WI: The League of The Three Emperors Retained?

[pattontank12]

The League of the Three Emperors was a political Alliance between The German Empire, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungary, lasting from 1873 to 1887. Was created by Otto Von Bismarck in the hopes of counteracting the threat of France and creating a peaceful Europe. Unfortunately it eventually broke down and dissolved, leading to the alliance system of ww1.

But what if the League hadn't fallen apart and lasted well into the 20th century, how would the general course of history had gone?

 

[Joshuapooleanox]

The League of the Three Emperors was a political Alliance between The German Empire, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungary, lasting from 1873 to 1887. Was created by Otto Von Bismarck in the hopes of counteracting the threat of France and creating a peaceful Europe. Unfortunately it eventually broke down and dissolved, leading to the alliance system of ww1.

But what if the League hadn't fallen apart and lasted well into the 20th century, how would the general course of history had gone?

Well, if that holds, then I say the Allies would lose. Austria-Hungary/Russia could defeat the Ottomans (If they even get involved, but if they did it would probably be allies)

Then the hordes descend on Western Europe. France/Britain wouldn't have the manpower to maintain themselves. Game over Cordiale.

 

[LordKalvan]

There is too much bad blood (Crimea in particular, but also the Polish insurrection of 1863) and too many mutually exclusive goals in the Balkans and in the Straits for A-H and Russia to stay in the same alliance. Even Bismarck - who was certainly not a rookie - was unable to keep them together with Germany in an alliance which would have been almost unbeatable. In the end he had to choose, and IMHO made the wrong pick (but that it's another story)

 

[JackLumber]

There is too much bad blood (Crimea in particular, but also the Polish insurrection of 1863) and too many mutually exclusive goals in the Balkans and in the Straits for A-H and Russia to stay in the same alliance. Even Bismarck - who was certainly not a rookie - was unable to keep them together with Germany in an alliance which would have been almost unbeatable. In the end he had to choose, and IMHO made the wrong pick (but that it's another story)

I'd disagree, Austria was the right pick the problem was letting relations with the British get so bad.

 

[Noblesse Oblige]

I'd disagree, Austria was the right pick the problem was letting relations with the British get so bad.

Though that would be blamed on by Wilhelm II, not Bismarck.

 

[JackLumber]

Though that would be blamed on by Wilhelm II, not Bismarck.

People tend to over simplify it that way, ole Willy certainly didn't help matters but really it came down to each party wanting something different from a potential alliance.
The Germans wanted something more binding and the British wanted something that would give them room to back out if they didn't like the situation an when the Anglo German talks fell through it only made sense for Britain to approach France.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

I'd disagree, Austria was the right pick the problem was letting relations with the British get so bad.

I certainly agree that the Habsburgs were the best choice for Germany, as opppossed to disunited and autocratic Russia.

 

[LordKalvan]

I'd disagree, Austria was the right pick the problem was letting relations with the British get so bad.

I certainly agree that the Habsburgs were the best choice for Germany, as opppossed to disunited and autocratic Russia.

The Prussian foreign policy - dating back to the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna - had more or less constantly being based on the Russian support against the Austrians. It had worked reasonably well, with the only exception of the Erfurt crisis which ended up with Prussia being humiliated at Olmutz, and it had become even more important once Bismarck got the chancellorship: the Prussian support to Russia at the time of the Polish insurrection of 1863 had been appreciated very much (Russia had become quite isolated in Europe after the repression) and the reinsurance treaty had been equally important for Prussia in 1866 (and - in minor measure - in 1870 too).
The League of the Three Emperors was a logical follow up, but the Europe of the last quarter of the 19th century was not the post-Vienna one, and the conflicting appetites in the Balkans would unavoidably pin Austrian interests against the Russian ones. Bismarck might have taken a middle way, in a sense, by keeping the alliance with Austria and at the same time renewing the reinsurance treaty with Russia: the problem however was with the big Prussian estates which were mainly producing wheat, and were resenting the cheap imports from Russia. The choice not to renew was "forced" by internal politics rather than diplomacy, but this does not make it the right one.

A-H did not bring any additional strength to the alliance (nor the expansion of the alliance to Italy produced any benefit), and its ambitions in the Balkans were not supported by an adequate strength. As a matter of fact, the weaker and more trouble A-H became, the more they felt pushed toward military adventures.

Damning Russia as a "disunited and oppressive" state might be acceptable, but not when compared with A-H: both of them were "disunited and oppressive".

 

[JackLumber]

The Prussian foreign policy - dating back to the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna - had more or less constantly being based on the Russian support against the Austrians. It had worked reasonably well, with the only exception of the Erfurt crisis which ended up with Prussia being humiliated at Olmutz, and it had become even more important once Bismarck got the chancellorship: the Prussian support to Russia at the time of the Polish insurrection of 1863 had been appreciated very much (Russia had become quite isolated in Europe after the repression) and the reinsurance treaty had been equally important for Prussia in 1866 (and - in minor measure - in 1870 too).
The League of the Three Emperors was a logical follow up, but the Europe of the last quarter of the 19th century was not the post-Vienna one, and the conflicting appetites in the Balkans would unavoidably pin Austrian interests against the Russian ones. Bismarck might have taken a middle way, in a sense, by keeping the alliance with Austria and at the same time renewing the reinsurance treaty with Russia: the problem however was with the big Prussian estates which were mainly producing wheat, and were resenting the cheap imports from Russia. The choice not to renew was "forced" by internal politics rather than diplomacy, but this does not make it the right one.

A-H did not bring any additional strength to the alliance (nor the expansion of the alliance to Italy produced any benefit), and its ambitions in the Balkans were not supported by an adequate strength. As a matter of fact, the weaker and more trouble A-H became, the more they felt pushed toward military adventures.

Damning Russia as a "disunited and oppressive" state might be acceptable, but not when compared with A-H: both of them were "disunited and oppressive".

This is mostly correct but you are ignoring something you yourself bring up, the 19th century was not the post Vienna one, prussia now leading Germany did not need Russia any longer.
Austria was the right choice because it had little chance of rising up to be a rival in the future, this was not true of the Russians.

 

[LordKalvan]

This is mostly correct but you are ignoring something you yourself bring up, the 19th century was not the post Vienna one, prussia now leading Germany did not need Russia any longer.
Austria was the right choice because it had little chance of rising up to be a rival in the future, this was not true of the Russians.

It may be that Germany didn't need Russia as much as Prussia did earlier on in the century, but it is certain that Russia was in a position to provide great potential benefits to the alliance, benefits which A-H was not capable of providing. The most obvious of these benefits would have been the certainty of non running the risk of a two-fronts war, but also the capacity of complementing the German industrial strength with the capacity of supplying raw materials and a huge market for export was nothing to sneeze about. I'm willing to acknowledge that it was a very far-sighted judgment call for an old Bismarck to make, and that overall the short-term benefits of solving an immediate internal problem was superficially attractive enough to lure him into making the wrong call. However I doubt that a Bismarck in his prime would have made the same mistake: if anything, the possible concern that Russia might one day in the future challenge the German dominance (a bit far-fetched in the 1880s) should have been another incentive to tie the Russians to the German chariot.

 

[JackLumber]

It may be that Germany didn't need Russia as much as Prussia did earlier on in the century, but it is certain that Russia was in a position to provide great potential benefits to the alliance, benefits which A-H was not capable of providing. The most obvious of these benefits would have been the certainty of non running the risk of a two-fronts war, but also the capacity of complementing the German industrial strength with the capacity of supplying raw materials and a huge market for export was nothing to sneeze about. I'm willing to acknowledge that it was a very far-sighted judgment call for an old Bismarck to make, and that overall the short-term benefits of solving an immediate internal problem was superficially attractive enough to lure him into making the wrong call. However I doubt that a Bismarck in his prime would have made the same mistake: if anything, the possible concern that Russia might one day in the future challenge the German dominance (a bit far-fetched in the 1880s) should have been another incentive to tie the Russians to the German chariot.

Germany proved in ww1 that the only thing it needed to win said two front war was to keep the British out if said war or better still on its side, Germany was better off allying its otl allys and keeping the British friendly than it would have been allying Russia opposed to AH.
Otl it did neither but had it done what you propose it would have to share Europe with Russia if it did whatvi propose it has all of Europe to itself.

 

[LordKalvan]

Germany proved in ww1 that the only thing it needed to win said two front war was to keep the British out if said war or better still on its side, Germany was better off allying its otl allys and keeping the British friendly than it would have been allying Russia opposed to AH.
Otl it did neither but had it done what you propose it would have to share Europe with Russia if it did whatvi propose it has all of Europe to itself.

Germany proved in WW1 (and in WW2, but WW1 was the more important) that they didn't know how to choose their allies, and that the diplomatic skills that had allowed Bismarck to unify all of Germany in just 10 years and with three short and sweet wars had been sadly lost.
It also proved that by spurning Russia in favor of A-H had given to France the only reasonable chance to find a major ally in Europe.
Not a great record.

 

[Diego]

Germany proved in ww1 that the only thing it needed to win said two front war was to keep the British out if said war or better still on its side, Germany was better off allying its otl allys and keeping the British friendly than it would have been allying Russia opposed to AH.
Otl it did neither but had it done what you propose it would have to share Europe with Russia if it did whatvi propose it has all of Europe to itself.

Agreed, it is never a good thing to have a superpower as your neighbour. You can ask Mexico or Poland about that... they have experience to share.

 

[JackLumber]

Germany proved in WW1 (and in WW2, but WW1 was the more important) that they didn't know how to choose their allies, and that the diplomatic skills that had allowed Bismarck to unify all of Germany in just 10 years and with three short and sweet wars had been sadly lost.
It also proved that by spurning Russia in favor of A-H had given to France the only reasonable chance to find a major ally in Europe.
Not a great record.

I never said they did have good diplomacy, quite the opposite im telling you they made a critical mistake turning away the British.
My point is simple and you have failed to refute it
Germany can beat Russia and France with it's otl allies all it needs is to keep the british out, so why split Europe with Russia when they can dominate all of it?

 

[raharris1973]

I never said they did have good diplomacy, quite the opposite im telling you they made a critical mistake turning away the British.
My point is simple and you have failed to refute it
Germany can beat Russia and France with it's otl allies all it needs is to keep the british out, so why split Europe with Russia when they can dominate all of it?

Agreed that Britain was the worst enemy to have, and Germany could have won without her as an enemy. However, when it comes to WWI, "the only winning move is not to play", and picking Russia over A-H means no WWI plain and simple.

 

[JackLumber]

Agreed that Britain was the worst enemy to have, and Germany could have won without her as an enemy. However, when it comes to WWI, "the only winning move is not to play", and picking Russia over A-H means no WWI plain and simple.

I'd say that's true of the otl far but perhaps not about one that doesn't involve the Brits.

 

[LordKalvan]

I never said they did have good diplomacy, quite the opposite im telling you they made a critical mistake turning away the British.
My point is simple and you have failed to refute it
Germany can beat Russia and France with it's otl allies all it needs is to keep the british out, so why split Europe with Russia when they can dominate all of it?

Why in a German-Russian alliance would they split Europe? If you're thinking of the Balkans, it is exactly what happened IOTL (and Bismarck's quip "the Balkans are not worth the life of a single Pomeranian grenadier" was said seriously).
Any alliance with the British not only will not last (too many contrasting interests) but will never start, as a matter of fact. The British Empire in the last decades of the 19th century is not looking for binding alliances or for entanglements; certainly not for an alliance which would recognize Germany as the hegemon of Europe.

 

[JackLumber]

Why in a German-Russian alliance would they split Europe? If you're thinking of the Balkans, it is exactly what happened IOTL (and Bismarck's quip "the Balkans are not worth the life of a single Pomeranian grenadier" was said seriously).
Any alliance with the British not only will not last (too many contrasting interests) but will never start, as a matter of fact. The British Empire in the last decades of the 19th century is not looking for binding alliances or for entanglements; certainly not for an alliance which would recognize Germany as the hegemon of Europe.

Okay will explain it to you then
Should Russia fully modernize it would be stronger than Germany which means Germany is forced to share influence in Europe with the Russians.
Should the Germans secure British neutrality for a ww1 analog they are then poised to smash the French and start carving up the Russian Empire into client states and puppets.
In the latter situation Germany dominates the whole of Europe and it really don't matter if the British are happy about it because there will be nothing they can do about it, after the war will be too late and prior to the war it wouldn't be hard to convince them that the French Russian alliance was the greater threat to them.

 

[LordKalvan]

Okay will explain it to you then
<snip>

You're really too kind.
However I'd prefer to consider this a classic case where agree-to-disagree is the only rational endgame

 

[JackLumber]

You're really too kind.
However I'd prefer to consider this a classic case where agree-to-disagree is the only rational endgame

Oh well, can't win'em all