had been trying to bring the USA into the war against germany in the years before, so would not likely change his mind so radically. (Unless he had had a meeting with Mr. Alzheimer, or so.)

The intact Pacific Fleet could do nothing at all, untill it got the necessary support to do something. It had been illequipped to start with, being mostly a battleship force, with little or no supporting fleetunits. The most likely thing it could do was sit and wait, untill late 1943, when the new ships of the buildingprograms came along, many of whom were intended for the needed fleettrain replenishment and supportfleets, as well as the transports to carry troops and equipment to do something. Battleships alone cannot operate under any circumstances in a modern war. The USN already had understood this and would not sacrifice men, without a serious reason. I still can point to the possibility the battleships could be used better for targetpractice for aviators, than sending them into the Japanese waters, to waist them for nothing. Also possible was to scrap the old and slow battleships, as they no longer were the true capital ships at sea and expensive to maintain and operate in terms of men and fuel.


Wake was important by the way, but not comparable with other events in the war. For the Japanese, it would be nice to have, but not more than that, as ot would remain an outpost. For the Allies it was also nice to retain, but without it, the war would still be won. Hawaii was the primary stepstone for the Allies in the Pacific, as was Australia. As long as the two could be supplied, the war would end in Allied favour.

By the way, the news from the USSR in mid 1941 was not that good, as in june 4th the Germans had just launched Operation Barbarossa, killing and capturing millions of Russian soldiers, destroying whole armies and occupying huge territories from the USSR. The only positive thing was that the UK got an ally in the war, but that was the only real positive thing then. Russia at first was on the brink of total collapse in the second half of 1941, so I don't see some positiveness in this, unless you mean positive for the Axis that is.
 
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AdA said:
with the USN reading IJN codes
Actually, no. In Dec '41, OP-20G had barely made the first breaks into the superencypherment of JN-25.
AdA said:
Something like...
There shouldn't be a need for it, if a relief is all that's wanted. Pye had all 3 of his available CVs bound for Wake OTL, not anticipating (or intending) a stand-up fight.

Now, if you want an interesting (if somewhat nutty:rolleyes:) option, what about sending 4 CVs, 1 or 2 carrying deckloads of B-25s, to recover at Wake?
HMS Warspite said:
the USA had a deal with the British (and other allies), so breaking such a contract would be considered treasoneous
:rolleyes: That's so wrong...

In the first place, there was no deal with the U.S.: the deal was with FDR, not binding on Congress.:rolleyes:

In the second, it isn't "treasonous". It is perfidious, but perfidy & breaking of promises by countries isn't exactly uncommon. The U.S. promised to stand by South Vietnam, recall...& that was with Congressional support at the time.
HMS Warspite said:
[FDR] would not likely change his mind so radically.
What part of "not his call" is unclear?:confused::rolleyes:
HMS Warspite said:
Battleships alone cannot operate under any circumstances in a modern war.
So, if the U.S. lands in Guadalcanal in early '42, you reject the usefulness of BBs to block New Georgia Sound (The Slot) against IJN raids?:confused:
 
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It seems more likely FDR get's a civil war in case he would go on that direction, which clearly was un-american. US history shows the military to be bold and ready for action all the time, but not suicidal. Second and not the least, the USA had a deal with the British (and other allies), so breaking such a contract would be considered treasoneous and it would blame the USA for loosing the war, if worse came out of it. FDR had been trying to bring the USA into the war against germany in the years before, so would not likely change his mind so radically. (Unless he had had a meeting with Mr. Alzheimer, or so.)

The intact Pacific Fleet could do nothing at all, untill it got the necessary support to do something. It had been illequipped to start with, being mostly a battleship force, with little or no supporting fleetunits. The most likely thing it could do was sit and wait, untill late 1943, when the new ships of the buildingprograms came along, many of whom were intended for the needed fleettrain replenishment and supportfleets, as well as the transports to carry troops and equipment to do something. Battleships alone cannot operate under any circumstances in a modern war. The USN already had understood this and would not sacrifice men, without a serious reason. I still can point to the possibility the battleships could be used better for targetpractice for aviators, than sending them into the Japanese waters, to waist them for nothing. Also possible was to scrap the old and slow battleships, as they no longer were the true capital ships at sea and expensive to maintain and operate in terms of men and fuel.


Wake was important by the way, but not comparable with other events in the war. For the Japanese, it would be nice to have, but not more than that, as ot would remain an outpost. For the Allies it was also nice to retain, but without it, the war would still be won. Hawaii was the primary stepstone for the Allies in the Pacific, as was Australia. As long as the two could be supplied, the war would end in Allied favour.

By the way, the news from the USSR in mid 1941 was not that good, as in june 4th the Germans had just launched Operation Barbarossa, killing and capturing millions of Russian soldiers, destroying whole armies and occupying huge territories from the USSR. The only positive thing was that the UK got an ally in the war, but that was the only real positive thing then. Russia at first was on the brink of total collapse in the second half of 1941, so I don't see some positiveness in this, unless you mean positive for the Axis that is.

1. The USA could, with an intact fleet, do both.
2. In December 5th the Red Army launched its counter offensive. In the 7th the Germans began to give way. By the 15th it looked like the German front might colapse. By the 20th Hitler was issuing its no retreat order. But from th 7th it was clear to anyone with an embasador im Moscow that Germany would not be winning in Russia anytime soon, what meant that Britain did not fear a massive German attack anywere. You'll note I mentioned news from Moscow in mid December...
3. The US startegy was built around the lack of a post December 7th PacFleet. With a full fleet, there was a lot more they could do. And since that gave the best chance of saving the whole British Show in the Pacific they would be crazy to object...
 
What I could see the USN doing (there would be a LOT of political pressuer to do something) would be to do some sort of 'reconnasance-in-force' towards the PI. Not using BB's, probably cruisers, with a carrier backing them up.

After all, at this point the USN doesnt really know how good the IJN airpower is. This is actually a way of finding out without risking too much, showing something is being done. Its not a suicide mission (well, if they run into Kido Butai it is, but they wont know that), although it is risky, but its also needed to find out just how good the Japanese actually are before risking the big ships.

Its hardly ideal, but the USN and the administration cant completely ignore the political pressure. This would be a compromise - when the Japanese land on it with both boots, it then shows that the PI cant be relieved at the moment. Otherwise that question will continue to be asked.
 
What I could see the USN doing (there would be a LOT of political pressuer to do something) would be to do some sort of 'reconnasance-in-force' towards the PI. Not using BB's, probably cruisers, with a carrier backing them up.

After all, at this point the USN doesnt really know how good the IJN airpower is. This is actually a way of finding out without risking too much, showing something is being done. Its not a suicide mission (well, if they run into Kido Butai it is, but they wont know that), although it is risky, but its also needed to find out just how good the Japanese actually are before risking the big ships.

Its hardly ideal, but the USN and the administration cant completely ignore the political pressure. This would be a compromise - when the Japanese land on it with both boots, it then shows that the PI cant be relieved at the moment. Otherwise that question will continue to be asked.

That's actually pretty similar to the last 5-6 years of USN plans prewar in the final iterations of Plan Orange, as well as the Rainbow Plans, & the specific plans Kimmel drew up upon taking command- beyond the immediate demands of protecting US territory in the eastern Pacific & the lines of communication, the basic idea was, while waiting for the couple years or so it'd take to build the fleet needed to drive across the central Pacific, to hold a defensive line of Midway-Johnston-Palmyra (and possibly Wake depending on the specific plans & situation), but not only to gain operational experience, but also to stave off the political and psychological issues that simply sitting in port would lead to, to carry out some aggressive action in the form of not just raids by carrier-cruiser forces, but also a limited offensive directed the Marshalls to the extent practical with the available resources
 
What I could see the USN doing (there would be a LOT of political pressuer to do something) would be to do some sort of 'reconnasance-in-force' towards the PI. Not using BB's, probably cruisers, with a carrier backing them up.

After all, at this point the USN doesnt really know how good the IJN airpower is. This is actually a way of finding out without risking too much, showing something is being done. Its not a suicide mission (well, if they run into Kido Butai it is, but they wont know that), although it is risky, but its also needed to find out just how good the Japanese actually are before risking the big ships.

Its hardly ideal, but the USN and the administration cant completely ignore the political pressure. This would be a compromise - when the Japanese land on it with both boots, it then shows that the PI cant be relieved at the moment. Otherwise that question will continue to be asked.

First: What sort of objective does such a `Recon` mission towards the already lost Philippines have? The Japanese already had conquered most of the philippines, once the USN would start planning such a futile mission. Were they going to do some sightseeing at Mount Pinatubo? Were they on a holiday cruise (in mid winter)? It simply makes no sense at all to do something like that, epsecially as they still would need tankers to follow them to replensih the taskforce at sea. Where do these come from in the first place?

The quest for doing "something", does not mean throwing away men and ships in pointless missions, with no objective. Also bear in mind, the USN only had two operational carriers the first month, so sending one out on a mission, which most likely was not going to be a good one, was not a good idea at all. In such a case, the USA better had to surrender to the Japanese terms and we all know the USA never surrenders to anyone.

Testing the enemy was an art of hit and run, where speed and intelligence are crucial. First objecitve was to know where the enemy was weak and vulnerable. Then a strikeforce could make a sudden dash at it, striking with airpower alone, after which the force retreated to save waters. Even with a US Pacific Fleet battleshipforce intact, the tactic does not change as the battleship was already seen by many as obsolete and far to insufficient to play a role in modern naval warfare. Submarines and aircraft (carriers) were the weapons needed and all knew that.

As far as political presure, the USN could do some raiding as in the OTL, with some special missions, as the Dollittle raid at best, but mostly limmited to an offensive use of the still under strength US Submarineforce and the hit and run carrierraids on Japanese outer ring outposts. Perhaps a submarine attack, like the Scapa Flow attack of Günter Prien in 1939, but this time on a Japanese main navalanchorage, like Truk Lagoon, could be untertaken. Give it a lot of media interest, once done and the people are happy.
 
Actually, no. In Dec '41, OP-20G had barely made the first breaks into the superencypherment of JN-25.

There shouldn't be a need for it, if a relief is all that's wanted. Pye had all 3 of his available CVs bound for Wake OTL, not anticipating (or intending) a stand-up fight.

Now, if you want an interesting (if somewhat nutty:rolleyes:) option, what about sending 4 CVs, 1 or 2 carrying deckloads of B-25s, to recover at Wake?

:rolleyes: That's so wrong...

In the first place, there was no deal with the U.S.: the deal was with FDR, not binding on Congress.:rolleyes:

In the second, it isn't "treasonous". It is perfidious, but perfidy & breaking of promises by countries isn't exactly uncommon. The U.S. promised to stand by South Vietnam, recall...& that was with Congressional support at the time.

What part of "not his call" is unclear?:confused::rolleyes:

So, if the U.S. lands in Guadalcanal in early '42, you reject the usefulness of BBs to block New Georgia Sound (The Slot) against IJN raids?:confused:

BB's do not block the straits, as they themsleves could not do much against the airattacks comming in every day. Even when facing their enemy, they were not even capable of inflicting more damage than they got back in return. (If you mentioned the loss of Kirishima, and a IJN DD, the USN lost four DD's and had one BB out of the battle due all sorts of reasons, pointing to a realy poor perfomance of the taskgroup to operate togehter as a single unit. BB's simply were not intended for such sort of inshore operations in the first place, but replaced cruisers, that should have been there, but had been either lost already, or send back for repairs. More important: only one BB mission was ever executed there, while all the other ones were by cruisers and DD's only.
 
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