WI: The USS Nevada sinks and blocks Pearl Harbor?

Obviously Japan still loses, let's get that out of the way. The Nevada almost sank in a place that would have blocked the harbor. Say she suffers an Arizona type explosion, rendering her unsalvagable. How long does it take to get her out, and what effect does this have on the war?
 
It's time to put this myth to rest. While the Nevada may have sunk in the channel and created an obstruction, due to the channel width, there was never any possibility of the channel being completely blocked and closed to navigation. The channel is approximately 400 yards/366 meters/1200 feet wide. The Nevada was only 538 feet long and 95.25 feet wide. Even if she had managed to sink perpendicular to the channel, shipping could go around the wreck and continue to use the channel.
 
I presume muskeg's #s are correct.

But even if the channel WERE narrower, and the Nevada went down perpindicular to it and blocked it, I assume it would have been cleared in a week or so. Various ways to do it - float it using air-filled sacs (if something suitable can be found). Slice it up into sections. Or just bomb it into multiple pieces. Given a high enough priority (and it WOULD have been a high priority) a well resourced nation like the US and port/base like Pearl would have found a way.

Bring the carriers or some cruisers back to Pearl, attach long chains/ropes to multiple of them and have 3-6 capital/large ships towing on it...
 
I presume muskeg's #s are correct.

But even if the channel WERE narrower, and the Nevada went down perpindicular to it and blocked it, I assume it would have been cleared in a week or so. Various ways to do it - float it using air-filled sacs (if something suitable can be found). Slice it up into sections. Or just bomb it into multiple pieces. Given a high enough priority (and it WOULD have been a high priority) a well resourced nation like the US and port/base like Pearl would have found a way.

Bring the carriers or some cruisers back to Pearl, attach long chains/ropes to multiple of them and have 3-6 capital/large ships towing on it...
Even an obstruction would need to be cleared out of the most important U.S. channel/port in the Pacific ASAP, calling for 24/7 highest priority work. If the wreck couldn't be quickly refloated and towed away, using tugs, cutting torch crews would reduce the wreck to the waterline after salvaging all reusable equipment. This includes removal of the turrets and guns for coastal artillery emplacements. Below water reduction would be a combination of demolition and cutting. Maybe it would take longer than psteinx guestimates, but it wouldn't take much longer.
 
Any notion that a sunk Nevada could have bottled up the channel is nonsense.

The Neosho, on the other hand - now that is a horse of a different colour.
 
Any notion that a sunk Nevada could have bottled up the channel is nonsense.

The Neosho, on the other hand - now that is a horse of a different colour.
Was the quote about her in TORA TORA TORA, correct about her being loaded with aviation fuel at the time of the attack?
 
Was the quote about her in TORA TORA TORA, correct about her being loaded with aviation fuel at the time of the attack?
Yes. "Dec. 7 1941", by Gordon Prange
p.44: 6 Dec 41. At 1910 Neosho finished discharging fuel at Hickam Airfield, by 2140 had moored starboard side to F4 Ford Island and by 2259 had begun to discharge gasoline.
p. 171-172: 7 Dec 1941. "Above all, Shoemaker (Capt,USN, Ford Island Station Commander) feared a possible explosion of the tanker Neosho, moored at Berth F4 dangerously close to the battleships. This was adjacent to the (gasoline storage) tank farm, and at 0750 the Neosho had just finished discharging aviation gas to Ford Island."
 
Nevada is the easy answer. Get the yard workers out with cutting torches to cut her to waterline. Go to NAVMAG Lualualei, grab a bunch of boom, insert on wreck and fuse. Rinse and repeat until the channel is clear. It‘s dredged to 40-50 feet. You just have to keep breaking down the metal.

The harder answer is a more pragmatic strike that hits the fleet oilers, tank farms, dry docks, and workshops. The damage dealt at Coral Sea, Savo, and other earlier fights would have been made more difficult to deal with, not to mention denying the resources that fueled the Marshal Island raids.
 
The harder answer is a more pragmatic strike that hits the fleet oilers, tank farms, dry docks, and workshops. The damage dealt at Coral Sea, Savo, and other earlier fights would have been made more difficult to deal with, not to mention denying the resources that fueled the Marshal Island raids.
Here is the problem, however - the Kido Butai did not have the capability to even carry out such a strike.
 
It was an either/or. While taking out the infrastructure at Pearl would have been incredibly helpful there just weren't enough planes to do it all in one day and unlike the US carrier raids on Japan in 1945 the Japanese didn't have the logistics train to enable the Kido Butai to sit offshore and launch follow up raids. Of crouse if you a doing a Japan wank you give someone the bright idea that long distance sustainment could be really, really helpful and instead of building the Yamato's and some cruisers the Japanese enhance their fleet train and most importantly train, train and train again because at sea replenishment is neither simple nor easy. Then come December 1941 they are able to sit off Hawaii and repeatedly attack, doing a thorough job. In fact while Japan can never "win" the Pacific War in a surrender ceremony in San Francisco Bay way if you want a Japan favourable stalemate such a logistics train is a prerequisite.
 
Kantei Kessen doctrine and their experiences against China, Russia and Germany led the IJN away from building a fleet designed for protracted war at sea. The IJN‘s history had led to the adoption of almost a sortie mentality, focused on a single throw of the dice. Evans and Peattie make the point in Kaigun that the IJN had become so focused on seeking decisive engagement that they shied away from lessons learned by elements of their service who had been engaged in protracted warfare, to include the Mediterranean squadron in WW1, instead forging an exceptionally skilled and deadly instrument lacking in strategic depth, resilience, or flexibility. By projecting their doctrinal preferences on the USN, the IJN planning and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack, submarine warfare, and maintenance of sea control all failed in striking the centers of gravity needed to prevent the USN from leading an effective counteroffensive in the Pacific through prolonged naval warfare.
 
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Kantei Kessen doctrine and their experiences against China, Russia and Germany led the IJN away from building a fleet designed for protracted war at sea. The IJN‘s history had led to the adoption of almost a sortie mentality, focused on a single throw of the dice. Evans and Peattie make the point in Kaigun that the IJN had become so focused on seeking decisive engagement that they shied away from lessons learned by elements of their service who had been engaged in protracted warfare, to include the Mediterranean squadron in WW1, instead forging an exceptionally skilled and deadly instrument lacking in strategic depth, resilience, or flexibility.
For all his talk of decisive battles, Yamamoto failed to realise that Guadalcanal WAS that very decisive battle he sought.
 

rascal1225

Banned
As pointed out the channel is quite wide.
Modern Map

Rather than re-floating or blowing it up, it would be quicker to just dredge around it.

Not so grasshopper.

You need to search harder for a Dec.7'41 PH entrance navigation chart ... the modern version will not give you a true answer.

Back on Dec.7'41 the PH entrance channel at the water level appeared to be 300+ yards wide BUT the dredged 2 channel width below the waterline was MUCH narrower. A USN battleship couldn't even have turned at 90 degrees in either narrow in or out channel without running firmly aground at both bow and stern first. With USN battleships (which usually drew a draft of roughly 36') needing a minimum of 40' depths to ensure that their very TENDER rudders and propeller shafts NEVER touched bottom ...

If you'd read about the very early history of Pearl Harbor you would learn that way back then the Americans had to drill, blast and then use power dredgers to get thru the 7 ancient coral barrier reefs which blocked the PH entrance channel ... it took them MONTHS and Millions of dollars to do so. Simply dredging around any wreck would thus be a LONG and EXPENSIVE project ... that channel's bottom was NOT just soft erosion silt ...
 
Having read Ellsberg's "Under the Red Sea Sun", and given the resources poured into Pearl Harbor for salvage, I don't think it'll take long at all to refloat and move Nevada.
 

rascal1225

Banned
Having read Ellsberg's "Under the Red Sea Sun", and given the resources poured into Pearl Harbor for salvage, I don't think it'll take long at all to refloat and move Nevada.

I can only suppose that depends on how many holes there are thru the Nevada, doesn't it ?
 
Having read Ellsberg's "Under the Red Sea Sun", and given the resources poured into Pearl Harbor for salvage, I don't think it'll take long at all to refloat and move Nevada.

I can only suppose that depends on how many holes there are thru the Nevada, doesn't it ?
Having read Ellsberg's "Under the Red Sea Sun", and given the resources poured into Pearl Harbor for salvage, I don't think it'll take long at all to refloat and move Nevada.

No matter how many holes there are in it. :)
 
Not so grasshopper.

You need to search harder for a Dec.7'41 PH entrance navigation chart ... the modern version will not give you a true answer.

Back on Dec.7'41 the PH entrance channel at the water level appeared to be 300+ yards wide BUT the dredged 2 channel width below the waterline was MUCH narrower. A USN battleship couldn't even have turned at 90 degrees in either narrow in or out channel without running firmly aground at both bow and stern first. With USN battleships (which usually drew a draft of roughly 36') needing a minimum of 40' depths to ensure that their very TENDER rudders and propeller shafts NEVER touched bottom ...

If you'd read about the very early history of Pearl Harbor you would learn that way back then the Americans had to drill, blast and then use power dredgers to get thru the 7 ancient coral barrier reefs which blocked the PH entrance channel ... it took them MONTHS and Millions of dollars to do so. Simply dredging around any wreck would thus be a LONG and EXPENSIVE project ... that channel's bottom was NOT just soft erosion silt ...
The chart I linked to is not appreciably different than a 1944 one:
PearlHarborMoorings-usnavy-1944.jpg


The works you refer to was to straighten the channel decades before.
Construction%20of%20Pearl%20Harbor%20by%20Evening%20Bulletin%201911%20-%20Library%20of%20Congress.jpg



A sunk ship won't block both channels and bending a channel around a wreck wont take aslong as digging a whole new channel.
 
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