Wi: The Scottish Covenant led to home rule in 1950?

linky

How would this affect the development of the UK over the second half of the twentieth century? Would the UK even exist today?
 
linky

How would this affect the development of the UK over the second half of the twentieth century? Would the UK even exist today?

Hmm, if the West Lothian Question could be straightened out that early, than maybe. Trouble is, according to that link from the Genocide that you linked, the Covenant was basically ignored, and Labour was very dismissive. What I think could happen would be:

*if it became a bill, since Labour was opposed to it, the Tories support it (if only to reduce the amount of work that has to be done at Whitehall)
*the final draft would look somewhat like Irish home rule, with a bicameral Parliament set up in Edinburgh (consisting of a Senate and a Legislative Assembly), an Executive Committee of the Privy Council that would act as a Cabinet, and the like - so more traditional than the current Scottish devolution
*I would think that Scottish MPs would still be allowed to sit at Westminster, but would votes mainly on bills that would affect Scotland or the UK as a whole, not on bills that solely affect England and Wales
*This link between the Tories and home rule probably makes the Tories popular in Scotland
*This becomes a stepping stone for a federal UK, Canadian style - which I wouldn't mind at all :D:cool:
 
Assuming there was a devolved parliament as early as the 50s, Scotland would very possibly become independent not long after the oil is discovered in the 1970s. After nearly two decades of devolution, I'd fully expect the Scottish government to be a more powerful institution than it is today, with more or less complete responsibility for everything that isn't defence and foreign affairs.

In such an instance, it's much easier to question the point of remaining under Westminster rule, and a referendum on independence is a lot easier won. It would always be close though, and is in no way a sure cut thing. Perhaps Nationalist demands would be bought off with full control of the oil revenues, but I can't see Westminster being keen to accede to such an agreement.

Alternatively, other, more innovative forms of state organisation might be looked at: federation, confederation, association. Whatever transpires, Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom won't fall out majorly. Any huff which transpires from a successful independence referendum will soon be healed over as both countries recognise their shared interests in many areas. The scenario I'm sketching here takes place in 1985, after a successful referendum on independence in the early-mid 1970s.

One thing which would be affected by Scottish independence is the United Kingdom's status as a Great Power. It accelerates the decline of the UK as a major force in world politics to that of a second rate player. Strategically, the UK will be forced to rely ever more on American military backup to secure geostrategic interests. That said, the Scots military, small though it is, retains close links with its UK counterparts and offers support where it can. There is a large overlap between the two militaries, as officers from one very often train or work with officers from the other.

The rump UK would join the EU as in OTL. Depending on when the oil is discovered, it is doubtful whether Scotland will do the same. Rather, like Norway, Scotland will defend it's fishing and oil interests far more effectively as an independent state than it did in OTL. As such, though many Scottish politicians are pro-EU, the majority of the population remains anti-, and coordinated campaigns by oil, fishing and farming interests will block moves in that direction. There are, however, no barriers to a free trade agreement. This independent Scotland is in NATO, with SNP objections over-ruled by a slight majority of other parties.

A Scottish Parliament set up in the fifties would be much more Conservative in outlook: Scotland misses out on Thatcher's radicalisation, and the Tories aren't regarded as an English party, as they largely are in OTL. Labour never achieve comprehensive dominance, and the Nationalists are still only a third party because of Scotland's Westminster style FPTP system. They are, however, the deal breakers, and fill the role that OTL Liberals do in the Scottish Parliament by lending or withdrawing support as they see fit. On the whole, the Scottish Parliament is ideologically central, with a roughly even balance of centre-right and centre-left parties. The Tories, initially upset with independence, have accepted it and come to terms with it (a small number actively supporting the movement). They play the role of a Christian Democratic party, representing the interests of small businesses, fishing and oil interests and the Church of Scotland. Labour, more evenly divided between pro- and anti- settles into it's role as a moderately left wing party advocating a mixed economy, only slightly to the left of the Tories, with a Catholic, working class voting base. The Nationalists, their reason d'etre realised, settle into the role of third, centre party with a *slight* left wing bias.

It's likely that the Queen remains, albeit somewhat miffed given her demonstrated Unionist sympathies. Republicanism is a small, but growing movement. The Scots pound retained the Queen's head, but she is "Elizabeth, Queen of Scots" rather than "Elizabeth II".

Scotland is a much, much wealthier place in this time line than in ours. With moderate state taxation of the oil resources, and the creation of an oil fund, the Scottish Government finds itself in (to quote Gavin McCrone) "embarassing surpluses". Prices in Scotland, like Norway, are much higher than in the rest of Europe, with correspondingly higher standards of living. Scotland will encounter many of the problems she does in OTL: de-industrialisation, unemployment, poverty, endemic sectarianism and privatisation. However, with the financial resources pouring out of the North Sea, these problems are tackled much more rapidly and effectively.

Demographically, the Scottish population is healthier, wealthier, and more numerous: with a better economy, there is less need for emigration. Scotland's ambitious young men and women no longer move to London, but can find opportunity in both public and private sectors at home. As such, Scotland easily maintains and even surpasses the five million mark. An (arguably tacky) "Scots Swagger" develops as a counterpart to OTL's "Caledonian Cringe", with Scots oilmen abroad wearing kilts and plaids in the manner that Saudis wear their thobes. The average standard of living is drastically improved, particularly in the most deprived areas of West Central Scotland where new heavy industries (largely related to the oil industry) are created at government instigation to counter charges that the East Coast is reaping all the benefits of Scotland's natural bounty.

As in any other society with a sudden surplus of government money, Scotland builds her share of white elephants. Dual carriageways in the Highlands lead to nowhere in particular, and grandiose construction projects run millions of pounds over budget. The public sector is as bloated as in OTL, but is sustainable for the forseeable future. Scotland's military is probably bigger than it really needs to be, part of a friendly rivalry with the UK. Scots politicians are engaged in a game of military oneupmanship with eachother over who will supply the most expensive military hardwear come the next election. This isdespite the fact that the country has an unofficial policy of neutrality and has never taken part in a war.

On the whole, though, Scotland is envied by other European countries as an example of a small, successful country generally happy with her place in the world. The oil fund continues to grow steadily, with more always put in than is taken out. By the mid eighties, it is already worth billions of dollars, and will continue to grow as worldwide oil scares push the price of the black gold up and up. Cordial relations with her neighbours (aside the cod dispute with Iceland) mean that Scotland is strategically secure, and the good times don't look like they're going to end any time soon.

Thoughts?
 
Something I've wondered about for a while. Aren't all the North Sea oil fields in international waters? I believe I heard they were some time ago. If Scotland did seceed from the Union before the discovery of oil wouldn't England, which is larger and richer and can therefor afford more investment in the oil industy, just set up it's own rigs and pipe the stuff ashore in the North East, (I read somewhere that the first line can ashore in Tyneside)?
 
Something I've wondered about for a while. Aren't all the North Sea oil fields in international waters? I believe I heard they were some time ago. If Scotland did seceed from the Union before the discovery of oil wouldn't England, which is larger and richer and can therefor afford more investment in the oil industy, just set up it's own rigs and pipe the stuff ashore in the North East, (I read somewhere that the first line can ashore in Tyneside)?
The first oil line came ashore near Aberdeen, if I am correct. Gas pipelines came ashore in England earlier though. What I would suspect is that Scotland would be in a similar position to that of Norway, which has a smaller population than Scotland across the North Sea. Whatever happens, it would be interesting.

Should Scotland have gone independent, it would have become in reality a western north sea version of Norway. No more, no less, in that it would be poor until multinational oil revenue starts pouring in.

Had it stayed within the union, I am unsure, which is why I made the op. I am also interested in how this would affect the rest of the UK. I mean to say, how could Ulster defend its unionist Ulster-Scots tradition, when Scotland is not part of the Union? How could Thatcherism cope should the North Sea oil revenue not be there? What of Wales? How would the rest of Britains position be in releation to the rest of the world? Should Scotland remain in the union, what of the Scottish Tories and would the rise of the SNP be affected?

So many thoughts on this but no answers! I considered a timeline on the subject, but it creates so many variables as to be untrue.
 
Why would this happen, and how?

In OTL devolution only became a live issue because of the electoral impact of nationalism in the 70s; even most Labour figures didn't believe in it on principle at that time. Presumably you would have to have nationalism become much more successful earlier for this to have any chance of success.

But the fifties (specifically, the '55 election) were the high point of Scottish Toryism. In the fifties, Scotland was a Conservative bastion. With that in mind, the idea even of a Scottish Assembly, never mind a Parliament, in this period seems incredible.
 
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Someone should read Lucky Jim and understand why one of the characters is made a Scottish nationalist.
 
Why would this happen, and how?

In OTL devolution only became a live issue because of the electoral impact of nationalism in the 70s; even most Labour figures didn't believe in it on principle at that time. Presumably you would have to have nationalism become much more successful earlier for this to have any chance of success.

But the fifties (specifically, the '55 election) were the high point of Scottish Toryism. In the fifties, Scotland was a Conservative bastion. With that in mind, the idea even of a Scottish Assembly, never mind a Parliament, in this period seems incredible.
The Scottish Covenenant was a petition for a devolved Scottish Parliament in 1949/50, signed by just under half the entire population of Scotland. As such, the idea is not as incredible as you may think.

Just because your averge Scot voted Tory in that period does not equate to an anti-devolution bastion, it simply equates to the appeal of the subject. Had the Tories backed the Scots wishes, and implemented a Scottish Parliament along the lines of the NI Parliament, then they may well have avoided the decline they did.

As to why? In Scotland it would be very popular. Votes.
 
That's interesting, I didn't know about that.

What half of the population was signing it, though? If you actually geared the whole thing up to the point of serious potential legislation level, I can really see it coming up against massive resistance. I am not really sure it would have been anything close to popular, or who would have sponsored it - if Labour runs with, it, it's going to have huge problems.

I mean, this is the fifties. There was plenty of unionist opposition to the idea of a Parliament in the nineties. Once you actually get down to it, the average unionist-minded Scot of the fifties is going to think this isn't just misguided, but revolutionary. The arguments against a Parliament in OTL - that it would presage the breakup of the union - are going to be brought out here, and they will be a hundred times more potent.
 
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Il faut que je se discute avec vous . . . :D

Assuming there was a devolved parliament as early as the 50s, Scotland would very possibly become independent not long after the oil is discovered in the 1970s. After nearly two decades of devolution, I'd fully expect the Scottish government to be a more powerful institution than it is today, with more or less complete responsibility for everything that isn't defence and foreign affairs.

Umm, what happened to the butterfly effect? The 1950s were probably not the best time for SNP support, and something like the 55 Group could happen earlier rather than later if Scottish home rule happened in the late 1940s/early 1950s, and this time it could be major. Also, if Scotland got home rule, then so would Wales, and so would the English regions (particularly areas like Yorkshire and the North East), thus creating a federal UK with the West Lothian Question mainly solved. In addition, oil may not be discovered until much later - say, for example, it trades places with Newfoundland, which didn't start operations until the mid-1980s in the Hibernia oil field off the coast of St. John's in OTL.

In such an instance, it's much easier to question the point of remaining under Westminster rule, and a referendum on independence is a lot easier won. It would always be close though, and is in no way a sure cut thing. Perhaps Nationalist demands would be bought off with full control of the oil revenues, but I can't see Westminster being keen to accede to such an agreement.

Ah, so Scotland becomes to the UK what Québec is to Canada?

One thing which would be affected by Scottish independence is the United Kingdom's status as a Great Power. It accelerates the decline of the UK as a major force in world politics to that of a second rate player. Strategically, the UK will be forced to rely ever more on American military backup to secure geostrategic interests.

Hmm, I would see the decline happening more slowly, but that's probably me.

The rump UK would join the EU as in OTL.

Or stay in EFTA.

A Scottish Parliament set up in the fifties would be much more Conservative in outlook: Scotland misses out on Thatcher's radicalisation, and the Tories aren't regarded as an English party, as they largely are in OTL.

Hmm, Scottish Red Tories - very interesting to see. :cool:

The average standard of living is drastically improved, particularly in the most deprived areas of West Central Scotland where new heavy industries (largely related to the oil industry) are created at government instigation to counter charges that the East Coast is reaping all the benefits of Scotland's natural bounty.

Wasn't heavy industry in decline all over Britain at the time, anyway? I'm thinking of failed projects like the Chrysler plant in Linwood.

As in any other society with a sudden surplus of government money, Scotland builds her share of white elephants. Dual carriageways in the Highlands lead to nowhere in particular, and grandiose construction projects run millions of pounds over budget.

Or, Scotland could wait and start developing the dual carriageway/motorway network later in TTL, à la Ireland in OTL, whilst learning from the mistakes made with the construction of the English motorway network.

Thoughts?

I've given you mine, for now - now I'll try others.
 
The first oil line came ashore near Aberdeen, if I am correct. Gas pipelines came ashore in England earlier though. What I would suspect is that Scotland would be in a similar position to that of Norway, which has a smaller population than Scotland across the North Sea. Whatever happens, it would be interesting.

Hmm, interesting.

Had it stayed within the union, I am unsure, which is why I made the op. I am also interested in how this would affect the rest of the UK. I mean to say, how could Ulster defend its unionist Ulster-Scots tradition, when Scotland is not part of the Union? How could Thatcherism cope should the North Sea oil revenue not be there? What of Wales? How would the rest of Britains position be in releation to the rest of the world? Should Scotland remain in the union, what of the Scottish Tories and would the rise of the SNP be affected?

Here's how I see it.
*If Scotland gains home rule, Wales will demand the same thing, since it's also a constituent country of the UK.
*From there, it would probably be a prelude to a Canadian-style federalism, which may or may not be a bad thing - it would be bad if you were either a unionist or someone who believed in the unitary system; it wouldn't be bad if you were in areas under-represented in Westminster (probably including areas in the North of England, like Yorkshire) since it would give your region equal standing with the other regions in the UK (unless you lived in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, or in the Overseas Territories). The system itself may not change much on a national - after all, the Canadian Senate was deliberately modelled on the House of Lords when Confederation came into being - but it would probably change in the regions.
*As for Northern Ireland - it's pretty much a unique situation unto itself. The Unionists would probably still defend the notion of the UK to the bitter end, and the Nationalists would still defend the notion of a "United Ireland" to the bitter end - unless something was done to combat the sectarianism problem, like a TTL version of the Good Friday Agreement.

So many thoughts on this but no answers! I considered a timeline on the subject, but it creates so many variables as to be untrue.

In the words of Mrs Doyle from Father Ted: well, go on! :D I would love to see such a TL.

The Scottish Covenenant was a petition for a devolved Scottish Parliament in 1949/50, signed by just under half the entire population of Scotland. As such, the idea is not as incredible as you may think.

Just because your averge Scot voted Tory in that period does not equate to an anti-devolution bastion, it simply equates to the appeal of the subject. Had the Tories backed the Scots wishes, and implemented a Scottish Parliament along the lines of the NI Parliament, then they may well have avoided the decline they did.

Hmm, interesting.
 
FletcherOfSaltoun said:
Had it stayed within the union, I am unsure, which is why I made the op. I am also interested in how this would affect the rest of the UK. I mean to say, how could Ulster defend its unionist Ulster-Scots tradition, when Scotland is not part of the Union? How could Thatcherism cope should the North Sea oil revenue not be there? What of Wales? How would the rest of Britains position be in releation to the rest of the world? Should Scotland remain in the union, what of the Scottish Tories and would the rise of the SNP be affected?

So many thoughts on this but no answers! I considered a timeline on the subject, but it creates so many variables as to be untrue.


Well, a devolved (or even federal) Scotland will still be fantastically wealthy, but such an arrangement would be accompanied by almost constant attempts by Westminster to cream off the revenue whatever happens.

I think most of my independence scenario would remain essentially the same. By the 1980s Scots Labour and the Tories would have carved out more distinctly "Scottish" identities, and links with the federal parties at Westminster would have been loosened enough that they could be considered virtually separate institutions. Moreover, in scenarios where Scotland's interests conflict with those of the United Kingdom, the Scots Tories and Labour (and, of course, the SNP) have no fear fighting the Scottish corner, as anything less will lose them votes.

Though there are significantly less Scots MPs at Westminster, they remain a fairly powerful voting bloc (like their Northern Irish counterparts) and given increased Scottish national conscienceness, they're not unknown to vote across party lines when it's in the country's national interest. As such, any Westminster government without a thumping majority would be forced to consider the Scottish position in foreign policy matters.

Ulster's case is an interesting one. A Scottish Parliament set up in the fifties is going to be a lot more tied to Scotland's sectarian traditions, and I can see this crystalising in the Scots party system(Presbyterian/Episcopal Tories, Catholic Labour). However, fairly immediate efforts would be taken to tackle the most overt symptoms of the problem. Certainly, any Labour/SNP government is going to want to tackle the problem, the SNP because of it's desire for national unity across religious lines, and Labour because a large part of its voting base is Catholic and republican.

Ulster has nothing to fear from Scottish devolution: what's good for the goose is good for the gander. Where things start getting complicated is if Scotland moves towards independence, particularly republican independence. The thousands of Orangemen in Scotland (and we are speaking thousands at this point in time) are going to be very, very unhappy. I can see acts of terrorism in West Central Scotland, assasination attempts against nationalist/republican politicians, and maybe even an emigration of militant Protestants across the border to England or Ulster. In such a case, the Protestant Ascendency in Ulster is going to be augmented, more righteously paranoid, and more likely to engage in violence against any further threat to the Union.

That said, I can forsee a few Ulster politicians embracing the newfound independence of mind in Scotland, as long as it remains under the crown. Certainly, the traffic in people and ideas will remain between the two areas. Ulster Scots would undergo an early renaissance, with aid from a nationalist or Tory Scots government.

Dan said:
Umm, what happened to the butterfly effect? The 1950s were probably not the best time for SNP support, and something like the 55 Group could happen earlier rather than later if Scottish home rule happened in the late 1940s/early 1950s, and this time it could be major. Also, if Scotland got home rule, then so would Wales, and so would the English regions (particularly areas like Yorkshire and the North East), thus creating a federal UK with the West Lothian Question mainly solved. In addition, oil may not be discovered until much later - say, for example, it trades places with Newfoundland, which didn't start operations until the mid-1980s in the Hibernia oil field off the coast of St. John's in OTL.

Somehow, I don't think it's likely that federalism would be instituted all at once. The UK has always specialised in clumsy, half arsed constitutional muddles. Even in our own rational, sensible age, devolution was implimented assymetrically. One reason is demand: why set up Welsh and regional English governments if there is no demand for them?

Moreover, oil is always going to be discovered in the North Sea. The UK government is going to be desparate to find new, reliable sources of fuel in her own waters. I think the first finds were actually made in the 60s, though they only came online in the 70s. You can guarantee that it won't take long to discover the North Sea's bounty.

Dan said:
Ah, so Scotland becomes to the UK what Québec is to Canada?

Essentially. But much, much wealthier.

Dan said:
Hmm, I would see the decline happening more slowly, but that's probably me.

I think it would be rapid purely because the UK had already fallen very far from grace by 1970: with just a couple of island outposts left of an Empire which once covered a quarter of the globe, the loss of Scotland would have massive psychological and economic ramifications. The rump UK would need a new flag, there would be seismic shifts in the party system, a large proportion of the British ruling class ("Anglo-Scots") would need to choose their allegiances... so many things would change. This wouldn't go un-noticed in the rest of the world, including with the UK's biggest allies, the US.

One thing which would resurge is English nationalism, thirty years early. English and Welsh nationalism would recieve enormous boosts. For that latter, the non-state nations across Europe would be ideologically buoyed by a peaceful Scottish indepenence event: expect to see Spain, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and maybe even Germany facing their own internal nationalist movements from Catalans, Basques, Bretons, Flemings, Slovaks and Bavarians.

Dan said:
Wasn't heavy industry in decline all over Britain at the time, anyway? I'm thinking of failed projects like the Chrysler plant in Linwood.

Absolutely. The difference is that with more money, a smaller population and more targetted resources, a Scottish government would be able to do more about it. If a Labour government, that take the form of subsidising heavy industries, if a Conservative one finding viable alternatives.

Dan said:
Or, Scotland could wait and start developing the dual carriageway/motorway network later in TTL, à la Ireland in OTL, whilst learning from the mistakes made with the construction of the English motorway network.

It's very possible. But never underestimate the capacity of ANY politician of ANY party to bugger up ANY project where taxpayers money can be spent :D
 
It's very possible. But never underestimate the capacity of ANY politician of ANY party to bugger up ANY project where taxpayers money can be spent :D

For a fine example of this look no further than the Scottish parliament building. Initial estimate cost £40 million final, cost £450 million and counting:D
 
Somehow, I don't think it's likely that federalism would be instituted all at once. The UK has always specialised in clumsy, half arsed constitutional muddles. Even in our own rational, sensible age, devolution was implimented assymetrically.

Well, Canadian federalism is a bit asymmetric as well - the original foundation of Confederation were three colonies, one which was separated into two. Even today, some of that effect still lingers - i.e., the position of Québec, but that was a mid-to-late 20th-century development. Federalism takes a bit of time to develop, yes, but it certainly is possible. I, for one, am surprised that the UK didn't go the federal route in the first place, even when some of the Dominions (i.e. Canada and Australia) did.

One reason is demand: why set up Welsh and regional English governments if there is no demand for them?

The domino effect - what Scotland gets, Wales wants, and then the English regions (particularly those on the periphery, like Yorkshire) would feel like they would have to play catch-up. In North America, we call up "keeping up with the Joneses". Which, IIRC, is essentially how devolution played out during Blair's term - Scotland gets a Parliament, so Wales wants one as well.

Moreover, oil is always going to be discovered in the North Sea. The UK government is going to be desparate to find new, reliable sources of fuel in her own waters. I think the first finds were actually made in the 60s, though they only came online in the 70s. You can guarantee that it won't take long to discover the North Sea's bounty.

The same with Newfoundland, but operations only commenced in the 1980s. If the North Sea wasn't rough enough, try the Atlantic Ocean. Also, don't forget the butterfly effect - North Sea oil might not be discovered at all in TTL.

It's very possible. But never underestimate the capacity of ANY politician of ANY party to bugger up ANY project where taxpayers money can be spent :D

You're preaching to the choir on that one.
 
That's interesting, I didn't know about that.

What half of the population was signing it, though?
Scotland had a population of five million, of whom four million were elligible to vote. Of these, over two million actually signed the covenant. Whatever way you put it, it must have been a cross-section from supporters of all parties.
If you actually geared the whole thing up to the point of serious potential legislation level, I can really see it coming up against massive resistance. I am not really sure it would have been anything close to popular, or who would have sponsored it - if Labour runs with, it, it's going to have huge problems.

I mean, this is the fifties. There was plenty of unionist opposition to the idea of a Parliament in the nineties. Once you actually get down to it, the average unionist-minded Scot of the fifties is going to think this isn't just misguided, but revolutionary. The arguments against a Parliament in OTL - that it would presage the breakup of the union - are going to be brought out here, and they will be a hundred times more potent.
Despite the fact that in theory at least, Labour have always been a pro-devolution party, I think that the Tories, or as they were called in Scotland at thge time, the Unionist Party would be more likely to implement the bill. I know that this sounds mad, but hear me out.

At this point, Northern Ireland was a part of the UK with a devolved Parliament. It could be argued that politically, as the strength of the Covenant showed that supporting it would be popular. As such, the Tories could gain votes in Scotland by supporting a Scottish Parliament within the union. By doing so they could enhance their Scottish credentials, whilst keeping their Unionist name and creed. By doing so, they could also roll back socialism in Scotland, sort of becoming a British CSU.

Labour is wedded to the British state at this point, what with the major nationalisations, and could lose out big time. They would be seen as the opponents of the will of the people, and it could guarantee the Tories a long time in office in Edinburgh, in which they could roll back socialism.

With hindsight, this could have averted the SNP becoming anything at all. It would certainly have created a very different Scotland.
Well, a devolved (or even federal) Scotland will still be fantastically wealthy, but such an arrangement would be accompanied by almost constant attempts by Westminster to cream off the revenue whatever happens.
After North Sea Oil, in such a scenario, I can see Scotland becoming more wealthy. Before that I'm not sure. I happen to agree about Westminster and oil money though.
I think most of my independence scenario would remain essentially the same. By the 1980s Scots Labour and the Tories would have carved out more distinctly "Scottish" identities, and links with the federal parties at Westminster would have been loosened enough that they could be considered virtually separate institutions. Moreover, in scenarios where Scotland's interests conflict with those of the United Kingdom, the Scots Tories and Labour (and, of course, the SNP) have no fear fighting the Scottish corner, as anything less will lose them votes.
I suspect that you would see a different political culture developing, as has happened post-devolution. That is only natural. Being honest though, in non-devolved areas, or even in an independent Scotland there would not be that much Scotland could do once Westminster decides whos getting which MoD contract for example. In an early independence scenario, you could also see the collapse of shipbuilding on the Clyde quicker than OTL.
Ulster's case is an interesting one. A Scottish Parliament set up in the fifties is going to be a lot more tied to Scotland's sectarian traditions, and I can see this crystalising in the Scots party system(Presbyterian/Episcopal Tories, Catholic Labour). However, fairly immediate efforts would be taken to tackle the most overt symptoms of the problem. Certainly, any Labour/SNP government is going to want to tackle the problem, the SNP because of it's desire for national unity across religious lines, and Labour because a large part of its voting base is Catholic and republican.
I'm not sure I entirely agree with this, and I speak as a member of both the Labour Party and the CoS. Much of the Labour support has derived from its strong RC base in Glasgow. They could and probably would solidify the base by prompting fears of some sort of Calvanist state where it would not be good to be a Catholic. It was one argument tht was used against the SNP in OTL, and the reason they were christened the "Tartan Tories". TBH, its another reason why I think the Tories could, if devious enough, could be the party at this point to support devolution.

I can see why the SNP would attempt such a move, but without the support of the churches or the media, with people running much of the show in Scotland, I think they would be restricted to third party at best.
Ulster has nothing to fear from Scottish devolution: what's good for the goose is good for the gander. Where things start getting complicated is if Scotland moves towards independence, particularly republican independence. The thousands of Orangemen in Scotland (and we are speaking thousands at this point in time) are going to be very, very unhappy. I can see acts of terrorism in West Central Scotland, assasination attempts against nationalist/republican politicians, and maybe even an emigration of militant Protestants across the border to England or Ulster. In such a case, the Protestant Ascendency in Ulster is going to be augmented, more righteously paranoid, and more likely to engage in violence against any further threat to the Union.
Your overplaying that I think. Any independent Scottish state, especially at this point would be both loyal to the crown and by a large majority, as today Presbyterian.
That said, I can forsee a few Ulster politicians embracing the newfound independence of mind in Scotland, as long as it remains under the crown. Certainly, the traffic in people and ideas will remain between the two areas. Ulster Scots would undergo an early renaissance, with aid from a nationalist or Tory Scots government.
Many unionists in Northern Ireland base their Unionism on their Scottish heritage. If Scotland leaves the Union, I can forsee quite a bit of interesting things happening.
 
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Whatever way you put it, it must have been a cross-section from supporters of all parties.

Actually, I was sort of wondering if this was more in the way of the centre vote - in so far as such a thing existed in the 1950s. It is, of course, all well and good to sign a petition, but that is not a reliable means of judging how people will subsequently vote after a referendum campaign in which the cards would be stacked against devolution.

Despite the fact that in theory at least, Labour have always been a pro-devolution party, I think that the Tories, or as they were called in Scotland at thge time, the Unionist Party would be more likely to implement the bill. I know that this sounds mad, but hear me out.

No, I would broadly agree with you - although I think both outcomes are very unlikely.

When I said that Labour would have a very hard time above, I was hinting at the fact that, as you say, Scottish Labour has always had a perception of being Catholic-lead. That would create big problems in the 1950s when the question is framed in terms of strict unionism or devolution. If there is even the merest hint of it being a sectarian issue then devolution is doomed.

My main problem here is that I just don't see either the political will at the top level, or, even if that was there, the acceptability to the political class as a whole for this to carry. Even in the 70s, in Scottish Labour itself - which as you say, has always nominally bee pro-devolution - there was majority hostility to devolution.

Interestingly, Churchill doesn't seem to have been as anti-devolution as one would suppose, (He was MP for Dundee in his Liberal phase and made some 'home rule all round' noises) but he doesn't exactly seem to have been a raging exponent of it either; his attitude seems to have been 'if the Scots want it, let them have it'. But in a battle between ultra-unionism and Churchill's broad indifference to the question, I think that ultra-unionism would very much win out. Remember, back then the Conservative Party in Scotland was the Unionist Party. That's what it was called.

If you can find a broadly favourable attitude to the question in the party of the time - I'm no expert here - then I'll go along with that, but I really doubt there was such an attitude.
 
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When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951 they established a royal commission on Scottish affairs. However, the Conservative government did not support Scottish devolution and the thirteen years of Conservative government between 1951 and 1964 witnessed a barren time for pro-devolutionists and a consistent Conservative opposition to Scottish home rule.

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I found this with a quick google search. Give the Royal Commision a different conclusion and things get very interesting.

I really think I'm going to do a timeline on this.
 
Despite the fact that in theory at least, Labour have always been a pro-devolution party, I think that the Tories, or as they were called in Scotland at thge time, the Unionist Party would be more likely to implement the bill. I know that this sounds mad, but hear me out.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't the Conservatives and the Unionists separate parties in Scotland at the time?
 
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