WI the north african ports had larger capacity in the 1940s
- Thread starter juanml82
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It'd help the Allies a bit more, but only until the Torch landings. The Axis' problem wasn't port capacity -- it was the ability of their ships to reach those ports. ULTRA, plus Allied naval superiority and aircraft based from Malta put a massive dent in what the Axis were able to ship.
In Egypt, Alexandria, Port Said and other places gave the British a big enough logistical base to mass a force far larger than anything the Axis were ever able to bring to bear. Their problem was the need to ship supplies all the way around the Cape and the Horn of Africa in order to reach Egyptian ports.
Its not just the port capacity, low as it was, its the communications from the ports, with large amounts of cargo piled up at the ports asit was.
On the contrary. The limited ware handling capabilities of ports like Tripoli had at least as great an impact on the logistical situation of the Italian-German Armored Army up front, as the problem of bringing the supplies all the way to the front from the ports, and as the sinkings by the enemy. Other key issues were simply that not enough stuff was being sent, and, linked to this, that not enough merchant ships were available (of course the sinkings had an effect on the latter).
If you don't look at key months and shipments, whose outcome did badly hurt the Axis, but at the overall figures, it turns out that some 86% of what was shipped, did arrive. 14% is a dent, sure, but it would not have been decisive without all the other concurrent factors mentioned above.
I quite like Martin van Creveld, and that book seems to be quite influential, but I am loathe to spend my time on a book that describes Normandy as a peninsular jutting into the Atlantic.
The main problem was not port capacity or the ability to get ships to said ports, actually. The main problem always was to get the supplies from the ports to the front. Libya lacked railroads those days. For example, more than half of the gasoline unloaded in Tripoli was spent bringing it to the front.
To really improve the axis supply situation in northern Africa, you need a full-width railroad Tripolis-Benghazi-Tobruk-Mesra Matruh-El Alamein. And you need to get Benghazi and Tobruk up and running FAST (the Germans had a bad track record at getting ports back into full operation, while the British had a good track record of disabling ports they lost) with rolling stock for the railroad, railroad and road construction battalions, cranes and dock crews etc.
To really improve the axis supply situation in northern Africa, you need a full-width railroad Tripolis-Benghazi-Tobruk-Mesra Matruh-El Alamein. And you need to get Benghazi and Tobruk up and running FAST (the Germans had a bad track record at getting ports back into full operation, while the British had a good track record of disabling ports they lost) with rolling stock for the railroad, railroad and road construction battalions, cranes and dock crews etc.
His "Fighting Power" is pretty good. And part of Normandy is a peninsular. In the Channel. Which is sort-of-part-of-the-Atlantic....
His "Fighting Power" is pretty good. And part of Normandy is a peninsular. In the Channel. Which is sort-of-part-of-the-Atlantic....
I was always curious abut fighting power, until I saw a footnote or bibliography referring to another book as much better, or at least more convincing.
Having read Van Creveld's Rise and Decline of the State I think he writes well and had a broad view, judging from the other comments I have referred to though he is perhaps the wrong person to trust on complex technical issues. i shall check for myself sometime when I am in the mood.
It's sort of in the Atlantic the way Morecambe Bay is sort of in the Atlantic...
I was always curious abut fighting power, until I saw a footnote or bibliography referring to another book as much better, or at least more convincing.
Having read Van Creveld's Rise and Decline of the State I think he writes well and had a broad view, judging from the other comments I have referred to though he is perhaps the wrong person to trust on complex technical issues. i shall check for myself sometime when I am in the mood.
It's sort of in the Atlantic the way Morecambe Bay is sort of in the Atlantic...
I can see you have never set sail upon the oceanic swells of Morecambe Bay....
Creveld was one of the sources I used for a recent essay, mostly about Germany army training, and the direct comparison approach he used in his book was useful for that. Not sure I'd have read it for fun though....
Another book I used was The German way of war by Citino, also quite interesting. I have a huge book list, but its too much to post here. My professor is Evan Mawdsley - you may have come across his books, mostly on the Soviets.
ah, I have seen Thunder in the East although never read it. Is it good?
I am trying to avoid reading any more narrative descriptions of Barbarossa.
The analytical questions I want to know are never answered. All I learn is that B disagrees with A, and C had copied A and D has copied B.
I'm also largely an occidentophile and so have not bothered to read it either. But I'm sure it's very good! He's a good lecturer, anyway.