WI the Louisiana Purchase included militarly advisors?

The US standing army in 1803 wasn't small, it was miniscule. The whole army wouldn't make up a couple of french brigades. That said many of the officers and non-coms were quite good, the dragoons were quite professional, and the artillery even impressed the british. But most platoons were more the size of a corporals guard. Not many wanted to enlist and desertion was high, at least in the navy you might get prize money by capturing a pirate.

True, but, desertion is most often a symptom of poor dicipline and weak leadership. Better trained and educated officers and non-coms applying dicipline to the standing army would probably reduce the desertion rate, although, you make a good point about pay. Pay increases would have to be part of the re-organization of the army.

I saw the suggestion of free blacks to bolster the force and while from an ecconomic and socially progressive viewpoint, that would have served the country very well in many ways. However, we need to keep this within the unfortunate reality of the era and it's doubtful Jefferson or his political allies would ever support having "so many negroes under arms".

Christ, they'd probably use that exact phrasing in voicing their concerns.

Oh, yes. Fighting America will do Britain far more good than stopping Nappy in Spain.

Precisely my point!

The whole point of this exercise is based on my theory (from the Alternate Louisiana Purchase thread) that I always suspected at least part of Napoleone's motives for selling Louisianna to the U.S. was to create trouble for Britain elsewhere, siphoning forces that would otherwise be used against him to fight a war or series of wars in the Americas. Problem with that was the political and millitary reality of the U.S. of the era OTL.

Thus, I suggested a POD where Naps sends millitary advisors as part of the deal.

Between this thread and the other, I think the discussion has been greatly advanced towards an interesting and possibly plausible scenario.

Obviously, still needs some hashing out to one of two ends: either it could be a plausible scenario or it couldn't, but that's the whole point of these discussion threads, isn't it?

This discussion's been an excellent accademic exercise and excuse to brush up on the Napoleonic era beyond Europe at the very least.
 
So, would the British split their forces or leave Canada out to dry?

Depends on the dispositions of the U.S. and Britain at the end of the 1808 campaigning season.

If the U.S. is doing well, say:

Has siezed control of the Oregon.

Controls Upper Canada and the Great Lakes without much or any partisan fighting.

Has total control of Lake Champlaine.

Controls Fort St. Jean, Montreal and Trois Rivieres. [EDIT: and Quebec, they'd HAVE to control Quebec to bring the British to the table under any circumstances.]

Maintains a strong defensive position on the Maine/New Brunswick frontier.

And the navy and privateers on the high seas have:

Successfully blunted British attempts at blockade.

Have put a decent sized dent in British merchant shipping from the West Indies and British North America.

Then I could see the British possibly sending out peace feelers in winter 1808/09.

It's the American war aims in the first place that I could see creating such a scenario; the core of American demands would be:

Recompense for American property and ships siezed by the Britsh on the high seas.

The release of American nationals impressed into the service of the Royal Navy or recompense for American nationals impressed and killed in the service of the Royal Navy.

And

British recognition of American neutrality and the right of the U.S. to trade freely with both beligerents without interference.

Land concessions would probably be sought in two areas:

Upper Canada. Mainly beacuse of the decades long British arms trade with the tribes of the old northwest (and tacit British approval, even perhaps encouragement of those tribes to make war against American settlers) which had severely curbed American settlement of the region.

And

The Oregon. If the U.S. controls the Oregon, millitarily, they can pretty much dictate terms there that require the British to cede their claim to the territory. Spain and Russia still claim the territory, but it's only so much bluster as neither has any real presence in the region. The British were the only real rivals to the U.S. for control of the Oregon. Plus, if the U.S. controls both, they place Rupert's Land in a vice for probable future acquisition.

In return, the Americans withdraw from Lower Canada and cease attacks on British commercial shipping.

In that case, I think the British cut a deal and make peace. What have they really lost? Upper Canada and the Oregon. They still have Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the West Indies, far more valuable territory than what they've conceded. Plus they have guarentees of American neutrality and they're free to re-deploy BNA forces to Spain and the Netherlands to confront the real threat: Napoleone.

If the U.S. is doin poorly, maybe the Brits stretch it into 1809 to neutralize the "American threat". Don't know what British demands would be. I suppose it would depend on what they control and how firm that control is.
 
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Ah, but how is Napoleon doing with the British somewhat distracted in North America?

If they're still fighting Welsley, even with a smaller force, I still see Spain as a quagmire or bordering on quagmire. With the Royal Navy spread out on multiple fronts, I could see the Continental System seeming like an initial success though. So, say Naps is doing better in commerical and ecconomic affairs, but still in quite a messy war in Iberia.

Truthfully, I think that, regardless of other circumstances, once Naps put a wildly unpopular king of his chosing on the Spanish throne, he pretty much guarenteed a messy (and unnecessary) war on his own back porch.
 
I find it unlikely that Jefferson would endorse such a rampant expansion of the US Military ($$$!) given his record of fiscal conservatism...
 
The main reason Napoleon sold Louisiana was because if he didn't then the US was going to take it without paying and had already been quietly asking the British how London would feel about this.

After very little consideration the British strangely concluded that driving Napoleon from North America AND converting the US into an ally for a price to be paid by the French enemy was not a bad idea.:D
 
The main reason Napoleon sold Louisiana was because if he didn't then the US was going to take it without paying and had already been quietly asking the British how London would feel about this.

After very little consideration the British strangely concluded that driving Napoleon from North America AND converting the US into an ally for a price to be paid by the French enemy was not a bad idea.:D

I can understand how the Louisiana Purchase would get the French out of North America, but not how it would turn the US into a British Ally? I can see how it would engender a lot of good will toward the French however.
 
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67th Tigers

Banned
If they're still fighting Welsley, even with a smaller force, I still see Spain as a quagmire or bordering on quagmire. With the Royal Navy spread out on multiple fronts, I could see the Continental System seeming like an initial success though. So, say Naps is doing better in commerical and ecconomic affairs, but still in quite a messy war in Iberia.

Truthfully, I think that, regardless of other circumstances, once Naps put a wildly unpopular king of his chosing on the Spanish throne, he pretty much guarenteed a messy (and unnecessary) war on his own back porch.

Wellesley was commanding a fairly small force until quite late on. In mid 1809 there are in fact 4 striking forces:

Wellesey in Portugal with about 18,000 men (after deducting garrisons)
Drummond in Sicily with about 15,000 men (after deducting garrisons)
Beckwith in the Leeward Islands with about 10,000 men (after deducting some huge garrisons)

plus the force at home, 50,000 disposable effectives.

The force of Drummond (and Bentinck, his successor) was fairly static in strength, and twice sent an expeditionary force into Eastern Spain (1812 and 1813), Beckwith's force is static in strength after capturing all the French islands.

Wellesey is slowly reinforced, mostly from the forces at home, reaching something like 60,000 in 1813. His campaigns against Massena in 1811 are fought with only about 40,000, in 1812 he has about 50,000 and by 1813 he has 60,000.

If willing to write out Wallcheren, then Wellesley can still have his historical force in 1811, and the British can still spare a force of 30,000 men for America.
 
If willing to write out Wallcheren, then Wellesley can still have his historical force in 1811, and the British can still spare a force of 30,000 men for America.

This seems a pretty big if isn't it? I'm not comfortable in saying Napoleon's 1809 campaign would play out the same way, and if Napoleon has more forces available than his musings about partioning the Habsburg Empire look a lot more viable.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
This seems a pretty big if isn't it? I'm not comfortable in saying Napoleon's 1809 campaign would play out the same way, and if Napoleon has more forces available than his musings about partioning the Habsburg Empire look a lot more viable.

The politics leading to Walcheren are very convoluted and easy to disrupt. War with America would certainly do it, although they certainly wouldn't send 30,000. IMHO, with the forces available they send an expeditionary corps of ca. 15,000, becoming the 5 British Army in the field.

This assumes the British are sticking with their peripheral strategy. Some advocated a massive concentration and landing a massive force on the north German plains.

This is a good summary of the strategic situation:

Strategic_Situation_of_Europe_1809.jpg
 
This assumes the British are sticking with their peripheral strategy. Some advocated a massive concentration and landing a massive force on the north German plains.

Wait, but where are the British getting the massive force to deploy on the plains?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Wait, but where are the British getting the massive force to deploy on the plains?

Home and stripping some overseas forces.

The advocates of it suggested pulling the striking forces in Portugal and Sicily out for 30,000 men, then reinforcing with 50-60,000 from home, roughly matching the French Army of Germany in strength. This would place the entire disposable force in one place had it been carried out.

The problem is the lack of ability to ship enough horses to the continent, which means the cavalry and artillery will take forever to arrive, and fighting in that area is largely a case of long range striking power (artillery and cavalry).

Sense prevailed in the end though.
 
I'm sure the British also had a concern that Napoleon could and did take losses on a large scale repeatedly and still recover or even win the campaign but if the British lose a field army of 75,000 or more men London's resolve might not be as strong. And since such a risk, at a disadvantage in artillery and cavalry as 67th Tigers said, didn't need to be taken...why take it?


Aranfan, first, Jefferson and Madison both contacted the British, just in case this move became necessary and second, once the US has stolen France's largest(by far) property outside of Europe the US had better become an ally of the UK because the US is certainly Napoleon's enemy.
 
Aranfan, first, Jefferson and Madison both contacted the British, just in case this move became necessary and second, once the US has stolen France's largest(by far) property outside of Europe the US had better become an ally of the UK because the US is certainly Napoleon's enemy.

Then shouldn't London have been against France selling Louisiana to the US? Because then the US hadn't stolen anything, instead they had bought.
 
Oregon!?!? WTF? How is the US going to get forces to OREGON!? Something like the Lewis and Clark expedition, living off the land, sure. But a military force in the hundreds with presumably cannon, etc.?

The US seizing the Canadas and the maritimes is theoretically possible, but not very, due to the Jeffersonian total allergy to standing/national armies.


Depends on the dispositions of the U.S. and Britain at the end of the 1808 campaigning season.

If the U.S. is doing well, say:

Has siezed control of the Oregon.

Controls Upper Canada and the Great Lakes without much or any partisan fighting.

Has total control of Lake Champlaine.

Controls Fort St. Jean, Montreal and Trois Rivieres. [EDIT: and Quebec, they'd HAVE to control Quebec to bring the British to the table under any circumstances.]

Maintains a strong defensive position on the Maine/New Brunswick frontier.

And the navy and privateers on the high seas have:

Successfully blunted British attempts at blockade.

Have put a decent sized dent in British merchant shipping from the West Indies and British North America.

Then I could see the British possibly sending out peace feelers in winter 1808/09.

It's the American war aims in the first place that I could see creating such a scenario; the core of American demands would be:

Recompense for American property and ships siezed by the Britsh on the high seas.

The release of American nationals impressed into the service of the Royal Navy or recompense for American nationals impressed and killed in the service of the Royal Navy.

And

British recognition of American neutrality and the right of the U.S. to trade freely with both beligerents without interference.

Land concessions would probably be sought in two areas:

Upper Canada. Mainly beacuse of the decades long British arms trade with the tribes of the old northwest (and tacit British approval, even perhaps encouragement of those tribes to make war against American settlers) which had severely curbed American settlement of the region.

And

The Oregon. If the U.S. controls the Oregon, millitarily, they can pretty much dictate terms there that require the British to cede their claim to the territory. Spain and Russia still claim the territory, but it's only so much bluster as neither has any real presence in the region. The British were the only real rivals to the U.S. for control of the Oregon. Plus, if the U.S. controls both, they place Rupert's Land in a vice for probable future acquisition.

In return, the Americans withdraw from Lower Canada and cease attacks on British commercial shipping.

In that case, I think the British cut a deal and make peace. What have they really lost? Upper Canada and the Oregon. They still have Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the West Indies, far more valuable territory than what they've conceded. Plus they have guarentees of American neutrality and they're free to re-deploy BNA forces to Spain and the Netherlands to confront the real threat: Napoleone.

If the U.S. is doin poorly, maybe the Brits stretch it into 1809 to neutralize the "American threat". Don't know what British demands would be. I suppose it would depend on what they control and how firm that control is.
 
How much effort did Britain put into defending Canada from 1803-1815? I don't know for certain but wasn't Canadian militia mostly responsible for the defense? British strength wouldn't be evident in Canada so much as its ability to use the Royal Navy to amphibiously assault tender littoral areas. It seems if this is accurate then a greater US naval strength would be better than a stronger army. But then again maybe a stronger US Army deters Britain from landing troops.

Actually, at the beginning of the war, the Brits had 8125 troops in Canada, of which some 2000 were militia. The numbers steadily mounted during the war. Check out
 
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