WI The US won in Vietnam

There are qualitative differences. The actual Korean war lasted only three years. South Korea is the beneficiary of 60 years of peace and security, during which the United States invested heavily in the country and its defense, and provided preferential trade treatment.

And if the war ended with a US victory in 75, then South Vietnam would have benefited from 30 years of peace and security during which the United States would invest heavily and provide preferential trade treatment.




South Vietnam was the result of sore losers in trying to frustrate an independence movement by partitioning the country. The 'civil war' was on since day one, and essentially endured through the entire history of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese government, unlike the South Korean, seems to have been hobbled with institutional and infrastructural corruption since day one.


A problem to be sure. Of course corruption was not a unique South Vietnam issue.



If you want an Asian comparison to South Vietnam, then your most appropriate standard is probably Afghanistan - another state which has experienced several decades of continuous warfare/civil war/foreign occupation. Not all outcomes are positive, consider Haiti.


Korea wasn't exactly a pastoral utopia during the Korean War, WWII, or for quite some time before.


If you are going to argue that South Vietnam or Vietnam as a whole might have done better under some other circumstances.... that's extremely vague and its hard to provide a constructive response, except to say 'in OTL Vietnam was so horrifically screwed every which way that almost any POD would lead to better outcomes.'


Well, the OP is pretty vague as was the post I responded to that claimed that the biggest point of the Vietnam War was that that was were the US lost it's moral leadership.

And considering the two other examples were a nation was cut in two by the East West divide, ie KOrean and Germany.

In both cases the West Allied nation grew and prospered while the SOviet dominated one lagged far behind and was oppressed.






Which really is the best thing you've got going for you?

Err, not really.




But does that excuse your not doing any work at all? It seems to me that if you put an idea out there, or advance a thesis, isn't there an obligation on you to do some kind of homework. To think it through carefully, look at the variables, and then put something more coherent than a random brain fart on the table?


I see a lot of these random musing on this site. I don't see anyone else attacking others for having casual conversations.




You have a notion "Could South Vietnam have paralleled South Korea's development..." Well... explore that?

Maybe someday I will.



Under what terms or circumstances does that survival come about? A surviving south Vietnam, you argue, could have been South Korea. But then again, it could have ended up as Haiti or El Salvador. What's your POD, and how do events flow.

Go write a timeline. I say that in the kindest fashion possible. You have an interesting idea, it is testable, it needs research and development. Choose a POD, and then explore.

It would at least be an interesting project. There's a lot of "How can we win Vietnam" threads, but there's not a lot of threads exploring what happens after.


I already have one timeline I am working on, and I have a good idea for my next. But perhaps, there needs to be an independent South Vietnam in it...

The next one is going to be in the ASB sub-forum also, but that would hopefully cut down on the naysaying anyways.
 
The Strategic Hamlet's Program and its predecessor between 1959 and 1963 relocated about eight million people. This in a country of maybe 11 million. Contemplate the scale of that.... almost 3 out of every 4 Vietnamese had been relocated from traditional homes and villages, with centuries of history and tradition, into what were essentially government run prison or concentration camps in an effort to defeat an insurgency. It not only failed, it failed spectacularly, 80% of the hamlets were under the control of the enemy by 1963. The scale of disruption worked on behalf of the Vietcong.

Well, let's say our POD starts with South Vietnam/the US deciding this was a terrible idea?
 
Well, let's say our POD starts with South Vietnam/the US deciding this was a terrible idea?

Well, not a bad POD. But then, what's the alternative strategy?

I suppose the issue is that it illustrates how bad things were even between 1959 and 1963.

When you are basically contemplating and setting in mind a plan to move 2/3rds of your population around things are already catastrophic.

So, back in 1959... or between 1954 and 1959, what does the US do?
 
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Well, not a bad POD. But then, what's the alternative strategy?

I suppose the issue is that it illustrates how bad things were even between 1959 and 1963.

When you are basically contemplating and setting in mind a plan to move 2/3rds of your population around things are already catastrophic.

So, back in 1959... or between 1954 and 1959, what does the US do?

Supporting Diệm. Operation Passage to Freedom. Restoring the Comprador landlords. The 56 laws.

I really can't see the United States not rolling down this line. The United States was willing to pick a very nasty fight with a competent communist party with significant nationalist mobilisation; in a country with a massive and reasonably organised rural proletariat who were religiously pissed off.

ymmv,
Sam R.
 
I really take umbrage with some of the myths in this post. My sources are journal articles in the last fifteen years on VWP internal politics.

The Viet Cong were effectively obliterated during Tet, not because the U.S. or ARVN forces suddenly get smart, but because the Hanoi government tossed them into the fire as cannon fodder with the goal of wiping them out due to political differences.

There's no real evidence for this that I've read in articles based on archival material from VWP senior leadership. While the VWP had always dominated the NFL, they did so largely through effective coalition building. Both the Northern VWP and the Southern VWP were in agreement on a "General Uprising, General Offensive" line going into Tet. The other line, of "General Offensive" was associated with (distaste) with the Giap faction and Northern Development: effectively revisionism with a tinge of socialist humanism.

Having the VWP dominated by a Giap line from 1953 onwards, and thus "amenable" to spontaneous class action from below (ala 1956 and 1968) would be fascinating; but, it isn't the POD under discussion.

Tet had broad agreement from the entire VWP, and was conducted on the basis of a belief that power would be achieved, that the urban lumpenproletariat would rise, and that military action would be within acceptable cost limits.

The real division around Tet is between the liberated areas as a network of rank-and-file communities of rural workers, and the VWP. The elimination of independent revolutionary praxis has always been an aim of Leninist organisations; but, even this elimination of the PRG organised communities waited until 1975. (A similar trajectory can be plotted in the waste of cadre and workers in the 1953-1956 land programmes).

I understand why people still believe the narrative of the VWP intentionally wiping out the PLAF; but, it simply isn't sustainable. The PLAF were treated as an asset thrown into the maelstrom of the last fight. They were expended. The end was not achieved. The VWP line that led to this misuse of resources was defeated, and the alternative line elevated to strategy.

It is in 1975 that the elimination of the danger of an independent revolutionary praxis occurs:

Many residents of the South, be they Catholics, "intellectuals", or former parts of the South Vietnamese government, wound up in "re-education" camps or fled to an uncertain, often fatal future (the "boat people").

And, of course, revolutionaries. Also the Chinese urban communities, who while dominated by petits-bourgeois trading were attacked on what appears to me to be a basis of pure ethnic chauvinism.

yours,
Sam R.
 
The Philippines aren't to far away, neither is Thailand, or Malaysia.

And did Japan really support South Korea?

True, but how far were/are Thailand and The Phillipines helpful to the USA and Vietnam like Japan was strategically and morally(they were the big price of the USA from WWII). Through Japan the USA had good influences on Korea. Can't be said for Vietnam.

Also, Thailand is more of a UK ally. and the Phillipines can't be really called "close" like Japan is to Korea.

Malaysia was a Communist country, still is IIRC. Not really an ally to any capitalist nation. Its one of those 3 communist nations that "surround" Vietnam.
 

katchen

Banned
The crazy thing about South Vietnam was that we already KNEW how to win that war and win the peace. We won the peace in Japan by giving over title to land to farmers, bringing in New Deal social engineers and restructuring Japanese big business to tolerate labor unions, just as in the United States in order to create the foundations of democracy. We knew that land reform in South Korea and Taiwan (land to the tiller) combined with teaching farmers how to get better yields resulted in farmers who not only supported capitalism but were budding small businessmen themselves. It was WELL KNOWN in official Washington circles that land reform was the way to win against Communism in South Vietnam.
Yet from the start, from 1965, the United States conducted the Vietnam War as if the farmers of Vietnam were the ENEMY, to be bombed and starved into submitting to a kleptocratic oligarchy. It was President Kennedy who initially approved Operation Ranch Hand, the systematic spraying of rice fields with Agent Orange (a mixture of 2-4-D and 2-4-5-T ) in order to destroy the rice crops of suspected Viet Cong sympathizers (any Vietnamese peasant not paying rent to a landlord) in order to create the capitalist version of Stalin's controlled famine in the Ukraine in the 1930s. The idea was to impoverish "VC sympathizers and to force them into either "strategic hamlets" or the cities. And this policy was started well before 1965 under Kennedy. :mad::mad::mad::eek:
And people today wonder why students with consciences on college campuses in the 1960s wanted the Viet Cong to win. :(
In other words, whoever was making policy for the Vietnam War seemed to be trying to prove that Communists could be defeated WITHOUT making any concessions to common people; without giving land to peasants and turning them into small farmers, but that victory could be achieved by sheer repression and that farmers in these nations who were not content to work for bare subsistence and pay rents without protest WERE in fact the enemy and deserved no quarter but deserved to be liquidated as a class just as Joseph Stalin believed that small farmers who DID own their own land (kulaks) needed to be liquidated as a class. It's the same policy that the US followed in Guatemala, where, when in 1962, the elected government of Jacobo Arbenz instituted a policy of land reform, of breaking up landed estates that included the banana plantations of United Fruit Corporation, which was a subsidiary of W.R. Grace, two of whose major stockholders included John Foster Dulles (Eisenhower's Secretary of State) and former CIA Director Allan Welsh Dulles, the US mounted a covert operation to overthrow the duly elected Arbenz Government that included training an army in neighboring Honduras on the grounds that the Arbenz Government was somehow "communist". Or American oil executives with companies such as Gulf, Texaco, SoCal. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of New York, who acted in solidarity with British Petroleum to boycott Iranian oil when Mossadegh nationalized British Petroleum assets even though he offered compensation, thus forcing Mossadegh to turn to the USSR in order to justify a CIA operation to overthrow Mossadegh and restore the Shah.
In short, after the immediate postwar and Korean War period, US defense and intelligence policy seems to have passed from New Dealers into the hands of people we have come to call Paleo-conservatives and whose mindset is one people on this list have come to identify as Draken. They do not have anything resembling a mainstream following in American society at this time (their chief intellectual exponent is William F. Buckley) or even the following within the American business community that their intellectual progeny, the neo-Conservatives will gain beginning in the 1970s. But they are quietly making considerable headway with their argument that preserving the New Deal social contract within the United States will require a certain amount of hedging overseas and for Americans to have a constantly expanding middle class, inputs of cheap resources and labor will be required from other countries. Thus, the US must act to keep nations from going Communist and sequestering their labor and resources away from US corporations and protect governments that protect private property rights, foreign and domestic, according to this argument. That a nation such as Australia manages to pay living wages to organized banana workers and still grow bananas (and produce sugar) that Australian consumers can afford to buy is totally ignored.
This, basically was why the New Left so passionately wanted the US to lose in Vietnam. Because of what a US victory in Vietnam would vindicate.
 

katchen

Banned
The British were able to defeat the Communist insurgency in Malaya (it didn't become Malaysia until long after the insurgency was defeated) because a) the insurgents had no outside supply lines and b) there wee plenty of opportunities for advancement for both Malays and Chinese in Malaysia that did not require common people to resort to living in a Communist police state--which is seldom peopel's first choice for a government.
 

katchen

Banned
Supporting Diệm. Operation Passage to Freedom. Restoring the Comprador landlords. The 56 laws.

I really can't see the United States not rolling down this line. The United States was willing to pick a very nasty fight with a competent communist party with significant nationalist mobilisation; in a country with a massive and reasonably organised rural proletariat who were religiously pissed off.

ymmv,
Sam R.[/QUOTE
So why did we do it, Sam? Why DID we pick a fight with a competent communist party that showed every indication of being willing to be independent of Moscow and Beijing (rather like Yugoslavia) if the US would extend it recognition? And if US policmakers chose not to, WHY did American military and diplomatic policymakers come down on the side of the landlords and compradors right down the line instead of insisting on land reform as we had in South Korea and Taiwan? Why the switch from supporting land reform, which we knew was an effective counter to Communism to treating private property and the position of local ruling classes as sacrosanct? And more to the point, who in Washington was pushing for that change in policy and making that change stick?
 
The British were able to defeat the Communist insurgency in Malaya (it didn't become Malaysia until long after the insurgency was defeated) because a) the insurgents had no outside supply lines and b) there wee plenty of opportunities for advancement for both Malays and Chinese in Malaysia that did not require common people to resort to living in a Communist police state--which is seldom peopel's first choice for a government.

The outside supply lines were the biggest single problem in Vietnam and tend to be for every major insurgency I have studied.
 
The outside supply lines were the biggest single problem in Vietnam and tend to be for every major insurgency I have studied.

Honestly the main issue with Vietnam was that the US was willing to commit near genocide but not actually cross the threshold of total war.

Allowing the VC to have a more or less secure base in the North undermines any strategy that they could put into effect. Of course invading the North would bring in the Chinese and Russians so what needs to be done is figuring out early if its worth the risk and if not accepting the South is a lost cause.
 
Honestly the main issue with Vietnam was that the US was willing to commit near genocide but not actually cross the threshold of total war.

Allowing the VC to have a more or less secure base in the North undermines any strategy that they could put into effect. Of course invading the North would bring in the Chinese and Russians so what needs to be done is figuring out early if its worth the risk and if not accepting the South is a lost cause.

That narrow strip of land dividing North and South could be heavily fortified from insurgent infiltration from the North.

That huge strip of Laos connected to South Vietnam simply could not be... therein lies the problem which was allowed to develop early on.
 

SunDeep

Banned
With Nixon re-elected into the White House after victory in the Vietnam War, the US takes an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, culminating in the 1980's when the difficult decision to intervene after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan leaves the world teetering on the brink of nuclear annihilation...
 
With Nixon re-elected into the White House after victory in the Vietnam War, the US takes an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, culminating in the 1980's when the difficult decision to intervene after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan leaves the world teetering on the brink of nuclear annihilation...

Soon enough, Chernobyl occurs, that will cause the Soviet Union to collapse sooner.
 

SunDeep

Banned
Chernobyl? No, by this stage the whole world derives power primarily from fuel cells, courtesy of Veidt Industries...
 
So why did we do it, Sam? Why DID we pick a fight with a competent communist party that showed every indication of being willing to be independent of Moscow and Beijing (rather like Yugoslavia) if the US would extend it recognition? And if US policmakers chose not to, WHY did American military and diplomatic policymakers come down on the side of the landlords and compradors right down the line instead of insisting on land reform as we had in South Korea and Taiwan? Why the switch from supporting land reform, which we knew was an effective counter to Communism to treating private property and the position of local ruling classes as sacrosanct? And more to the point, who in Washington was pushing for that change in policy and making that change stick?

I honestly have no idea. My expertise lies in VWP infighting in this period.

I suspect that the Catholic compradors were very well organised in Vietnam. They kicked out Bao Dai, for example. I'm not sure that outside of the Catholic elite and Bao Dai there were any credible ways to mobilise a right wing Vietnam. And America bought into a right wing Vietnam in 1953, partly to save France's face. Partly due to Korea. Partly because the US ruling class were hysteric at that point in time, having attacked the institutions of labour inside the US thoroughly.

Another factor here is the effectiveness with which the French had reorganised Vietnam through proletarianisation of the major rural areas. Vietnam didn't have a peasantry as such in 1953, it had a large rural proletariat. This is AFAIK a major difference between Vietnam and Korea or China. Partitioning Vietnam requiring a bourgeois ruling class who couldn't align with the rural proletariat. All of the French systems of rule, inherited by Diem, were predicated on rural marketised production and profit / taxation extraction.

Asking why Land reform didn't happen in Vietnam in 1955 in the South is kind of like asking why the Reform of Parliament in the United Kingdom didn't result in de-enclosure and a common fields system in agriculture.

yours,
Sam R.
 
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