I'm not being coy, I'm directly pointing out the encirclements could and did happen, even contemporary to the time in question; to claim they could not because they didn't happen historically is to ignore that we are talking about Alternate History and is, at it's core, circular logic. The argument literally boils down to "It couldn't happen because it didn't happen, and it didn't happen because it couldn't happen". As for IOTL Solstice, sure, but we're talking about one with the combat power of an additional Panzer Army thrown in.
Yes your being coy. I talked explicitly about multi-army encirclements and you responded with division-level encirclements, which are on a vastly smaller scale and require a correspondingly smaller effort. And your also misrepresenting the core of my argument: the reason such encirclements didn't happen is because the Germans had long lost the capacity for it and for successful maneuver warfare on that scale in general. Everything about German operations in '45, from the shambolic state of their logistics, the poor training of their armies, the lack of motorization, lack of fuel, the actual conduct of their historical operations, point to this. Even your last claim is in contradiction to the actual history: Guderian originally wanted 6th Panzer Army and even then he didn't expect it to be able to cut off and destroy 1st Belorussian Front. Once again, your indulging in a delusion that even the German generals refused to engage in.
It's very notable you talk about the strategic while likewise completely ignoring the changed tactical features of this. For one major strategic difference, the Ardennes attack was focused on taking the port city of Antwerp and didn't really utilize any finesse in the attack; instead of attack on flanks, like the Generals advocated, the plan ultimately became one of a broad front attack directly into American positions in order to reach Antwerp. Here, ATL-Solstice is directly about attacking on the flanks and destroying Soviet forces.
Because the tactical is irrelevant. Strategic trumps tactical. Leaving aside that there were no flanks against the Americans to really turn in the Ardennes, a weak point in the line is a weak point, whether it's the front or the flanks. Then again, having looked into what the 1st Belorussian had deployed to defend it's right flank, I'm not so sure the flank was a weakpoint any more.
Outside of the strategic and focusing on the tactical level which you completely ignored:
- The Germans have air superiority
- Unlike the Anglo-Americans, the Soviets have just advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their troops and straining their logistics; as noted by Art and contained within the Soviet reports, logistical issues were emerging of a serious nature.
- The Germans are actually hitting exposed flanks.
The Germans had fighters up, but they were unable to leverage that superiority into anything meaningful on the ground and their superiority was already waning by late-February as the VVS started to advance their air bases. The advance by the Soviets did not weaken them remotely enough for the vastly weaker German forces to succeed in such an ambitious operation. And flanks can be covered by redeploying forces, as the Soviets did historically. And the Germans don't really have the skills for finesse: their forces consist of mostly of half-trained teenagers and old men by this point.
Again with the circular logic here, as you're not offering any real argument; you just keep saying it's not going to work without being able to provide an actual reason as to why. As for what I said, you're attempting to strawman me or don't understand what the point is, which was that I never said just threatening 1st BF's logistics and flanks wasn't enough. My contention is that to actually have an effect, Alt-Solstice has to cut said logistics.
Nice projection there. I've already stated why it's not going to work: because the Soviets can deploy far more forces to handle it then the Germans can in far shorter amounts of time. The redeployment of Nor am I strawmanning you: you are flatly claiming that the Germans will suddenly magic up the ability to cut-off a force that has already proven itself able to run rings around them, smash their attacks, and vastly outweighs them in every conceivable category. And you have singularly failed to prove that the mere addition of a single panzer army would be enough to cut said logistics.
They were the reserves of both elements and had to be released by STAVKA. Point being, the Soviets have nothing else to throw in once the Germans hit them.
They weren't released by STAVKA, they were moved by the front commands. Your claim that the Soviets have nothing else is also unsubstantiated: there is nothing preventing additional forces being redeployed.
The Soviets stopped Solstice by completely cancelling their original Berlin operation, diverting the resources directly slated for it, and then had to go on the defensive for nearly a week before reverting to the offensive. This was against a slap dash German effort of about 10 divisions, hastily planned and supported, and which Soviet intelligence had some knowledge was coming. Then, despite the much vaunted superiority of the Soviets you keep extolling, an operation to eliminate the German forces took eight weeks as opposed to original two STAVKA thought it would take. That, despite for all their superiority, it took them that long to eliminate the Germans and had to cancel the aforementioned operation really speaks volumes about said superiority.
None of which is evidence that the addition of a mere panzer army is going to allow the Germans to suddenly succeed against a force that still massively outweighs them. The Germans had already previously failed with more favorable odds then what they are facing here.
No one is contending that the Soviets don't have more numbers and equipment. That advantage, however, does not make them immune to getting into bad military situations that their opponents can take advantage of, as we saw on the Eastern Front going all the way back to June of 1941.
I'm not sure what this is on about: the Germans were the ones with numerical superiority in June of 1941 and through much of the rest of that year. It was only in 1942 that the Germans demonstrated the ability to advance against a Red Army that had strategic numerical superiority and even then they were able to muster operational numerical superiorities in the areas they made their sweeping advances. Even then, this argument relies on desperately ignoring that the 1945 Red Army has the skills to match it's size unlike the 1941 one, but then given how consistently you've treated the Red Army as the Germans punching bag you don't seem to think the Russians at all over the 4 years of massive war. Of course, then the Soviets in 1941 or 1942 lacked the tactical-operational skill they possessed in 1945, which makes a lot more difference then who has more in numbers. They also proved consistently able to avoid getting into bad military situations in 1945, which is why they paused in February of '45, redeployed their strengths to the flanks, and smashed the Germans in Pomerania.
This is either an obvious strawman, or you really need to slow down and actually read what was posted.
I did read it and no, it is not a strawman. You are essentially claiming that the Germans ability to defend against and repulse a minor attack by a single cavalry corps suddenly equates to the ability to breakthrough the full-depth of Soviet defenses, drive deep into their operational-strategic depths, cut them off, and destroy them something the Germans didn't even come close to doing. It also continues to entirely depend on ignoring that when the Soviets attacked again on the first of March, this time in full force, they cut through this same area like a hot knife through butter.
The situation I was talking about here and you were responding to concerns engagements that occurred after Solstice had ended and the Soviets have begun their counter-attack against the Germans with both 1st and 2nd BF: to be clear, this is the Soviets on the attack and the Germans defending. You're attempting to equate this with Solstice, which can't be done for the above bolded fact; the situation is completely different. The point made with the original citation of this action, quite clearly, was that for all the alleged superiority of the Soviets, with both of their fronts attacking and the Germans exhausted after their own attack, the Soviets were still rebuffed along this portion of the front. This quite clearly suggests the Germans were far stronger and the Soviets far weaker than you are claiming here.
Except the actual history makes it clear that the Soviets when they launched their main attack were not rebuffed, that they overwhelmed the Germans on this portion of the front after a few hours at best and a few days at worst, and that they were at the Baltic within a few more days, having overrun the bulk of Pomerania. It then took them considerably more time to smash every last pocket of resistance, but there was never any doubt that those pockets would fall.
That IOTL Solstice did manage to threaten the Soviet flanks and rear is not a matter up for debate, as it is historical fact. We have the Soviet documents from STAVKA to prove so and I don't think you can claim Art doesn't know what he's talking about in this regard.
That the IOTL Solstice collapsed within three days, achieving a mere 7 miles of advance, and never came close to moving beyond threatening the Soviets flanks and rear to threatening Soviet logistical lines or threatening encirclement is also not a matter up for debate and to posit that a mere panzer army is gonna add enough strength for a nearly 300 kilometer advance is beyond ludicrous. Hell, you haven't even demonstrated that the Germans have enough
fuel to support such a advance...
Excuse me what? Your original claim was that any garrison would be crushed if caught out in the open, but here we have a verified example disproving that.
Hmm... reviewing I indeed didn't clarify I was talking about the garrison counter-attacking it's besiegers which was my intention. Egg on my face there.
Your new contention that any attack on a garrison would end in catastrophe is disproven by the previous point of contention in that we have a verified instance of German garrisons forcing Soviet forces to retreat.
No we don't.
Um, what? Your logic here makes absolute no sense at all.
"You've said the Soviets took two months to destroy German forces in Pommerania so now the Germans have to attack 1st Ukrainian for some reason"
Now your expressing severe ignorance about basic facts. You stated that in order to complete the encirclement the German forces will drive all the way to Silesia to hook up with the German forces there. Where do you think 1st Ukrainian
was in February 1945? I'll give you a hint: it begins with an "S" and ends with "ilesia"...
Directly contradicted by STAVKA's own reports, as noted by Art. Even after Zhukov was forced to cancel the op and transferred resources it took a week of the Soviets sitting on the defensive to bring the Germans to a halt and then two months of counter-attacks to eliminate them.
No, it took three days to bring the Germans to a halt: Sonnenwende began on February 15th and terminated on the 18th. The offensive consisted of one day of the Germans making progress and then two more of the Germans hammering their heads against Soviet defenses before giving up.
"With its assortment of Danes, Norwegians, and Flemings in the lead, Sonnenwende drove south seven miles and actually managed to relieve the besieged German garrison of Arnswalde. But this relatively impressive opening soon petered out into tough positional fighting over the next two days-the last thing the Wehrmacht could afford. The infantry component-German and non-German alike-was half-trained, and the previous Panzers suffered heavy and irreaplaceable losses to Soviet antitank guns, mines, and artillery." -The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-45, Pg 450
That the Soviets sat on the defensive for another six days while they prepared their counter-attack does not change that the Germans had been halted by day three. It's also worth noting that seven miles (a little over 11 kilometers) isn't even enough of an advance to penetrate into the rear area of a Soviet rifle corps (at it's smallest, a corps defensive region is 13 kilometers deep), much less the rear of the defending Soviet armies, so not only did Sonnenwinde fail but it also failed to even breakthrough the tactical defenses of the corps and never came close to breaking through the tactical defenses of the armies. The fact that it took two months to eliminate every last pocket of resistance does not change the fact that when the Soviet counter-attack started on February 24th, it broke through the full depth of German defenses within hours at best and a few days at worst and had already overrun the great bulk of Pomerania by the end of the first week of March. The German forces wound-up crushed against the coast by March 4th. It was their sheer density which made it take the rest of the month for 2nd Belorussian to finish them off.
Nope, not at all actually and you know that, it's why you've entirely limited yourself in this debate to just claiming superiority in material because that's the only leg you have to stand on and even that bares qualification. What are the differences?
- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have recently advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their forces and stretching their logistics. Compare that to Spring Awakening, where the Soviets built additional temporary bridges and gas pipelines over the Danube River in the leadup to the German attack.
Yet their forces still massively outweigh, outgun, and outmaneuver their German counterparts.
- Unlike in Hungary, a massive open flank had emerged through which a German attack could exploit.
The flank wasn't open. It was guarded by multiple Soviet armies.
- Unlike in Hungary, the Germans have achieved air superiority over the VVS. This is a major difference.
It's not really a difference at all. The Germans were never able to
do anything with their air superiority. Air power (of either sides) doesn't appear at all in the historical accounts of Solstice (or Spring Awakening for that matter) and there's no evidence they had any impact upon Soviet ground forces ability to maneuver and fight.
- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have no available reinforcements. The other fronts are bogged down in East Prussia and Silesia.
Unsubstantiated nonsense. In addition to the Front reserves we have previously discussed which would still be available (and which by themselves outweigh the Germans), the Soviets would still have the STAVKA reserves and there's nothing preventing either 2nd or 1st Belorussian from redeploying additional armies from elsewhere on their front.
- Unlike in Hungary,
the Soviets have not had time to construct defense zones reaching up to 25–30 km in depth. To really drive this home,
in the Lake Balaton area alone,
66 anti-tank ambush points were constructed over 83 km of the front.
After having looked into it, the 62nd, 47th, and 2nd Guards Tank Army (alongside the 1st Guards Tank and the 3rd Shock Army in the process of moving up as local reserves) had all been deployed to guard the 1st Belorussians northern flank since the beginning of February and had been preparing defenses in the region. Given that the defenses in Hungary were SOP, there is no reason they'd be any different here and indeed, the account I've already given above gives the Germans coming up against strong AT defenses, as do several others.
Furthermore, let's get down some hard numbers here: the German forces assigned to Operation Solstice possessed 256 AFVs. Manpower strength is frustratingly hard to pin down, but is generally being described as the equivalent to a full-strength corps, which for the Germans would be in the range of 50,000 men, give or take 10,000. 6th Panzer in Spring Awakening possessed 255 AFVs and just shy of 90,000 men. That's around 140,000 men and 511 total. A near-tripling of the manpower strength of the attack and doubling of the AFV strength might seem impressive, until one looks at the other side and see's that 1st Belorussian, by itself, outnumbers this 7:1 in men and something like 5:1 in AFVs. The two tank armies alone would outweigh this forces armored strength 3:1. An alternative comparison is, again, Spring Awakening: there they had 300,000 men and 600 AFVs and only managed to advance 40 kilometers at most, less then a 1/3rd of the distance they needed to make to do any damage to 1st Belorussian's logistical lines, against what amounts to Soviet forces with similar strength in manpower and smaller strength in armor. Even ignoring that, this quantity is so small that getting most of the way to Poznan (where 1st Belorussian's railhead was toward the end of January) would leave the flanks of this German advance so overstretched that it would be trivial for 1st or 2nd Belorussian to lop it off and annihilate it, never mind the additional distance to Silesia which is even further from Poznan then Poznan is to the German start lines (150 kilometers vs 130).