WI: The USA refused to make peace during the War of 1812 for several years longer?

Deleted member 97083

Somewhat unlikely, but imagine that US negotiators refused to make peace for 2-3 additional years, if not longer, during the War of 1812. What would be the result?
 
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AFAIK, the US economy was pretty weak in 1815. Delaying the end of the war by 3 years will be enough to collapse it. At the very least, the British get half of Maine.

- BNC
 

Deleted member 97083

AFAIK, the US economy was pretty weak in 1815. Delaying the end of the war by 3 years will be enough to collapse it. At the very least, the British get half of Maine.

- BNC
What do you mean by collapse, here?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Somewhat unlikely, but imagine that US negotiators refused to make peace for 2-3 additional years, if not longer, during the War of 1812. What would be the result?
Britain wins. Indeed, Britain might even help New England secede from the rest of the U.S. in this TL.

Also, even after its humiliating defeat at New Orleans, Britain will once again try attacking this city in order to capture the Mississippi River and split the U.S. into two parts. Then, Britain might be willing to hand over all of the territory west of the Mississippi River to friendly Native American tribes.
 

Deleted member 97083

Britain wins. Indeed, Britain might even help New England secede from the rest of the U.S. in this TL.

Also, even after its humiliating defeat at New Orleans, Britain will once again try attacking this city in order to capture the Mississippi River and split the U.S. into two parts. Then, Britain might be willing to hand over all of the territory west of the Mississippi River to friendly Native American tribes.
Is it possible that an earlier Nullification Crisis ITTL leads to the secession of a state or two?
 
My impression is that the USA was taking a foolish risk that did not pay off well as hoped in starting the war, and that continuing it with the threat and distraction of Napoleon removed would have been nigh suicidal.
 
It would be a lot earlier than 1818. The US goverment get most of it's funds from selling land in the west and tariffs on good entering or exiting the US. The war thoroughly disrupted trade because of the British blockade. Banks had to stop paying people in what they were owed in late 1814 in most of the US.
 
1816 was the year without a summer. The Americans will be in warm fortified positions while the British will be in the field.
I'd expect insane levels of British casualties due to the weather if they try offensive operations from Canada in 1816.
With the food shortage British and American forces would take food from local sources, causing hard feelings more so in Canada but particularly in Quebec.
 
1816 was the year without a summer. The Americans will be in warm fortified positions while the British will be in the field.
I'd expect insane levels of British casualties due to the weather if they try offensive operations from Canada in 1816.
With the food shortage British and American forces would take food from local sources, causing hard feelings more so in Canada but particularly in Quebec.

Why do you think the war would still be going on by 1816? The US economy was in free-fall by late 1814 - it defaulted on both payments for the Louisiana purchase and the national debt. Not surprising, given that over 90% of the US government's peacetime income came from customs revenue, and that fell by 80% between 1811 and 1814. All the army had to do was sit on the defensive and wait for the Royal Navy to destroy the US.
 
What do you mean by collapse, here?

From Brian Arthur's PhD thesis from Greenwich, on 'The Royal Navy and economic warfare in North America 1812-1815,' which is available for free online:

'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'

'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'

'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'

'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'

'American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.'

'a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."'
 
America! America! That once proud nation now split in three... It's fragments riddled by division, from ocean coast to the old border on the Mississippi...
 
The merchants of the north wouldn't allow the war to go on and if it went on longer the British would simply bring in their own navy to force it through. Not that Northernors really could effect things, with most of the first presidents being Virginians. When an election for Congress or the Presidency you will get a lot of the north voting for some non-Democratic-Republicans (I forget, but did the Federalists get slandered with the stuff about the Hartford Convention and lose all their support IOTL? Though there were plenty of good reasons to not go Federalist) while a number of Southernors will be angry that they still can't sell any of their cash crops to the British anymore. Not as if the French were ever a decent market and they were constantly pirating American shipping. Anyways, the Nothernors kinda kept ou for the invasion of Canada and there would not really be any place for the federal government to focus the war on further, as it would simply end with the Royal Navy sailing along and blasting various coastal cities that didn't have governments that were anti-war. Better to leave the war when they did IOTL with bombast about having made the British change their practices against Americans and that you won a second war of independence or something. Honor was likely satisfied to the satisfaction of planter standards.
 
It lasts maybe another year. It has to be done by 1816 because otherwise America is flat broke. Britain was about to start a massive Great Lakes building campaign that would have dwarfed the American one. They were going to reestablish a post at Lake Erie at Turkey Point and he'll or High Water they were going to take Plattsburgh.

America on the other hand is simply screwed. Their last sale of bonds went mostly unsold, the army was actually shrinking because disease and desertion is causing more losses than they can replace (this is thankfully somewhat offset by the rise in quality of the troops) and even after the British loss at New Orleans they were still fighting on the Gulf Coast. We shouldn't forget about at least one New England governor trying to make a separate peace either.

What we see is more fighting at Niagara, a renewed offensive on Lake Champlain and scattered fighting in the west. America will be almost totally bankrupt by years end and facing utterly massive desertions by men who haven't been payed, an openly hostile New England who probably engaged in almost open treason, the fall of a few forts on the Gulf Coast to the British and more raiding/burning in the Chesapeake.

It's tough to say if the British at Ghent know how desperate the Americans truly are though. America probably signs a worse deal than they did historically, but its tough to say exactly what form it takes. New England specifically avoided discussing secession in OTL, but with another year of fighting they might ditch that and start to organize.
 
What if the Brits decline an American officer of ceasefire and keep the war going?

Britain would never do that unless the negotiators were making outlandish claims in the peace talks. After the twin failures of Baltimore and Plattsurgh Britain (rightfully) didn't see the point in continuing. The British knew that the war was expensive and pointless by this point and the American negotiators knew how dire things were on the ground. If the British start to win, the Americans will relent and give in to some of the British demands, and the British will push for demands but keep trying to end the war.

If Clay falls ill or dies and Adams becomes the leader negotiator then the peace talks might get dragged along if Britain is winning, but even then I don't think it would last more than three months longer. At some point Madison will send a later stating, "We're broke and New England is openly treasonous. Hurry the hell up."
 
I think Britain will look to take Michigan and Ohio rather than Maine. See, the thing is the general consensus among the British after the revolution was that they were not going to even try to go back since all the loyalists went to Canada or were brainwashed by the local radicals after living under President Washington and Jefferson.

The OP says USA continues on regardless of circumstansas for three years, so let's roll with that. Most likely, they continue the war by going to every city and grabbing everything of value, and maybe paying to a select minority. In the revolutionary war, they brought cash for their requisitions because they might deal with Loyalists, which don't exist this war.

So my guess is that NE is going to have to break away from USA and give "Pro British" yelpings for at least 3 decades before the British accept what they consider a land of radicals (where did the American Revolution start?). If NE wants to be part of Birtian's sphere of influence that badly, I'm sure they can apply by offering to form a new kingdom with an absolute monarchy with a personal union with the British Crown (and therefore not be formally part of Britain). Britain does not want to sink more money into that land.
 
I think Britain will look to take Michigan and Ohio rather than Maine.

This argument is strongly countered by the fact that Thomas Hardy was de facto Governor of Maine by late 1814. Yes, given a choice between the two, the UK would probably have taken control of the great lakes and the upper Mississippi over northern Maine, but given that a continued war stood a good chance of giving us whatever we wanted choose? Certainly a shortened land route from Halifax to Quebec was an important enough asset to be worth pushing for.
 
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