WI: Theodore Roosevelt runs for a third term

[Mikestone8]

I doubt every state. The Democrats will still win every state in the Deep South. I think this is the absolute best Roosevelt can do.

And even that is wildly unlikely.

TR never made any serious inroads on the Democratic vote. Allowing for population increase, his popular vote in 1904 (outside the South where the Republican vote actually fell) was about the same as McKinley's in 1900. His Electoral College landslide was mainly due to anti-Parker Democrats abstaining rather than voting Republican. In 1908, these will "come home" to vote for Bryan, and be joined by others with doubts about a "third term", resulting in TR's vote being somewhat lower than last time, probably not much different from Taft's. Bryan will get the eleven confederate States, plus at least Kentucky and Oklahoma - possibly one or two western states as well.

 

[MichaelWest]

Why would TR drop Charles Fairbanks from the ticket?

My understanding is that TR did not like him, he was from the conservative wing and was likely only a politically motivated choice. Part of me wonders if Fairbanks would decline to run again under TR. Also I think by the time TR is ready to run again he may be confident of his own popularity to break with Fairbanks and pick someone else. The VP was a rather undefined and symbolic position but had potential. I suspect TR might choose to elevate its importance and especially if he had a legislative agenda in mind since the VP sits in the Senate, a role some believed to make the VP more legislative than executive in nature. But then he might give the bone to the conservatives to secure the party cohesion and either keep Fairbanks or choose another to play nice.

 

[MichaelWest]

Hughes would make sense as the candidate except that per the Edmund Morris biography of TR, Colonel Roosevelt, TR didn't like Hughes. (I also think TR's ego will demand he have a "protege" as his successor rather than a "peer.")

That's why I wonder if Albert Beveridge could end up as the candidate. He's from a Mid-West state (important for helping to carry that crucial region), was a famed orator, and his political views certainly track with Roosevelt's as Beveridge was a progressive in domestic policy and an imperialist in foreign policy.

If TR makes Taft his Secretary of State at the start of his third term, then that could open up the Secretary of War position for Beveridge. And then if Taft convinces TR to put him on the Supreme Court when the Chief Justice position becomes available then Beveridge could get bumped up to Secretary of State. Two key Cabinet positions should give him enough prestige to be a plausible successor to TR (especially since being in the Cabinet means that Beveridge avoids his OTL 1910 defeat for reelection.)

Of course the Republican Old Guard would hate, hate, hate the idea of Albert Beveridge as President, but if TR has had a reasonably successful third term then he should have the political muscle necessary to get his preferred candidate the nomination in 1912.

Admittedly I have elevated the VP slot to a successor path to the Presidency, but it was not quite that in those days. But TR might well have seen it as a way to groom his successor. And Beveridge offers some of the conflict we see in the Republicans, and Americans, of this era, he certainly seems a potentially troublesome candidate and perhaps too progressive to run on his own but if TR pushed it then we might see a more divided GOP as the progressives become dominate. Or would the conservative elements still moderate TR and influence his successor as seems to have happened with Taft?

Seems we might get the "Second to None" Navy proposed under TR and built under his successor. To me this would push the British and USA apart while potentially renewing a naval arms race on the eve of the Great War just as other pressures are taking wind out of those sails. Beveridge appears to be pushing for a more regulatory and governmentally active agenda if in office. That is my next series of questions, how does the legislative landscape change under TR then his likely progressive successor?

 

[Mikestone8]

You're last point, it depends. IF Roosevelt remains President through WWI, he, unlike Wilson, has enough international clout to get a better peace treaty and not let Britain and France ride roughshod over him the way Wilson did.

How? Assuming the armistice is similar to OTL's, ie leaving Germany unable to resume hostilities, then the European Allies can impose any terms they like. American consent is not required.

Indeed, if an earlier end to war means that Russia is still in the Allied camp, then Britain is sidelined as well - France and Russia will dictate the peace, with the Anglo-Saxons just looking on.

 

[Mikestone8]

Even then, I think TR at the least wins Texas. Bryan suffered his worst electoral defeat in 1908 to Taft. If Roosevelt runs again, I really think the South swings more his way.

The Republican vote in Texas went as follows

1900 31%
1904 22%
1908 22%
1912 18% (Republican plus Progressive)
1916 17%
1920 24%
1924 20%
Unless/until the Democrats see fit to nominate a Catholic, neither TR nor any other Republican stands a snowball's chance in Hades there.

 

[David T]

The Republican vote in Texas went as follows

1900 31%
1904 22%
1908 22%
1912 18% (Republican plus Progressive)
1916 17%
1920 24% of carrying it
1924 20%
Unless/until the Democrats see fit to nominate a Catholic, neither TR nor any other Republican stands a snowball's chance in Hades there.

And in 1928 even a Catholic Democrat could probably have carried Texas (though certainly by less than the normal Democratic margin) if he were "dry" on Prohibition and not associated with Tammany... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_J._Walsh

 

[Japhy]

Honestly any question of a 1912 election is moot. Roosevelt himself only did the IOTL run citing the view that his first term was not his own and the Cleveland concept of 1896 that as a separate period it wouldn't count then anyway. A continuous term from 1901-1913 would have been his personal limit.

 

[HaroldGodwinson]

What would the consequences be on American politics and the world in general if Roosevelt decided to run in the 1908 election? Would he be reelected (possibly in a landslide?), or would the 3rd term taboo lead to his downfall?

Extra: Let's say he does win 1908 and for whatever reason he chooses to run again in 1912. Would a 4th term be too much for America? Or would he become the first 4 term POTUS in US history? (32 years earlier than FDR)

Bryan wouldn't run in 1908 and Roosevelt would easily beat his unknown Democrat opponent.

Roosevelt would win in 1912, but it would be closer. He'd beat his opponent (Wilson, Bryan, or Clark) by 1-5%.

By the 1916, if the US was at war by then Roosevelt would run again; if not, he might run again or might retire and choose his successor (Beveridge or Johnson).

Roosevelt wins a forth term as a wartime president and dies in 1919 and Vice President Albert J. Beveridge becomes President.

After losing 6 terms in a row, the Democrats might been facing serious challenges by 1920. They won the House back in 1918 and came close in the Senate, but were divided on a candidate.

The Democrats finally nominate Governor James Cox and Congressman Franklin Roosevelt.

The Republicans renominate Beveridge and Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge for Vice President.

After an economic downturn and 26 years of Republican control the Democrats would probably win the election.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

So if TR is roped into running in 1908, this averts a few things, such as his falling out with Taft. Assuming Taft runs in 1912, he wins, meaning Wilson quietly goes away.

I'll assume that TR and Taft have a falling out at this time unless Taft decides to involve the US in World War I, which may be his saving grace and keep TR on his side. If so, Taft gets re-elected again, and the GOP becomes a national party with some serious longevity, meaning the Democrats either become a marginalized Southern party or are out of luck until the Depression.

You know, if TR wins, and he does not have his break with Taft he could appoint Taft to the Supreme court as Chief Justice in 1910 instead of White. Then again there is also Hughes.

Hard choice between those two.

 

[Colonel Zoidberg]

You know, if TR wins, and he does not have his break with Taft he could appoint Taft to the Supreme court as Chief Justice in 1910 instead of White. Then again there is also Hughes.

Hard choice between those two.

I had that thought, but it depends on what TR wanted to groom his friend for. I could see it going either way, and if Taft ends up on the Supreme Court, then TR and Taft probably never have a falling-out.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

The period 1896 through 1932 was a Republican era, and became even more so because of Wilson taking the country into World War I. No party has been as dominant in American politics as the Republicans were in the 1920s. And the Democratic victories between 1910 and 1916 really were mainly due to the Roosevelt -Taft split.

So Republican candidates will win the presidency in 1912 and 1916, and the Republicans will hold Congress. The only questions are which Republicans, and do they take the US into the Great War and under what terms? If a Republican president enters World War I that will be a huge boost to the Democratic Party, though it won't have the same effect as Wilson breaking his main campaign promise within weeks of his inauguration. And does this Republican president suppress the Socialists as much as Wilson did IOTL?

Taft will probably wind up as Chief Justice a decade earlier. But the composition of the Court will likely be very different from OTL. Taft wound up hand-picking most of the justices who were on the Supreme Court in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, either as one of the six nominations he made as President, or through Harding who pretty much picked Taft's selections. Charles Evan Hughes was the only Taft selected justice to often differ from Taft. The dissenters from the conservative majority were Roosevelt (Holmes), Wilson (Brandeis), Coolidge (Stone), and Hoover (Cardozo) selections. But Teddy Roosevelt had selected Oliver Wendell Holmes as a justice, so he probably would put Taft himself on the Court, but not necessarily defer to Taft as far as the other five vacancies that came up 1909-13 went.

 

[Mikestone8]

Bryan wouldn't run in 1908 .

What is your source for this?

Roosevelt would win in 1912,

What evidence have you that he would run in 1912? OTL he wouldn't even run in 1908, because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the "letter" of the no third term tradition. There was no crisis in 1912 to justify such a step.

The period 1896 through 1932 was a Republican era, and became even more so because of Wilson taking the country into World War I. No party has been as dominant in American politics as the Republicans were in the 1920s. And the Democratic victories between 1910 and 1916 really were mainly due to the Roosevelt -Taft split.

No. The Roosevelt-Taft split was caused by Republican defeat, not vice versa. The Reps had already been thoroughly curbstomped in the 1910 midterms (ie before that split developed), and knew that they were going to lose the Presidency in 1912. Had Taft stood any chance of winning, TR would almost certainly not have challenged him, and would have garnered little support if he had. It was precisely the impending defeat which made Taft weak enough to be challenged.

 

[HaroldGodwinson]

What is your source for this?



What evidence have you that he would run in 1912? OTL he wouldn't even run in 1908, because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the "letter" of the no third term tradition. There was no crisis in 1912 to justify such a step.

Bryan skipped in 1908 for the same reason he did in 1904. Roosevelt looked to strong to beat.


No guarantee Roosevelt runs in 1912.

 

[bguy]

As Taft will by now be Chief Justice, the 1912 nomination goes to someone like Elihu Root, or possibly Philander Knox.

Running an eastern conservative like Root or Knox means Robert La Follette will run as a third party candidate and that pretty much guarantees a Democratic victory in 1912. I would expect TR to push for a more progressive Republican candidate like Hughes or Beveridge to try and diminish the potential damage from a La Follette insurgency, and as the incumbent President he should have sufficient influence to get his preferred candidate the nomination.

 

[1940LaSalle]

TR's choice of Fairbanks in 1904 was one of relatively limited options (I recall from Morris' biography that TR said something like "who on earth else is there?").

Anyhow, I submit that TR and Hughes were both consummate professionals who could set aside personal differences to work toward a common goal or set of goals. Therefore, I see a TR elective term beginning in 1909 with Hughes as Secretary of State, Taft moving from War to Justice as Attorney General, and Philander Knox taking War. At the first opportunity, Taft will be appointed to a long-coveted Supreme Court seat: so much for a TR / Taft rift as in OTL. Herbert Hadley of Missouri is a not-unlikely candidate for Justice thereafter.

That sets the table for 1912: Hughes for president and Hadley for vice president. That's a ticket that should be at minimum acceptable to all but the extreme fringes of the party. I can't see at this point that the butterflies are far-reaching enough to have a Dem ticket other than Wilson and Marshall, so let's go with that. In a general election, Hughes doesn't have Wilson's gift for lofty but vague rhetoric; offsetting that, however, is a solid record as both governor of New York plus Secretary of State: in other words, he has all the tools to be president. TR will likely make a few speeches supporting Hughes (and Bryan will likely make a few supporting Wilson). It has the makings of a close election between two progressives, but I think Hughes would prevail, albeit narrowly.

When the Austro-Serbian crisis happens in late June 1914, look for TR to cable the White House saying in effect that now's your chance to do something particularly solid and consolidate America's place in the sun in the bargain: namely, offer to mediate the crisis. Hughes knows an opportunity when he sees it, and makes the proposal to the chancelleries of Europe (not merely the contesting parties, given the interlocking alliances)--and submits TR as the chief mediator given his track record in ending the Russo-Japanese War. Kaiser Wilhelm II seizes on this impulsively, citing the astuteness of "my friend Roosevelt", all but demanding the Austrians go along with the idea. There is considerable support for mediation in Great Britain and Russia as well; ultimately, a reluctant Austria complies.

In assembling the mediation team, Hughes names TR as the head, supported by vice president Hadley and senator Gilbert Hitchcock--the latter calculated deliberately to involve both sides of the aisle in reaching a solution.

 

[SsgtC]

This is the only issue I see. The Kaiser was desperate for Germany to secure her "place in the sun." I don't think Germany would accept mediation before hostilities break out. They MIGHT after the start of the war if they're the seen as the ones being leinant and are recognized as THE power on the continent

Kaiser Wilhelm II seizes on this impulsively, citing the astuteness of "my friend Roosevelt", all but demanding the Austrians go along with the idea.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

"When the Austro-Serbian crisis happens in late June 1914"

This is well thought out but there is one problem. No one outside of Berlin and St. Petersburg thought the July Crisis was a serious crisis until the last week of July, hence the name July Crisis. There is research showing that the financial markets didn't register what was happening until the last possible minute, and also plenty of accounts of the British Cabinet being focused pretty much exclusively on another crisis in Ireland, of the French (except the President) on a sensational trial in France, and so on. As for the Kaiser, he was literally at sea for much of the time, I've seen arguments that this was deliberate, hence the last minute and improvised nature of his own attempts to find a peaceful solution.

Actually pretty much most of the top officials went on vacation after the Sarajevo assassination. That was a key reason why things got out of control.

Assuming anyone high up in the federal government stayed on in Washington in the summer, no one would catch on to the seriousness of the crisis in time to intervene diplomatically. And Roosevelt himself would likely have been hunting big game in Africa, out West, or doing the same Amazon expedition he did IOTL. Even if he had stayed on Long Island, I don't see any American newspaper coverage until the last week of July. CNN didn't exist and there is no way Roosevelt would have had access to cables sent between European diplomats.

Its little known, though its featured in Shirer's account, but Franklin Roosevelt did try to intervene diplomatically in Europe in 1938-9 and got a speech by Hitler mocking him for his pains. It should also be noted that Wilson's efforts in 1916 went nowhere, more due to the Entente countries than the Central Powers.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

You actually might have not gotten the Roosevelt speeches pushing for US involvement in the war in this timeline, because there would have been no need to score points off of Wilson.

Hughes might have set firmer boundaries as to how far the Germans could push in the West and the naval war, but this may have had the effect of them dropping the u-boat idea completely. Though when they tried it in 1917, it was mostly as a desperation measure (they had no idea how close Russia was to collapse and though they were about to lose), with the understanding that this would get the USA involved. But in this timeline, there may not have even been the u-boats available then.

 

[1940LaSalle]

"When the Austro-Serbian crisis happens in late June 1914"

This is well thought out but there is one problem. No one outside of Berlin and St. Petersburg thought the July Crisis was a serious crisis until the last week of July, hence the name July Crisis. There is research showing that the financial markets didn't register what was happening until the last possible minute, and also plenty of accounts of the British Cabinet being focused pretty much exclusively on another crisis in Ireland, of the French (except the President) on a sensational trial in France, and so on. As for the Kaiser, he was literally at sea for much of the time, I've seen arguments that this was deliberate, hence the last minute and improvised nature of his own attempts to find a peaceful solution.

Actually pretty much most of the top officials went on vacation after the Sarajevo assassination. That was a key reason why things got out of control.

Assuming anyone high up in the federal government stayed on in Washington in the summer, no one would catch on to the seriousness of the crisis in time to intervene diplomatically. And Roosevelt himself would likely have been hunting big game in Africa, out West, or doing the same Amazon expedition he did IOTL. Even if he had stayed on Long Island, I don't see any American newspaper coverage until the last week of July. CNN didn't exist and there is no way Roosevelt would have had access to cables sent between European diplomats.

Valid points that I should have recognized: things didn't become a crisis until Vienna issued its ultimatum. I'm wondering if a more astute State department (perhaps led by someone like Henry Cabot Lodge) might have monitored the goings-on in Europe in general more closely and passed along such intelligence to President Hughes coupled with some sort of rudimentary analysis; e.g., this regicide in the Balkans might have the potential to develop into something ugly, recalling Bismarck's famous quote.

Yes, I admit that foreign affairs acumen wasn't exactly an American hallmark at the time, but one could conceivably postulate a crowd of Ivy League old boys with not much else better to do poring in minute details over cables from European capitals and playing what-if games that seemed plausible--and might lead to opportunities for the US to take a proper role on the world stage.

Fascinating that you mention Wilson's 1916 efforts going nowhere more due to the Entente than the Central Powers: I'm reading something now on the US home front during World War I that advances that proposition. I'd have to couple that, however, with the fact that Wilson didn't have much political capital in Europe: he was not well known at all, in contrast to TR. This is really going out on a limb but if TR were in the White House and offered mediation at the same time and set of circumstances in the war, it's not out of the question that the chancelleries might have listened instead of dismissing the offer out of hand. But I doubt that a TR presidency from 1913 onward would have confronted identical circumstances in Europe: it's possible that the Lusitania sinking might well be butterflied by (let's say) executive orders involving shipping, merchant vessels and the like, since TR was a student of the War of 1812. As such, he would have recognized the questions surrounding freedom of the seas, trade by a neutral with belligerents, etc., and would have taken steps (I think) to ensure that the US' position was defensible in all respects--and to ensure US citizens' safety.

 

[MichaelWest]

For me the nuanced query is what TR does in 1911 during and after the Second Moroccan Crisis (assuming it is not butterflied by something else TR's Presidency set it motion from 1908). Considered part of the causes to war in 1914 I think TR's diplomacy efforts compared to what occurred under Taft might give us insight into how a Republican President, especially one such as Hughes with more connection to a popular retired TR, might attempt to intervene during the July Crisis in 1914. And if Hughes is Secretary of State in 1911 he might have far more weight in European circles as President then I have seen discussed here.

Frankly I do not think this one event can butterfly the World War, unless it sparks a war itself in 1911, but it might lead to some differences sufficient to alter events as we know them. Added to this I am not convinced that Germany and the Kaiser were looking for a diplomatic solution, it seems reasonable that German leadership wanted a war with France and Russia, using an Austro-Serbian War as the path towards knocking those two down if not clear them from the board, but still wanted British neutrality. Admittedly I find no innocents among the Great Powers in 1914, perhaps mere fools. Here is where TR's efforts in 1911 or more remotely in 1914 might alter the course of events.

For example one might see a better diplomatic resolution in 1911 that eases tensions, or perhaps less obviously a worse outcome for Germany, one that more clearly shows that Britain is firmly in the Entente camp despite the obscurity propounded by Lord Grey. That may firmly dispel German naivety about courting Britain. In addition to how he interacts at some conference TR might kick off an American naval expansion that might start a cooling of Anglo-American relations, or he goes Anglophobic, or even if he is firmly Anglophilic and builds a strengthening of relations, any choice alters the math of German leaders pondering war in 1914 (as perhaps it does everyone involved). Perhaps A-H may have lost nerve sooner or Germany might not have been as eager, perhaps Russia and France overplay their hands and actually reveal they are as guilty of aggression in the events unfolding, and so on and so on, all things that can alter the how and why of the war's genesis. That is why I find this fascinating, TR as President in 1911 might be a true butterfly, a tiny flap in events that blows harder in 1914 than otherwise.