WI: The Western Allies Reached Berlin

[marathag]

Taking Berlin and then controlling what happens with the handover and all the stuff they captured in it

But the US didn't give all the V2, turbines and other stuff they grabbed at Mittelwerk back before relinquishing the area to the USSR

 

[David T]

To quote an old post of mine:

There have been plenty of what-ifs about Eisenhower driving toward Berlin in 1945 instead of stopping at the Elbe but has there been anything about the Soviets in that event capturing Lübeck and proceeding on to what would then become the Danish People's Republic? ("An incidental advantage, mentioned by Eisenhower at the time, was that it would keep the Russians out of Denmark, which of course had not been assigned to any of the allies for occupation purposes...") https://books.google.com/books?id=cseazHx2jdsC&pg=PA69

 

[History Learner]

Yes, entirely, as the endless historical failure for the Germans to achieve an encirclement against the Red Army from mid-'43 shows. It's basically proposing the Germans are suddenly going to turn around and achieve what they just conspicuously failed to do in the Ardennes with weaker forces. It's fuhrerbunker delusionalism.

Again, not at all and it's actually quite false to claim no encirclement occurred after Mid-1943; during the German counter-attack after Kiev you saw several encirclements of Soviet units and again in Hungary in January of 1945, coincidentally enough. Nor did any magical ability to prevent encirclements suddenly come into the possession of the Soviets, it's just that the Germans got few opportunities to do such. Here, however, is a golden one and to attempt to compare it to the Ardennes, without taking in note the completely changed strategic objectives and tactical settings is a fallacy.

Again, so what? Being able to threaten flanks and rear is not actually the same as threatening major defeat, much less encirclement and destruction. German panzers in Barbarossa and Typhoon continuously operated with threatened flanks and rear for weeks, even months at a time, yet I get the impression you would scoff if I suggested that this would permit the Soviets to encircle and destroy them.

....good thing I did not suggest that was the end of it. I noted specifically that the IOTL German attack threatened the flanks and rears and supposed that the addition of an entire Panzer Army would allow them to directly encircle them and cut their logistics.

Contrary to your claim, neither 1st Belorussian nor 2nd Belorussian received new forces: their OOBs on February 27th remain the same as on March 1st.

Because they had received the reinforcements before the 27th as was literally bolded in the portions I posted. Here again it is:

On 15th Rokossovsky reported to Stavka his plan of further actions in connection with the arrival of 19th Army and 3rd Tank Corps (report #3708 to the chief of the General Staff). He proposed to this force on his right wing but to develop the offensive not in the western direction as it was called for by Stavka’s directive of 8th February but to the north and reach the coats of Baltic Sea in the area of Kolberg. The part of Pomerania to the east of Kolberg should be cleared by right wing of the front (70th, 49th, 65th, 2nd Shock Armies). This offensive could be begun on 22-23th February because the time was needed to reserve forces to reach the frontline from their current location. Rokossovksy wrote that to fully carry out fully the objectives posed by Stavka’s directive of 8th February – that is to occupy all the Eastern Pomerania up to the Vistula’s mouth his front need additional reinforcement – two armies and two tank corps. He complained on the high losses suffered in previous operations: 26 of his rifle divisions had 3 in average thousands men, and 8 – 4 thousands. So the front commander asked for reinforcement in 80 thousands men in order to bring the divisions to the strength of 6 thousands men.
In essence, this report indicated that 2nd BF was too weak to carry out the task of clearing Eastern Pomerania and securing the flank of the left neighbour, and so additional forces were needed to reach this objective.

As it was planned the offensive of 1st BF began on 19th February but almost immediately it bogged down. On the uttermost right wing the attack coincided with the German counteroffensive. Despite the commitment to actions of 7th Guards Cavalry Corps Soviet troops not even didn’t gain ground but were forced to retreat on some sectors of the front. Further to the west Soviet actions were more successful. 9th Guards and 80th Rifle Corps of 61st Army attacked Arnswalde and break through to the streets of the town. Finally Arnswalde was abandoned by garrison. 2nd Tank Army on the left wing of attacking group south of Stargard was pinned down by German counterattacks and was unable to switch to offensive. So the actions of 1st BF showed that due to the stiffening enemy resistance couldn’t fulfill the tasks they received. It was clear that additional forces were needed to cope with the situation on the right wing of the front.

Already on 20th February Zhukov asked Stalin to authorize temporally switch to defense on the entire front including Oder sector. He intended to exhaust the attacking German forces and to prepare to repulse the possible even more powerful attacks from Pomerania. The defensive phase had to last 5-6 days, i.e. till 25-26th February, after that 1st BF would assume offensive with the forces of the right wing of the front and 1st GTA committed from reserve.

Rather what happened was that 1st Belorussian redeployed it's armies so the weight of it's forces was now on the exposed northern flank and drove them north in coordination with 2nd Belorussian Front. Why the Soviets wouldn't be able to do the same redeployment in response to a more threatening advance is something you glaringly don't even try to address. It should also be noted that 1st Belorussian Fronts forces completed their own mission as per the time schedule and then redeployed back down to Berlin, leaving 2nd Belorussian to finish the rest of the campaign.

I did address it, quite glaringly so by pointing out such a move is meaningless. Against much weaker German defenses, it took six weeks to accomplish what they had expected to do in less than two weeks despite reinforcements. Hell, they were even beaten in several sectors in their counter-offensive.

While local garrisons may have held up Soviet attacks, they could not outright defeat them, ultimately succumbed to them,

No, as Art noted:

As it was planned the offensive of 1st BF began on 19th February but almost immediately it bogged down. On the uttermost right wing the attack coincided with the German counteroffensive. Despite the commitment to actions of 7th Guards Cavalry Corps Soviet troops not even didn’t gain ground but were forced to retreat on some sectors of the front.

and would have been summarily obliterated if they had to leave their fortified positions and expose themselves to the full fury of Soviet firepower.

No:

Further to the west Soviet actions were more successful. 9th Guards and 80th Rifle Corps of 61st Army attacked Arnswalde and break through to the streets of the town. Finally Arnswalde was abandoned by garrison. 2nd Tank Army on the left wing of attacking group south of Stargard was pinned down by German counterattacks and was unable to switch to offensive. So the actions of 1st BF showed that due to the stiffening enemy resistance couldn’t fulfill the tasks they received. It was clear that additional forces were needed to cope with the situation on the right wing of the front.

Even with the 6th Panzer Army, where is the German manpower and equipment coming from to secure the ever widening flanks for an advance which would have to cover hundreds of miles in order to smash 2nd Belorussian and encircle 1st Belorussian?

From 6th Army itself, the IOTL advance itself was enough to position the Germans on Zhukov's flanks and it took the Soviets six weeks to push them back. The influx of 6th Panzer and it's logistics train is more than sufficient to accomplish the job nor is any Southern Pincer needed, given the Germans still control Silesia and thus it can serve as their Southern anchor.

Where is the transport capacity coming from to sustain a advance deep enough to smash 2nd Belorussian and encircle 1st Belorussian? Why do the Soviets just sit there and let themselves be encircled instead of, you know, redeploying their forces to meet the threat? Where is the southern pincer to seal a encirclement of the 1st Belorussian?

The same transport capacity that got 6th Panzer from the Ardennes, across Germany, Austria and then into Hungary and then allowed it to launch the last major offensive of the Germans in WWII that March. As for the Soviets I fully expect them to do exactly that, the problem is IOTL showed it wouldn't matter.

It's a matter of historical record that the historical Solstice lacked the transport capacity to adequately deploy the forces historically dispatched too it. Why that is the case can be speculated upon: perhaps the Red Army severing the rail lines weakened their capacity in that direction. Regardless, even in your cited offensive, however, it's worth noting that the 6th Panzer Army largely ran out of fuel, lost all of it's gains from those ten days to the Soviet counter-attack's first day, and it's defensive fighting afterward largely consisted of it being driven relentlessly back and at no point did it do meaningful damage to the Soviet forces it was sent to engage. If 6th Panzer couldn't defeat the combined million men of 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Front in mobile battle, how the hell is it going to defeat two Fronts that are (combined) a half-million men stronger then that?

Because the tactical situation is completely different between two situations and attempting to compare them is not reasonable; it's like trying to compare 1st Kiev to 2nd Kiev.

 

[Chris S]

I think a better PoD for this scenario would be to begin in late 1944 and have the WAllies advance much further and faster than they did in OTL. Maybe have it so that the Allies find out about German plans for the Ardennes Offensive (maybe through radio interception or some additional aerial reconnaissance is able to spot the buildup of German troops and tanks), thus stopping the Battle Of The Bulge in its tracks (which IOTL delayed the Allied advanced into Germany by at least a few weeks).

That way, the WAllies come into the Yalta Conference (Feb 1945) holding much more of the cards in their hands, and will be able to negotiate different Occupation Zones with Stalin. Though as to what those zones would be exactly, I'm not sure. But at least here, you would have more justification for the Allies to "race to Berlin" even if it means taking horrendous casualties in the process.

This topic of the western Allies reaching Berlin first and then there being different occupation zones comes up from time to time. However the history of the zones requires that a POD occurs in 1943, rather than 1944. I did a map series on this in the New OTL Maps thread which was inspired by @Stateless ' own maps and source, plus further research (to anyone interested, scroll down to p. 131 and read onwards from there).

The problem with a late 1944 POD that then relies on the February 1945 Yalta conference is that the basic outline for the zones had been agreed as far back as 1943 and in February 1944 (that is before the Normandy landings) the remaining areas of disagreement concerning the zones was not between the Western Allies and the Soviets, but between the British and Soviets on one hand and the Americans on the other - the British and the Soviets came up with practically identical proposals for the zones in February 1944 (if not from 1943), but it was FDR who held out for very different boundaries which were also unrealistic in that it would require the Americans to occupy northern and northwestern Germany (which FDR in particular and some other Americans wanted because they envisioned occupying Germany for only 1-2 years and didn't want to rely on supply lines through France but rather via the sea; additionally they envisioned the need to withdraw troops from Europe to continue pursuing the war against Japan which was not expected to be finished until 1946 at the time*) while the British occupied southern Germany (and the Soviets occupying the east). This was unrealistic for two reasons; first because Operation Overlord had the Americans landing on the westernmost beaches in Normandy while the British landed on the eastern beaches. Thus when the Americans and British pushed south into France and then turned east into the Germany, the Americans would end up, solely on the basis of geography, in southern Germany, while the British would end up in northwestern Germany (this was thus the basis of the British proposal for the zones in 1943-1944). To get FDR's preferred arrangement of the Americans in northwestern Germany and the British in southern Germany would require changes in the deployment plans for Overlord OR it would require that the two vast armies switch places at some point during the advance into Germany, or after VE Day (which would be a very large and largely unnecessary logistical undertaking). Secondly it was unrealistic because it did not use existing administrative boundaries as the basis for the zones (which is what the British and Soviet proposals did - though they were so close in outline apparently they should probably be considered as one proposal). This would cause major headaches administratively as rather than appropriate existing administrative machinery, the Allied military governments would now have to create whole new apparatuses which would likely cut across existing administrative borders and cause confusion and inefficiency (if one thinks about it, the division of Austria into zones also followed existing administrative divisions and it was clearly for similar reasons).

If I'm not mistaken the basic zonal boundaries were agreed in outline in January 1944, then more concretely by May 1, 1944 (again this is before the Normandy landings) when the Americans agreed with the Soviet and British proposals on the boundaries of the eastern zone allocated to the USSR and then ultimately in the London Protocol and in the Second Quebec Conference of September 1944 and the only thing left to determine was which Ally (America or Britain) was going to occupy the northwestern zone and which ally (Britain or America) was going to occupy the southern zone. Actually, by the time of Yalta, the disagreement wasn't over the zonal boundaries, or even over which zones were going to be occupied by the British and which one by the Americans (that had been agreed on September 16, 1944 when the British finally convinced FDR that it would be better for the British to take the northwestern zone, while the Americans took the southern zone) but over whether the Americans would have administrative control over the districts of Bremen and Bremerhaven (as the Americans expected) rather than just control over the port facilities in those towns (as the British expected). The solution to that minor dispute came just before Yalta when the Americans agreed to keep conform their occupation policies in the Bremen/Bremerhaven enclave with those of the surrounding British zone, if the British relinquished full control over that enclave to the Americans.


The western Allied advance into Germany between March and April 1945 was already fairly rapid, but let's say that they thwart the Ardennes Offensive and by March 1945 had already reached the Weser. By then however the Soviets would still be at the Oder and thus likely still closer to Berlin than the British and Americans. It seems unlikely that Eisenhower is going to aim to send American and British forces to fight a vicious battle for Berlin when most of the area surrounding Berlin (plus parts of Berlin itself) are going to be turned over to Soviet occupation anyway. As @ejpsan noted, Eisenhower was reportedly popular according to Stephen Ambrose because he didn't waste lives in useless ventures. Additionally there is still the issue of logistics (see below) which in the event of even faster initial advances than in OTL are likely to be even more problematic.



*since the British had put forward a planned invasion of the Home Islands for 1947-1948 which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would mean prosecuting the war for far too long and in the First Quebec Conference of August 1943 it was agreed to Japan should be forced to surrender within 1 year of Germany's surrender.

EDIT: So if persons can come up with an 1943 POD concerning the zones, that would be interesting, but it would likely require that:

1. the Normandy deployments are different - how that affects the campaign in France (if at all) would need to be considered. In particular it would require the western Allies to have logistical plans in place to expect and support advances faster than expected (which in turn will also be dictated by consideration for the war against Japan). In OTL the advances being faster than expected threw up some logistical problems (examples underlined):

Logistics and supply

Although the breakout from Normandy had taken longer than planned, the advances until September had far exceeded expectations. Bradley, for example, by September had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were 150 miles (240 km) ahead of their expected position. One effect was that insufficient supplies could be delivered to the various fronts to maintain the advance: demand had exceeded the expected needs.

Much war material still had to be brought ashore across the invasion beaches and through the one remaining Mulberry harbour(the other had been destroyed in an English Channel storm). Although small harbours, such as Isigny, Port-en-Bessin, and Courcelles, were being used, the major forward ports such as Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk and Le Havre either remained in German hands as "fortresses" or had been systematically destroyed. The availability of Cherbourg had been valuable until the breakout, but then the shortage of transport to carry supplies to the rapidly advancing armies became the limiting factor.

Although fuel was successfully pumped from Britain to Normandy via the Pluto pipeline, this still had to reach the fronts, which were advancing faster than the pipelines could be extended.[5] The railways had been largely destroyed by Allied attacks and would take much effort to repair, so fleets of trucks were needed in the interim.[6] In an attempt to address this acute shortage of transport, three newly arrived U.S. infantry divisions—the 26th, 95th, and 104th—were stripped of their trucks in order to haul supplies.[7] Advancing divisions of the U.S. 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units.[8] Four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans.[9]Unfortunately, 1,500 other British trucks were found to have critical engine faults and were unusable, limiting assistance from that quarter.[10] The Red Ball Express was an attempt to expedite deliveries by truck but capacity was inadequate for the circumstances.[11]

The 6th Army Group advancing from southern France were supplied adequately from Toulon and Marseille because it had captured ports intact and the local railway system was less damaged. This source supplied about 25% of the Allied needs.

The U.S. supply organization—Communications Zone (COMZ)—is perceived to have failed to expedite solutions and to have been far too bureaucratic, employing 11,000 staff. COMZ and its commander, General John C. H. Lee, were roundly criticised by other American generals. Failure to supply forward units led to unofficial arrangements, with pressed units "diverting" supplies intended for others. General Eisenhower felt he could not exert authority since COMZ was directly answerable to Washington and not to SHAEF, but General Eisenhower has been criticised for not exerting more pressure and influence than he did.

At this time the main Allied supply lines still ran back to Normandy, presenting serious logistical problems. The solution was to get Antwerp into operation quickly. Although this major port had been captured almost intact, the mere occupation of Antwerp was not enough, because the 21st Army Group failed to gain sea access by clearing the Scheldt estuary.

The delay in securing this area has been blamed on General Eisenhower and the 21st Army Group commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, who favored Operation Market-Garden over clearing the Scheldt when it was weakly held. This allowed the German 15th Army to dig in there, requiring a protracted campaign by the Canadian First Army that delayed the use of Antwerp for months (see below).

2. FDR gets his way against the British and the Soviets who in this instance actually have the same idea on how Germany should be split into occupation zones

and this in turn would likely render the conflict from 1943 onwards unrecognizable to us from OTL because of the vast butterflies likely to be unleashed (not least, if the Americans take Berlin, then the Soviets don't suffer the losses they did in OTL which allows them to have more forces available in the campaign against Japan, in OTL in June 1945 the Soviet leadership discussed what would be required to capture Hokkaido and Zhukov suggested four divisions were needed)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

But the US didn't give all the V2, turbines and other stuff they grabbed at Mittelwerk back before relinquishing the area to the USSR

Right, that's my point. Taking the city would mean keeping whatever they wanted that they found and withdrawing when they were ready.

 

[Chris S]

To quote an old post of mine:

There have been plenty of what-ifs about Eisenhower driving toward Berlin in 1945 instead of stopping at the Elbe but has there been anything about the Soviets in that event capturing Lübeck and proceeding on to what would then become the Danish People's Republic? ("An incidental advantage, mentioned by Eisenhower at the time, was that it would keep the Russians out of Denmark, which of course had not been assigned to any of the allies for occupation purposes...") https://books.google.com/books?id=cseazHx2jdsC&pg=PA69

You asked this before in a post on Greenland, yes and it was an excellent question then and is an excellent question now. As then you said you thought it unlikely that the Soviets would try to Sovietize Denmark, but that if the US tried, they wouldn't hesitate to seize Greenland.

Expounding on this, if somehow the Soviets had captured Lubeck and proceeded into Denmark and then set up a Danish People's Republic (which I too doubt, though they might attempt to wring concessions out of a withdrawal from Denmark or attempt to Finlandize Denmark), then the US might attempt to get Greenland to become independent on the Icelandic model of an Home Rule and an Act of Union which would make Greenland into an independent Kingdom of Greenland in personal union with the Kingdom of Denmark. With the Kingdom of Denmark ended then the personal union would be ended and the Danish King would remain King officially only in Greenland but still claiming the throne of Denmark (which he (or rather "she" as Queen of Denmark) may be restored to following any end of communism in the 1980s onwards, presuming that by then Greenland hadn't already become a republic as well).

 

[Rorke]

I think a better PoD for this scenario would be to begin in late 1944 and have the WAllies advance much further and faster than they did in OTL. Maybe have it so that the Allies find out about German plans for the Ardennes Offensive (maybe through radio interception or some additional aerial reconnaissance is able to spot the buildup of German troops and tanks), thus stopping the Battle Of The Bulge in its tracks (which IOTL delayed the Allied advanced into Germany by at least a few weeks).

That way, the WAllies come into the Yalta Conference (Feb 1945) holding much more of the cards in their hands, and will be able to negotiate different Occupation Zones with Stalin. Though as to what those zones would be exactly, I'm not sure. But at least here, you would have more justification for the Allies to "race to Berlin" even if it means taking horrendous casualties in the process.

Someone should write a story about this

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Again, not at all and it's actually quite false to claim no encirclement occurred after Mid-1943; during the German counter-attack after Kiev you saw several encirclements of Soviet units and again in Hungary in January of 1945, coincidentally enough. Nor did any magical ability to prevent encirclements suddenly come into the possession of the Soviets, it's just that the Germans got few opportunities to do such.

Don't be coy. I already specified what kind of encirclement we're talking about in my very first post and cutting off the occasional exposed division/corps is a far cry from manifesting the ability to cut-off and destroy multiple armies, much less an entire front. The Hungarian encirclements are even more inane as an example, as the Germans couldn't even destroy them and the forces in questions were either relieved or successfully fought their way out. Not even the German generals ever deluded themselves so badly that they believed Solstice could ever cut off major Soviet forces (although Hitler did). They just sought what they actually achieved: a delay for the attack on Berlin so as to prepare additional defenses. They knew anything more was beyond the German militaries power.

Here, however, is a golden one and to attempt to compare it to the Ardennes, without taking in note the completely changed strategic objectives and tactical settings is a fallacy.

The strategic objective in the Ardennes was to punch through a weak point in a enemy that otherwise was operational-strategically superior to the German forces in every way, drive hundreds of miles into their depths, and cut off and destroy a massive proportion of their forces.

The strategic objective in your proposed Operation Solstice is to punch through a weak point in a enemy that otherwise is operational-strategically superior in every way, drive hundreds of miles into their depths, and cut off and destroy a massive proportion of their forces.

If there's a difference between the strategic objective of the two, I'm not seeing it.

....good thing I did not suggest that was the end of it. I noted specifically that the IOTL German attack threatened the flanks and rears and supposed that the addition of an entire Panzer Army would allow them to directly encircle them and cut their logistics.

Yes, you pretty much did. You stated: "1st BF could've been encircled and destroyed and 2nd BF likely bashed to pieces. This would significantly derail Soviet planning and operations, to say the least". This is almost the same as saying "If Hitler had the Dragonballs, he could have wished all of 1st Belorussian Front and most of 2nd Belorussian Front out of existence. This would significantly derail Soviet planning and operations, to say the least": technically true (the need to reform the million-man 1st Belorussian and refit half-million strong 2nd Belorussian would consume all the manpower replacements the Soviets had at the time, but since the Dragonballs are fictional to posit it could actually happen is insane. The only difference here is that 6th Panzer Army is merely not remotely enough to do it instead of being completely fictional. Your entire plan rests on ignoring the reality that even with the Panzer Army, the Soviets have massive superiority.

Because they had received the reinforcements before the 27th as was literally bolded in the portions I posted. Here again it is:

19th Army had joined 2nd Belorussian Front a month prior to Solstice on January 29th and the East Pomeranian Offensive and 1st Guards Tank Army was a part of 1st Belorussian Front from the very beginning of the Vistula-Oder Offensive. Neither were new additions to either front's OOB by the time of either Operation Solstice or the East Pomeranian Offensive.

I did address it, quite glaringly so by pointing out such a move is meaningless. Against much weaker German defenses, it took six weeks to accomplish what they had expected to do in less than two weeks despite reinforcements. Hell, they were even beaten in several sectors in their counter-offensive.

No, you did not. You ignored it entirely and the supposition that it is meaningless flies in the face of history, where the Soviet redeployment stopped Solstice dead. Even your assertion that the Soviets took six weeks to push the Germans back East Pomerania is a misrepresentation: when 2nd Belorussian went over to the offensive on February 24th, the Soviets broke through the German defenses in two days. The Germans rushed the VII Panzer Corps to try and contain the breakthrough but the corps merely found itself encircled by March 2nd. 1st Belorussian attacked on March 1st, broke through the same day, and it's tank units reached the Baltic a mere three days later. The "six weeks" figure was merely the time it took the Soviets to mop up every last pocket of resistance, but those pockets had as much impact on the Battle of Berlin as the fact that Koenigsberg held out to April 16th or that Poznan held out until May.

No, as Art noted:

Yes and there is nothing in the quoted section that contradicts me here. That 2nd Cavalry Corps was forced to give some ground is a far cry from a comprehensive breakthrough of Soviet defenses that smashes 2nd Belorussian and encircles 1st Belorussian. You seem to be equating the ability to achieve minor tactical gains with the ability to breakthrough the full depth of Soviet operational-strategic defenses, engage in a campaign of maneuver to encircle a army-group sized force, and then eliminate that force. The scale of requirements is massively different.

No:

Yes. The bolded portions of your quote says that a garrison even in their fortified positions couldn't hold their positions and had to abandon the town in order to save themselves. It then says that the 2nd Tank Army was pinned down by counterattacks by unspecified German forces at a different section. I'm not sure how any of that contradicts my observation that attempt by a garrison to attack would end in catastrophe for that garrison.

From 6th Army itself, the IOTL advance itself was enough to position the Germans on Zhukov's flanks and it took the Soviets six weeks to push them back. The influx of 6th Panzer and it's logistics train is more than sufficient to accomplish the job nor is any Southern Pincer needed, given the Germans still control Silesia and thus it can serve as their Southern anchor.

As I already noted, it did not take the Soviets six weeks to push the Germans back, that's a willful misrepresentation of what actually happened on your part. You requirement to push means that now not only does 6th Panzer Army have to defeat 1st Belorussian, they also have to push through the bulk of 1st Ukrainian. Between those two and 2nd Belorussian, that's a force larger then the entire German OstHeer in the Winter of 1945! I have a hard time envisioning even Hitler plumbing the depths of such delusion! And you still haven't proven that 6th PAnzer's logistics train is adequate enough to even support it's deployment into Eastern Pomerania, much less a massive advance on the scale your positing!

The same transport capacity that got 6th Panzer from the Ardennes, across Germany, Austria and then into Hungary and then allowed it to launch the last major offensive of the Germans in WWII that March. As for the Soviets I fully expect them to do exactly that, the problem is IOTL showed it wouldn't matter.

And the last supposition is completely inane. As it was, the Soviets ground Solstice to a complete halt within three days with the Germans not even making it through the Soviets tactical defenses and into their operational depths. The attack unnerved the STAVKA and caused them to postpone the Berlin Operation, but for all intents and purposes, that's all it managed. The Soviets then rapidly redeployed their forces, attacked, and broke through the German lines. There is nothing about OTL that supports the claim that it "won't matter". The idea that the Germans of 1945 will hack through manifestly superior Soviet forces and inflict a defeat upon them to surpass 1st Kiev is up there with the Ardennes Offensive in terms of delusion.

Because the tactical situation is completely different between two situations and attempting to compare them is not reasonable; it's like trying to compare 1st Kiev to 2nd Kiev.

We're not talking about something as narrow as tactics, we're talking operations. And no, the situation is entirely comparable: in Hungary, the Germans had inadequate forces, inadequate logistics, and the Soviets had massive superiority in every category. Here in Poland/East Germany, the Germans have inadequate forces, inadequate logistics, and the Soviets have massive superiority in every category. They are TOTALLY comparable.

 

[Aber]

To quote an old post of mine:

"An incidental advantage, mentioned by Eisenhower at the time, was that it would keep the Russians out of Denmark, which of course had not been assigned to any of the allies for occupation purposes..."

Because of course you don't assign "occupation forces" for the territories of your allies.

 

[James Ricker]

we would have had very high causlites and there would be no rape of berlin so more people there and less tramua

I'm not entirely sure about the high casualties. German units would be given the choice of surrendering to the Western allies or fighting to the death against the Russians. At the end of the war German units for rushing to surrender code to the Western powers.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I'm not entirely sure about the high casualties. German units would be given the choice of surrendering to the Western allies or fighting to the death against the Russians. At the end of the war German units for rushing to surrender code to the Western powers.

*cough cough*

Handwaving away Soviet reaction for a moment, while the WAllies might not face much resistance getting to the city, their still going to have to fight for the city as hard as the Soviets did. After all, unlike elsewhere in Germany, Hitler is in Berlin, willing to shoot anyone who tries to give up, and half the cities defenders are diehard SS men who know they have no future regardless of whether it's the Soviets or Western Allies they surrender too (in part because a number of them are from previously occupied territories who willingly joined the SS) and hence are perfectly willing to carry out those orders to ensure the other half keeps fighting.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

*cough cough*

I don't think you know the history of the SS divisions who did try and fight their way west to surrender, like the 2nd SS division. Even Hitler's SS bodyguard tried to break out of Berlin to surrender to the Americans, with some succeeding, while the rest of the 1st SS also did also disengage from the Soviets to retreat into the path of the advancing US forces to surrender in Austria. So did the 3rd SS that survived Budapest and Vienna. Same with the 5th, 9th, and 10th SS. Without looking even further I don't think I will find many if any who didn't try to fight their way west to surrender to the Americans. I get what you're saying about Berlin being the last holdout, but no one was really that afraid of the Americans the way they were the Soviets so were repeatedly proven that the German army and most of the SS would surrender against orders to fight to the bitter end in 1945 against the Americans. There is a reason that the Wallies took about 8 million PoWs during WW2 and the Soviets under 3 million. France and the UK between them held more PoWs than the Soviets.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I don't think you know the history of the SS divisions who did try and fight their way west to surrender, like the 2nd SS division.

I know the history of those who were in Berlin. They fought ferociously and were determined to resist regardless of who it was. Even the bodyguards only attempted their breakout after their beloved Fuhrer was dead. Most of the units were also made up of foreign volunteers, who would be hung once they were sent back to their home countries regardless of who they surrendered to. Their lives were forfeit regardless.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I know the history of those who were in Berlin. They fought ferociously and were determined to resist regardless of who it was. Even the bodyguards only attempted their breakout after their beloved Fuhrer was dead. Most of the units were also made up of foreign volunteers, who would be hung once they were sent back to their home countries regardless of who they surrendered to. Their lives were forfeit regardless.

The only military they had to resist were the Soviets, who they clearly were expecting nothing but death from. Meanwhile the SS in general fled west to try and get some chance for survival. Even among the French SS who were some of the most dogged defenders in Berlin, still broke out and headed west to surrender to the Wallies...most of them were spared and after some prison were released:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/33rd_Waffen_Grenadier_Division_of_the_SS_Charlemagne_(1st_French)
They apparently were willing to take the chance IOTL. Their OTL desire to fight so doggedly was probably more to due with the fact that the entire reason they volunteered in the first place was to fight the Soviets. They were the most extremist anti-communist elements of French society, so, unsurprisingly, they fought doggedly against the military they joined even a occupying foreign military force to have the opportunity fight.

 

[eltf177]

[snip]Maybe have it so that the Allies find out about German plans for the Ardennes Offensive (maybe through radio interception or some additional aerial reconnaissance is able to spot the buildup of German troops and tanks), thus stopping the Battle Of The Bulge in its tracks (which IOTL delayed the Allied advanced into Germany by at least a few weeks).

Little was sent out via radio, Hitler wanted total secrecy so most orders were sent out by courier.

Given the supply situation getting closer to Berlin won't be easy...

 

[ejpsan]

If the Allies were able to reach Berlin they may decide that the best thing to do is to surround it and continue East as far as possible.
Instead of fighting block by block the Allies could shell the city, run strafing missions during the day and drop bombs at night.
There may be reconnaissance patrols to pick up prisoners and gather intelligence, throw in some sound trucks and leaflets promising safe passage could be a way to lower resistance in Berlin.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The only military they had to resist were the Soviets, who they clearly were expecting nothing but death from. Meanwhile the SS in general fled west to try and get some chance for survival. Even among the French SS who were some of the most dogged defenders in Berlin, still broke out and headed west to surrender to the Wallies...most of them were spared and after some prison were released:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/33rd_Waffen_Grenadier_Division_of_the_SS_Charlemagne_(1st_French)
They apparently were willing to take the chance IOTL. Their OTL desire to fight so doggedly was probably more to due with the fact that the entire reason they volunteered in the first place was to fight the Soviets. They were the most extremist anti-communist elements of French society, so, unsurprisingly, they fought doggedly against the military they joined even a occupying foreign military force to have the opportunity fight.

That a handful of them survived does not change the fact they went into the battle with what basically amounts to a deathwish. The reality is that the military in Berlin showed no hint of disobeying Hitler's directive and there is no evidence they would have done otherwise if it was the WAllies. As it was, the WAllies did encounter many SS or other German military or paramilitary holdouts who resisted to the last with the same fanaticism as seen in the East even in April. Hitler and the Nazis simply held that much sway over Germany, with their previously issued directives being solemnly obeyed right up to the moment a Allied soldier showed up, even in places where the German military was absent. Many of those same soldiers would later note that if their government had told them to lay down arms they would have, even if it was to the Russians. May have been a nice ex-post-facto excuse, but the reality is that those German soldiers continued to fight because that was what Hitler desired, and Hitler had delusional ideas of somehow pulling off a last minute victory almost to the very end. Moreover, Hitler didn't actually care about the fate of the surviving German people, infamously stating that all the good ones had already died on the battlefield.

The idea that they were fighting to delay the Russians and save as many German civilians as possible is ultimately just an attempt to make sense of the madness of Germany's final apocalyptic Gotterdammerung. It has elements of truth, because certainly that was what some Germans used the fighting in the last days to do, but it's not the actual reason why the Germans fought to the bitter end.

Hell, even after Hitler died it's not like the Germans instantly stopped fighting. Donitz tried to faithfully carry out Hitler's wishes on that point, which is the reason Hitler appointed the Admiral as his successor and not Goering or Himmler, who had already been involved in "treasonous" surrender discussions with the Allies. Donitz only changed his mind after he became aware of the surrender of German forces in Italy (which had happened before Hitler's suicide) and saw the potential there to drive a wedge between the Allies. He wasn't trying to protect German civilians with his staggered surrenders to the Western Allies in Nazi Germany's last week. What he was actually trying to do was a desperate attempt to split the Allies, force a breach in the terms of Yalta, and turn the British and Americans against the Soviets. Fortunately, Eisenhower shut that down right quick.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

That a handful of them survived does not change the fact they went into the battle with what basically amounts to a deathwish. The reality is that the military in Berlin showed no hint of disobeying Hitler's directive

Against the Soviets. OTL showed that in April 1945 Germans were surrendering left and right to the Americans and British, 1.5 million of them to be exact, more than half of what the Soviets took for the entire war. What was the similar number for the Soviets in April? From June 1941-April 1945 the Soviets took only 2 million Germans prisoner and in one month the Wallies nearly equaled that total.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_prisoners_of_war_in_the_Soviet_Union

According to Edward Peterson, the U.S. chose to hand over several hundred thousand German prisoners to the Soviet Union in May 1945 as a "gesture of friendship".[15] Niall Ferguson maintains that "it is clear that many German units sought to surrender to the Americans in preference to other Allied forces, and particularly the Red Army".[16] Heinz Nawratil maintains that U.S. forces refused to accept the surrender of German troops in Saxony and Bohemia, and instead handed them over to the Soviet Union.[17]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germa...pe#Time-line_of_German_surrenders_in_the_West

In the first five days of April, 146,000 German soldiers were taken prisoner[28] [at a rate of 29,000 a day]. In the next nine days, 402,000[29] prisoners were taken [44,000 a day]. Between April 15 and 21, over 450,000 Germans surrendered[30][over 60,000 a day]; in the last ten days of the month over 500,000[31] waved the white flag [over 50,000 a day]. For the month as a whole the average rate of Germans surrendering was 50,000 a day.[2]

From D-Day onwards the numbers of German soldiers who surrendered in north-west Europe were as follows: 200,000 in Normandy; 610,000 up to October 17, 1944; 1.3 million up to the end of March 1945 and 2.8 million up to the end of April 1945, when Hitler died.

Hitler only committed suicide at the end of April, yet throughout April the Wallies were increasing their prisoner totals exponentially.

At that point the German army was imploding and they were surrendering to the Wallies as fast as possible to get away from the Russians and because no one wanted to die in a lost war. Fanatic fighting to the death in 1945 was mostly in the East as it was thought better than Soviet captivity, the numbers show the Germans did not feel the same way about Wallied captivity.

Whatever notions about German fanaticism that you have don't bear up under the numbers taking throughout 1945. The Germans knew they were beaten and were surrendering in the millions before Hitler committed suicide. If anything the dead enders were fighting to escape the Russians or secure a better deal for themselves, delusionally believing that maybe they could negotiate like Donitz. But the reality was the German fighting man was more interested in quitting the war ASAP to the Wallies than fighting to the bitter end. Some certainly were interested in fighting to the death, but they were the exception in the west because surrender was an option rather than likelihood of being outright massacred or gulaged.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

OTL showed that in April 1945 Germans were surrendering left and right to the Americans and British,

Save for those who resisted to the last. The Americans encountered plenty of hold-outs who refused to surrender and went down fighting, or fought until the fanatic Nazis at their head was killed and the more rational second took over and ordered a surrender (this happened at Nuremberg) and American KIA rates in April only declined slightly compared to the rest of 1945.

Whatever notions about German fanaticism that you have don't bear up under the numbers taking throughout 1945.

They bear up perfectly. The German military surrendered in the places where Hitler had lost control the moment WAllied soldiers showed up and even then it wasn't always the case they surrendered like you are claiming. The supposition that the German military within Berlin will suddenly turn on him just because it's the Americans he is ordering them to fight not borne out by their slavish willingness to obey his orders in regard to fighting the Americans whenever the guy at the top of the local command chain still put loyalty to Hitler over common sense. The fact the war was obviously lost hadn't previously stopped German soldiers from resisting the WAllies tenaciously well into March of '45. And they can't duck the Fuhrers eye in Berlin like they can elsewhere in the country.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The final Partition of Germany was not agreed on until early Feb 45 at Yalta

So a more successful western allied results before then would make a potential difference to what was agreed.

So ideas are - an earlier victory in the Battle of the Atlantic - simple pod is hundreds of LR Liberators are given to the LRMP Squadrons of the RAF Coastal command and the USN from 1941 rather than a couple of dozen OTL till the sudden panic in March 43 (and the USN ones used where the U Boats were not)

An earlier Victory in the Med / North Africa Campaign - my go to here is a more effective Op Judgement with 2 or 3 carriers attacking Taranto with 3 or 4 x more aircraft and most of them torpedo carrying AC absolutely wrecking the Italian fleet - followed up with a more effective reinforcement of Malta - followed up with the Aussies and Kiwis being more suspicious regarding the Greek adventure resulting in Rommel's Op Sonnenbaum hitting a far stronger force than OTL and losing that campaign and the FJs being defeated by units 'not' lacking heavy equipment abandoned in Greece. Meanwhile Mallory has an accident and the wasteful and ineffective offensive patrols across France are not conducted and Spitfire units are released far earlier to equip both the DAF and the Malta defenders resulting in a far higher loss rate of the Axis air forces in the region and a correspondingly lower loss rate of Commonwealth Air forces.

Italy is knocked out of the war in Late 42 and the Normandy and Dragoon Campaign is conducted in the summer of 1943 with France fully liberated by the Fall of 43 and the Germany Campaign launched in March 44 combined with a more effective bomber campaign with units (bomber and escort) able to operate from France as well as the UK and Southern Italy.

This I think is the best case for Anglo US boots on the Unter den Linden. Earlier success and aggressive west Allied strategy, perhaps with a bit less LL material to the Red Army 1943-44. This will alter the successive Allied ideas and agreements on post war policy towards Europe. By the time of the OTL Yalta it would be clear the Red Army will only reach Warsaw, & perhaps not even there. So, any Soviet occupation forces in Germany & other locations would be more token than actual control. Occupation commissioners & liaison groups rather than armies mixed in with the Anglo/US occupation forces.