WI: The Great War results in a stalemate

There are a lot of TLs on AH about a Central powers victory, or perhaps even a quicker Entente victory in the Great War. But I had something different in mind.

What if the Great War dragged on for even longer than it did, grinding down Britain, France and Germany and causing unrest everywhere? What if, after years of bitter, bloody warfare battered powers agreed to status quo anti bellum? This does not include the Eastern Front, which would be a clear German Victory as OTL.

The POD would be no later than January 1, 1915. How would all of this affect Europe?

Germany would likely suffer through the same revolutions and starvation problems. Likely, we would find a German republic negotiating peace with the Entente. A disintegrating Austria would merge with this new German Republic. Politicans would try to convince the German people that overall The Great War was overall a victory for Germany, because of the defeat of Russia. If they are smart, we could easily see a German-dominated Eastern Europe.

France would not be happy. Basically, they lost a generation, and would probably perceive the war as a loss because they failed to limit Germany. There would be a lot of resentment.

Great Britain would recover and eventually accept the fact they no longer dominate Europe like they used to. Nobody's happy about the war, but at least we didn't lose.

Russia would be all kinds of hell. Germany might try to get involved in its civil wars, and who knows how that could turn out. There would be even more resentment here, as it seems to Russia its allies had abandoned her.

What do you think would happen? Is a total stalemate even feasible, or would someone win out eventually?
 
Whoops, meant to post this in After 1900. I'm intelligent, I swear.

Is there any way to move it or would I have to ask some mods?
 
I don't think it could have continued much longer than it did in OTL. Germany was on the verge of starvation and the Entente only kept going as long as they did through US loans and the promise of fresh soldiers from the US.
 
I'm afraid I strongly disagree with the prediction of a German republic. IOTL the fall of the Kaiserreich was because of two reasons: outright revolution caused mostly by the Kaiserreich continuing to fight at a point when it was clear that utter defeat was inevitable, and Emperor Wilhelm II abdicating largely because it was dictated to him by the Entente powers at the point of the sword. For future reference, you perhaps ought to know that the German soldiers returning home from WW1 tended to remain solidly loyal to the Kaiserreich and regarded even capitalist republican revolutionaries, let alone the much-hated communists, as "rats" and "traitors" and treated them with extreme cruelty. Unless German defeat is already assured, the Kaiserreich isn't going anywhere.

I doubt that either side would give up out of exhaustion in any TL with the war going roughly as it did IOTL: both sides hated each other too much to accept anything but victory, and there was no point when one side didn't think it had a crucial advantage and needed only to wait to secure the much-desired victory (the Central Powers before the American intervention and the Entente powers after it). Perhaps if you reduce several of the grand offensives, including the early ones, and turn the war into a much less bloody affair, this might not be the case, although that'll be difficult given the pre-war mentalities of general staffs on both sides.

{edit} As one should also note, the status quo ante bellum would be a defeat for France from the perspective of virtually everyone, as what the French regarded as the legitimate status quo for international borders was the status quo ante the previous bellum, i.e. they wanted Alsace-Lorraine to be reunited with France. There's no solution that satisfies/dissatisfies the French and Germans equally unless Alsace-Lorraine is partitioned, and it's tricky how to achieve that.
 
I'm afraid I strongly disagree with the prediction of a German republic. IOTL the fall of the Kaiserreich was because of two reasons: outright revolution caused mostly by the Kaiserreich continuing to fight at a point when it was clear that utter defeat was inevitable, and Emperor Wilhelm II abdicating largely because it was dictated to him by the Entente powers at the point of the sword. For future reference, you perhaps ought to know that the German soldiers returning home from WW1 tended to remain solidly loyal to the Kaiserreich and regarded even capitalist republican revolutionaries, let alone the much-hated communists, as "rats" and "traitors" and treated them with extreme cruelty. Unless German defeat is already assured, the Kaiserreich isn't going anywhere.

I doubt that either side would give up out of exhaustion in any TL with the war going roughly as it did IOTL: both sides hated each other too much to accept anything but victory, and there was no point when one side didn't think it had a crucial advantage and needed only to wait to secure the much-desired victory (the Central Powers before the American intervention and the Entente powers after it). Perhaps if you reduce several of the grand offensives, including the early ones, and turn the war into a much less bloody affair, this might not be the case, although that'll be difficult given the pre-war mentalities of general staffs on both sides.

{edit} As one should also note, the status quo ante bellum would be a defeat for France from the perspective of virtually everyone, as what the French regarded as the legitimate status quo for international borders was the status quo ante the previous bellum, i.e. they wanted Alsace-Lorraine to be reunited with France. There's no solution that satisfies/dissatisfies the French and Germans equally unless Alsace-Lorraine is partitioned, and it's tricky how to achieve that.

It is a very tricky scenario to achieve, it's true. The Germans would have to feel like they couldn't eventually break through and take Paris, which was the belief throughout most of the war. France would have to feel as though they could never win, and Great Britain would have to feel even more so. What if the war stretched on into 1919 or even longer, 1920 or 1921, without either side seeming to achieve anything?

About Germany and the Republic: The revolutions may not happen quite as quickly or aggressively with a stalemate, but the roots were still there, and a war-weary populace could still have some sort of uprising. However, to say they were to create a German Republic is something of a leap, I'm realizing now. Something might have gone down, but toppling the regime is a stretch.
 
It is a very tricky scenario to achieve, it's true. The Germans would have to feel like they couldn't eventually break through and take Paris, which was the belief throughout most of the war. France would have to feel as though they could never win, and Great Britain would have to feel even more so. What if the war stretched on into 1919 or even longer, 1920 or 1921, without either side seeming to achieve anything?

The thing is, even if one side wanted peace it's difficult to imagine that it would have been willing to offer a peace that the other would have regarded as acceptable. I don't think the French government was politically capable of giving up its claim to Alsace-Lorraine under virtually any conditions, whereas for the German government to give up Alsace-Lorraine is even less likely than that; even most German socialists hated it, and as for everyone to the right of them, they'd be apoplectic.

I don't think a peace with OTL conditions is realistically possible; there was too much hatred by then. I'd hazard that you need a complicating factor to make it not OTL conditions, be it less bloody battles (as I previously proposed) or something more radical such as a common enemy, presumably communist revolutionaries, mass rebellion in their colonies or a combination of the two.

About Germany and the Republic: The revolutions may not happen quite as quickly or aggressively with a stalemate, but the roots were still there, and a war-weary populace could still have some sort of uprising. However, to say they were to create a German Republic is something of a leap, I'm realizing now. Something might have gone down, but toppling the regime is a stretch.

I'm afraid I don't think this is supported by the historical evidence. In fact the German people weren't nearly as war-weary as modern progressive sensibilities might make us =think. The German revolution was spurred by the continuation of the war at a time when it was completely obvious that defeat was inevitable, specifically the idea of sending out the High Seas Fleet to fight the British Grand Fleet (an idea which anyone who could count knew was suicide); the mere continuation of war wasn't so extremely unpopular. Even then, there was a massive nationalist backlash against the "traitors" (republican revolutionaries) and the Army's opinion of them, for all that we might like to think otherwise, was murderous; if not for Germany's surrender and the abdication of Wilhelm II, I'd hazard that the revolution would have been crushed fairly quickly, with a great deal of popular support.
 
I'm afraid I strongly disagree with the prediction of a German republic. IOTL the fall of the Kaiserreich was because of two reasons: outright revolution caused mostly by the Kaiserreich continuing to fight at a point when it was clear that utter defeat was inevitable, and Emperor Wilhelm II abdicating largely because it was dictated to him by the Entente powers at the point of the sword.

I question some of these assertions.

First, Wilhelm II did not abdicate because the Entente dictated that to him. He "abdicated" when he learned that his own Chancellor Max von Baden had already publicly announced Wilhelm II had abdicated the throne, and the SPD took over the government. This was done on November 9, 1918 before the armistice. Von Baden knew that popular resentment against the Kaiser meant the survival of the monarchy was in doubt, and originally asked for his abdication earlier. Wilhelm's refusal to do so likely doomed the possibility any member of the Hohenzollern could resume the throne.

Now while some of this was due to popular imagination that the Kaiser was an obstacle to a quick peace with the Allies, I think it is telling that events moved so quickly that not even a constitutional monarchy could be saved.

For future reference, you perhaps ought to know that the German soldiers returning home from WW1 tended to remain solidly loyal to the Kaiserreich and regarded even capitalist republican revolutionaries, let alone the much-hated communists, as "rats" and "traitors" and treated them with extreme cruelty. Unless German defeat is already assured, the Kaiserreich isn't going anywhere.

Second, while there was undoubtedly a large number of former soldiers who held conservative views, the vast majority of the German army were probably voters of the SPD and supported the republic.

Germany had maybe 11 million in arms during World War I. The Freikorps numbered in the thousands, and most of them were men recruited after the war from people who had not actually served, but wanted to see some action. Most of the veterans just went home. Even the Stahlhelm numbered only half a million. Despite popular supprot for Hindenburg as President, the conservative parties only held about 15-20% of the vote in the Reichstag elections of the 1920s. SPD consistently got between 20-25%, the Catholic Centre 15%, other moderate parties around 10%,a nd the KPD 10%. There does not seem to be overwhelming mass support for the conservatives which were essentially the people who would have supported the monarchy.

In November 1918 General Wilhelm Groener, who replaced Ludendorff, told Wilhelm II that the men would march back in good order under Hindenburg's command, but would not fight to restore Wilhelm II to the throne. An odd thing to say if the army was such a bastion of support.

The fact is the Hohenzollern monarchy saw eroded support throughout World War One even before the defeat in 1918. People were not happy with the Kaiser. In 1915, Wilhelm II was peeved that Hindenburg was so popular. Imagery of the two meeting presented Hindenburg as being reverent to the Kaiser. By 1917, his courtiers were demanding Wilhelm II be seen to support Hindenburg in order to shore up his own shoddy status. When they met now, imagery showed the Kaiser in a more subservient position to his own general.


A German Republic is not necessarily guaranteed in a stalemate scenario, but there were large revolutionary forces in Germany by 1918. An inability to win the war is going to put a lot of pressure of any government. The most likely result is a constitutional monarchy that is a republic in all but name where the Kaiser is a figurehead, and most likely the Crown Prince with Wilhelm shuffled off to retirement. But a republic is a strong possibility.
 
The thing is, even if one side wanted peace it's difficult to imagine that it would have been willing to offer a peace that the other would have regarded as acceptable. I don't think the French government was politically capable of giving up its claim to Alsace-Lorraine under virtually any conditions, whereas for the German government to give up Alsace-Lorraine is even less likely than that; even most German socialists hated it, and as for everyone to the right of them, they'd be apoplectic.

I don't think a peace with OTL conditions is realistically possible; there was too much hatred by then. I'd hazard that you need a complicating factor to make it not OTL conditions, be it less bloody battles (as I previously proposed) or something more radical such as a common enemy, presumably communist revolutionaries, mass rebellion in their colonies or a combination of the two.



I'm afraid I don't think this is supported by the historical evidence. In fact the German people weren't nearly as war-weary as modern progressive sensibilities might make us =think. The German revolution was spurred by the continuation of the war at a time when it was completely obvious that defeat was inevitable, specifically the idea of sending out the High Seas Fleet to fight the British Grand Fleet (an idea which anyone who could count knew was suicide); the mere continuation of war wasn't so extremely unpopular. Even then, there was a massive nationalist backlash against the "traitors" (republican revolutionaries) and the Army's opinion of them, for all that we might like to think otherwise, was murderous; if not for Germany's surrender and the abdication of Wilhelm II, I'd hazard that the revolution would have been crushed fairly quickly, with a great deal of popular support.

My idea for the German revolution was something thrown out with only basic knowledge of; after looking at the situation a bit more (ie google), I'm starting to see your point.

If neither side were to accept peace (I never said it had to be right away), and neither side were making gains (ie Italian front stabilizes, Western Front just stacks body counts) how long could the war realistically go on? After 10 years at war, would there still be no talks of peace?
 
My idea for the German revolution was something thrown out with only basic knowledge of; after looking at the situation a bit more (ie google), I'm starting to see your point.

If neither side were to accept peace (I never said it had to be right away), and neither side were making gains (ie Italian front stabilizes, Western Front just stacks body counts) how long could the war realistically go on? After 10 years at war, would there still be no talks of peace?

No way is it going to last ten years. Even into 1920 is probably ASB. Someone would run out of steam long before then.

As for talk of peace, the question is who asks for it first. Whoever does will be seen as having conceded defeat, and morale will crumble. Max of Baden warned the High Command of this when they demanded an immediate armistice, but as a mere civilian his objections were brushed aside.

The Entente, if anything, has even less freedom of manoeuvre. Germany is in occupation of huge chunks of enemy territory, and might at least try to present itself as making an offer from a position of strength. If the Entente seek peace while still unable to dislodge the Germans from their territory, that will be seen as defeat pure and simple. And when the troops (and civilians) despair of beating the enemy, things will unravel fast.

Neither side will seriously talk compromise until they totally despair of winning, and by then it will be too late. If heads is an Entente win and tails a CP win, a stalemate is equivalent to the coin standing on edge - and about as likely.
 
I question some of these assertions.

First, Wilhelm II did not abdicate because the Entente dictated that to him. He "abdicated" when he learned that his own Chancellor Max von Baden had already publicly announced Wilhelm II had abdicated the throne, and the SPD took over the government. This was done on November 9, 1918 before the armistice. Von Baden knew that popular resentment against the Kaiser meant the survival of the monarchy was in doubt, and originally asked for his abdication earlier. Wilhelm's refusal to do so likely doomed the possibility any member of the Hohenzollern could resume the throne.

Now while some of this was due to popular imagination that the Kaiser was an obstacle to a quick peace with the Allies, I think it is telling that events moved so quickly that not even a constitutional monarchy could be saved.

And the large enemy armies bearing down on Germany that held Wilhelm II personally responsible for just about everything under the sun had nothing to do with this? I'm happy to take your word for it, but it doesn't seem to me to materially change things. Either way, it's not the sort of thing that could easily have happened without the war already lost in all but name.

Second, while there was undoubtedly a large number of former soldiers who held conservative views, the vast majority of the German army were probably voters of the SPD and supported the republic.

Germany had maybe 11 million in arms during World War I. The Freikorps numbered in the thousands, and most of them were men recruited after the war from people who had not actually served, but wanted to see some action. Most of the veterans just went home. Even the Stahlhelm numbered only half a million.

This I can't support. Just look at how the soldiers (yes, including the Freikorps fellows) talked about the revolution and acted in it; there's plenty of evidence in (if I recall correctly) The Coming of the Third Reich, which argues that the Army was mostly conservative royalist and profoundly disliked the revolutionaries.

Despite popular supprot for Hindenburg as President, the conservative parties only held about 15-20% of the vote in the Reichstag elections of the 1920s. SPD consistently got between 20-25%, the Catholic Centre 15%, other moderate parties around 10%,a nd the KPD 10%. There does not seem to be overwhelming mass support for the conservatives which were essentially the people who would have supported the monarchy.

Mass support in the general population, OK. The Army did not hold identical views to the general population.

Also: by that time it was obvious that the monarchy was deposed and unlikely to come back. There were plenty of parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Zentrum, that accepted the new republican status quo but hadn't greatly tried to get rid of the royalist status quo in the time of the Kaiserreich.

Also: the opinions of even the general public were not the same before and after it became clear that Germany's defeat was sure.

In November 1918 General Wilhelm Groener, who replaced Ludendorff, told Wilhelm II that the men would march back in good order under Hindenburg's command, but would not fight to restore Wilhelm II to the throne. An odd thing to say if the army was such a bastion of support.

I don't think it impossible for a general to mistake the will of his men—in particular since that era was not exactly one to inspire optimism on the part of German generals.

The fact is the Hohenzollern monarchy saw eroded support throughout World War One even before the defeat in 1918. People were not happy with the Kaiser. In 1915, Wilhelm II was peeved that Hindenburg was so popular. Imagery of the two meeting presented Hindenburg as being reverent to the Kaiser. By 1917, his courtiers were demanding Wilhelm II be seen to support Hindenburg in order to shore up his own shoddy status. When they met now, imagery showed the Kaiser in a more subservient position to his own general.

I'm perfectly happy to believe you on this point, nor do I think I've disputed it. Where I don't believe you is that this was also the case in the Army, not just in the population at large, since it contradicts what I've read before.

A German Republic is not necessarily guaranteed in a stalemate scenario, but there were large revolutionary forces in Germany by 1918. An inability to win the war is going to put a lot of pressure of any government. The most likely result is a constitutional monarchy that is a republic in all but name where the Kaiser is a figurehead, and most likely the Crown Prince with Wilhelm shuffled off to retirement. But a republic is a strong possibility.

Which democratic capitalist republicans, or indeed democratic capitalist royalists, were there in Germany seriously agitating for violent revolution in the First World War before German defeat was obvious? When the chips were down IOTL the Germans who held that sort of ideology were remarkably loyal to the established government whether it was imperial, Weimar or even Nazi, and tended to side against any prospect of violent revolution. Unless you think that Wilhelm II is going to concede things without being forced to, this argument doesn't seem to hold. Either Wilhelm II remains in power or he is deposed by force by far-left socialists of some kind, and in the latter scenario the public will rally against them; there simply wasn't sufficient support for them to be able to pull it off.

If you don't mind, I would also like you to explain which revolutionary forces there were that were so large before German defeat was clear and the imperial government started pulling shenanigans like the sending of the fleet.


Agreed in entirety.
 
Agreed in entirety.

Thanks.

This, incidentally, is one reason (though not the only one) why I can never take seriously the attempts made from time to time to downplay the importance of US intervention in 1917. It was absolutely crucial.

Previously, with the CPs in possession of major chunks of their territory, the Entente needed a battlefield victory to dislodge them. The alternative would be a peace conference at which the CP held all the best bargaining chips. A military stalemate would in effect be a CP victory. The CP needed only to hold their ground until the Entente despaired of regaining it.

After April 6, 1917, this situation was reversed. From now on, it was the Entente who needed only to "hang in there". They had only to avoid a battlefield defeat, and sooner or later, as American power was mobilised, the CP would be crushed by sheer weight of manpower and material.

This duly happened. There was admittedly a hairy moment in March/April 1918 when it looked as if the Entente might spoil that perfect symmetry by snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. However, Ludendorff made enough mistakes of his own to balance out those of his opponents, and things continued on their predictable course.
 
Thanks.

This, incidentally, is one reason (though not the only one) why I can never take seriously the attempts made from time to time to downplay the importance of US intervention in 1917. It was absolutely crucial.

Previously, with the CPs in possession of major chunks of their territory, the Entente needed a battlefield victory to dislodge them. The alternative would be a peace conference at which the CP held all the best bargaining chips. A military stalemate would in effect be a CP victory. The CP needed only to hold their ground until the Entente despaired of regaining it.

After April 6, 1917, this situation was reversed. From now on, it was the Entente who needed only to "hang in there". They had only to avoid a battlefield defeat, and sooner or later, as American power was mobilised, the CP would be crushed by sheer weight of manpower and material.

This duly happened. There was admittedly a hairy moment in March/April 1918 when it looked as if the Entente might spoil that perfect symmetry by snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. However, Ludendorff made enough mistakes of his own to balance out those of his opponents, and things continued on their predictable course.

Reasonable summary.

Left field "what if"? What if the Americans were to suffer HUGE casulaties in Europe - say if the Germans did not press the Spring offensives as hard and the 100 Days offensives suffered Somme level casualties particulaly on the Americans.

Could Wilson be prepared to modify the 14 points to be truly based on self-determination e.g. allow a plebicite in Al;sace Lorraine as well?

France would be livid but if Wilson is holding the purse strings could war weariness / apathy on the American side achieve a negotiated stalemate.
 
And the large enemy armies bearing down on Germany that held Wilhelm II personally responsible for just about everything under the sun had nothing to do with this? I'm happy to take your word for it, but it doesn't seem to me to materially change things. Either way, it's not the sort of thing that could easily have happened without the war already lost in all but name.



This I can't support. Just look at how the soldiers (yes, including the Freikorps fellows) talked about the revolution and acted in it; there's plenty of evidence in (if I recall correctly) The Coming of the Third Reich, which argues that the Army was mostly conservative royalist and profoundly disliked the revolutionaries.
If you would actually take a close look on the November revolution, you can see, that even guard regiments declined to shoot on revolutionary soldiers. Yes at that time the war was already lost, but if you have a stalemate, the ordinary soldier will already thinkt the war to be lost. The aggressively anticommunist Freikorps only really got started, after the SPD took over and where used to fight communist outliers of the already succesfull revolution

Mass support in the general population, OK. The Army did not hold identical views to the general population.

Also: by that time it was obvious that the monarchy was deposed and unlikely to come back. There were plenty of parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Zentrum, that accepted the new republican status quo but hadn't greatly tried to get rid of the royalist status quo in the time of the Kaiserreich.
All parties radicalised in WW I. The SPD accepted a bourgeois republic, but you couldn't get them to accept a Monarchy. And the army may not have hold the same views as the population, but the soldiers did. A stalemate still means, that the kaiser got millions of soldiers for exactly nothing killed.
Also: the opinions of even the general public were not the same before and after it became clear that Germany's defeat was sure.



Which democratic capitalist republicans, or indeed democratic capitalist royalists, were there in Germany seriously agitating for violent revolution in the First World War before German defeat was obvious? When the chips were down IOTL the Germans who held that sort of ideology were remarkably loyal to the established government whether it was imperial, Weimar or even Nazi, and tended to side against any prospect of violent revolution. Unless you think that Wilhelm II is going to concede things without being forced to, this argument doesn't seem to hold. Either Wilhelm II remains in power or he is deposed by force by far-left socialists of some kind, and in the latter scenario the public will rally against them; there simply wasn't sufficient support for them to be able to pull it off.
IOTL Wilhelm II got deposed by conservative who wanted to save their own hides and join with the moderate left. If they wouldn't have done so he would be deposed by the left. 1918 no soldiers, only officers were willing to fight against the revolting soldiers. You think a longer war would make them more willing to fight their brothers in arms? 1918 Willhem II was pretty much powerless, no great revolution is needed to get rid of him, a large revolt is enough.
If you don't mind, I would also like you to explain which revolutionary forces there were that were so large before German defeat was clear and the imperial government started pulling shenanigans like the sending of the fleet.
It is not the sure defeat, which started the revolts. It was generals and admirals throwing away lives without a chance to actually achieve some kind of victory. This is exactly the szenario, that you need for a stalemate. Both sides don't have any chance to win and still keep on fighting. If one regiment, or a part of the fleet has enough the whle card house is going down. The only chance for Wilhelm II is, if the french start revolting first and even then I would want to bet on him.
 
If you would actually take a close look on the November revolution, you can see, that even guard regiments declined to shoot on revolutionary soldiers. Yes at that time the war was already lost, but if you have a stalemate, the ordinary soldier will already thinkt the war to be lost. The aggressively anticommunist Freikorps only really got started, after the SPD took over and where used to fight communist outliers of the already succesfull revolution

Soldiers refusing to fire on other soldiers, I'm happy to believe you. It certainly didn't stop them from being happy to fire on civilian revolutionaries.

All parties radicalised in WW I. The SPD accepted a bourgeois republic, but you couldn't get them to accept a Monarchy.

Given that we're talking about the point in time when the war had gone on for ages and ages but before the time when German defeat was already clear… citation needed. I know of no major attempt at violent revolution from the Social Democrats against the imperial government before that time, even though the war had gone on for a very long time and had been very destructive. Quite possibly I'm wrong, but I'd like proof of it, please.

And the army may not have hold the same views as the population, but the soldiers did. A stalemate still means, that the kaiser got millions of soldiers for exactly nothing killed.

The Kaiser had already got lots of soldiers killed. If you were contending that there was plenty of tendency to mutiny in the French Army, I'd believe you. In the German Army (again, let me stress, before the near-certainty of defeat came around) I wouldn't be so confident.

You can talk for as long as you like about the motives which you deduce that WW1 German soldiers would have had, but the fact of the matter, so far as I know, is that they didn't rebel against Wilhelm II in any appreciable number in the time-period we're talking about. Again: if you provide evidence that contradicts me on this point I'm happy to retract what I've said on it.

IOTL Wilhelm II got deposed by conservative who wanted to save their own hides and join with the moderate left. If they wouldn't have done so he would be deposed by the left.

For the idea that there were large-scale revolutionary movements in any major part of German society except the very-poorly-supported far left in the time-period we're talking about… citation needed.

1918 no soldiers, only officers were willing to fight against the revolting soldiers. You think a longer war would make them more willing to fight their brothers in arms?

No, but there's a factor you're missing. Being sent to fight in a war that you still think is winnable is a very, very different proposition to being sent to fight in one that you're pretty sure you're going to lose (most famously the sending of the High Seas Fleet, but pretty broadly anything after it became clear that the great 1918 offensive was going down the toilet). IOTL sheer attrition and lots of deaths did not, on their own, prove enough to cause mass revolution in Germany; the continuation of the war in the face of defeat did.

As appears to be becoming a mantra: give me evidence that contradicts me and I'm happy to retract what I've said. I have not, however, seen such evidence from you.

1918 Willhem II was pretty much powerless, no great revolution is needed to get rid of him, a large revolt is enough.
It is not the sure defeat, which started the revolts. It was generals and admirals throwing away lives without a chance to actually achieve some kind of victory. This is exactly the szenario, that you need for a stalemate. Both sides don't have any chance to win and still keep on fighting. If one regiment, or a part of the fleet has enough the whle card house is going down.

Wilhelm II personally, to a great extent yes, but the entire social order of the Kaiserreich?

It is not the sure defeat, which started the revolts. It was generals and admirals throwing away lives without a chance to actually achieve some kind of victory.

"Without a chance to actually achieve some kind of victory". Yes. First you contradict me, and after that you highlight the very point I've been trying to make: it's a very different proposition fighting when you think your country can win to fighting when you think your country is going to lose anyway.

I'm not sure we actually do disagree on this point; perhaps we're just phrasing things differently. Or perhaps I've misunderstood you now.

In any case: if one takes the position that the revolution was indeed caused mainly by German lives being thrown away by the generals and admirals, and that the factor of expected defeat wasn't crucially necessary to this, one ought to expect a steady rise in revolutionary sentiment, with there being lots and lots of revolutionary sentiment even before defeat was clear (let's say, in February 1918). Was there? As usual, I'm happy to give in if you have facts to present that contradict me.

The only chance for Wilhelm II is, if the french start revolting first and even then I would want to bet on him.

Hardly so unlikely as to be called an "only chance". The French Third Republic was hardly the most stable of polities and its army in the WW1 era was proved by the historical record to definitely have the traits that you ascribe so readily to the German Army. I'd be very surprised if large-scale revolution took place in Germany before it did in France in any ATL with a stalemate, unless it was an ATL far away from OTL where most of the war was being fought on German soil and greatly damaging Germany rather than France, or some such major alteration from OTL.
 
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