Deleted member 97083
Somewhat unlikely, but imagine that US negotiators refused to make peace for 2-3 additional years, if not longer, during the War of 1812. What would be the result?
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What do you mean by collapse, here?AFAIK, the US economy was pretty weak in 1815. Delaying the end of the war by 3 years will be enough to collapse it. At the very least, the British get half of Maine.
- BNC
Britain wins. Indeed, Britain might even help New England secede from the rest of the U.S. in this TL.Somewhat unlikely, but imagine that US negotiators refused to make peace for 2-3 additional years, if not longer, during the War of 1812. What would be the result?
Is it possible that an earlier Nullification Crisis ITTL leads to the secession of a state or two?Britain wins. Indeed, Britain might even help New England secede from the rest of the U.S. in this TL.
Also, even after its humiliating defeat at New Orleans, Britain will once again try attacking this city in order to capture the Mississippi River and split the U.S. into two parts. Then, Britain might be willing to hand over all of the territory west of the Mississippi River to friendly Native American tribes.
Very possibly Yes. However, again, I think that New England will be the first U.S. states to secede from the U.S. in this TL.Is it possible that an earlier Nullification Crisis ITTL leads to the secession of a state or two?
By 1818, you're looking at a Weimar-type situation. At best.What do you mean by collapse, here?
1816 was the year without a summer. The Americans will be in warm fortified positions while the British will be in the field.
I'd expect insane levels of British casualties due to the weather if they try offensive operations from Canada in 1816.
With the food shortage British and American forces would take food from local sources, causing hard feelings more so in Canada but particularly in Quebec.
What do you mean by collapse, here?
'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'
'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'
'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'
'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'
'American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.'
'a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."'
What if the Brits decline an American officer of ceasefire and keep the war going?
I think Britain will look to take Michigan and Ohio rather than Maine.