WI the Great Northern war is delayed and Sweden is in the anti-French Grand Alliance in 1702?

[lokaloki]

WI: Charles XI of Sweden died five years later, in summer of 1702?
In OTL, Charles XI had complained of stomach pains since 1694. He continued to perform his duties as usual, but, in February 1697, the pains became too severe for him to cope and he died on 5 April 1697.
In TTL, pains started in 1699, became too severe in May 1702, and he died on 5 June 1702.
It seems, not too unrealistic POD.
I see several effects, main of them is delay of the Great Northern War.

First, Johann Patkul, who fled in 1694, waited for a new king and only when the new king refused to pardon him, Patkul entered the service of Augustus II the Strong of Saxony and Poland and bombarded Augustus with proposals for the partition of Sweden.
His first plan was a combination against her of Saxony, Denmark and Brandenburg; but, Brandenburg failing him, he was obliged very unwillingly to admit Russia into the partnership.
So, if Augusts was not bombarded with these proposals, on the meeting of Peter and Augustus at Rava in August 1698 kings can discuss the war against Ottoman Empire, as Peter planned.

Second, in OTL, the war began when an alliance of Denmark–Norway, Saxony and Russia, sensing an opportunity as Sweden was ruled by the young Charles XII – but in TTL they do not have this opportunity.

So, Great Northern War does not start.
On 7 September 1701, Great Britain, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the United Provinces reconstituted the 1689 anti-French Grand Alliance.
Sweden took part in the Gran Alliance in 1689, and if Charles XI is alive, I think, Sweden may become the fourth member of the Alliance.
Then, on 15 May 1702, Gran Alliance declared war on France.

In TTL, Charles XI died soon and Charles XII, I think, can lead Sweden army to this war instead of Great Northern War.

Is it possible?
Can Charles XII with his army change anything in this war?
Is it possible, that Peter of Russia and Augustus of Saxony and Poland start the war against Ottoman Empire?
And when the analog of the Great Northern war should start? Does Sweden Empire have chances to survive?
Does Augustus of Saxony and Poland has chances to finish his reforms and make Poland strong?

 

[alexmilman]

WI: Charles XI of Sweden died five years later, in summer of 1702?
In OTL, Charles XI had complained of stomach pains since 1694. He continued to perform his duties as usual, but, in February 1697, the pains became too severe for him to cope and he died on 5 April 1697.
In TTL, pains started in 1699, became too severe in May 1702, and he died on 5 June 1702.
It seems, not too unrealistic POD.
I see several effects, main of them is delay of the Great Northern War.

First, Johann Patkul, who fled in 1694, waited for a new king and only when the new king refused to pardon him, Patkul entered the service of Augustus II the Strong of Saxony and Poland and bombarded Augustus with proposals for the partition of Sweden.
His first plan was a combination against her of Saxony, Denmark and Brandenburg; but, Brandenburg failing him, he was obliged very unwillingly to admit Russia into the partnership.
So, if Augusts was not bombarded with these proposals, on the meeting of Peter and Augustus at Rava in August 1698 kings can discuss the war against Ottoman Empire, as Peter planned.

Second, in OTL, the war began when an alliance of Denmark–Norway, Saxony and Russia, sensing an opportunity as Sweden was ruled by the young Charles XII – but in TTL they do not have this opportunity.

So, Great Northern War does not start.
On 7 September 1701, Great Britain, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the United Provinces reconstituted the 1689 anti-French Grand Alliance.
Sweden took part in the Gran Alliance in 1689, and if Charles XI is alive, I think, Sweden may become the fourth member of the Alliance.
Then, on 15 May 1702, Gran Alliance declared war on France.

In TTL, Charles XI died soon and Charles XII, I think, can lead Sweden army to this war instead of Great Northern War.

Is it possible?
Can Charles XII with his army change anything in this war?
Is it possible, that Peter of Russia and Augustus of Saxony and Poland start the war against Ottoman Empire?
And when the analog of the Great Northern war should start? Does Sweden Empire have chances to survive?
Does Augustus of Saxony and Poland has chances to finish his reforms and make Poland strong?

As in a famous weather forecast, “tomorrow everything is possible”. 😜

Few considerations:
1. Sweden is lacking any vested territorial interest in the WoSS and just provides an army for hire. Not an uncommon situation at that time.
2. However, if the army is being led by the Charles XII situation becomes tricky because on one hand he is just a hired hand and does not yet have any military reputation or experience but OTOH by his status he is above Marlborough and Eugene and can’t be subordinated to any of them. OTOH, both of them may object to the idea of being subordinated to an inexperienced youngster.
3. While Eugene and Marlborough had been quite friendly and willingly cooperated with each other, expecting the same with Charles would be highly optimistic (at least judging by the descriptions of his personality).
4. Then go substantial differences between the Swedish and “generally accepted” tactics of that period which may make tactical cooperation even more difficult.
5. It would make sense to provide Charles with a theater of his own but where to find one? Perhaps somewhere on the Rhine (just off the top of my head) but here goes another problem: rather likely than not Charles would resolve his supply problems by looting the friendly territory. Unless a special effort is made to keep the Swedish army fully supplied in organized fashion but then, again, in OTL he was not routinely carrying with him a big baggage train (famous Lewenhaupt‘s train was a special case) so that it would not impede his march. Saddling him with the 3rd party train, besides being difficult to organize, may be even counter-productive for his operations.
6. Charles and August (as Elector of Saxony) are in the same (imperial) side so the war between them is unlikely. OTOH, to fight the Ottomans August probably need some enthusiasm in the PLC. Will he get it with the previous war just finished?
7. On his own Peter would not risk a war with either Sweden or Poland so, instead of rushing from one war to another, he may spend few more years improving his army. OTOH, based upon his previous and future performance, expecting something truly meaningful without his nose being rubbed into the ...er... problem is highly optimistic. Well, he can at least start a program of massive domestic weaponry production: in OTL he was heavily relying upon the muskets supply from Amsterdam and by the time of Poltava a noticeable part of his infantry had been armed with the “half pikes” (protazans). The same goes for the artillery. Besides having most of it as rather ineffective 3 pounders, due to the OTL haste a church bells bronze had been used with the predictable results, the cannons needed frequent repairs. Plus, if his anti-Swedish adventure is delayed by few years, it is plenty of time to get familiar with the increasingly available latest techniques and to provide troops with the socket bayonets instead of plug bayonets the Russian army was using at the start of the GNW. This, even with all Peter’s shortcomings in organization of his army, may result in a seriously different tactics, much more effective against the Swedes than one of the OTL with its almost complete reliance upon the musket and artillery fire (*)
8. As far as the PLC reforms are involved, was August really planning anything of the kind? And if he did, how likely would be success of anything meaningful without GNW as a factor? @Jan Olbracht ?
9. Could Sweden hold its Baltic Empire forever? I doubt it: even putting the PLC aside, look at the history of pre-Petrian Russian-Swedish conflicts. Tsardom kept trying to get a direct access to the Baltic coast and, having greater resources than Sweden, probably would succeed sooner or later. Of course, depending upon the circumstances, Swedish loss can be smaller than in OTL but an idea of getting Riga and Revel was in the Russian “traditional agenda”.
_________
(*) It seems that the muskets with socket bayonets started finding their way into the Russian army somewhere around 1705 but there were too few of them to make a difference.

 

[Archduke]

In OTL, Charles XII did consider going to war with the Hapsburgs in 1706 after defeating the Saxons over the Hapsburg mistreatment of the Protestants in Silesia. This issue was resolved with the Treaty of Altranstädt (1707) probably because the Hapsburgs realized that denying some concessions to the Protestants was not worth risking opening a new front. If I recall correctly, at the time, Hungary was still a mess, so that was another issue weighing on the Hapsburgs.

 

[Jan Olbracht]

August could take advantage of Lithuanian Civil War (Lithuanian nobles rebelled against Sapieha family, which dominated GDL at the end of 17th century, Lithuania under Sapieha's rule was de facto outside Warsaw's control) War weakened magnates and created occassion for Augustus to restore rule over GDL, if not Swedish invasion that soon followed Lithuanian Civil War

 

[lokaloki]

As in a famous weather forecast, “tomorrow everything is possible”. 😜

Few considerations:
1. Sweden is lacking any vested territorial interest in the WoSS and just provides an army for hire. Not an uncommon situation at that time.
2. However, if the army is being led by the Charles XII situation becomes tricky because on one hand he is just a hired hand and does not yet have any military reputation or experience but OTOH by his status he is above Marlborough and Eugene and can’t be subordinated to any of them. OTOH, both of them may object to the idea of being subordinated to an inexperienced youngster.
3. While Eugene and Marlborough had been quite friendly and willingly cooperated with each other, expecting the same with Charles would be highly optimistic (at least judging by the descriptions of his personality).
4. Then go substantial differences between the Swedish and “generally accepted” tactics of that period which may make tactical cooperation even more difficult.
5. It would make sense to provide Charles with a theater of his own but where to find one? Perhaps somewhere on the Rhine (just off the top of my head) but here goes another problem: rather likely than not Charles would resolve his supply problems by looting the friendly territory. Unless a special effort is made to keep the Swedish army fully supplied in organized fashion but then, again, in OTL he was not routinely carrying with him a big baggage train (famous Lewenhaupt‘s train was a special case) so that it would not impede his march. Saddling him with the 3rd party train, besides being difficult to organize, may be even counter-productive for his operations.
6. Charles and August (as Elector of Saxony) are in the same (imperial) side so the war between them is unlikely. OTOH, to fight the Ottomans August probably need some enthusiasm in the PLC. Will he get it with the previous war just finished?
7. On his own Peter would not risk a war with either Sweden or Poland so, instead of rushing from one war to another, he may spend few more years improving his army. OTOH, based upon his previous and future performance, expecting something truly meaningful without his nose being rubbed into the ...er... problem is highly optimistic. Well, he can at least start a program of massive domestic weaponry production: in OTL he was heavily relying upon the muskets supply from Amsterdam and by the time of Poltava a noticeable part of his infantry had been armed with the “half pikes” (protazans). The same goes for the artillery. Besides having most of it as rather ineffective 3 pounders, due to the OTL haste a church bells bronze had been used with the predictable results, the cannons needed frequent repairs. Plus, if his anti-Swedish adventure is delayed by few years, it is plenty of time to get familiar with the increasingly available latest techniques and to provide troops with the socket bayonets instead of plug bayonets the Russian army was using at the start of the GNW. This, even with all Peter’s shortcomings in organization of his army, may result in a seriously different tactics, much more effective against the Swedes than one of the OTL with its almost complete reliance upon the musket and artillery fire (*)
8. As far as the PLC reforms are involved, was August really planning anything of the kind? And if he did, how likely would be success of anything meaningful without GNW as a factor? @Jan Olbracht ?
9. Could Sweden hold its Baltic Empire forever? I doubt it: even putting the PLC aside, look at the history of pre-Petrian Russian-Swedish conflicts. Tsardom kept trying to get a direct access to the Baltic coast and, having greater resources than Sweden, probably would succeed sooner or later. Of course, depending upon the circumstances, Swedish loss can be smaller than in OTL but an idea of getting Riga and Revel was in the Russian “traditional agenda”.
_________
(*) It seems that the muskets with socket bayonets started finding their way into the Russian army somewhere around 1705 but there were too few of them to make a difference.

Thank you!
1-5. From my perspective, the best way "to use Charles XII" is to send him against Bavaria in 1702. If I understand correctly, Charles has good chance to defeat Maximilian II Emanuel before Villars comes to help him.
If Charles can defeat Villars as well, it can change the whole war.
But I am not so good in understanding of both of them and more realistic campaign of Charles against Bavaria and Villars.

7,9. When the POD was discussed on the Russian forum, it was mentioned that Peter can propose to buy Narva for two (or even more) millions of thalers (as he did in OTL in 1721). If Peter proposes this deal to Sweden, is it realistic that Charles XII agree to have "free hades' in the WoSS?
And if yes, is it realistic that Peter will war against Ottoman Empire when he has allies and new army?

6, 8. So, again from my perspective, if Augustus can finish reforms, he can help Peter later against Ottoman Empire, maybe after WoSS.

 

[lokaloki]

In OTL, Charles XII did consider going to war with the Hapsburgs in 1706 after defeating the Saxons over the Hapsburg mistreatment of the Protestants in Silesia. This issue was resolved with the Treaty of Altranstädt (1707) probably because the Hapsburgs realized that denying some concessions to the Protestants was not worth risking opening a new front. If I recall correctly, at the time, Hungary was still a mess, so that was another issue weighing on the Hapsburgs.

Do you mean that Charles XII will not support Hapsburgs even if his father has declared the war to France?
Or Charles XI cannot support the Big Alliance in 1702 as he did it in 1689?
Sorry for many questions, I am not very good in the period.
Thanks.

 

[Archduke]

Do you mean that Charles XII will not support Hapsburgs even if his father has declared the war to France?
Or Charles XI cannot support the Big Alliance in 1702 as he did it in 1689?
Sorry for many questions, I am not very good in the period.
Thanks.

I mean there could be a case for him to fight for the Grand Alliance. It could be as simple as the Grand Alliance purchasing the use of his army as it purchased the use of the Dano-Norwegian army during the War of the Spanish Succession. I just wanted to point out another point of divergence that existed. Also, maybe Charles XII has some claims against the Wittelsbachs to settle or can make up some claims to Wittelsbach land as a member of the family himself.

 

[von Adler]

Sweden did rent out troops and ships to the Grand Alliance in 1689, but did not partake otherwise - Karl XI had a firm anti-French and pro-Dutch and English/British foreign policy, but also a policy of not getting involved in wars. Twice during the 1680s Denmark-Norway tried to start a war with Sweden on their own, and twice Karl XI with the help of diplomatic support from England and the Netherlands thwarted it. Had Karl XI actually wanted war, the situation would have been close to ideal - a lot of his reforms had taken place, he was firmly in power, experienced in warfare and had good troops and Denmark-Norway would stand alone. Yet he did not pounce at a chance of war because he did not want war. He knew Sweden, while strong, was surrounded by powers eager to regain lost territory and focused inwards, towards reform and strengthening the defences of Sweden.

Karl XII retained the same ministers and the same pro-naval powers foreign policy of his father, and barring a war there's no reason to believe that he would be more inclined to go on foreign adventures.

Sweden would most likely rent out its German garrisons and some volunteers as it had during the war of the Grand Alliance, and they would be commanded by a prominent group of officers, but not the King himself as Sweden proper would have little to nothing to gain from the war, as alexmilman says. Rehnskiöld, Stenbock, Lewenhaupt and Stuart are potential candidates. Rehnskiöld had been in command of the Swedish troops in the war of the Grand Alliance earlier and knew how to work with the English and the Dutch.

As for Sweden's Baltic Empire, it is on borrowed time once Peter has enacted his reforms. The state of Russia and its institutions became strong enough to survive multiple instances of coups, severe corruption and weak rulers. Russia under Peter became the Russia we know in history - a country that a bit like Rome could just muster another army, learn from the devastating losses and try again, and again when suffering a devastating defeat. Unless you somehow butterfly Peter and his reforms, or somehow manage to give Russia some kind of cultural focus against the Central Asian Khanates, the Ottomans or Poland-Lithuania to the extent that they neglect retaking lost territory from Sweden (which seems unlikely to me), Russia will be taking the Baltic coast from Sweden sooner or later due to the disparity in population and resources.

 

[lokaloki]

I mean there could be a case for him to fight for the Grand Alliance. It could be as simple as the Grand Alliance purchasing the use of his army as it purchased the use of the Dano-Norwegian army during the War of the Spanish Succession. I just wanted to point out another point of divergence that existed. Also, maybe Charles XII has some claims against the Wittelsbachs to settle or can make up some claims to Wittelsbach land as a member of the family himself.

Oh. Thank you!
To give Bavaria to Sweden is an interesting idea.

 

[lokaloki]

Karl XII retained the same ministers and the same pro-naval powers foreign policy of his father, and barring a war there's no reason to believe that he would be more inclined to go on foreign adventures.

I thought, he wanted to war himself. And as he is the king, he can go to the war. But my knowledge of his character is not very good.

As for Sweden's Baltic Empire - I understand, that it cannot exist forever. Just curious, how long it can exist without Great Northern War. And if the Sweden army can change the War of Spanish Success.

 

[lokaloki]

August could take advantage of Lithuanian Civil War (Lithuanian nobles rebelled against Sapieha family, which dominated GDL at the end of 17th century, Lithuania under Sapieha's rule was de facto outside Warsaw's control) War weakened magnates and created occassion for Augustus to restore rule over GDL, if not Swedish invasion that soon followed Lithuanian Civil War

I have read very fast about Sapieha's and August. If I understand correctly, without the war, August can do not support Sapeha - and in this case, may take control of GDL even without a civil war.

 

[von Adler]

I thought, he wanted to war himself. And as he is the king, he can go to the war. But my knowledge of his character is not very good.

As for Sweden's Baltic Empire - I understand, that it cannot exist forever. Just curious, how long it can exist without Great Northern War. And if the Sweden army can change the War of Spanish Success.

He also had a ton of administrative ideas, some very good, others not so much. He did make sure to always bring a "Field chancellery" with him on campaign, so the normal running of the government could happen despite the war. The man was very duty-bound, and I don't think he'd up and go and fight in a war in which Sweden is not more than remotely engaged. Unless Sweden is directly attacked, he'll probably feel that his duty is to stay at home and handle the Kingdom - especially without a clear heir.

 

[alexmilman]

Thank you!
1-5. From my perspective, the best way "to use Charles XII" is to send him against Bavaria in 1702. If I understand correctly, Charles has good chance to defeat Maximilian II Emanuel before Villars comes to help him.
If Charles can defeat Villars as well, it can change the whole war.
But I am not so good in understanding of both of them and more realistic campaign of Charles against Bavaria and Villars.

7,9. When the POD was discussed on the Russian forum, it was mentioned that Peter can propose to buy Narva for two (or even more) millions of thalers (as he did in OTL in 1721). If Peter proposes this deal to Sweden, is it realistic that Charles XII agree to have "free hades' in the WoSS?
And if yes, is it realistic that Peter will war against Ottoman Empire when he has allies and new army?

6, 8. So, again from my perspective, if Augustus can finish reforms, he can help Peter later against Ottoman Empire, maybe after WoSS.

In OTL Peter paid not just for Narva but for Latvia, Estonia & Ingria which is substantially more, especially taking into an account that Riga was the biggest port on the Baltic Sea and the second biggest town in Sweden. Part of the reason for him paying these money was legalistic: while Narva (and Ingria) were his share as per pre-war agreement with August, the rest was supposed to be Augusts’s part and, cynically speaking, Peter was screwing his partner (of course, it could be argued that it was up to the partner to conquer these areas, etc.) so in the peace treaty it was explicitly stated that the provinces are going to Russia providing Peter with a formal excuse.
As for the peaceful purchasing, my personal impression is that Charles would consider selling the land he inherited as a dishonorable act but I’d reference you to @von Adler as a more knowledgeable person on the issues related to Sweden.

Actually, the Russian obsession with Narva puzzles me: Tsardom was holding Ingria for a very long time (and before that it was Novgorodian territory) but never tried to build a port there. More than that, IIRC, during Alexei’s war with Sweden the existing Swedish settlement there, Nien, was burned by the Russian troops. And each and every war they were trying to take Narva even if it was a rather lousy target. To start with, it is not well-positioned relatively to the traditional Russian communication routes except for Pskov (not too much sense of going “naval” from it because there was a functioning fair providing in-land trade with Estonia), then it is not a port, being few miles up the river (not a very big one), then the coast does not gave a good harbor safe from the storms (no bay or any cover, just a fiat coastline). Needless to say that when Peter finally got it, it was not put to any serious use and his “paradise” was built on the site of a destroyed Nien. Why didn’t he start with taking it? The place did not have any serious fortification, made much more sense being on the end of the traditional river-lake route, and easier to defend (being pretty much in a middle of nowhere so marching to it from Finland or from the South always was an “adventure“ and geography (major river and the islands) was adding to the defense. Better and secured (by Kronstadt) harbor. Well, of course the regular floods but this did not deter Oeter or his successors.

Charles against Villars is an interesting scenario because the methods had been substantially different. Taking into an account how Charles fared at Poltava against relatively modest (by the standards of WoSS) artillery and adequately trained “shooting” infantry, I’d bet on Villars but this is just an unprofessional opinion. But let’s assume that Charles is successful in Bavaria, then what? Actually, “success” would mean just success in a battle because Charles’ ability to take even a modest fortification is questionable: his army did not have a heavy artillery and was lacking the competent engineers. So he is winning a battle, does some creative looting and then what? Marching back to Sweden, trying to invade France, demands position of a generalissimo of the anti-French coalition?

 

[von Adler]

In OTL Peter paid not just for Narva but for Latvia, Estonia & Ingria which is substantially more, especially taking into an account that Riga was the biggest port on the Baltic Sea and the second biggest town in Sweden. Part of the reason for him paying these money was legalistic: while Narva (and Ingria) were his share as per pre-war agreement with August, the rest was supposed to be Augusts’s part and, cynically speaking, Peter was screwing his partner (of course, it could be argued that it was up to the partner to conquer these areas, etc.) so in the peace treaty it was explicitly stated that the provinces are going to Russia providing Peter with a formal excuse.
As for the peaceful purchasing, my personal impression is that Charles would consider selling the land he inherited as a dishonorable act but I’d reference you to @von Adler as a more knowledgeable person on the issues related to Sweden.

Actually, the Russian obsession with Narva puzzles me: Tsardom was holding Ingria for a very long time (and before that it was Novgorodian territory) but never tried to build a port there. More than that, IIRC, during Alexei’s war with Sweden the existing Swedish settlement there, Nien, was burned by the Russian troops. And each and every war they were trying to take Narva even if it was a rather lousy target. To start with, it is not well-positioned relatively to the traditional Russian communication routes except for Pskov (not too much sense of going “naval” from it because there was a functioning fair providing in-land trade with Estonia), then it is not a port, being few miles up the river (not a very big one), then the coast does not gave a good harbor safe from the storms (no bay or any cover, just a fiat coastline). Needless to say that when Peter finally got it, it was not put to any serious use and his “paradise” was built on the site of a destroyed Nien. Why didn’t he start with taking it? The place did not have any serious fortification, made much more sense being on the end of the traditional river-lake route, and easier to defend (being pretty much in a middle of nowhere so marching to it from Finland or from the South always was an “adventure“ and geography (major river and the islands) was adding to the defense. Better and secured (by Kronstadt) harbor. Well, of course the regular floods but this did not deter Oeter or his successors.

Charles against Villars is an interesting scenario because the methods had been substantially different. Taking into an account how Charles fared at Poltava against relatively modest (by the standards of WoSS) artillery and adequately trained “shooting” infantry, I’d bet on Villars but this is just an unprofessional opinion. But let’s assume that Charles is successful in Bavaria, then what? Actually, “success” would mean just success in a battle because Charles’ ability to take even a modest fortification is questionable: his army did not have a heavy artillery and was lacking the competent engineers. So he is winning a battle, does some creative looting and then what? Marching back to Sweden, trying to invade France, demands position of a generalissimo of the anti-French coalition?

That is an interesing question - in general, Sweden was never good at ruling orthodox subjects, and most of the orthodox population, despite being Ingrian Ugric rather than Russian, upped and left Ingria during the Swedish rule, and protestant Finns were moved in instead. The tolls on the Neva river did provide a nice boon to the Swedish state coffers, but the region was swampy and sparsely populated - the land rents were negligible.

In general, Karl XI and Karl XII considered Denmark and Brandenburg and perhaps the Emperor the worst threats to Sweden before the war - in previous wars with Russia, Russia had in general lacked the ability to conduct multi-season sieges and maintain armies deep in enemy territory, besides lacking a navy. This is why places such as Malmö, Bohus, Carlsten and Älvsborg saw extensive fortification works, while Nöteborg remained a 15th century fortification and Narva and Nyen remained very small.

If an offer comes to buy Ingria from Russia, my speculation is that it would be rejected, as Russia is not considered a great threat - the results of Peter's revamping of the Russian state has not become obvious yet and control of the tolls on the Baltic trade has been a Swedish goal for 150 years at that point. Giving it up for a temporary cash boost would seem unwise.

As for how Karl XII and the Swedish army would do in battle against other European armies, I think it would do quite well, at least early war. The Saxonians used the High German tactical school while the Danes and Brandenburgians used the Anglo-Dutch school. Russia used a variant of the High German school (which itself was a more defensive variant of the French school) with added modifications to deal with the Swedish army (like deploying 6 instead of 4 ranks deep to give inertia against the Swedish charge).

The Swedes were quite capable of dealing with larger armies even after years of attrition - Fraustadt 1706, Holowczyn 1708, Helsingborg 1710 and Gadebusch 1712 are decisive Swedish victories against some of the best armies they had faced so far.

Poltava has the Swedish army fighting a 4 times stronger Russian army, without their artillery (due to supply issues) while still trying to maintain a siege and after a very cold winter with very little supply. The big difference between Narva 1700 and Poltava 1709 is that the Russian army had improved leaps and bounds since then, and the Swedish army could not reliably rout it when it had the advantage of field fortifications.

As for the Swedish school, Count Suvorov showed that an offensive spirit based on initiative and the personal effort of each soldier (and attention to their morale, quarters, supply etc) and the bayonet was viable 70 years later, so I would not completely disregard the Swedish school even if it relied on high quality troops (which could not be maintained after 1712).

Sweden had a distinct advantage with its semi-professional and very well-drilled army and its willingness to actually charge home and a very strong cavalry arm with an equal or even larger willingness to charge home. The French school had a similar focus on the charge (the Swedish school was based on the French one as experienced by Rehnskiöld the hard way during the War of the Grand Alliance), but as quality of the French army went down through attrition, the French troops started exchanging fire at close range rather than charge home more and more - which was a way of war the Anglo-Dutch school focused on.

 

[alexmilman]

Sweden did rent out troops and ships to the Grand Alliance in 1689, but did not partake otherwise - Karl XI had a firm anti-French and pro-Dutch and English/British foreign policy, but also a policy of not getting involved in wars. Twice during the 1680s Denmark-Norway tried to start a war with Sweden on their own, and twice Karl XI with the help of diplomatic support from England and the Netherlands thwarted it. Had Karl XI actually wanted war, the situation would have been close to ideal - a lot of his reforms had taken place, he was firmly in power, experienced in warfare and had good troops and Denmark-Norway would stand alone. Yet he did not pounce at a chance of war because he did not want war. He knew Sweden, while strong, was surrounded by powers eager to regain lost territory and focused inwards, towards reform and strengthening the defences of Sweden.

Karl XII retained the same ministers and the same pro-naval powers foreign policy of his father, and barring a war there's no reason to believe that he would be more inclined to go on foreign adventures.

Sweden would most likely rent out its German garrisons and some volunteers as it had during the war of the Grand Alliance, and they would be commanded by a prominent group of officers, but not the King himself as Sweden proper would have little to nothing to gain from the war, as alexmilman says. Rehnskiöld, Stenbock, Lewenhaupt and Stuart are potential candidates. Rehnskiöld had been in command of the Swedish troops in the war of the Grand Alliance earlier and knew how to work with the English and the Dutch.

As for Sweden's Baltic Empire, it is on borrowed time once Peter has enacted his reforms. The state of Russia and its institutions became strong enough to survive multiple instances of coups, severe corruption and weak rulers. Russia under Peter became the Russia we know in history - a country that a bit like Rome could just muster another army, learn from the devastating losses and try again, and again when suffering a devastating defeat. Unless you somehow butterfly Peter and his reforms, or somehow manage to give Russia some kind of cultural focus against the Central Asian Khanates, the Ottomans or Poland-Lithuania to the extent that they neglect retaking lost territory from Sweden (which seems unlikely to me), Russia will be taking the Baltic coast from Sweden sooner or later due to the disparity in population and resources.

I would say that retaining at least a big part of its Baltic Empire was not a complete impossibility for Sweden, at least for “mid-term”. To start with, Peter just grabbed an opportunity presented to him by Charles and what passed for his strategy and foreign policy. His real desires had been much more modest: just Ingria with a site of St-Petersburg. This does not mean that sooner or later the Russian expansionism would not stretch to the OTL borders or that growing Prussia would not try to grab Latvia and Estonia as it grabbed piece of Swedish Pomerania, etc. Strictly objectively, practically the first thing Peter did after conquering Riga and Revel was trying to shut down their trade and to channel it to St-Petersburg (to be fair, he was trying to do the same with his own Archangelsk and in all three cases had to roll back this idiotic decision). If Riga and Revel remain Swedish and he wants to make St-Petersburg the main outlet for the Russian trade on the Baltic Sea, the only thing he has to do is to establish the high tariffs on the Russian land exports to Livonia.

Your idea about the CA is not unrealistic at all. At that time Russia was one of the main suppliers of the Chinese goods to Europe (to my surprise, one of the main items was rhubarb). Of course the trade was screwed by the ineffective government’s attempts to control everything but this is besides the point. Russian main trade items had been furs and the CA merchants had been also involved in the schema (both furs and Chinese good had been popular in the CA). On the top of it, there were rumors about big gold deposits in the area of Aral Sea and Russia was desperately short of the precious metal. In OTL Peter did send an expedition into the CA but it failed. So if, instead of being focused on war with Sweden and the failed policy of turning Baltic Sea into the Russian lake, Peter concentrates on Eastern direction and is reasonably successful, then Russian expansion Eastward may happen more than a century ahead of the OTL schedule with the earlier exploration of Siberia (and finding the gold there and in Altai mountains), and many other developments which would make the Baltic outlet important but secondary issues.

 

[alexmilman]

That is an interesing question - in general, Sweden was never good at ruling orthodox subjects, and most of the orthodox population, despite being Ingrian Ugric rather than Russian, upped and left Ingria during the Swedish rule, and protestant Finns were moved in instead. The tolls on the Neva river did provide a nice boon to the Swedish state coffers, but the region was swampy and sparsely populated - the land rents were negligible.

In general, Karl XI and Karl XII considered Denmark and Brandenburg and perhaps the Emperor the worst threats to Sweden before the war - in previous wars with Russia, Russia had in general lacked the ability to conduct multi-season sieges and maintain armies deep in enemy territory, besides lacking a navy. This is why places such as Malmö, Bohus, Carlsten and Älvsborg saw extensive fortification works, while Nöteborg remained a 15th century fortification and Narva and Nyen remained very small.

If an offer comes to buy Ingria from Russia, my speculation is that it would be rejected, as Russia is not considered a great threat - the results of Peter's revamping of the Russian state has not become obvious yet and control of the tolls on the Baltic trade has been a Swedish goal for 150 years at that point. Giving it up for a temporary cash boost would seem unwise.

As for how Karl XII and the Swedish army would do in battle against other European armies, I think it would do quite well, at least early war. The Saxonians used the High German tactical school while the Danes and Brandenburgians used the Anglo-Dutch school. Russia used a variant of the High German school (which itself was a more defensive variant of the French school) with added modifications to deal with the Swedish army (like deploying 6 instead of 4 ranks deep to give inertia against the Swedish charge).

The Swedes were quite capable of dealing with larger armies even after years of attrition - Fraustadt 1706, Holowczyn 1708, Helsingborg 1710 and Gadebusch 1712 are decisive Swedish victories against some of the best armies they had faced so far.

Poltava has the Swedish army fighting a 4 times stronger Russian army, without their artillery (due to supply issues) while still trying to maintain a siege and after a very cold winter with very little supply. The big difference between Narva 1700 and Poltava 1709 is that the Russian army had improved leaps and bounds since then, and the Swedish army could not reliably rout it when it had the advantage of field fortifications.

As for the Swedish school, Count Suvorov showed that an offensive spirit based on initiative and the personal effort of each soldier (and attention to their morale, quarters, supply etc) and the bayonet was viable 70 years later, so I would not completely disregard the Swedish school even if it relied on high quality troops (which could not be maintained after 1712).

Sweden had a distinct advantage with its semi-professional and very well-drilled army and its willingness to actually charge home and a very strong cavalry arm with an equal or even larger willingness to charge home. The French school had a similar focus on the charge (the Swedish school was based on the French one as experienced by Rehnskiöld the hard way during the War of the Grand Alliance), but as quality of the French army went down through attrition, the French troops started exchanging fire at close range rather than charge home more and more - which was a way of war the Anglo-Dutch school focused on.

To be fair, Suvorov and his methods had been successful against the bigger numbers of the relatively low quality troops (Ottomans), opponents of a questionable quality (newly-created Polish army) or when he had a healthy numeric advantage (French). To a certain degree this goes for Charles as well (as Saxon commander wrote to August, “your [Saxon] soldiers do not gave heart against the Swedes”). Both of them stressed the charge over the firepower and for both of them artillery was secondary (ven in Suvorov’s Italian campaign) but none of them (we’ll skip Poltava) had been facing a really serious firepower; rather ironically, in his joined operations with the Austrians Suvorov managed to turn successfully the “firepower” Austrians into the charging force. 😜

Which, of course, does not diminish the military talents of either of them.BTW, Suvorov’s last title was Prince (“Prince f Italy”).

However, we should not forget that Villars also was an outstanding general, by some assessments, the best French general between Turenne and Napoleon.

 

[von Adler]

To be fair, Suvorov and his methods had been successful against the bigger numbers of the relatively low quality troops (Ottomans), opponents of a questionable quality (newly-created Polish army) or when he had a healthy numeric advantage (French). To a certain degree this goes for Charles as well (as Saxon commander wrote to August, “your [Saxon] soldiers do not gave heart against the Swedes”). Both of them stressed the charge over the firepower and for both of them artillery was secondary (ven in Suvorov’s Italian campaign) but none of them (we’ll skip Poltava) had been facing a really serious firepower; rather ironically, in his joined operations with the Austrians Suvorov managed to turn successfully the “firepower” Austrians into the charging force. 😜

Which, of course, does not diminish the military talents of either of them.BTW, Suvorov’s last title was Prince (“Prince f Italy”).

However, we should not forget that Villars also was an outstanding general, by some assessments, the best French general between Turenne and Napoleon.

I'd argue that Rehnskiöld faced some serious firepower at Fraustadt. The Saxonian (and a small Russian force) - 16 000 infantry supported by 32 guns. The infantry was also reinforced by 50 small mortars for increased firepower and deployed behind cheval de frises for extra protection. The Swedish infantry that attacked consisted of 3 700 men. The big difference is that at Poltava, the Russians had made sure there was no room for the Swedish cavalry to manouvre - a lot of the Swedish offensive tactic relied on the cavalry driving the enemy cavalry off and then denying the enemy infantry the chance to reform or counterattack in the face of the Swedish infantry assault, either by pursuit or attacking their flanks or rear.

 

[alexmilman]

I'd argue that Rehnskiöld faced some serious firepower at Fraustadt. The Saxonian (and a small Russian force) - 16 000 infantry supported by 32 guns. The infantry was also reinforced by 50 small mortars for increased firepower and deployed behind cheval de frises for extra protection. The Swedish infantry that attacked consisted of 3 700 men. The big difference is that at Poltava, the Russians had made sure there was no room for the Swedish cavalry to manouvre - a lot of the Swedish offensive tactic relied on the cavalry driving the enemy cavalry off and then denying the enemy infantry the chance to reform or counterattack in the face of the Swedish infantry assault, either by pursuit or attacking their flanks or rear.

Actually, it seems that at Poltava Russian cavalry was fighting Swedish quite successfully: Menshikov reported numerous captured colors and insisted (rather optimistically, IMO) on winning the whole battle at the redoubts line. Peter did not share his optimism and replaced him with Bour (sp) who conducted an orderly retreat. Taking into an account that Menshikov already was victorious at Kalisz (with overwhelming force) and quite handy at Lesnaya (which Russians considered a victory against equal force), his optimism is easy to understand.

As for Fraudstadt, it does not look like the firepower played a serious role: ”Swedish cavalry on the right flank, passed outside the left Russian flank with 12 dragoon squadrons, near the village of Rörsdorf, and engaged the Saxon Cavalry covering the Russian flank. After witnessing the destruction of the Saxon right flank, the left flank fled, and were routed by the Swedish dragoons. Colonel von Krassow's cavalry then wheeled clock-wise into the Saxon-Russian rear, which caused several of the Saxon regiments to break formation.” Very impressive performance which made most of the opponent’s firepower irrelevant and became possible mostly due to the opponent’s ineptitude.

 

[von Adler]

Actually, it seems that at Poltava Russian cavalry was fighting Swedish quite successfully: Menshikov reported numerous captured colors and insisted (rather optimistically, IMO) on winning the whole battle at the redoubts line. Peter did not share his optimism and replaced him with Bour (sp) who conducted an orderly retreat. Taking into an account that Menshikov already was victorious at Kalisz (with overwhelming force) and quite handy at Lesnaya (which Russians considered a victory against equal force), his optimism is easy to understand.

As for Fraudstadt, it does not look like the firepower played a serious role: ”Swedish cavalry on the right flank, passed outside the left Russian flank with 12 dragoon squadrons, near the village of Rörsdorf, and engaged the Saxon Cavalry covering the Russian flank. After witnessing the destruction of the Saxon right flank, the left flank fled, and were routed by the Swedish dragoons. Colonel von Krassow's cavalry then wheeled clock-wise into the Saxon-Russian rear, which caused several of the Saxon regiments to break formation.” Very impressive performance which made most of the opponent’s firepower irrelevant and became possible mostly due to the opponent’s ineptitude.

Well, yes, that was the entire point of the Swedish school - ensure that firepower did not play a role. A charge to rout the enemy and then pursue mercilessly, as Karl XI knew that Sweden would almost always have inferior numbers and standing in enemy fire was a sure way to suffer more casualties than Sweden could handle. When the Russian army improved leaps and bounds and the attrition wore down the quality of the Swedish army so that it could no longer reliably rout their enemies, fire did start to play a role, with devastating losses for the Swedes, as happened at Poltava.

That said, in 1702 I think even the French would be in for a nasty surprise facing a Swedish army.

 

[alexmilman]

Well, yes, that was the entire point of the Swedish school - ensure that firepower did not play a role. A charge to rout the enemy and then pursue mercilessly, as Karl XI knew that Sweden would almost always have inferior numbers and standing in enemy fire was a sure way to suffer more casualties than Sweden could handle. When the Russian army improved leaps and bounds and the attrition wore down the quality of the Swedish army so that it could no longer reliably rout their enemies, fire did start to play a role, with devastating losses for the Swedes, as happened at Poltava.

That said, in 1702 I think even the French would be in for a nasty surprise facing a Swedish army.

“French” in general, maybe. But I’ll repeat: Villars was one of the greatest generals of his time and what worked out with the mediocre Swedish opponents of the GNW may not work with him.