WI: The USS Nevada sinks and blocks Pearl Harbor?

rascal1225

Banned
The chart I linked to is not appreciably different than a 1944 one:
PearlHarborMoorings-usnavy-1944.jpg


The works you refer to was to straighten the channel decades before.

A sunk ship won't block both channels and bending a channel around a wreck wont take aslong as digging a whole new channel.

Thanks for providing that 1944 Moorings and Berthings Chart , I found a zoomable version at https://www.geographicus.com/P/AntiqueMap/pearlharbormoorings-usnavy-1944 for old guys like me who can't see all that well any longer.

The 1941 dated PH navigation chart which I used to consult seems to be a dead link these days. And sadly the wayback machine didn't capture it either. I am left with:

"The Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel commences some 4,000 yd from "Papa Hotel" on a bearing of 333º36'. The entrance channel is marked by lighted and unlighted buoys and a lighted range. With an approximate width of 350 yd, the channel has an initial project depth of 49.9 ft (15.2 m) near the center and 45 ft (13.7 m) on either side of the central 100 yd wide main channel. The central channel project depth decreases to 45 ft (13.7 m) approximately one nmi north of the channel entrance. The project depths on either side of the central channel decrease to 40 ft (12.2 m) at the same location. The same depths are maintained in the Main Channel to a point adjacent to Dry Docks 1 and 2. Channel depths within Pearl Harbor vary by location, and should be verified with the Pearl Harbor Port Operations Office. "

from the also modern https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/pearl_harbor.htm

Its true that dredging a channel around a wreck in the PH entrance channel won't take nearly as long, nor cost nearly as much, as dredging an entirely new entrance channel out to the Pacific. However, the question quickly becomes, how much time do you actually have ? Had Nagumo, for instance, authorized a 3rd wave air strike on the afternoon of Dec.7'41 or the on Dec.8'41 then dredging around a wrecked USS Nevada blocking the PH entrance channel is NOT going to provide any exit relief for all of the USN warships trapped by her, still inside of Pearl Harbor.

With most of Gen. Short's fighter aircraft also wrecked on Oahu's airfields, the expression "like shooting fish in a barrel" comes quickly to mind.
 
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rascal1225

Banned
It was an either/or. While taking out the infrastructure at Pearl would have been incredibly helpful there just weren't enough planes to do it all in one day and unlike the US carrier raids on Japan in 1945 the Japanese didn't have the logistics train to enable the Kido Butai to sit offshore and launch follow up raids. Of crouse if you a doing a Japan wank you give someone the bright idea that long distance sustainment could be really, really helpful and instead of building the Yamato's and some cruisers the Japanese enhance their fleet train and most importantly train, train and train again because at sea replenishment is neither simple nor easy. Then come December 1941 they are able to sit off Hawaii and repeatedly attack, doing a thorough job. In fact while Japan can never "win" the Pacific War in a surrender ceremony in San Francisco Bay way if you want a Japan favourable stalemate such a logistics train is a prerequisite.

Sorry to have missed this conversation but I was not yet an AH.com member when it happened ...

IIRC in the late summer and Fall of 1941 the OT Japanese had some 45 fast modern tankers swinging idle at anchor because the US led oil embargo against them meant that no other nation would sell them the petroleum products that they formerly used those 45 tankers to haul back to Japan. Historically they converted just 8 of those 45 into IJN crewed, underway refueling capable fleet oilers, in great secrecy especially for their well planned upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor.

By postponing some other shipyard projects such as the conversion of several merchants ships into disguised commerce raiders (which never accomplished much anyway) those Japanmese could easily have converted many more of those fast civilian tankers into more swift fleet oilers easily able to provide underway refueling to further IJN mischief missions.

Sure, once the DEI oil resources were captured by the Japanese, many of those new fleet oilers would have to return to more mundane petroleum transportation missions BUT until then, the IJN might have had much greater fueling flexibility.
 
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With most of Gen. Short's fighter aircraft also wrecked on Oahu's airfields, the expression "like shooting fish in a barrel" comes quickly to mind.
Not so easy, in fact "Turkey Shoot" would be a better description for the fate of Nagumo's third wave, particularly if he delayed sending in his third wave until the afternoon of 7 Dec or the next day. The longer Nagumo lingers in close proximity to the remaining serviceable aircraft, including those from the Enterprise, the greater is the risk of detection, damage and failure. If he hangs around approximately 200 miles off the coast, he's going to be caught and attacked. If the US air searches haven't pinpointed the Kido Butai by the time a third delayed attack is launched, alert radar operators and ground observers will be able to relay vital info to the appropriate, and by now functional, command centers to ready the considerable AA assets and plan a retaliatory strike. Historically, the second wave suffered not insignificant losses to Army and Naval gunners.

A third wave would suffer major losses, and Nagumo's victory would become a self-inflicted defeat.
 
A third wave would suffer major losses, and Nagumo's victory would become a self-inflicted defeat.
They wouldn't merely have suffered major losses - the damage they might have inflicted would have been hardly worth those losses, as well. What most people don't realise is that Kido Butai lacked the capability to destroy the harbour facilities, to say nothing of the oil storage tanks.
 

rascal1225

Banned
Not so easy, in fact "Turkey Shoot" would be a better description for the fate of Nagumo's third wave, particularly if he delayed sending in his third wave until the afternoon of 7 Dec or the next day. The longer Nagumo lingers in close proximity to the remaining serviceable aircraft, including those from the Enterprise, the greater is the risk of detection, damage and failure. If he hangs around approximately 200 miles off the coast, he's going to be caught and attacked. If the US air searches haven't pinpointed the Kido Butai by the time a third delayed attack is launched, alert radar operators and ground observers will be able to relay vital info to the appropriate, and by now functional, command centers to ready the considerable AA assets and plan a retaliatory strike. Historically, the second wave suffered not insignificant losses to Army and Naval gunners.

A third wave would suffer major losses, and Nagumo's victory would become a self-inflicted defeat.

Sorry but I can't agree.

However, I think that the topic of a 3rd Wave PH air raid well deserves a new thread all of it's own, rather than being tacked onto this one. Maybe later when some of my other threads here have reached their natural endings.
 
Sorry to have missed this conversation but I was not yet an AH.com member when it happened ...

IIRC in the late summer and Fall of 1941 the OT Japanese had some 45 fast modern tankers swinging idle at anchor because the US led oil embargo against them meant that no other nation would sell them the petroleum products that they formerly used those 45 tankers to haul back to Japan. Historically they converted just 8 of those 45 into IJN crewed, underway refueling capable fleet oilers, in great secrecy especially for their well planned upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor.

By postponing some other shipyard projects such as the conversion of several merchants ships into disguised commerce raiders (which never accomplished much anyway) those Japanmese could easily have converted many more of those fast civilian tankers into more swift fleet oilers easily able to provide underway refueling to further IJN mischief missions.

Sure, once the DEI oil resources were captured by the Japanese, many of those new fleet oilers would have to return to more mundane petroleum transportation missions BUT until then, the IJN might have had much greater fueling flexibility.
And what about ammunition? Japanese carriers were pretty light on ammunition loads, compared to their American counterparts.

Quite frankly Pearl Harbor's logistical facilities are something you work over with thousand-bomber raids, and I mean heavy bombers, round the clock, for weeks. Not six carriers with very limited stores of ammunition and aviation gasoline and, unlike fuel oil, no real way to replenish them at sea.
 
And what about ammunition? Japanese carriers were pretty light on ammunition loads, compared to their American counterparts.
Shokakus carried 90x800kg, 306x250kg and 540x60kg bombs and 45 Type 91 torpedoes.

~10 sorties for Vals
~3 loadouts of heavy bombs for Kates and 1.5 for torpedoes. They could also carry the lighter bombs the Vals had so perhaps enough ordinance for 5-6 strikes for both types.
 
They wouldn't merely have suffered major losses - the damage they might have inflicted would have been hardly worth those losses, as well. What most people don't realise is that Kido Butai lacked the capability to destroy the harbour facilities, to say nothing of the oil storage tanks.
I think in earlier threads it was also mentioned that those facilities were low on the list of priorities, so chances are they're not really targeted much anyway.
 

rascal1225

Banned
I think in earlier threads it was also mentioned that those facilities were low on the list of priorities, so chances are they're not really targeted much anyway.

In a new world where a 3d wave AHTL is now possible, those rigid OT IJN warplane attack priorities can change within "reasonable" limits.

Though your definition of "reasonable" might well differ from mine. LoL !
 
In a new world where a 3d wave AHTL is now possible, those rigid OT IJN warplane attack priorities can change within "reasonable" limits.
This was in the context of a third wave, i.e. there were so many targets left after the 1st and 2nd wave, that even then the facilities would be low on the list.
 

rascal1225

Banned
This was in the context of a third wave, i.e. there were so many targets left after the 1st and 2nd wave, that even then the facilities would be low on the list.
In the context of a hypothetical 3rd wave, Genda may well have altered the OT target priority listings , with Nagumo's approval of course.
 
I don't have the statistics for remaining naval aircraft, that should include Enterprise aircraft that weren't shot down by trigger happy gunners, but the following shows Army aircraft status after the second wave's attack, courtesy of "7 December 1941, The Air Force Story" by Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn,1991:
(I don't believe these figures include any of the B-17s that arrived during the attack)
 

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To the list of Army aircraft ready for combat after the second wave, add nine more B-17s immediately available with two more repairable. These are the B-17s that arrived during the attack and are also courtesy of "7 December 1941, The Air Force Story" by Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn,1991:
 

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rascal1225

Banned
According to the NavWeaps PH Order of Battle, the returning Enterprise's Air Group, that would have been in range to contribute to the defense or a counterattack if there had been a Third Wave attack, consisted of 37 SBD-2 Dauntless scout/dive bombers, 14 F4F-3 Wildcat fighters and 18 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers.

The question being, would IJN attack aircraft from Nagumo's 6 KB carriers or scoutplanes launched from his two heavy cruisers FIND that Enterprise TF before those Americans found the 6 KB carrier TF ? One to six odds wouldn't make for a very long carrier fight BUT would certainly leave some deep scratch marks.
 
The question being, would IJN attack aircraft from Nagumo's 6 KB carriers or scoutplanes launched from his two heavy cruisers FIND that Enterprise TF before those Americans found the 6 KB carrier TF ? One to six odds wouldn't make for a very long carrier fight BUT would certainly leave some deep scratch marks.
It's more likely that the Enterprise air wing minus the CAP relocates to Ford Island as they had already begun to do, and begins to provide a land-based CAP while making preparations for a counterstrike from Oahu or the Enterprise once refueled as soon as KB is located . Meanwhile the few remaining Navy patrol bombers and AAF B-18s initiate an intensive search. If the KB continues to loiter some 200 mi N/NW of Oahu, eventually they will be found.

If long range searches don't discover the KB, if/when Nagumo sends in a third wave, the now extremely alert radar operators, maritime pickets and at last resort, ground observers, will detect the incoming attack. By plotting a reciprocal course, comparing search areas not yet searched and estimating the distance the 3d wave could be launched from, Oahu command centers can obtain a fairly accurate plot of KB's location. Meanwhile, every AA position in Hawaii (and almost everyone else with a gun) will be looking skyward for incoming KB targets.

I don't expect that the few remaining strike assets would be able to mount a very successful ad hoc counterattack on KB, but if they could, it would be launched. The survivors had a duty to exact retribution and regain a bit of lost honor.
 
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