WI: Truman Killed in 1950?

I don't know, but I can see General LeMay's reaction.

"Mr President, you are asking me to use 10%+ of our nations arsenal to save Mac's ego. Which parts of Russia do you think we shouldn't be able to hit for this to happen"?

All this at a time when the Korean war was seen by many as a preliminary move by the Soviet Union.
 
I'd have to review some on my books, but LeMay (AFAIK) only ever gave a crap about the Soviet Union. They were the guys with the bomb, they were the guys with cities and industries that strategic bombing could defeat. The USAF had spent the years since 1945 trying to prove that strategic boming had won the wars against Japan and Germany on just such a basis.

China had none of that, so was of little interest.
 
I'd have to review some on my books, but LeMay (AFAIK) only ever gave a crap about the Soviet Union. They were the guys with the bomb, they were the guys with cities and industries that strategic bombing could defeat... China had none of that, so was of little interest.

How did LeMay and the USAF then understand the Korean War, and China's role therein? FWIR, the PRC was pretty much footing the bill (in troops, food, material, etc) for the Northern side, the way the US was for the South.
 
That wasn't the understanding at the time. The whole thing was felt to be Joe Stalin's show and the big worry was that it was just a diversion for a European push.

Now we know much better, but that was the majority view at the time.

It was one of the reasons why (as far as the US Air Force was concerned) it was treated a secondary theatre. The bombers used for example were clapped out B-29's instead of the new B-36 and B-50's. (I suspect the B-36 was also held back to avoid putting the lie to the claim that it was "uninterceptable").
 

Thande

Donor
Interesting discussion, but how come nobody's raised the point of how the backlash against this might affect the position of Puerto Rico, and of Puerto Ricans in America.
 
That wasn't the understanding at the time. The whole thing was felt to be Joe Stalin's show and the big worry was that it was just a diversion for a European push.

Wow, well that's certainly a point. Little distressing to think that had the brass known better, it might have made full nuclear war more likely... :eek:

how the backlash against this might affect the position of Puerto Rico, and of Puerto Ricans in America.

It'd be bad, no doubt about it, and Civil Rights could only do worse when it hits...
 
Well the North Korea's did have to get Stalin's permission to attack, so there was some justification to that POV. The fact that the USSR was charging the PRC for every bullet, bomb and bean was not known however. And the North Korean forces in 1950 were entirely equiped with Soviet WW2 surplus.

If I remember rightly the PRC was in large part involved as the remnants of the KMT were being protected in Taiwan by the US and were using the opportunity to agitate for being involved in the war (they offered a couple of divisions to the UN when the war broke out). The prospect of the KMT having a way to attack the (freshly set up and not by any means stable yet) Peoples Republic was definately a prospect the PRC leadership looked on with trepidation - especially a KMT with US military backing.
 
It'd be bad, no doubt about it, and Civil Rights could only do worse when it hits...

Except those in favor of Civil Rights would argue that, "American Blacks have sacrificed for their country and never done anything so treasonous." I think that the support by Barkley 9and rayburn) of voting rights could lead to that still going forward.

However, I can foresee a Southern Manifesto 4-5 years early. And, blacks might be used as a tool to promote just enough so that Hispanics can be placed below someoneelse on society.
 
OK, so I am home now and reviewing some sources. At the time that atomic release was requested, the US had approx 290 working atomic weapons (more triggers etc than that, but these are the assembled and ready to use weapons).(1)

MacArthur wanted at least 27 bombs used on various targets (or slightly under 10% of the US arsenal). The JCS were worried enough that the idea was taken seriously in late December 1950/early Jan 1951. However by mid January it was clear that the crisis had passed and the idea was shelved. (2)

So the most likely time for this to happen is during the great panic in early January. Even then Air Force General Vandenburg (the AF's member of the JCS) is likely to be reluctant to expend nukes on targets he'd consider a waste. Perhaps if the Chinese lloked like they were going to throw the UN forces out of Korea altogether then a final "screw you" may have been considered. However logistics for the Chinese makes this pretty much "Sea Lion" impossible.

There were a number of other ideas being reviewed at the time that may (or may not) have made a difference to Chinese pressure in Korea. These included a conventional bombing campaign against industrial targets in Manchuria, giving the go-ahead to the KMT to attack mainland China, and a naval blockade of the PRC.




(1) The Revolt of the Admirals
(2) Max Hasting's The Korean War
 
Awesome research work Kiwi! :) I think the gist of it is what I've come to understand as well -- and if anything like my scenario was going to happen, you'd have Barkley going into a coma around x-mas 1950, with the desperate gambit decision being made in January to go with blockading the PRC and nuking industrial centers in Manchuria, with the hopes of forcing a swift surrender as they did in Japan. If it's successful, and the PRC agrees to a separate truce, it would create the kind of incentives, in terms of Executive Branch operation and use of atomic weapons, (with a clamp down on Puerto Ricans and Hispanics thrown in) to really turn out badly for the US and everyone else down the road...
 
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