WI the High Seas Fleet Doesn't Mutiny in 1918?

SsgtC

Banned
Ok, so we all know the ultimate outcome: the HSF is destroyed with massive casualties. They were outnumbered two to one and the British had a huge quality advantage as well.

But what kind of damage does the Grand Fleet take in the process of killing the German Navy? How many ships will the British, American and Australian navies lose during the battle (either sunk or written off as a total constructive loss after)? How do the various squadrons perform? This last I'm really curious about as, depending on the maneuvers ordered, the American 9th BatDiv could end up in the van and undergo their baptism by fire in the naval battle of the war.

And would there be any longer term butterflies of this? Would the Wiemar Republic still arise seeing as a key event in it's formation was the Kiel Mutiny? And what lessons would the British and American navies learn from this battle?
 
The British also had fixed their problems with shell penetration and ammunition handling that had hurt them badly at Jutland. Bad shells probably cost them several kills, and sloppy ammunition handling definitely contributed to the loss of three British BCs.

Germany doing significant damage to the Grand Fleet would probably depend on them finally pulling off the "station U-Boats to ambush the battle fleet as it sorties to intercept us" trick that they'd been trying for practically the entire war, like Bullwinkle trying to pull a rabbit out of his hat. Maybe this time they'd pull it off, but their track record isn't promising.
 
The British also had fixed their problems with shell penetration and ammunition handling that had hurt them badly at Jutland. Bad shells probably cost them several kills, and sloppy ammunition handling definitely contributed to the loss of three British BCs
Mostly fixed by 1918?

Germany doing significant damage to the Grand Fleet would probably depend on them finally pulling off the "station U-Boats to ambush the battle fleet as it sorties to intercept us" trick that they'd been trying for practically the entire war, like Bullwinkle trying to pull a rabbit out of his hat. Maybe this time they'd pull it off, but their track record isn't promising.
Kind of hard when RN is reading your radio codes.....
 
Unless the HSF manages to sink half the Grand fleet without any losses themselves - which I consider to be incredibly unlikely to the point of ASB - then regardless of Entente losses the HSF is still going to have been (in their eyes) sent 'to get murdered' and this is likely to - if anything - increase the likelihood of a mutiny.

Morale wise in 1918 the Grand fleet was at an all time high with men on the sick rolls at an all time low (no one wanted to miss the big fight) - the issues identified after Jutland had been resolved or mitigated to a large degree

As for losses etc that is hard to say - but I suspect that any 1918 clash will follow the same old formula, with the HSF sneaking out of port thinking the Entente does not know only to be 'ambushed again' by the Grand Fleet taking a kicking and running for the Jade

If 9th Batdiv/6th Squadron was in the Van for whatever reason (ie the fleet executes a turnaround manovre and this places the US Ships in the lead rather than at the rear) then things could get interesting for them.

Depending on when this battle takes place - depends on how well they do.

Before summer 1918 the US Ships were struggling to match the British ships particularly in gunnery but by June after 6 months of training they had started to close the gap

The main danger I think is the Squadron being caught on its own on a convoy mission (to Norway?) particularly earlier in 1918 and getting over matched by 1 or 2 German Squadrons before the Grand fleet can arrive - but again while this did happen once on a small scale in 1917 were 2 German light Cruisers annihilated a Scandinavian convoy escorted by 2 DDs (Action off Lerwick) we are unlikely to see a larger fleet managing to to do this.
 
Mostly fixed by 1918?

The "greenboy" shells were specifically designed in response to post-battle analysis of Jutland, with harder armour-piercing caps, better fuzes, and a more stable explosive charge. They started getting delivered to the fleet in April 1918, and had completely replaced the fleet's AP shell inventory by the time of the OTL Armistice. Here's a good article on the shells.

The ammunition handling practices had also been identified as a problem by the Admiralty in the immediate aftermath of Jutland, although Jellicoe and Beatty both insisted the problem has been the thickness of the BCs' deck armour. And Beatty was still in command of the Grand Fleet, so I'm not sure if he would have implemented the Admiralty's recommendations.

Kind of hard when RN is reading your radio codes.....

Yes, that's one of the big reasons they kept failing. The other is that the ocean is a big place, WW1-vintage U-Boats were a lot slower than surface warships, and the RN was aware of the danger and took precautions around obvious choke-points, so a successful ambush requires really good guesswork and a fair bit of luck.
 
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