WI: The US exploits the nuclear monopoly to bomb the USSR

I'll make it clear I'm not defending the Soviets under Stalin. I'm also not promoting mass murder by the US.

The US/west should have been a tad more demanding during the war and in sept-nov 1939. yet, we were pretty passive about things
I agree. I didn't mean to sound so condemning. War is an incredibly difficult thing to deal with morally. Thankfully it isn't utilized as often in these modern times.
 

MrP

Banned
Arguably more important than how many bombs is “what means did they have to deliver them?”
You raise an interesting point. Technically, the USSR did become a nuclear power in 1949, but how much longer was it until the vectors to properly deliver its bombs were available?
 
By definition, it would in fact be the first time in history.

Quite. It's one thing for individual pilots to undertake suicidal actions in moments of desperation, something that happens at some point to every air force. It's quite another for a nation to undertake the deliberate policy of forming up whole units with the express purpose of suicide missions. If the US wants to create, essentially, kamikaze nuclear bomber wings, they have a hell of a uphill battle to follow. Who and how do they recruit for these formations? How do they indoctrinate them? How do they sell it to the rest of the military and the population at large?

In any case, we know what the tactics used by US nuclear bombers in the late-40s were going to be and suffice to say they were not at all massed wings of aircraft. Given the lack of weapons, intelligence, planes, crews, crew training, and infrastructure as well as the foibles of the first-generation nuclear weapons available at the time and the expected resistance from Soviet fighter aircraft, the odds of a late-40s nuclear attack on the Soviet Union delivering a knock out punch is rather low. This changes radically in the early-50s, of course, but by then the Russians have the bomb as well.
 
For at least 10-15 years various US nuclear strikes flown by manned aircraft (AF & Navy) had issues with range limitation. Basically taking off from their planned bases/carriers and even if they got the fuel top off planned, a fair number of these aircraft would most definitely not make it back to original bases/launch points and often would not have enough fuel to make it out of the USSR. The hope was to get as close as possible to a friendly (or at least neutral) country and bail out hiking the rest of the way. Naturally you hoped to be able to avoid areas that had been hit by the good guys, or places with much population density. It was not going to be too likely any aircrew would be lucky enough to survive to be taken by regular troops if the locals caught up with them. Of course up until the mid-50s or later, essentially all Soviet bomber missions were 1-way.
 
Anyone who thinks the USA wont be loathed by huge masses of people from Russia and EU is blind and im practicing a great deal of self restraint when i only write this. How can people believe that the soviet union being identified as evil makes it ok to destroy millions of its civil citizens? We bombed your home to oblivion, murdered your family but you should be happy as we toppled your evil leaders? Im very sorry for the people who thinks the world works that way.

Aren't you describing both sides in World War II? Slightly more efficient everything your disgusted by the allies in the Axis powers during World War II
 
You raise an interesting point. Technically, the USSR did become a nuclear power in 1949, but how much longer was it until the vectors to properly deliver its bombs were available?
Number of Warheads
1949 1
1950 5
1951 25
1952 50
All riding in Tu-4 Bulls, the B-29 copy
In 1949 the USA had 235
 
@Inferus I think this argument seems a bit suspect; if nothign else, while Communism in eastern Europe was undeniably awful there were no mass killings on the scale of the Great Purges or famines. Anyhow, if the prime goal is "damage communism" in Eastern Europe, there are probably smarter things like "get the French and Brits on a leash over Suez to deprive the Soviets of cover", "Find more effective ways of supporting the Hungarian revolution" and "throw money at people"
 
@Inferus I think this argument seems a bit suspect; if nothign else, while Communism in eastern Europe was undeniably awful there were no mass killings on the scale of the Great Purges or famines. Anyhow, if the prime goal is "damage communism" in Eastern Europe, there are probably smarter things like "get the French and Brits on a leash over Suez to deprive the Soviets of cover", "Find more effective ways of supporting the Hungarian revolution" and "throw money at people"
The goal would likely be to prevent a competitor from threatening the status quo; the reason for the first two world wars. It isn't insane to think the US would be petrified of the USSR gaining atomic weapons and striking preemptively as many generals wanted.

I'm not debating Communism as that is petty flamebait. I'm playing devil's advocate providing a reason for a Western strike. Like the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there are varying degrees of opinion on whether it should have been done and what other options would have led to. My opinion: the US would not have been ostracized like it would have been a generation later.
 
I mean, the reasons stated above are pretty strong, as well as the whole "mutual assured destruction" thing of later.

MAD really didn't start being mutual until the mid to late 1960s until then a US first strike sometime in the early 60s could have conceivably caught every single Soviet Bomber and ICBM that could reach the US on the ground before they could get airborne
 
MAD really didn't start being mutual until the mid to late 1960s until then a US first strike sometime in the early 60s could have conceivably caught every single Soviet Bomber and ICBM that could reach the US on the ground before they could get airborne

At the start of the Cold War the soviet nuclear war communications were very primitive. The Soviets initiated the rockets arms race by launching the first space satellite on 1957. In 1959 the Soviets built the R-7 – the world’s first intercontinental Ballistic Missile. The heavy liquid oxygen missiles were placed on the regular guard duty. The soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was so excited about them that he boasted to the Americans that soviets builds rockets like sausages. In reality he had only 27 R-7 rockets, while the US and NATO had twice the numbers of Atlas and Titan type rockets. Also the medium range rockets placed in West Germany and Turkey. However, the Khrushchev’s threats that he “will bury” the allies made them to produce even more rockets like the Minuteman. The US political and military leadership did not know or ignored the fact that R-7 rockets did not use the underground missile silos meaning if the Soviets launch the nuclear attack first they would certainly receive a counter attack, but if allies attack first – the soviets could not answer in return. Such situations lead the soviets and allies escalate the missile crisis in Cuba where we return again to our hero – Valery Yarynich.

After graduating the Leningrad Military communications school in 1959 he was appointed to serve at the Jur’e Rocket Base near Kirov city. As stated him in his book “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation” the orders to the rocket base commanders were given by radio or cable. The messages used coded word system called the “Monolyth”. In a event of emergency the commander opened the special envelope kept in safe at the command point just in case. Yarynich remembers that in the training drill in the definite moment the officer in duty could not open the envelope fast enough because of the stressful shaking hands. It was decided not use scissors when opening the vital envelope. Instead a zipper was used so the operator could open the envelope quickly. The whole monolyth system was unreliable, worse than that the monlyth order could not be reversed nor canceled.

In October 1962 Yarynich was sent to the rocket division in the Nizhny Tagila 1380 km from Moscow. It was the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then a monolyth message reached the base it was BRONTOZAUR (БРОНТОЗАВР). The meaning of this message was to switch the command system from standby to the full combat alert. As Yarynich picked up the teletype message from the young female operator he was in shock “Dear God! BRONTOZAUR!” It was the first time when they received the message and it meant that the package must be opened. The package contained new callsings and frequencies in case of the nuclear war. Yarynich wrote that it was unreasonable to change the callsings and frequencies in such an event leading to chaos in communications, but such was the procedure. The new information then had to be forwarded to all other rocket bases. The rockets at Nizhny Tagila were not yet fueled and the stress and horror of all the communications staff – officers, conscripts and the female telephone operators were unforgettable. The nuclear war did not happen, but the issue about handling the rocket force communications remained.

The first attempt of making the automatic rocket system was made in 1967. The system was called “Signal” that could issue 30 pre-made orders from the staff headquarters to the rocket units. For instance the order to increase combat readiness. In comparison to paper packets and envelopes it was a huge step forward.
LINK

So since the USSR had no early warning system like the US had with DEW and BMEWS, a first strike could catch them unawares, and with communication centers glassed, no way for the Strategic Rocket Forces to even go off _Standby_

A total blowout was possible, gaffed at the starting gate.
 
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At the start of the Cold War the soviet nuclear war communications were very primitive. The Soviets initiated the rockets arms race by launching the first space satellite on 1957. In 1959 the Soviets built the R-7 – the world’s first intercontinental Ballistic Missile. The heavy liquid oxygen missiles were placed on the regular guard duty. The soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was so excited about them that he boasted to the Americans that soviets builds rockets like sausages. In reality he had only 27 R-7 rockets, while the US and NATO had twice the numbers of Atlas and Titan type rockets. Also the medium range rockets placed in West Germany and Turkey. However, the Khrushchev’s threats that he “will bury” the allies made them to produce even more rockets like the Minuteman. The US political and military leadership did not know or ignored the fact that R-7 rockets did not use the underground missile silos meaning if the Soviets launch the nuclear attack first they would certainly receive a counter attack, but if allies attack first – the soviets could not answer in return. Such situations lead the soviets and allies escalate the missile crisis in Cuba where we return again to our hero – Valery Yarynich.

After graduating the Leningrad Military communications school in 1959 he was appointed to serve at the Jur’e Rocket Base near Kirov city. As stated him in his book “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation” the orders to the rocket base commanders were given by radio or cable. The messages used coded word system called the “Monolyth”. In a event of emergency the commander opened the special envelope kept in safe at the command point just in case. Yarynich remembers that in the training drill in the definite moment the officer in duty could not open the envelope fast enough because of the stressful shaking hands. It was decided not use scissors when opening the vital envelope. Instead a zipper was used so the operator could open the envelope quickly. The whole monolyth system was unreliable, worse than that the monlyth order could not be reversed nor canceled.

In October 1962 Yarynich was sent to the rocket division in the Nizhny Tagila 1380 km from Moscow. It was the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then a monolyth message reached the base it was BRONTOZAUR (БРОНТОЗАВР). The meaning of this message was to switch the command system from standby to the full combat alert. As Yarynich picked up the teletype message from the young female operator he was in shock “Dear God! BRONTOZAUR!” It was the first time when they received the message and it meant that the package must be opened. The package contained new callsings and frequencies in case of the nuclear war. Yarynich wrote that it was unreasonable to change the callsings and frequencies in such an event leading to chaos in communications, but such was the procedure. The new information then had to be forwarded to all other rocket bases. The rockets at Nizhny Tagila were not yet fueled and the stress and horror of all the communications staff – officers, conscripts and the female telephone operators were unforgettable. The nuclear war did not happen, but the issue about handling the rocket force communications remained.

The first attempt of making the automatic rocket system was made in 1967. The system was called “Signal” that could issue 30 pre-made orders from the staff headquarters to the rocket units. For instance the order to increase combat readiness. In comparison to paper packets and envelopes it was a huge step forward.
LINK

So since the USSR had no early warning system like the US had with DEW and BMEWS, a first strike could catch them unawares, and with communication centers glassed, no way for the Strategic Rocket Forces to even go off _Standby_

A total blowout was possible, gaffed at the starting gate.
If thats the case, what was stopping the US from launching a massive first strike in the 50's? They had plenty of nukes and would've had full if any retaliation. I am not saying they should've done so, but pragmatically wasn't it very advantageous to them if they could've done a first strike with pretty much no retaliation?
 
If thats the case, what was stopping the US from launching a massive first strike in the 50's? They had plenty of nukes and would've had full if any retaliation. I am not saying they should've done so, but pragmatically wasn't it very advantageous to them if they could've done a first strike with pretty much no retaliation?

Uhm because nobody particularly wanted to kill cover 200 million people?
 
The problem was that atomic-bombs were both relatively speaking more costly to produce than later H Bombs and a great deal less destructive.
It didn't matter. The U.S. could have easily brought down the SU with a single Fat Man on Kuibishev: it was central to Sov electric power production, & KO it could have produced a revolt.

Edit: Also, if the U.S. offered aid to Russians who hated Communists (& Poles, Czechs, Ukranians, & others who did), given revolution, how long do you suppose it would take for them to be killing Communists with abandon?

I find myself wondering what Winston would have done. I imagine he'd say, "Sod the Russkies, sod the weak-kneed cowards of Europe. They may hate us now, & for a decade or more, but in 100 years, we will be heroes." (Only he'd say it way better.:openedeyewink:)
 
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