WI: The Western Allies Reached Berlin

The final Partition of Germany was not agreed on until early Feb 45 at Yalta

So a more successful western allied results before then would make a potential difference to what was agreed.

So ideas are - an earlier victory in the Battle of the Atlantic - simple pod is hundreds of LR Liberators are given to the LRMP Squadrons of the RAF Coastal command and the USN from 1941 rather than a couple of dozen OTL till the sudden panic in March 43 (and the USN ones used where the U Boats were not)

An earlier Victory in the Med / North Africa Campaign - my go to here is a more effective Op Judgement with 2 or 3 carriers attacking Taranto with 3 or 4 x more aircraft and most of them torpedo carrying AC absolutely wrecking the Italian fleet - followed up with a more effective reinforcement of Malta - followed up with the Aussies and Kiwis being more suspicious regarding the Greek adventure resulting in Rommel's Op Sonnenbaum hitting a far stronger force than OTL and losing that campaign and the FJs being defeated by units 'not' lacking heavy equipment abandoned in Greece. Meanwhile Mallory has an accident and the wasteful and ineffective offensive patrols across France are not conducted and Spitfire units are released far earlier to equip both the DAF and the Malta defenders resulting in a far higher loss rate of the Axis air forces in the region and a correspondingly lower loss rate of Commonwealth Air forces.

Italy is knocked out of the war in Late 42 and the Normandy and Dragoon Campaign is conducted in the summer of 1943 with France fully liberated by the Fall of 43 and the Germany Campaign launched in March 44 combined with a more effective bomber campaign with units (bomber and escort) able to operate from France as well as the UK and Southern Italy.

This I think is the best case for Anglo US boots on the Unter den Linden. Earlier success and aggressive west Allied strategy, perhaps with a bit less LL material to the Red Army 1943-44. This will alter the successive Allied ideas and agreements on post war policy towards Europe. By the time of the OTL Yalta it would be clear the Red Army will only reach Warsaw, & perhaps not even there. So, any Soviet occupation forces in Germany & other locations would be more token than actual control. Occupation commissioners & liaison groups rather than armies mixed in with the Anglo/US occupation forces.

As I outlined earlier, Yalta really isn't the place to get alternate occupation zonal borders (unless we are talking about Bremen and the French). By May 1944 the borders of the zones were pretty much agreed upon. The only thing that was then agreed by the time of Yalta was the Bremen enclave for the US zone (and this was agreed shortly before Yalta) and that France would get an occupation zone carved out of the British and the American zones (hence why France's occupation zone ended up looking the way it did). And the story of France's occupation zone (along with the very real American goal of transferring troops out of Europe in order to finish the war with Japan and to bring troops home) likely means that the Soviets are never only going to have just token forces in the occupation of Germany. Unless the war goes quite differently from 1941-1943 whereby the war in the East is not nearly as brutal (perhaps with the USSR holding off the Germans...somehow..don't ask me how) and the Red Army wasn't responsible for dealing with the majority of Germany's armed forces/units, then some Soviet zone would be in the making.

There was no Soviet zone in Japan because the Americans were able to forestall it due to the very quick capitulation of Japan in August 1945. Even so, in the early stages of the occupation of Japan, the Americans requested and planned initially for 60,000 Chinese troops, 175,000 Soviet troops (later downgraded to 70,000) and 135,000 Commonwealth troops (later downgraded to 65,000) - this was in part because there was domestic hopes for demobilization once the war was won. The Soviets had no intention of placing their troops under American command (so turned down the request) and China's Civil War prevented Chiang from sending any Chinese troops. If I'm not mistaken I don't believe that Chiang was also that interested in having a Chinese occupation zone in Japan itself. But even so, in May 1945 the Americans were drafting plans for a four power occupation of Japan following discussions with the Soviets on their entry into the war. And the Pentagon, did in fact finish drafting such plans (which in part were meant to lessen the burden of occupation by sharing it out). In August 1945. However by then things had changed dramatically to the point where the plans were never presented to the Joint Chiefs or other top policy makers because those same policy makers were now opposed to a zonal occupation. However May 1945 in regards to the progress of the war with Japan would have been equivalent to some time in 1942-1943 in the war against Germany. It was before any Allied troops had even set foot in Japan-proper (apart from the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands) and Operation Downfall was being planned for November/December 1945. If Germany suddenly collapsed in 1943 before zones began to be properly discussed, then you could potentially get radically different zones and a far smaller Soviet participation. To get only very token Soviet forces though, you likely need the Soviet equivalent of Chiang to be in charge (one who is more concerned with domestic pressures and doesn't have a real interest in having an occupation zone).

That last scenario by Cryhavoc101 I think probably has a good chance of resulting in quite different occupation policies and zones.
 
That a handful of them survived does not change the fact they went into the battle with what basically amounts to a deathwish. The reality is that the military in Berlin showed no hint of disobeying Hitler's directive and there is no evidence they would have done otherwise if it was the WAllies. As it was, the WAllies did encounter many SS or other German military or paramilitary holdouts who resisted to the last with the same fanaticism as seen in the East even in April. Hitler and the Nazis simply held that much sway over Germany, with their previously issued directives being solemnly obeyed right up to the moment a Allied soldier showed up, even in places where the German military was absent. Many of those same soldiers would later note that if their government had told them to lay down arms they would have, even if it was to the Russians. May have been a nice ex-post-facto excuse, but the reality is that those German soldiers continued to fight because that was what Hitler desired, and Hitler had delusional ideas of somehow pulling off a last minute victory almost to the very end. Moreover, Hitler didn't actually care about the fate of the surviving German people, infamously stating that all the good ones had already died on the battlefield.

The idea that they were fighting to delay the Russians and save as many German civilians as possible is ultimately just an attempt to make sense of the madness of Germany's final apocalyptic Gotterdammerung. It has elements of truth, because certainly that was what some Germans used the fighting in the last days to do, but it's not the actual reason why the Germans fought to the bitter end.

Hell, even after Hitler died it's not like the Germans instantly stopped fighting. Donitz tried to faithfully carry out Hitler's wishes on that point, which is the reason Hitler appointed the Admiral as his successor and not Goering or Himmler, who had already been involved in "treasonous" surrender discussions with the Allies. Donitz only changed his mind after he became aware of the surrender of German forces in Italy (which had happened before Hitler's suicide) and saw the potential there to drive a wedge between the Allies. He wasn't trying to protect German civilians with his staggered surrenders to the Western Allies in Nazi Germany's last week. What he was actually trying to do was a desperate attempt to split the Allies, force a breach in the terms of Yalta, and turn the British and Americans against the Soviets. Fortunately, Eisenhower shut that down right quick.

Most of the troops that were in the defences of Berlin came from army Group Oder. Heinrichi had orders to hold as long as possible and then retreat into Berlin, something he had no intention of doing. Now many troops were forced away from Oder and surrounded and had no other way of retreating but into Berlin. I think the 12th army that were on the Elbe would have put up less of a fight than the troops on the Oder. Inside Berlin i guess the police would not have fought as hard against Americans as against Russians. 40,000 Volksturm troops would be less if fighting Americans.
 
A crazy extreme extension of this idea would be Allied amphib ops into the Baltic states, Poles sponsored by the Brits lunging on to Warsaw, US ground forces reaching Prague & Budapest, & Churchils dream of a Commonwealth Balkans expedition fulfilled.
 

Deleted member 1487

Save for those who resisted to the last. The Americans encountered plenty of hold-outs who refused to surrender and went down fighting, or fought until the fanatic Nazis at their head was killed and the more rational second took over and ordered a surrender (this happened at Nuremberg) and American KIA rates in April only declined slightly compared to the rest of 1945.
The Americans did have a fight in early 1945, but by March and April they were getting far more surrenders than fights. Nuremberg was an outlier situation in April 1945 and even with the most fanatic of Nazis defending one of the most ideologically important sites in the nation it was still surrendered within 5 days. US KIAs might have only slightly dropped, but German PoW totals increased exponentially and ground was taken at a faster clip than at any point in the conflict save for the break out after Normandy.

They bear up perfectly. The German military surrendered in the places where Hitler had lost control the moment WAllied soldiers showed up and even then it wasn't always the case they surrendered like you are claiming. The supposition that the German military within Berlin will suddenly turn on him just because it's the Americans he is ordering them to fight not borne out by their slavish willingness to obey his orders in regard to fighting the Americans whenever the guy at the top of the local command chain still put loyalty to Hitler over common sense. The fact the war was obviously lost hadn't previously stopped German soldiers from resisting the WAllies tenaciously well into March of '45. And they can't duck the Fuhrers eye in Berlin like they can elsewhere in the country.
We aren't talking about March '45, rather April 1945 when they were quitting at a rate never before experienced. March was the start of the breakdown, April was the culmination.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weste...2th_Army_Group_advances_to_the_Elbe_(9_April)
As it was the push on to the Elbe experienced little resistance except for a few places and even that was quickly bypassed and dealt with during the push on Leipzig. The 90,000 diehards setting up in the Harz Mountains were also quickly overrun.

I just want to be clear, i'm not saying Berlin would surrender without a fight, but you're heavily overestimating German willingness to fight on Hitler's order to the death against the Americans. The Russians were different because of the expected treatment they would get, while most did not feel that way about the Americans judging from PoW totals. Hitler was a wreck contained in his bunker, his officers willing and able to fight to the death on his behalf were not fully in charge everywhere and they wouldn't have the stiffening effect of fear of Soviet wrath on their minds when fighting US forces as can be seen by even the willingness of the SS to resist against the US.
 
That last scenario by Cryhavoc101 I think probably has a good chance of resulting in quite different occupation policies and zones.

Agreed.

In the absence of FDR's willingness to really battle Stalin, an earlier Overlord (Roundup) is the best bet for getting a more favorable set of occupation zones for the WAllies.
 
I just want to be clear, i'm not saying Berlin would surrender without a fight, but you're heavily overestimating German willingness to fight on Hitler's order to the death against the Americans. The Russians were different because of the expected treatment they would get, while most did not feel that way about the Americans judging from PoW totals. Hitler was a wreck contained in his bunker, his officers willing and able to fight to the death on his behalf were not fully in charge everywhere and they wouldn't have the stiffening effect of fear of Soviet wrath on their minds when fighting US forces as can be seen by even the willingness of the SS to resist against the US.

Yeah, I differ from Nuker here.

Yes, the Germans would fight. Yes, it would be bloody.

But I simply cannot imagine the resistance would be quite as fierce as it was with the Soviets, even with Hitler on the scene. His effective control of Berlin's defenses deteriorated with each passing week, each passing day.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yeah, I differ from Nuker here.

Yes, the Germans would fight. Yes, it would be bloody.

But I simply cannot imagine the resistance would be quite as fierce as it was with the Soviets, even with Hitler on the scene. His effective control of Berlin's defenses deteriorated with each passing week, each passing day.
Plus if the US forces actually leaped ahead to pincer and cut off the city in addition to the bombing the US forces conducted IOTL of the city there would be plenty of chance for them to surrender and lose will to fight.
 
What I have probably missed is what would the reaction to the Allies going for Berlin that the Soviets would have?
The Western Allies wanted the Soviets to join in the fight against Japan after Germany was defeated and if the Soviets feel that they can't trust the Wallies then we probably can forget about the Soviets declaring war against Japan.
The Soviet Union can also string the Japanese in to continuing the war in the Pacific by giving them hope for a meditated peace deal while letting the Americans and British Commonwealth nations bleed themselves more.
 

Deleted member 1487

What I have probably missed is what would the reaction to the Allies going for Berlin that the Soviets would have?
The Western Allies wanted the Soviets to join in the fight against Japan after Germany was defeated and if the Soviets feel that they can't trust the Wallies then we probably can forget about the Soviets declaring war against Japan.
The Soviet Union can also string the Japanese in to continuing the war in the Pacific by giving them hope for a meditated peace deal while letting the Americans and British Commonwealth nations bleed themselves more.
The lack of trust would have probably mostly come if the US refused to cede territory as agreed, not so much taking it first. After all the US and UK did exceed the territory they were to hold post-war IOTL, but they pulled out as agreed. As it was the Soviets had interests in the Far East too, so wouldn't want to back out of that if possible.
 
Agreed.

In the absence of FDR's willingness to really battle Stalin, an earlier Overlord (Roundup) is the best bet for getting a more favorable set of occupation zones for the WAllies.

Favourable being dependent on what the objective is. For the most part the US actually did not want to be burdened by a lengthy and extensive occupation in either Germany or Japan. Larger zones just means more troops will be needed to occupy it and this will mean less demobilization (which if I'm not mistaken became one of many issues in various elections between 1944 and 1948 as not only did the people at home want their friends and family back, but some of the soldiers themselves who were drafted wished to go home and were themselves voters).
 
Don't be coy. I already specified what kind of encirclement we're talking about in my very first post and cutting off the occasional exposed division/corps is a far cry from manifesting the ability to cut-off and destroy multiple armies, much less an entire front. The Hungarian encirclements are even more inane as an example, as the Germans couldn't even destroy them and the forces in questions were either relieved or successfully fought their way out. Not even the German generals ever deluded themselves so badly that they believed Solstice could ever cut off major Soviet forces (although Hitler did). They just sought what they actually achieved: a delay for the attack on Berlin so as to prepare additional defenses. They knew anything more was beyond the German militaries power.

I'm not being coy, I'm directly pointing out the encirclements could and did happen, even contemporary to the time in question; to claim they could not because they didn't happen historically is to ignore that we are talking about Alternate History and is, at it's core, circular logic. The argument literally boils down to "It couldn't happen because it didn't happen, and it didn't happen because it couldn't happen". As for IOTL Solstice, sure, but we're talking about one with the combat power of an additional Panzer Army thrown in.

The strategic objective in the Ardennes was to punch through a weak point in a enemy that otherwise was operational-strategically superior to the German forces in every way, drive hundreds of miles into their depths, and cut off and destroy a massive proportion of their forces.

The strategic objective in your proposed Operation Solstice is to punch through a weak point in a enemy that otherwise is operational-strategically superior in every way, drive hundreds of miles into their depths, and cut off and destroy a massive proportion of their forces.

If there's a difference between the strategic objective of the two, I'm not seeing it.

It's very notable you talk about the strategic while likewise completely ignoring the changed tactical features of this. For one major strategic difference, the Ardennes attack was focused on taking the port city of Antwerp and didn't really utilize any finesse in the attack; instead of attack on flanks, like the Generals advocated, the plan ultimately became one of a broad front attack directly into American positions in order to reach Antwerp. Here, ATL-Solstice is directly about attacking on the flanks and destroying Soviet forces.

Outside of the strategic and focusing on the tactical level which you completely ignored:

- The Germans have air superiority
- Unlike the Anglo-Americans, the Soviets have just advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their troops and straining their logistics; as noted by Art and contained within the Soviet reports, logistical issues were emerging of a serious nature.
- The Germans are actually hitting exposed flanks.

Yes, you pretty much did. You stated: "1st BF could've been encircled and destroyed and 2nd BF likely bashed to pieces. This would significantly derail Soviet planning and operations, to say the least". This is almost the same as saying "If Hitler had the Dragonballs, he could have wished all of 1st Belorussian Front and most of 2nd Belorussian Front out of existence. This would significantly derail Soviet planning and operations, to say the least": technically true (the need to reform the million-man 1st Belorussian and refit half-million strong 2nd Belorussian would consume all the manpower replacements the Soviets had at the time, but since the Dragonballs are fictional to posit it could actually happen is insane. The only difference here is that 6th Panzer Army is merely not remotely enough to do it instead of being completely fictional. Your entire plan rests on ignoring the reality that even with the Panzer Army, the Soviets have massive superiority.

Again with the circular logic here, as you're not offering any real argument; you just keep saying it's not going to work without being able to provide an actual reason as to why. As for what I said, you're attempting to strawman me or don't understand what the point is, which was that I never said just threatening 1st BF's logistics and flanks wasn't enough. My contention is that to actually have an effect, Alt-Solstice has to cut said logistics.

19th Army had joined 2nd Belorussian Front a month prior to Solstice on January 29th and the East Pomeranian Offensive and 1st Guards Tank Army was a part of 1st Belorussian Front from the very beginning of the Vistula-Oder Offensive. Neither were new additions to either front's OOB by the time of either Operation Solstice or the East Pomeranian Offensive.

They were the reserves of both elements and had to be released by STAVKA. Point being, the Soviets have nothing else to throw in once the Germans hit them.

No, you did not. You ignored it entirely and the supposition that it is meaningless flies in the face of history, where the Soviet redeployment stopped Solstice dead. Even your assertion that the Soviets took six weeks to push the Germans back East Pomerania is a misrepresentation: when 2nd Belorussian went over to the offensive on February 24th, the Soviets broke through the German defenses in two days. The Germans rushed the VII Panzer Corps to try and contain the breakthrough but the corps merely found itself encircled by March 2nd. 1st Belorussian attacked on March 1st, broke through the same day, and it's tank units reached the Baltic a mere three days later. The "six weeks" figure was merely the time it took the Soviets to mop up every last pocket of resistance, but those pockets had as much impact on the Battle of Berlin as the fact that Koenigsberg held out to April 16th or that Poznan held out until May.

The Soviets stopped Solstice by completely cancelling their original Berlin operation, diverting the resources directly slated for it, and then had to go on the defensive for nearly a week before reverting to the offensive. This was against a slap dash German effort of about 10 divisions, hastily planned and supported, and which Soviet intelligence had some knowledge was coming. Then, despite the much vaunted superiority of the Soviets you keep extolling, an operation to eliminate the German forces took eight weeks as opposed to original two STAVKA thought it would take. That, despite for all their superiority, it took them that long to eliminate the Germans and had to cancel the aforementioned operation really speaks volumes about said superiority.

No one is contending that the Soviets don't have more numbers and equipment. That advantage, however, does not make them immune to getting into bad military situations that their opponents can take advantage of, as we saw on the Eastern Front going all the way back to June of 1941.

Yes and there is nothing in the quoted section that contradicts me here. That 2nd Cavalry Corps was forced to give some ground is a far cry from a comprehensive breakthrough of Soviet defenses that smashes 2nd Belorussian and encircles 1st Belorussian. You seem to be equating the ability to achieve minor tactical gains with the ability to breakthrough the full depth of Soviet operational-strategic defenses, engage in a campaign of maneuver to encircle a army-group sized force, and then eliminate that force. The scale of requirements is massively different.

This is either an obvious strawman, or you really need to slow down and actually read what was posted.

The situation I was talking about here and you were responding to concerns engagements that occurred after Solstice had ended and the Soviets have begun their counter-attack against the Germans with both 1st and 2nd BF: to be clear, this is the Soviets on the attack and the Germans defending. You're attempting to equate this with Solstice, which can't be done for the above bolded fact; the situation is completely different. The point made with the original citation of this action, quite clearly, was that for all the alleged superiority of the Soviets, with both of their fronts attacking and the Germans exhausted after their own attack, the Soviets were still rebuffed along this portion of the front. This quite clearly suggests the Germans were far stronger and the Soviets far weaker than you are claiming here.

That IOTL Solstice did manage to threaten the Soviet flanks and rear is not a matter up for debate, as it is historical fact. We have the Soviet documents from STAVKA to prove so and I don't think you can claim Art doesn't know what he's talking about in this regard.

Yes. The bolded portions of your quote says that a garrison even in their fortified positions couldn't hold their positions and had to abandon the town in order to save themselves. It then says that the 2nd Tank Army was pinned down by counterattacks by unspecified German forces at a different section. I'm not sure how any of that contradicts my observation that attempt by a garrison to attack would end in catastrophe for that garrison.

Excuse me what? Your original claim was that any garrison would be crushed if caught out in the open, but here we have a verified example disproving that. Your new contention that any attack on a garrison would end in catastrophe is disproven by the previous point of contention in that we have a verified instance of German garrisons forcing Soviet forces to retreat.

As I already noted, it did not take the Soviets six weeks to push the Germans back, that's a willful misrepresentation of what actually happened on your part. You requirement to push means that now not only does 6th Panzer Army have to defeat 1st Belorussian, they also have to push through the bulk of 1st Ukrainian. Between those two and 2nd Belorussian, that's a force larger then the entire German OstHeer in the Winter of 1945! I have a hard time envisioning even Hitler plumbing the depths of such delusion! And you still haven't proven that 6th PAnzer's logistics train is adequate enough to even support it's deployment into Eastern Pomerania, much less a massive advance on the scale your positing!

Um, what? Your logic here makes absolute no sense at all.

"You've said the Soviets took two months to destroy German forces in Pommerania so now the Germans have to attack 1st Ukrainian for some reason"

And the last supposition is completely inane. As it was, the Soviets ground Solstice to a complete halt within three days with the Germans not even making it through the Soviets tactical defenses and into their operational depths. The attack unnerved the STAVKA and caused them to postpone the Berlin Operation, but for all intents and purposes, that's all it managed. The Soviets then rapidly redeployed their forces, attacked, and broke through the German lines. There is nothing about OTL that supports the claim that it "won't matter". The idea that the Germans of 1945 will hack through manifestly superior Soviet forces and inflict a defeat upon them to surpass 1st Kiev is up there with the Ardennes Offensive in terms of delusion.

Directly contradicted by STAVKA's own reports, as noted by Art. Even after Zhukov was forced to cancel the op and transferred resources it took a week of the Soviets sitting on the defensive to bring the Germans to a halt and then two months of counter-attacks to eliminate them.

We're not talking about something as narrow as tactics, we're talking operations. And no, the situation is entirely comparable: in Hungary, the Germans had inadequate forces, inadequate logistics, and the Soviets had massive superiority in every category. Here in Poland/East Germany, the Germans have inadequate forces, inadequate logistics, and the Soviets have massive superiority in every category. They are TOTALLY comparable.

Nope, not at all actually and you know that, it's why you've entirely limited yourself in this debate to just claiming superiority in material because that's the only leg you have to stand on and even that bares qualification. What are the differences?

- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have recently advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their forces and stretching their logistics. Compare that to Spring Awakening, where the Soviets built additional temporary bridges and gas pipelines over the Danube River in the leadup to the German attack.
- Unlike in Hungary, a massive open flank had emerged through which a German attack could exploit.
- Unlike in Hungary, the Germans have achieved air superiority over the VVS. This is a major difference.
- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have no available reinforcements. The other fronts are bogged down in East Prussia and Silesia.
- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have not had time to construct defense zones reaching up to 25–30 km in depth. To really drive this home, in the Lake Balaton area alone, 66 anti-tank ambush points were constructed over 83 km of the front.

So yeah, there is absolutely nothing in these two situations alike beyond saying that the Soviets have an advantage in men and material but they had that in June of 1941 too.
 
Last edited:
I'm not being coy, I'm directly pointing out the encirclements could and did happen, even contemporary to the time in question; to claim they could not because they didn't happen historically is to ignore that we are talking about Alternate History and is, at it's core, circular logic. The argument literally boils down to "It couldn't happen because it didn't happen, and it didn't happen because it couldn't happen". As for IOTL Solstice, sure, but we're talking about one with the combat power of an additional Panzer Army thrown in.

Yes your being coy. I talked explicitly about multi-army encirclements and you responded with division-level encirclements, which are on a vastly smaller scale and require a correspondingly smaller effort. And your also misrepresenting the core of my argument: the reason such encirclements didn't happen is because the Germans had long lost the capacity for it and for successful maneuver warfare on that scale in general. Everything about German operations in '45, from the shambolic state of their logistics, the poor training of their armies, the lack of motorization, lack of fuel, the actual conduct of their historical operations, point to this. Even your last claim is in contradiction to the actual history: Guderian originally wanted 6th Panzer Army and even then he didn't expect it to be able to cut off and destroy 1st Belorussian Front. Once again, your indulging in a delusion that even the German generals refused to engage in.

It's very notable you talk about the strategic while likewise completely ignoring the changed tactical features of this. For one major strategic difference, the Ardennes attack was focused on taking the port city of Antwerp and didn't really utilize any finesse in the attack; instead of attack on flanks, like the Generals advocated, the plan ultimately became one of a broad front attack directly into American positions in order to reach Antwerp. Here, ATL-Solstice is directly about attacking on the flanks and destroying Soviet forces.

Because the tactical is irrelevant. Strategic trumps tactical. Leaving aside that there were no flanks against the Americans to really turn in the Ardennes, a weak point in the line is a weak point, whether it's the front or the flanks. Then again, having looked into what the 1st Belorussian had deployed to defend it's right flank, I'm not so sure the flank was a weakpoint any more.

Outside of the strategic and focusing on the tactical level which you completely ignored:

- The Germans have air superiority
- Unlike the Anglo-Americans, the Soviets have just advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their troops and straining their logistics; as noted by Art and contained within the Soviet reports, logistical issues were emerging of a serious nature.
- The Germans are actually hitting exposed flanks.

The Germans had fighters up, but they were unable to leverage that superiority into anything meaningful on the ground and their superiority was already waning by late-February as the VVS started to advance their air bases. The advance by the Soviets did not weaken them remotely enough for the vastly weaker German forces to succeed in such an ambitious operation. And flanks can be covered by redeploying forces, as the Soviets did historically. And the Germans don't really have the skills for finesse: their forces consist of mostly of half-trained teenagers and old men by this point.

Again with the circular logic here, as you're not offering any real argument; you just keep saying it's not going to work without being able to provide an actual reason as to why. As for what I said, you're attempting to strawman me or don't understand what the point is, which was that I never said just threatening 1st BF's logistics and flanks wasn't enough. My contention is that to actually have an effect, Alt-Solstice has to cut said logistics.

Nice projection there. I've already stated why it's not going to work: because the Soviets can deploy far more forces to handle it then the Germans can in far shorter amounts of time. The redeployment of Nor am I strawmanning you: you are flatly claiming that the Germans will suddenly magic up the ability to cut-off a force that has already proven itself able to run rings around them, smash their attacks, and vastly outweighs them in every conceivable category. And you have singularly failed to prove that the mere addition of a single panzer army would be enough to cut said logistics.

They were the reserves of both elements and had to be released by STAVKA. Point being, the Soviets have nothing else to throw in once the Germans hit them.

They weren't released by STAVKA, they were moved by the front commands. Your claim that the Soviets have nothing else is also unsubstantiated: there is nothing preventing additional forces being redeployed.

The Soviets stopped Solstice by completely cancelling their original Berlin operation, diverting the resources directly slated for it, and then had to go on the defensive for nearly a week before reverting to the offensive. This was against a slap dash German effort of about 10 divisions, hastily planned and supported, and which Soviet intelligence had some knowledge was coming. Then, despite the much vaunted superiority of the Soviets you keep extolling, an operation to eliminate the German forces took eight weeks as opposed to original two STAVKA thought it would take. That, despite for all their superiority, it took them that long to eliminate the Germans and had to cancel the aforementioned operation really speaks volumes about said superiority.

None of which is evidence that the addition of a mere panzer army is going to allow the Germans to suddenly succeed against a force that still massively outweighs them. The Germans had already previously failed with more favorable odds then what they are facing here.

No one is contending that the Soviets don't have more numbers and equipment. That advantage, however, does not make them immune to getting into bad military situations that their opponents can take advantage of, as we saw on the Eastern Front going all the way back to June of 1941.

I'm not sure what this is on about: the Germans were the ones with numerical superiority in June of 1941 and through much of the rest of that year. It was only in 1942 that the Germans demonstrated the ability to advance against a Red Army that had strategic numerical superiority and even then they were able to muster operational numerical superiorities in the areas they made their sweeping advances. Even then, this argument relies on desperately ignoring that the 1945 Red Army has the skills to match it's size unlike the 1941 one, but then given how consistently you've treated the Red Army as the Germans punching bag you don't seem to think the Russians at all over the 4 years of massive war. Of course, then the Soviets in 1941 or 1942 lacked the tactical-operational skill they possessed in 1945, which makes a lot more difference then who has more in numbers. They also proved consistently able to avoid getting into bad military situations in 1945, which is why they paused in February of '45, redeployed their strengths to the flanks, and smashed the Germans in Pomerania.

This is either an obvious strawman, or you really need to slow down and actually read what was posted.

I did read it and no, it is not a strawman. You are essentially claiming that the Germans ability to defend against and repulse a minor attack by a single cavalry corps suddenly equates to the ability to breakthrough the full-depth of Soviet defenses, drive deep into their operational-strategic depths, cut them off, and destroy them something the Germans didn't even come close to doing. It also continues to entirely depend on ignoring that when the Soviets attacked again on the first of March, this time in full force, they cut through this same area like a hot knife through butter.

The situation I was talking about here and you were responding to concerns engagements that occurred after Solstice had ended and the Soviets have begun their counter-attack against the Germans with both 1st and 2nd BF: to be clear, this is the Soviets on the attack and the Germans defending. You're attempting to equate this with Solstice, which can't be done for the above bolded fact; the situation is completely different. The point made with the original citation of this action, quite clearly, was that for all the alleged superiority of the Soviets, with both of their fronts attacking and the Germans exhausted after their own attack, the Soviets were still rebuffed along this portion of the front. This quite clearly suggests the Germans were far stronger and the Soviets far weaker than you are claiming here.

Except the actual history makes it clear that the Soviets when they launched their main attack were not rebuffed, that they overwhelmed the Germans on this portion of the front after a few hours at best and a few days at worst, and that they were at the Baltic within a few more days, having overrun the bulk of Pomerania. It then took them considerably more time to smash every last pocket of resistance, but there was never any doubt that those pockets would fall.

That IOTL Solstice did manage to threaten the Soviet flanks and rear is not a matter up for debate, as it is historical fact. We have the Soviet documents from STAVKA to prove so and I don't think you can claim Art doesn't know what he's talking about in this regard.

That the IOTL Solstice collapsed within three days, achieving a mere 7 miles of advance, and never came close to moving beyond threatening the Soviets flanks and rear to threatening Soviet logistical lines or threatening encirclement is also not a matter up for debate and to posit that a mere panzer army is gonna add enough strength for a nearly 300 kilometer advance is beyond ludicrous. Hell, you haven't even demonstrated that the Germans have enough fuel to support such a advance...

Excuse me what? Your original claim was that any garrison would be crushed if caught out in the open, but here we have a verified example disproving that.

Hmm... reviewing I indeed didn't clarify I was talking about the garrison counter-attacking it's besiegers which was my intention. Egg on my face there.

Your new contention that any attack on a garrison would end in catastrophe is disproven by the previous point of contention in that we have a verified instance of German garrisons forcing Soviet forces to retreat.

No we don't.

Um, what? Your logic here makes absolute no sense at all.

"You've said the Soviets took two months to destroy German forces in Pommerania so now the Germans have to attack 1st Ukrainian for some reason"

Now your expressing severe ignorance about basic facts. You stated that in order to complete the encirclement the German forces will drive all the way to Silesia to hook up with the German forces there. Where do you think 1st Ukrainian was in February 1945? I'll give you a hint: it begins with an "S" and ends with "ilesia"...

Directly contradicted by STAVKA's own reports, as noted by Art. Even after Zhukov was forced to cancel the op and transferred resources it took a week of the Soviets sitting on the defensive to bring the Germans to a halt and then two months of counter-attacks to eliminate them.

No, it took three days to bring the Germans to a halt: Sonnenwende began on February 15th and terminated on the 18th. The offensive consisted of one day of the Germans making progress and then two more of the Germans hammering their heads against Soviet defenses before giving up.

"With its assortment of Danes, Norwegians, and Flemings in the lead, Sonnenwende drove south seven miles and actually managed to relieve the besieged German garrison of Arnswalde. But this relatively impressive opening soon petered out into tough positional fighting over the next two days-the last thing the Wehrmacht could afford. The infantry component-German and non-German alike-was half-trained, and the previous Panzers suffered heavy and irreaplaceable losses to Soviet antitank guns, mines, and artillery." -The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-45, Pg 450

That the Soviets sat on the defensive for another six days while they prepared their counter-attack does not change that the Germans had been halted by day three. It's also worth noting that seven miles (a little over 11 kilometers) isn't even enough of an advance to penetrate into the rear area of a Soviet rifle corps (at it's smallest, a corps defensive region is 13 kilometers deep), much less the rear of the defending Soviet armies, so not only did Sonnenwinde fail but it also failed to even breakthrough the tactical defenses of the corps and never came close to breaking through the tactical defenses of the armies. The fact that it took two months to eliminate every last pocket of resistance does not change the fact that when the Soviet counter-attack started on February 24th, it broke through the full depth of German defenses within hours at best and a few days at worst and had already overrun the great bulk of Pomerania by the end of the first week of March. The German forces wound-up crushed against the coast by March 4th. It was their sheer density which made it take the rest of the month for 2nd Belorussian to finish them off.

Nope, not at all actually and you know that, it's why you've entirely limited yourself in this debate to just claiming superiority in material because that's the only leg you have to stand on and even that bares qualification. What are the differences?

- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have recently advanced hundreds of miles, exhausting both their forces and stretching their logistics. Compare that to Spring Awakening, where the Soviets built additional temporary bridges and gas pipelines over the Danube River in the leadup to the German attack.

Yet their forces still massively outweigh, outgun, and outmaneuver their German counterparts.

- Unlike in Hungary, a massive open flank had emerged through which a German attack could exploit.

The flank wasn't open. It was guarded by multiple Soviet armies.

- Unlike in Hungary, the Germans have achieved air superiority over the VVS. This is a major difference.

It's not really a difference at all. The Germans were never able to do anything with their air superiority. Air power (of either sides) doesn't appear at all in the historical accounts of Solstice (or Spring Awakening for that matter) and there's no evidence they had any impact upon Soviet ground forces ability to maneuver and fight.

- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have no available reinforcements. The other fronts are bogged down in East Prussia and Silesia.

Unsubstantiated nonsense. In addition to the Front reserves we have previously discussed which would still be available (and which by themselves outweigh the Germans), the Soviets would still have the STAVKA reserves and there's nothing preventing either 2nd or 1st Belorussian from redeploying additional armies from elsewhere on their front.

- Unlike in Hungary, the Soviets have not had time to construct defense zones reaching up to 25–30 km in depth. To really drive this home, in the Lake Balaton area alone, 66 anti-tank ambush points were constructed over 83 km of the front.

After having looked into it, the 62nd, 47th, and 2nd Guards Tank Army (alongside the 1st Guards Tank and the 3rd Shock Army in the process of moving up as local reserves) had all been deployed to guard the 1st Belorussians northern flank since the beginning of February and had been preparing defenses in the region. Given that the defenses in Hungary were SOP, there is no reason they'd be any different here and indeed, the account I've already given above gives the Germans coming up against strong AT defenses, as do several others.

Furthermore, let's get down some hard numbers here: the German forces assigned to Operation Solstice possessed 256 AFVs. Manpower strength is frustratingly hard to pin down, but is generally being described as the equivalent to a full-strength corps, which for the Germans would be in the range of 50,000 men, give or take 10,000. 6th Panzer in Spring Awakening possessed 255 AFVs and just shy of 90,000 men. That's around 140,000 men and 511 total. A near-tripling of the manpower strength of the attack and doubling of the AFV strength might seem impressive, until one looks at the other side and see's that 1st Belorussian, by itself, outnumbers this 7:1 in men and something like 5:1 in AFVs. The two tank armies alone would outweigh this forces armored strength 3:1. An alternative comparison is, again, Spring Awakening: there they had 300,000 men and 600 AFVs and only managed to advance 40 kilometers at most, less then a 1/3rd of the distance they needed to make to do any damage to 1st Belorussian's logistical lines, against what amounts to Soviet forces with similar strength in manpower and smaller strength in armor. Even ignoring that, this quantity is so small that getting most of the way to Poznan (where 1st Belorussian's railhead was toward the end of January) would leave the flanks of this German advance so overstretched that it would be trivial for 1st or 2nd Belorussian to lop it off and annihilate it, never mind the additional distance to Silesia which is even further from Poznan then Poznan is to the German start lines (150 kilometers vs 130).
 
Last edited:
Top