Well, indeed in 1814 we weren't exactly where we started. The big difference was that the threat of Native alliances had suffered a pretty painful setback that was sadly exemplary for them. Arguably the Natives were a diminishing threat anyway, so we won very little. We also demonstrated ability to construct naval superiority on some of the Great Lakes extempore, to overcome some defenses in Upper Canada, and to repel some heavy attacks into various strategically valuable target areas. Vice versa we also demonstrated overconfidence and incompetence in the matter of attempting to conquer Canada.If you have removed a threat you aren't where you started.
Overall I'd call it a push, and it was smart to get out to avoid risking losing more. In the course of the war we totally lost control of the far western territories we claimed, but those were easy to get back at the table--provided we were reasonable about consistently returning to status quo ante.
I've always thought of it as an optional and dumb war on our part, initiated for no good reason; had we let the whole thing slide probably there would have been little deviation from OTL in that Native resistance would not have been able to amount to a whole lot more--unless indeed the British had a master plan to escalate it to the hilt with whatever levels of funding it took, and coordinate and back up their attacks, with much heavier force than the Natives themselves could muster. The problem was that to paranoid American frontiersman eyes it looked entirely plausible the British would indeed have their revenge in just this way. In short in hindsight it is perfectly clear the war was a mistake, but one can see how it looked different to some people at the time--the ones who were right to oppose it were themselves taking a risk in assuming the British were going to be reasonable in the long run.
Reading up more on it for this thread I actually have a better impression of overall American performance. But still it is plain, we went in on emotions and did not plan the conflict well (if we had, taking and holding Canadian territory ought to have worked better) and wound up with most of our successes due to defensive improvisation. I'd take it as a heartwarming proof we were strong enough to defend ourselves, were it not for the glaring weakness in the form of moral culpability and intellectual half-bakedness it revealed. Getting out of it was the most brilliant stroke of policy in the whole mess.
We came out ahead, a little bit, on points that probably did not matter in the long run. One can argue the painful experience led to more careful thought and the eventual boon of demilitarizing the whole vast border. It settled a lot of uncertainties much the way the Cuban Missile Crisis did--both powers realizing they mainly wanted not to be fighting at all. Arguing we won anything has to be set against the entirely avoidable cost of the war which was considerable to both sides.