WI: The Soviet Union/Eastern Europe accepts the Marshall Plan?

Stalin was initially supportive of accepting the Plan, but later went against it as he learned more about the conditions. Suppose he instead keeps supportive and wishes for the Soviet Union and its sphere to accept the aid?
 
He'd be as likely to accept it as he would partitioning Poland like Germany. The Marshall Plan would loosen his grip on the Eastern Bloc by virtue of offering the citizens an alternative to the Soviets. He wasnt going to let that happen after Barbarossa. Think of the propaganda - "Communism is so great it needs aid from the capitalists!"
 

Don Quijote

Banned
Well Poland and Czechoslovakia did apply for Marshall Aid, but for some reason withdrew their applications. I can't think why...
 
He'd be as likely to accept it as he would partitioning Poland like Germany. The Marshall Plan would loosen his grip on the Eastern Bloc by virtue of offering the citizens an alternative to the Soviets. He wasnt going to let that happen after Barbarossa. Think of the propaganda - "Communism is so great it needs aid from the capitalists!"

It's the point of the PoD - IOTL he was initially open to the offer and initially directed Eastern Bloc countries to accept the offer in the upcoming summit in Paris. Here, while he is hostile to some of the conditions, he reasons that he can't let Western Europe, which has suffered less total damage, charge ahead of the East, and denying this aid would only hurt them and hence his control/influence on them.
 
Stalin was initially supportive of accepting the Plan

Stalin was never supportive of the plan. He was open to the Czech application for a time but with the terms as they were, no economic planning, large American influence of participants economies, etc, made the plan anathema to the Soviet system. It's more plausible for the French to reject it than for the Soviets to accept it, given as they did in OTL through gritted teeth.
 
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Wouldn't it be more realistic for the Americans to change the conditions? Say under a Wallace administration.
 
He'd be as likely to accept it as he would partitioning Poland like Germany. The Marshall Plan would loosen his grip on the Eastern Bloc by virtue of offering the citizens an alternative to the Soviets. He wasnt going to let that happen after Barbarossa. Think of the propaganda - "Communism is so great it needs aid from the capitalists!"
He could use "Communism is so great it needs aid from the capitalists"
 
Stalin's intention was to enslave the economies of eastern Europe to the needs of the Soviet Union. They were supposed to create the things the Soviet Union did not have, and be dependent on the Soviet economy. The bourgeosie were going to be wiped out and any dissenting elements to Communist control ended.

The Marshall Plan would have undermined Stalin's main objectives. It was based on cooperation between the private and public sectors to serve the needs of the individual countries and promote European cooperation. Stalin did not want cooperation between his slave states and the West. He did not want private enterprise at all. He certainly did not want Hungarians, Romanians, etc. working with US officials on their own national objectives. Furthermore, he saw economic misery as necessary to Communist expansion. Unless people were desperate, the Communist movement would not become popular. In particular, this is why he did not want the Plan to extend to Germany. He thought if Germany remained a basket case that Communism could thrive even in the western zone. He also did not want the West to learn the truth of the failings of the Communist economies. Not only did he want secrecy because he was paranoid, he knew the truth would undermine Communist propaganda.

If Stalin accepts the Marshall Plan, he is going to lose a large part of his empire. He's already going to lose western Germany like he did IOTL. He will also lose Finland and Czechoslovakia. The Czech coup will likely never happen and in the next election the Communists will lose and be excluded from the government as Benes takes a more pro-Western line. Finland will be allowed to cooperate with the West, and it will weaken the policies that created Finlandization. Furthermore, in all the occupied countries of the Communist Bloc, he's just created a faction that can be pro-West while still being "good Communists". This presents an opportunity for a potential counter revolution as the Red Army has left these territories. Given the results of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, and similar movements/demonstrations in other countries by the mid-1950s, additional countries might be able to free themselves from the Communist regimes.

Most likely, Stalin realizes he made a huge mistake and within a year or so decides he needs to end involvement in the Marshall Plan. By that time, several countries will likely defy Moscow. The most independent countries - Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Yugoslavia likely refuse to do so. What happens in the other countries is harder to predict. They are all ruled by Communists at this point, Stalinists all, but the Red Army has only a limited presence in them. Bulgaria has no Soviet troops in 1948. Romania only has about 30,000, and that only "necessary" to maintain links to the Austrian occupation zone. I believe they still had a lot of troops in Hungary and Poland, both areas directly adjacent to their occupation zones. The presence of the Red Army keeps Poland and Hungary in line, although dissent in those countries will have increased dramatically. There is greater chance for Romania or Bulgaria to defect as well, but I don't see the Communist leadership in either country going "Titoist". Most likely in all these countries there is a horrible purge against any party members "tainted" with collaboration with the West during the brief Marshall Plan period. The end result will be increased dissent in all these countries which will likely explode after Stalin dies.

Finland will still remain neutral, but will end up with a more independent foreign policy. Czechoslovakia likely ends up joining the EEC and NATO. Yugoslavia is more likely to align with the West and move towards a more social democratic model under the influence of Milovan Djilas. Djilas was a prominent Yugoslav communist and was considered to be Tito's successor up to 1954 before his social democratic tendencies caused him to be removed from power. I see some possibility that a more western aligned Yugoslavia tied to the Marshall Plan would see him get a stronger role. Plus Tito would be more likely to embrace the West given the even greater fury unleashed against the "Titoists" in post-Marshall Plan Soviet bloc. If NATO does not exist by then, it most assuredly will be created in the wake of the new Stalinist purges in the remaining satellite states.

If for some reason Stalin continues to pursue involvement with the Marshall Plan, we'd likely see multiple defections to the West by the mid-1950s after Stalin's death. At the same time, there may not be any NATO or as much Western hostility against the Soviet Union so such "defections" may not impede Soviet security concerns. Nevertheless, the Soviets will have to accept the loss of their European empire and receive a major blow to their prestige.
 
Yeah basically the above, Stalin wanted Eastern Europe broken and dependent on the USSR. Accepting aid from the US now the war was over undermines the entire concept.

Maybe if Stalin dies during or towards the end of the war? (Can't be that implausible, the man was unhealthy as deep fried butter...)
 
It's the point of the PoD - IOTL he was initially open to the offer and initially directed Eastern Bloc countries to accept the offer in the upcoming summit in Paris. Here, while he is hostile to some of the conditions, he reasons that he can't let Western Europe, which has suffered less total damage, charge ahead of the East, and denying this aid would only hurt them and hence his control/influence on them.

Well Czechoslovakia tried to break free in 48, East Germany in 53, and Hungary in 56. Only Yugoslavia and Albania were able to escape the Soviet hegeomony. So, if Western aid comes in a reactionary crackdown probably follows it. It probably would have created a legit war scare at some point with accusations of CIA meddling etc. The blockade of Berlin is probably delayed as the Marshall Plan is being implemented but as part of the response it is probably absolute - no airlift.
 
Well Czechoslovakia tried to break free in 48, East Germany in 53, and Hungary in 56. Only Yugoslavia and Albania were able to escape the Soviet hegeomony. So, if Western aid comes in a reactionary crackdown probably follows it. It probably would have created a legit war scare at some point with accusations of CIA meddling etc. The blockade of Berlin is probably delayed as the Marshall Plan is being implemented but as part of the response it is probably absolute - no airlift.
Actually Czechoslovakia was free until 1948 when Communist realized they have to act. Some not good decission on Benes as well as leaders of other political parties helped them.
 
An important thing to remember is that the US and Western Allies not only thought Soviet agreement to participate in the Marshall Plan was unlikely, but they did not *want* such participation:

"Molotov and Novikov had a firm foundation for their suspicions. Most of the available
evidence indicates that the Western powers designed the aid program to ensure that Moscow
would not participate. The Americans, the British, and the French all agreed that Soviet
participation would lead to protracted bargaining and delays in implementing any plan, since the
suspicious Soviet leaders would be sure to impose many difficult conditions on their participation.
The West Europeans and Americans were united on the need to move quickly. If, as Marshall put
it, “the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate,” then endless haggling with the Soviets had
to be avoided.3

"In the days following Marshall’s speech, both the British and French governments
scrambled to put together a rapid response. Desperate for the credits which Marshall was
offering, they were nevertheless on the horns of a difficult political dilemma. For reasons of
efficiency and strategy, noted above, they did not want to include the USSR in their plans, but, on
the other hand, they had to put together an all-European plan of some sort for by the summer of
1947 it had become clear that the U.S. Congress would not approve any further piecemeal aid to
individual European countries. American legislators felt that too much aid had already been sent
into the “black hole” of the European economies. Thus any response to Marshall’s plan—if it was
to pass muster in the American legislature—had to take the form of an all-European plan which
held out the prospect of re-creating in the near future a self-sustaining European economy. The
rub was that putting together such a plan also had to include a visible effort to include the Soviet
Union, because in France and Italy, two countries whose participation was deemed essential to
any successful program for Western European recovery, joining an economic plan which overtly
barred Moscow would be politically unacceptable. In both countries...governments
had only just that past spring excluded the Communists from governing coalitions and were
hanging on to bare majorities in their respective parliaments. Any further action which would
antagonize the Left—as the deliberate exclusion of the USSR surely would—might throw these
countries into a political crisis. As a result, even though British Foreign Minister Bevin and his
French counterpart Georges Bidault did not desire Soviet participation in the American aid
program, they felt constrained to invite the USSR to collaborate in the initial planning.36
When Bevin and Bidault met in Paris a few days after Marshall’s speech, they were careful
to transmit to Moscow their desire to enter into consultations with the Soviets about a European
response to the American initiative. As Bevin reported to London, “the main concern of the
French government was to disarm domestic criticism to the effect that Russia had not been given
in good faith a full and cordial opportunity to join in the discussions at the outset.”37 Thus,
following their discussions, Bevin and Bidault extended an invitation to Molotov to join them at a
meeting to be held in Paris the week of June 23. Both Bevin and Bidault assured the U.S.
ambassador in Paris, Jefferson Caffery, however, that the invitation was little more than window
dressing to defuse potential leftist opposition at home. Both separately informed Caffery that
“they hope the Soviets will refuse to cooperate and that in any event they will be prepared to ‘go
ahead full steam even if the Soviets refuse to do so.’”38"
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf

As for the Soviets, it is true that--given the vagueness of Marshall's initial speech--they did not at first want to reject the plan outright. But it seems very unlikely they would accept it in the form the plan was actually to take. This was in part because of fear of US penetration of the economies of eastern Europe but also specifically because of the German question: "In addition, the issue of Germany again proved divisive.Molotov wanted assurances that any German participation in the aid program would not jeopardize possible reparations payments or lead to an increase in German industrial capacity. The British and the French fudged the issue, but refused to agree to such terms. When it became clear that the French and British would not agree with the Soviet proposal, Molotov delivered a harsh denunciation of the Western states and stalked out of the conference. Essentially, the Western states had attempted to impose exactly those conditions which the Soviet leaders had defined as unacceptable in their pre-conference analyses..."
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Stalin was open to it as long as sounded like: free money for glorious Communism! Then he read the conditions and immidiately decided: nah. You need to change the Marshall plan to get the Eastern Block to accept it.
 
Ok so this is technically not necro but it does feel like one but whatever. I feel like Stalin missed a tremendous opportunity: He could have involved himself with the Marshall Plan but not with the goal of getting aid, no, but with the goal of stalling and obstructing its execution as much as possible. This could be useful as a propaganda tool(evil capitalists would rather see eastern europe starve!) and otherwise as a win by denying the western economies quick recovery, while also making the western populace get mired in economic misery, making them more sympathetic to communism.
In hindsight I don't really know why he didn't do this, surely someone over there must have thought about this too. Right?
 

Deleted member 97083

Although Yugoslavia did receive American aid, it was not part of the Marshall Plan. However, what if Yugoslavia was officially part of the Marshall Plan?

Stalin's intention was to enslave the economies of eastern Europe to the needs of the Soviet Union. They were supposed to create the things the Soviet Union did not have, and be dependent on the Soviet economy. The bourgeosie were going to be wiped out and any dissenting elements to Communist control ended.
To what extent did this "imperial" policy continue after Stalin? Did it change at all over time?
 
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Although Yugoslavia did receive American aid, it was not part of the Marshall Plan. However, what if Yugoslavia was officially part of the Marshall Plan?


To what extent did this "imperial" policy continue after Stalin? Did it change at all over time?
Well the puppet states gradually developed into satellite states and the Soviet Union's main goal in the Cold War became having the west accept the status quo as eternal, they kind of got what they wanted in the seventies but In the eighties things went south again. The ironic development was that the Soviet Union became a colony of its own satellites. the Soviet Union started to rely on them for manufactured goods while it sent natural resources to them. Stalin's imperial project developed into a necessity and ended up enslaving the Soviet Union itself.
 
Ok so this is technically not necro but it does feel like one but whatever. I feel like Stalin missed a tremendous opportunity: He could have involved himself with the Marshall Plan but not with the goal of getting aid, no, but with the goal of stalling and obstructing its execution as much as possible. This could be useful as a propaganda tool(evil capitalists would rather see eastern europe starve!) and otherwise as a win by denying the western economies quick recovery, while also making the western populace get mired in economic misery, making them more sympathetic to communism.
In hindsight I don't really know why he didn't do this, surely someone over there must have thought about this too. Right?

As I noted above, https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...cepts-the-marshall-plan.389178/#post-12436383 the Western powers were quite determined *not* to have endless haggling with the Soviets over the Marshall Plan. If the Soviets didn't accept US terms quickly, they would just have gone ahead without them.
 
As I noted above, https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...cepts-the-marshall-plan.389178/#post-12436383 the Western powers were quite determined *not* to have endless haggling with the Soviets over the Marshall Plan. If the Soviets didn't accept US terms quickly, they would just have gone ahead without them.
I did read your post but nevertheless they could have used the bully pulpit to create a grand display of how much of a geopolitical power play the Marshall plan was, and those complaints would be heard in France and Italy and it would still be a propaganda victory for eastern europe.
 
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