WI there was no recovery in American fertility rates from the mid-1980s on?

The Washington Post was just one of many news sources to note a recent report provided by the National Vital Statistics System of the Centers for Disease Control, "Births: Provisional Data for 2016"</u></a> (PDF format). This report noted that not only had the absolute number of births fallen, but that the total fertility rate in 2016 was the lowest it had been in more than three decades: "The 2016 total fertility rate (TFR) for the United States was 1,818.0 births per 1,000 women, a decrease of 1% from the rate in 2015 (1,843.5) and the lowest TFR since 1984." The Washington Post's Ariana Eunjung Cha noted that this fall was a consequence of a sharp fall in births among younger Americans not wholly compensated for by rising fertility rates in older populations.

According to provisional 2016 population data released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on Friday, the number of births fell 1 percent from a year earlier, bringing the general fertility rate to 62.0 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44. The trend is being driven by a decline in birthrates for teens and 20-somethings. The birthrate for women in their 30s and 40s increased — but not enough to make up for the lower numbers in their younger peers.

[. . .]

Those supposedly entitled young adults with fragile egos who live in their parents' basements and hop from job-to-job — it turns out they're also much less likely to have babies, at least so far. Some experts think millennials are just postponing parenthood while others fear they're choosing not to have children at all.

Strobino is among those who is optimistic and sees hope in the data. She points out that the fall in birthrates in teens — an age when many pregnancies tend to be unplanned — is something we want and that the highest birthrates are now among women 25 to 34 years of age.

“What this is is a trend of women becoming more educated and more mature. I’m not sure that’s bad,” she explained.

Indeed, as fertility treatments have extended the age of childbearing, the birthrates among women who are age 40 to 44 are also rising.​

Total fertility rates in the United States were last this low, as noted above, in 1984, after a decade where fertility rates had hovered around 1.8 children born per woman. The United States' had sharply dropped to below-replacement fertility occurring in 1972, with a sharp increase to levels just short of replacement levels only occurring in the mid-1980s.

There has been much talk this past half-year about the end of American exceptionalism, or at least the end of a favourable sort of American exceptionalism. To the extent that fertility rates in the United States are falling, for instance, this may reflect convergence with the fertility rates prevalent in other highly developed societies. Gilles Pison's Population and Societies study "Population trends in the United States and Europe: similarities and differences" observed that, although the United States and the European Union saw the same sorts of trends towards lower fertility rates and extended life expectancies, the European Union as a whole saw substantially lower birth rates and lower completed fertility.

The strong natural growth in the United States is due, in part, to high fertility: 2.05 children per woman on average, compared with 1.52 in the European Union. In this respect, it is not the low European level which stands out, but rather the high American level, since below-replacement fertility is now the norm in many industrialized countries (1.3 children per woman in Japan, for example) and emerging countries (1.2 in South Korea, and around 1.6 in China). With more than two children per woman in 2005, the United States ranks above many countries and regions of the South and belongs to the minority group of highfertility nations.

Average fertility rates conceal large local variations, however: from 1.6 children per woman in Vermont to 2.5 in Utah; from 1.2 in Poland to 1.9 in France. The scale of relative variation is similar on either side of the Atlantic. In the north-eastern USA, along a strip spreading down from Maine to West Virginia, fertility is at the same level as in northern and western Europe (Figure 3). Close to Mexico, on the other hand, the “Hispanic” population (a category used in American statistics) is pushing up fertility levels. Over the United States as a whole, Hispanic fertility stands at 2.9 children per woman, versus 1.9 among nonHispanic women [4]. Between “White” and “AfricanAmerican” women, the difference is much smaller: 1.8 versus 2.0.

The highest fertility levels in the European Union are found in northern and western Europe (between 1.7 and 1.9 children per woman) and the lowest in southern, central and eastern Europe (below 1.5). Exceptions to this rule include Estonia (1.5), with higher fertility than its Baltic neighbours, and Austria (1.4) and Germany (1.3), which are closer to the eastern and southern countries.​

This overall pattern seems to have endured. Why this is the case, I am uncertain. Even though the United States lacks the sorts of family-friendly policies that have been credited for boosting fertility in northern and western Europe, I wonder if the United States does share with these other high-fertility, highly-developed societies cultural similarities, not least of which is a tolerance for non-traditional families. As has been observed before, for instance at Population and Societies by Pison in "France and Germany: a history of criss-crossing demographic curves" and by me at Demography Matters back in a June 2014 blog post, arguably the main explanation for the higher fertility in France as compared to West Germany is a much greater French acceptance of non-traditional family structures, with working mothers and non-married couples being more accepted. (West Germany's reluctance, I argued at Demography Matters in February 2016, stems from the pronounced conservative turn towards traditional family structures without any support for government-supported changes following efforts by totalitarianism states to do just that, first under Naziism and then in contemporary East Germany. I posted a WI on this here back there.)

It's much too early to come to any conclusions as to whether or not this fall in American fertility will be lasting. From the perspective of someone in the early 1980s, for instance, the sharp spike in American fertility in the mid-1980s that marked arguably the single most importance divergence between the United States and the rest of the highly developed world would have been a surprise. Maybe fertility in the United States will recover to its previous levels. Or, maybe, under economic pressure it will stay lower than it has been.

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That said, what if fertility rates in the United States were lower from the mid-1980s on? Imagine that the United States followed the trajectory of Australia, with its fertility rates that--while high by the standards of highly-developed countries--were notably lower than those of the United States from the mid-1980s on. (The Canadian trajectory, with considerably lower fertility rates from 1980 on, may not be relevant, on account of the peculiarities of a country with regionally very divergence population--Québec's experience alone might throw things off, to say nothing of the diversity within English Canada.)

For overall American fertility rates to track those of Australia, fertility rates would need to fall. Unless we are presuming changes in the numbers of immigrants and their fertility rates--Mexico completes its modernization and enters the First World?--this would imply substantially lower fertility among native-born Americans. Perhaps the country is more conservative; perhaps extra-marital fertility is simply lower. (More widely spread birth control?)

What would this United States look like? The relatively smaller cohorts of young people would be just now entering life as adults, trying to enter the job market. Would smaller numbers minimize unemployment and underemployment, or would this lead to less net growth, or would there be little effect? With lower fertility rates generally, perhaps especially if among native-born Americans, would anti-immigrant sentiment be stronger?
 
Can't answer the questions, but I wondering about the influence of:

Religious groups on abortion rates & teen pregnancies.

Drug use which seems to connect to increased unplanned pregnancies.

Increase of professional or career women in the blue and white collar workforce.

Teen pregnancy programs improving over several decades.

Other...?
 

Ak-84

Banned
It would have probably started having major effects on the economic health of the country by now. What you see in some Euro nations, whose fertility did not recover.

Unless the US gets more immigrants from Latin America, of course, that's a temporary solution, Latin American countries have even lower fertility rates than the US and A.
 
What are the odds of immigration policy changing in this case? Much larger groups are possible from other areas. The Vietnamese migration to the US could have doubled or more. Asia in general would certainly have been a migration source as large and important as the 19th Century European migration. More east Europeans & Africans post 1990?
 
..... The Canadian trajectory, with considerably lower fertility rates from 1980 on, may not be relevant, on account of the peculiarities of a country with regionally very divergence population--Québec's experience alone might throw things off, to say nothing of the diversity within English Canada.)
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Canadian fertility rates parallel American fertility rates. Much fluctuation in birth rates parallels the Baby Boom (1946 to 1964). Canada had very high birth rates during that period, but birth rates declined during the 1960s as young (child-bearing age) Canadian women decided that they did not want to get stuck in the same rut (housewife) as their mothers. Simultaneously, increased access to abortions (Dr. Morgenthaler) and birth control pills reduced un-planned teenaged pregnancies.
With changes in British immigration laws during the early 1960s, Canada started accepting significant numbers of immigrants from non-white countries. This changed the colour of Canadian identity forever. Now entire neighbourhoods in Vancouver are dominated by: Chinese, Sikh, Korean, Persian, etc.

Quebec experienced even more dramatic social change - starting in the 1950s - when the Catholic Church lost its centuries-old tight grasp of religion, education, hospitals, welfare, orphanages, immigration, etc. Quebec quickly changed from a conservative to a leftist society .... farther left than the rest of Canada. Quebec birth rates dropped from a dozen per woman to only two children.
With fewer children, Quebec struggled to find labourers to fill low-paying jobs. Descendants of original habitant families still wanted to "party like it was 1740" with only white, Catholic, French-speaking neighbors. IOW Quebec stubbornly wanted to preserve culture and privileges enjoyed by the first few hundred immigrant families without those pesky Iroquois or Jews or Hungarians or Italians or Jamaicans, etc.
Initially Quebec City tried to limit immigration to French-speaking Catholics, but the first wave of applications came from North Africans who lived in former French colonies (eg. Algeria) and horror-of-horrors! ...... they had dark skin!!!!!!!!!


-------------------------------------------------------------------- With lower fertility rates generally, perhaps especially if among native-born Americans, would anti-immigrant sentiment be stronger?[
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President Trump got elected because he promised to "Make America Great" ... again .... Trump was elected by working-class voters from rust-belt states. Read "Hillbilly Elegey" to understand their hypocritical mindset. These working-class white folks fear immigrants taking their jobs. Meanwhile, hillbillies buy cheap, foreign-made goods at Walmart, but are too lazy to re-train for modern jobs. ??????????

Anti-immigrant hostility is always directed at the most recent group of immigrants because they are willing to work longer hours in rougher jobs than native-born labourers. Meaning that they force native-borns out of the bottom of the work-force ..... or even worse ..... get promoted ahead of lazy native-borns. Speaking with an accent makes it easier for native-norms to hate immigrants. If immigrants pray at a different church .... that is another excuse to hate immigrants. If immigrants have different skin colours .... that is another excuse to hate them, etc.
 
It would have probably started having major effects on the economic health of the country by now. What you see in some Euro nations, whose fertility did not recover.
Is this really so? Germany must have one of the worst fertility rates in Europe. Effect on the economy: practically zero.
 
The Washington Post but that the total fertility rate in 2016 was the lowest it had been in more than three decades: "The 2016 total fertility rate (TFR) for the United States was 1,818.0 births per 1,000 women, a decrease of 1% from the rate in 2015 (1,843.5) and the lowest TFR since 1984."
Seems like a very high fertility rate indeed. :p
 

Ak-84

Banned
Is this really so? Germany must have one of the worst fertility rates in Europe. Effect on the economy: practically zero.
Germany has had a pretty heavy level of immigration, with Turks and now Syrians. As well as Eastern Euros since 2004. Merkel has punted Germany's problems forward a few decades with her decision to let lots of Syrians in.
 
Some years ago a German was remarking about the excess of Turkish guest labors in Germany. I remarked on the current high unemployment in Poland & if the Poles were as common as Turks in the guest labor force. If I understood the shit storm of invective that triggered it seemed the Turks were preferable to Poles.
 
It would have probably started having major effects on the economic health of the country by now. What you see in some Euro nations, whose fertility did not recover.

Unless the US gets more immigrants from Latin America, of course, that's a temporary solution, Latin American countries have even lower fertility rates than the US and A.

Hmm. I'm not sure that there is necessarily that close a correlation between a country's rate of net reproduction and its rate of economic growth. The relatively high and sustained fertility of the French population, for instance, hasn't resulted in an especially dynamic French economy, while Germany's economic successes have been achieved despite sustained very low fertility from the early 1970s on.

Quebec experienced even more dramatic social change - starting in the 1950s - when the Catholic Church lost its centuries-old tight grasp of religion, education, hospitals, welfare, orphanages, immigration, etc. Quebec quickly changed from a conservative to a leftist society .... farther left than the rest of Canada. Quebec birth rates dropped from a dozen per woman to only two children.
With fewer children, Quebec struggled to find labourers to fill low-paying jobs. Descendants of original habitant families still wanted to "party like it was 1740" with only white, Catholic, French-speaking neighbors. IOW Quebec stubbornly wanted to preserve culture and privileges enjoyed by the first few hundred immigrant families without those pesky Iroquois or Jews or Hungarians or Italians or Jamaicans, etc.
Initially Quebec City tried to limit immigration to French-speaking Catholics, but the first wave of applications came from North Africans who lived in former French colonies (eg. Algeria) and horror-of-horrors! ...... they had dark skin!!!!!!!!!

I am not sure about the extent to which this is actually the case. Québec does not have proportionally as many immigrants as Ontario, but then one would expect that: Québec is a poorer province. The proportion of immigrants in the population of Québec, that said, is somewhere around 15%, roughly the same order of magnitude as Sweden.

Speaking about fertility, meanwhile, Québec briefly did have lower fertility than English Canada, but things have become more complicated.

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/hlth85b-eng.htm

Fertility rates in the Prairie provinces are substantially higher, but fertility rates in British Columbia and Ontario (with lots of immigrants) and Atlantic Canada (with relatively few immigrants) are not only below the Québec average but below the Canadian average. Québec fertility rates, meanwhile, are above the Canadian average. If you drill dowt o the regional level within Québec, it looks like immigrant-heavy Montréal has substantially lower fertility than the rest of the province.

Germany has had a pretty heavy level of immigration, with Turks and now Syrians. As well as Eastern Euros since 2004. Merkel has punted Germany's problems forward a few decades with her decision to let lots of Syrians in.

That has been a consistent policy re: immigration, not only in Germany since sources of ethnic German immigrants to West Germany dried up in the early 1960s but in most immigrant-receiving countries. Immigration provides the human capital that labour-hungry economies need.
 
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