WI: The US Marines stormed Normandy?

[CalBear]

I believe that at the time of Normandy, the Army had made more large scale amphibious assaults than had the Marines: North Africa, Sicily, and several in Italy. 1st Infantry Division had made several assaults.

They had made more landings not assaults. North Africa was, while not administrative, only difficult because of total lack of combat experience. Sicily was effectively administrative, the Italians had no interest or effort in stopping them at the beach, initial defensive position were several miles inland. Salerno was not seriously opposed, in no small part due to the fact that thte sea state was so bad that the enemy didn't believe that anyone in their right mind would make the attempt. Even Anzio was a easy landing, the Germans were totally taken by surprise and didn't have troops in pace, even in the high ground surrounding the beachhead until the following day (Lucas should have, at the very least, have been retired for that debacle).

The Marines learned more about amphibious landings under heavy five on three days in November of 1943 than the sum knowledge of the entire ETO command structure.

 

[sloreck]

Want to correct the poster who said the Marines had no medical support. Not true. Yes, all medical personnel with the Marines from corpsmen to surgeons are Navy personnel, but there is dedicated support for the Marines and the Navy Medical Corps developed specific doctrine for medical support of amphibious landings (which has major differences from a "land" battle) during the 1930's. In fact the Army used Navy/Marine Corps doctrine (including medical doctrine) in the late 1930's when they got in to the amphibious assault business (totally USMC only until 1938-39). This includes support for the assault phase, when the key is MEDEVAC off the beach to casualty receiving ships (designated transports with medical units on board). Of course there will be hospital ships of one sort or another as well.

For those interested I can provide >130 pages of primary source detail on this (my MA thesis).

 

[CalBear]

Want to correct the poster who said the Marines had no medical support. Not true. Yes, all medical personnel with the Marines from corpsmen to surgeons are Navy personnel, but there is dedicated support for the Marines and the Navy Medical Corps developed specific doctrine for medical support of amphibious landings (which has major differences from a "land" battle) during the 1930's. In fact the Army used Navy/Marine Corps doctrine (including medical doctrine) in the late 1930's when they got in to the amphibious assault business (totally USMC only until 1938-39). This includes support for the assault phase, when the key is MEDEVAC off the beach to casualty receiving ships (designated transports with medical units on board). Of course there will be hospital ships of one sort or another as well.

For those interested I can provide >130 pages of primary source detail on this (my MA thesis).

The point of that statement was to indicate that the Corps had insufficient logistical tail to operate anywhere except close to the beaches. The Fleet has, and does, provide the Corps with its medical personnel, from combat medics to Stateside Hospitals. It had no structure to set up independent Field Hospitals.

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

Having Marines do the initial landing and followed on by the Army is a degree of complexity that the planners simply didn't see a good reason for. What are you going to do, pull the Marines off the beach and replace them with Army units that have a logistical tail and can deal with armored counterattack? If so, when?

The war wasn't going to be won or lost in the initial landing, the question is whether the Allies could break out, and the Marines weren't any more likely to do that and in fact would be less likely. If there was a role for a specialized amphibious assault force, it was the tasks that were carried out by the Ranger battalions.

 

[viperjock]

The egos would have been the killer.

There were actually enough Marines by then to have used one division to take Omaha (which was always seen as the toughest nut due to the cliffs, although no one really expected it to be so much worse as was the case) and enough LVT to deal with both Omaha AND Saipan.

The reality is that none of the planners had any idea of exactly how hot Omaha would actually be and no idea of just how much more experience/tactical thought the Corps could bring to bear on the scenario. The belief (and to be fair, it was correct enough) was that the ETO forces could deal with the beach defenses just fine, thank you, without any help from the triple damned Marines.

Food for thought:
The 5th Marine Division was formed on 11 Nov 1943 at Camp Pendleton. In theory if the powers that be wanted a Marine Division for D-Day you could have the division stood up at Camp lejeune. Marine Air Group 51 was at Cherry Point NC training for Project Danny, the mission to attack V1 rockets with F4U Corsairs armed with Tiny Tim rockets. When that mission was cancelled in the summer of 44 MAG-51 went west for deployment to the Pacific. So you could have a Marine Air Group available.
The 5th MarDiv was partially made up of Marine paratroopers. That would have made a good match for the assault on Utah Beach.

You could have the 6th Marine Division stood up for Iwo Jima and have the 5th make the assault in Normandy then rebuild and re-train and be ready for Okinawa or go to Okinawa one division short and have the 5th on standby for the invasion of Japan.

 

[Locke01]

All other Allied forces same as OTL.

If this scenario had occurred in OTL, one shudders to think of the permanent damage to inter-service relations that might have occurred if Holland Smith of the USMC had been required to operate in close proximity to George Patton USA.

 

[TFSmith121]

Considering the 1st and 29th infantry divisions took all of

Considering the 1st and 29th infantry divisions took all of one morning to get past the Atlantic Wall on OMAHA, it's a solution in search of a problem.

The Marine Corps was well-suited to the Pacific Theater, for very real issues of C3I involving the Navy and the type of war the US was fighting, especially in the South and Central Pacific.

Best,

 

[sloreck]

CalBear: Actually they did have "field hospitals" to be set up ashore in various sizes, depending on what stage the battle was in, how much physical secure space there was etc. Also, what would be called "communication zone" units were set up as well. Medically the USMC/Navy could support the Marines share of a Normandy landing, but as others have noted going deeper and fighting regular German forces was not what the USMC was supposed to do.

Only if the USMC did the assault, then let army units do an administrative landing to go after the HEER would USMC at Normandy make sense.

 

[Das Amerikan]

All of Normandy? Or just the US sectors?

They would need to bring 4 Divisions to match the entire US contingent including Airborne, 3 Divisions to match the ground forces.

Just the U.S sector

 

[CalBear]

CalBear: Actually they did have "field hospitals" to be set up ashore in various sizes, depending on what stage the battle was in, how much physical secure space there was etc. Also, what would be called "communication zone" units were set up as well. Medically the USMC/Navy could support the Marines share of a Normandy landing, but as others have noted going deeper and fighting regular German forces was not what the USMC was supposed to do.

Only if the USMC did the assault, then let army units do an administrative landing to go after the HEER would USMC at Normandy make sense.

The only real advantage would have been on Omaha. There the biggest change would be a probable casualty reduction thanks to differing equipment that would reduce, although far from eliminate, losses at the water's edge and reduce or possibly eliminate the losses incurred in the DD Shermans, and better coordination of CAS.

As soon as they reach the top of the cliff and eliminate the remaining bunkers there (which Army troops could do equally, at least those who were combat veterans) the Corps would be a major hindrance.

 

[marathag]

I'm going to have to disagree with you on both those points.

OK.

Why?

Why would experienced Jungle Fighters do worse than Green Army units in the Hedgerows?

 

[riggerrob]

Having Marines do the initial landing and followed on by the Army is a degree of complexity that the planners simply didn't see a good reason for. What are you going to do, pull the Marines off the beach and replace them with Army units that have a logistical tail and can deal with armored counterattack? If so, when?

The war wasn't going to be won or lost in the initial landing, the question is whether the Allies could break out, and the Marines weren't any more likely to do that and in fact would be less likely. If there was a role for a specialized amphibious assault force, it was the tasks that were carried out by the Ranger battalions.

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You are forgetting that the US Army routinely replaced units after a few days or weeks of combat. Exhausted regiments needed new vehicles and new soldiers to replace battle casualties.
It makes perfect sense to send US Marines in as the first wave to clear beaches. After a few days, sufficient US Army regiments have come ashore to relieve Marines, so Marines board ships returning to England, where they can rest, refit and integrate recruits.
It also makes sense to send US Marines ashore in the first wave in LTVs, Amtraks, etc.

The alternative is to learn lessons the hard way, the way that the Canadian Army did during the same campaign. After being in combat for 90 days straight, the exhausted Canadian Army struggled to clear the soggy Breskens Pocket. The Breskens Pocket was the last piece of the southern shore of the Scheldt Estuary, providing access to the Port of Antwerp. They had captured the port intact in early September, but were too exhausted to clear the shipping approaches.
It took a combined Royal Navy and Royal Marine assault to clear German defenders out from Wallchern Island, and the port of Antwerp did not receive its first shipment until November.
A few months later, British Buffalos and Amtraks again proved invaluable in crossing the Rhine River.

Both line, USMC specialized skills and vehicles could have shortened the Normandy campaign by a few months, even if they never penetrated beyond the smell of salt water.