So, suppose that the PRC crushes the KMT even further in the Chinese Civil War, by somehow invading and occupying the island of Taiwan. Perhaps a better communist performance at the Battle of Guningtou?
What happens next?
Without a friendly capitalist rump chinese regime to negotiate with, what do the USA do? How will they react to a whole communist China? Will they accept them into the UN Security Council?
 
It has big effects, but the devil is in the details. The Red Chinese did not have any sort of amphibious capability in 1945-49. Therefore the Nationalists have to truly collapse and not have a coordinated evacuation to Taiwan.

I'm no expert, but the Nationalists had enough time to move large amounts of troops equipment and refugees to Taiwan in OTL.

If they don't, then a small force of Reds can then secure the island with only token opposition.
 
There's a big difference between taking Quemoy and taking Taiwan:
ROC_Quemoy.png


That doesn't mean that the CCP couldn't take Taiwan later in 1950 if the US didn't stand in their way. But this requires that there be no Korean War--at least not in 1950. Which, I think, answers your question "How does this affect the Korean War?"

As I wrote some years ago in soc.history.what-if:

***

Obviously, it would have been a lot harder than Hainan (which was much closer to the mainland and which already had a large Communist guerrilla force with which the invaders could link up.) But that doesn't mean that it couldn't be done:

"Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, the Acting Director of Naval Intelligence, concluded that the successive evacuations [of Hainan and smaller offshore islands] had had a 'devastating effect on morale.'1 The U.S. Charge d'Affairs and the naval and military attaches in Taipei now concluded that 'Taiwan will probably fall to the Communists sometime before the end of July.'2 Although Espe thought the attaches' estimate too pessimistic, he observed that 'there seems to be little doubt that Taiwan will in due course fall into Communist hands.'3

"The Communist drive to seize Taiwan had by then reached fever pitch. U.S. naval intelligence reported advanced preparations by the Chinese Communists for an amphibious attack, labeled appropriately 'Operation Taiwan.' Walter McConaughy, the U.S. Consul General at Shanghai, reported that the liberation of Taiwan was being trumpeted publicly by Peking as the nation's paramount immediate mission and one on which they were staking the reputation and all the resources of the new regime.

"In what would prove to be a prophetic observation, McConaughy reported to Washington that 'there would seem no avenue left for Communist retreat. Either they gain Taiwan, or, goaded by bitter humiliation and by Kremlin propaganda, they must keep it ever before the Chinese people as China's great irredentist issue and perpetual cause for anti-American vehemence. Well to remember that Taiwan Irredentism is not Communist monopoly but popular Chinese national issue.'4

"By the late spring of 1950, the Chinese Communist armed forces were prepared to carry out the assault on Taiwan, their most ambitious maritime operation yet. The Communists assembled 5,000 vessels for the invasion by commandeering freighters, motorized junks, and sampans and refloating ships that had been sunk in the Yangtze River during the fight for the mainland. Further, they gathered and trained over 30,000 fishermen and other sailors to man the flotilla.

"Since the previous year, General Chen Yi's 3rd Field Army, which was responsible for the assault, had been positioned on the Fukien coast opposite the large island. The Communists trained their troops extensively in amphibious warfare and applied the lessons learned from the Hainan and other island seizures. Despite an outbreak of the Asian blood fluke disease, which reportedly felled thousands of soldiers, preparations proceeded apace for the cross-channel attack. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson later revealed that between June 10 and June 24, 1950, the strength of the field army swelled from 40,000 to 156,000 men. Also prior to June 25, elements of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army moved from south China to the Shanghai area, where they were positioned to serve as a strategic reserve for Chen Yi. Historian Allen Whiting, author of the seminal work, China Crosses the Yalu, relates that by late June, Peking's exhortations to men in the units stationed opposite the island paralleled in fervor those broadcast to the troops before the Hainan invasion. In short, the Communists were now ready to launch the attack on Taiwan and win final victory in the civil war."
http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch3c.htm

See also Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History*, p. 111:

"For the young PLA, a successful amphibious invasion across the strait was a difficult but not an impossible proposition, especially given the leadership's willingness to suffer high casualties in pursuit of a political victory of such magnitude. The Chinese had reportedly mobilized over 150,000 assault troops and collected in Fujian ports a large number of motorized junks for transporting these troops by mid-1950. These junks were difficult to sink with naval gunfire; the shells tended to pass cleanly through their wood hulls leaving holes that could be plugged. They were fitted with 40 mm guns that would allow them to put up a stiff defense against both aircraft and destroyers. The Sino-Soviet alliance that coalesced in early 1950 increased the likelihood the PLA would conquer Taiwan. Stalin refused to get directly involved in the invasion, but agreed to help beef up Chinese naval and air capabilities in preparation for the assault. United States and British intelligence analysts predicted the invasion would take place sometime in the summer of 1950; the US government ordered its nonessential personnel on Taiwan to evacuate on May 26."

http://books.google.com/books?id=DN...111&sig=rVLcH5SxMpCVwzx-pgDnTVlhvqk#PPA113,M1

So it appears that Taiwan might have been doomed if not for the intervention of the US Seventh Fleet. However, was the North Korean invasion of the South the only thing that could have brought about that intervention? Roy (p. 113) suggests one other interesting possibility:

"The interposition of the US Navy would make an assault on Taiwan by the PLA impossible. Truman indicated, however, that his support for the KMT regime was limited. He added that as a 'corollary' he was calling upon Taipei to cease attacks against the mainland, and that the 'future status of Formosa' was not yet settled--sharp jolts to two core KMT principles. The status of Taiwan had seemed a settled issue. The Cairo Declaration...stated that Taiwan 'shall be restored to the Republic of China.' After the war, having recognized the ROC as one of the major allied powers, the US government declined to push for independence or UN trusteeship for Taiwan, adhering to the position that Taiwan was part of the ROC even after the abuses of the Chen Yi [the Nationalist governor, not the Communist general with the same name] administration came to light. It was the Chiang government's defeat by numerically smaller Communist forces despite substantial US aid, rather than questions about the justice or competence of its rule on Taiwan, that degraded the KMT's status in the worldview of American officials. International politics, not Chinese or Taiwan politics. moved Washington to reopen the question of Taiwan's status. In short, the United States was now following a 'two Chinas' policy to justify denying Taiwan to the CCP. *A successful anti-Chiang coup might have had the same effect*... [emphasis added]

"Truman so quickly decided on using the Seventh Fleet to enforce a neutralization of Taiwan because his advisors had already discussed this contingency, *although they had linked it with Chiang's removal by a coup d'etat.* Since the war preempted the coup, the United States was now stuck protecting Chiang." [emphasis added]

So there is another interesting what-if: An anti-Chiang coup in Taiwan in 1950 before the Communists invade? According to Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955*

"The boldest interventionist schemes came from Nitze, Dulles, and Rusk. In early May Nitze concocted a scheme that hitched a possible defensive military commitment to the establishment of a new government under Gen. Sun Li-jen, who several months earlier had become commander-in-chief of the Nationalist army. The American-educated Sun...was well-regarded in Washington for his military competence and progressive views...Nitze's proposal envisaged a coup d'etat led by Sun (but not involving the United States) to oust Chiang and his most prominent loyalists. With a new government in place and with 'veiled but vigorous' American guidance, Nitze hypothesized that Taiwan might become a show window for Asia and a platform for clandestine propaganda and subversive activities against Soviet imperialism on the mainland."

http://books.google.com/books?id=26...Fpmr&sig=FuiXInDw20NTBktx3c4-TG6Mo9s#PPA30,M1

Accinelli, though, thinks it unlikely that Sun could depose Chiang, "a master of the art of political survival and intrigue." "A US intelligence report in March 1950 dismissed the likelihood of a coup attempt by Sun. Noting that rumors of a possible coup had been in wide circulation on Taiwan in recent months and were known to Chiang's entourage, the report went on to point out that Sun was politically inexperienced and lacked influence with important military and political figures." Moreover, his authority did not extend to the air force and navy.

It should be noted that there *were* some officials who even before the Korean War suggested schemes for the "neutralization" of Taiwan *not* dependent on an anti-Chiang coup, notably John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk (although Rusk's plan did call for the retirement of Chiang who was to be "induced"--Rusk did not say how--to turn over the administration of the island to General Sun and the provincial governor K.C. Wu). Regrettably, according to Accinelli, there is no record of how Acheson reacted to the Rusk plan. Acheson did tell the British ambassador in early June that he and his staff were searching for a way, short of military intervention, of keeping Taiwan out of Communist hands. Still, "short of military intervention" was the sticking point. In mid-June Dulles told a group of pro-Nationalist Republican senators that Truman and Acheson remained adamant on Taiwan. Moreover, within the military, the advocates of armed action had to contend with the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even Rusk retreated somewhat with a subsequent proposal to put the Taiwan issue before the Security Council. The idea was that the Council would appoint a commission to investigate the Taiwan question. Pending the commission's report, both Communists and Nationalists were not to attack each other in the Taiwan Strait area. Rusk added that only if the USSR vetoed the creation of such a commission or if Communist forces tried to frustrate the UN initiative or invade neighboring states would the US consider military force. It is not clear whether Truman and Acheson would have agreed to such use of force, though.

Accinelli concludes (pp. 29-30) that

"Contrary to what some historians have written, the Korean crisis was a major cause for the intervention in the Taiwan Strait and more than just the occasion for it. Despite wavering support for the nonmilitary policy within the State and Defense Departments prior to the crisis, no irresistible undertow pulled government officials toward armed intervention. Although many of the motives were clearly present for such a move, the crisis was itself a significant determining factor in precipitating it...Certainly the rapidity and unanimity with which officials embraced military action would have been impossible without the Korean crisis."

One other point: As Dulles lamented to KMT officials, one of the chief arguments raised by those who opposed any further military aid to Chiang was that in case of an invasion the Nationalists would put up no real resistance, and that the American arms would therefore fall into Communist hands. [1] If the Nationalists did put up staunch resistance to a Communist invasion, this argument might be harder to make, and the political pressure to intervene might be hard to resist.

In short, the possibility that the US would have intervened militarily even without the Korean War and even without a coup against Chiang cannot IMO be dismissed entirely. For one thing, the Pentagon by June was recommending a military fact-finding mission by General MacArthur to Taiwan; it might have been difficult to prevent that from leading to a full-scale military commitment, because once the general set foot on Taiwan, the prestige of the US would be at stake. For that reason, George Kennan urged that before a military survey was sent, two conditions had to be met: the removal of Chiang from power and a commitment by the Joint Chiefs to "go the whole hog if required." (p. 27) (It is possible that by June Chiang was so desperate that he would have "voluntarily" resigned to get US backing for Taiwan; supposedly he said as much in a secret letter to Truman.) But there was certainly no decision for such intervention before the Korean crisis. The non-interventionist line was weakening but had not yet been abandoned.

[1] As repeatedly happened on the Mainland: Derk Bodde (an American professor who was a witness to the Communist takeover), describing the PLA victory parade in Beijing in 1949 said "What made it especially memorable to Americans was the fact that it was primarily a display of *American* military equipment, virtually all of it captured or obtained by bribe from Kuomintang forces in the short space of two and one half years."
 
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@David T
Good analysis on that one, i'll have to say! :)
Still, could some further military defeats on part of the KMT before 1950 precipitate more non-interventionist feelings on part of the USA?
 
If the PRC does not intervene on the Korean Peninsula, it is possible the US will decide to throw Chiang under the bus in the event of a PRC attack.

As the above post says, Truman was lukewarm at best on Taiwan, the KMT, and Chiang.
 
Supposing the Red Chinese do indeed completely unify China, then perhaps there’s a path open for an earlier American reapproachment in China? I’m just spitballing here, but it’s a thought.
 
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Supposing the Red Chinese do indeed completely unify China, then perhaps there’s a path open for an earlier American reapproachment in China? I’m just spitballing here, but it’s a thought.
Yeah, that’s what I would guess would happen. There’s less bad blood between China and the US, and if the US and China come to an agreement trading North Korea for Taiwan (which China would definitely agree to), both parties would be united against Soviet opposition to this agreement.
 
Certainly a good development for everyone not Taiwanese. Removes one of the biggest thorns in the geopolitical order in North East Asia, takes away a spark for the excessive nationalism in "mainland" China, and removes one of the main levers through which the US has tried to bully the PRC. Obviously though this is pretty bad news for the Taiwanese people, who instead of eventually living in a prosperous democratic nation get to live under Mao and his successors.
 
If Washington plays it’s cards right this could work out. If US moves to recognize the Communist regime and indicate its considering letting China keep the UN seat, then not only does China not intervene in the Korean War, it probably does not support North Vietnam trying to conquer the south either. China would be satisfied with Vietnamese independence from France. Furthermore, China probably does not align with Moscow staying non-aligned like Yugoslavia.

But... Washington was pretty myopic during early Cold War. It could not comprehend China was not Stalin’s puppet. I expect it would remain hostile to the PRC and refuse to seat them at the UN. This leads to everything going the way it did in the Cold War, minus the multiple Taiwan Strait Crisises.
 
Supposing the Red Chinese do indeed completely unify China, then perhaps there’s a path open for an earlier American reapproachment in China? I’m just spitballing here, but it’s a thought.

My thoughts exactly; there actually was an effort to normalize relations with China around 1955 IOTL. Without Taiwan and presumably no Korean War, this could occur and thus allow for China to align with the U.S. earlier in an Anti-Soviet arrangement once the Sino-Soviet split begins to become serious in the 1960s.
 

Deleted member 94708

... removes one of the main levers through which the US has tried to bully the PRC.
Despite being pretty broadly sympathetic to China and its people I’m not sure how insisting that Taiwan’s fate be contingent on the will of its people is “bullying the PRC.”
 
Despite being pretty broadly sympathetic to China and its people I’m not sure how insisting that Taiwan’s fate be contingent on the will of its people is “bullying the PRC.”
Taiwan has been the main arena in which American power has been used to cow the PRC, and 'insisting that is is up to Taiwan' is obviously threatening to Chinese interests. Irrespective of whether or not Taiwan should be able to choose its own fate, it is inherently problematic from a geopolitical perspective. As it happens I would 'support' Taiwan having the choice to themselves, but that is why I said Taiwan being part of China is good for everyone except the Taiwanese. I don't want a war over Taiwan, the US doesn't, the PRC doesn't. If there were no 'Taiwan', the problem would not exist. I don't support China's position, but I can't ignore that it exists.
 
Taiwan has been the main arena in which American power has been used to cow the PRC, and 'insisting that is is up to Taiwan' is obviously threatening to Chinese interests. Irrespective of whether or not Taiwan should be able to choose its own fate, it is inherently problematic from a geopolitical perspective. As it happens I would 'support' Taiwan having the choice to themselves, but that is why I said Taiwan being part of China is good for everyone except the Taiwanese. I don't want a war over Taiwan, the US doesn't, the PRC doesn't. If there were no 'Taiwan', the problem would not exist. I don't support China's position, but I can't ignore that it exists.

There is also the simple fact that the PRC views the whole Taiwan issue as being unfinished business from its civil war and most nations (the US is a great example) tend to take their civil wars very seriously and take a dim view of outside meddling in such affairs (again, the US is a great example). From that perspective, the US selling weapons to Taiwan is no different than the British selling weapons to the Confederates and outfitting their blockade runners.
 
Certainly a good development for everyone not Taiwanese. Removes one of the biggest thorns in the geopolitical order in North East Asia, takes away a spark for the excessive nationalism in "mainland" China, and removes one of the main levers through which the US has tried to bully the PRC. Obviously though this is pretty bad news for the Taiwanese people, who instead of eventually living in a prosperous democratic nation get to live under Mao and his successors.

Ehh, the victims of Chiang’s White Terror would like to disagree with you.
 
Ehh, the victims of Chiang’s White Terror would like to disagree with you.
The word “eventually” was there very deliberately, but I think it would be quite disingenuous to say that Taiwan was a cumulatively worse place to live in the 20th century to the PRC.
 
China somehow taking Taiwan would cause the U.S to shit themselves twice over, ironically it could butterfly away the Korean War. If Mao finds himself busy with Taiwan he could see it as an impossible task to support the DRPK and deal with Taiwan at the same time. This would mean that Stalin would not give Kim the okay to try to attack the South, as Stalin would only back Kim if Mao did the heavy lifting.
 
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