WI: The Germans halt their advance to Moscow

There's also the possibility, as has been mentioned, of Stalin getting desperate. This leads to several sub-scenarios:
1. Stalin successfully deposed and the USSR avoids major infighting with either Beria (1a) or Zhukov (1b) taking over. Or someone else of course. This might actually be a better thing overall for the USSR.
2. Stalin being successfully deposed and the USSR engaging in significant factional fighting, weakening their ability to stop the Germans and perhaps emboldening Hitler (or whomever is in charge if he's died in a pastry related choking incident).
3. Stalin resists the coup and engages in a bloody purge, perhaps enough to make the Germans (especially Germany sans Hitler) start looking like a better option.
4. Stalin pre-empts the plotters, real or the product of his paranoid imagination, and purges some of his inner circle and Red Army readership. This would strengthen his control in the short-to-medium term but might make the survivors desperate.
5. Stalin, made desperate by the worsened situation (loss of Leningrad and Stalingrad, neutralisation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk) and murmurings about his leadership does something really desperate. In 1942 there was a curious outbreak of the generally rare pulmonary form of tularemia. amongst German troops around Stalingrad that's been attributed to Soviet biological warfare. Might a desperate Stalin deploy BW agents?
 
There's also the possibility, as has been mentioned, of Stalin getting desperate. This leads to several sub-scenarios:
1. Stalin successfully deposed and the USSR avoids major infighting with either Beria (1a) or Zhukov (1b) taking over. Or someone else of course. This might actually be a better thing overall for the USSR.
2. Stalin being successfully deposed and the USSR engaging in significant factional fighting, weakening their ability to stop the Germans and perhaps emboldening Hitler (or whomever is in charge if he's died in a pastry related choking incident).
3. Stalin resists the coup and engages in a bloody purge, perhaps enough to make the Germans (especially Germany sans Hitler) start looking like a better option.
4. Stalin pre-empts the plotters, real or the product of his paranoid imagination, and purges some of his inner circle and Red Army readership. This would strengthen his control in the short-to-medium term but might make the survivors desperate.
5. Stalin, made desperate by the worsened situation (loss of Leningrad and Stalingrad, neutralisation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk) and murmurings about his leadership does something really desperate. In 1942 there was a curious outbreak of the generally rare pulmonary form of tularemia. amongst German troops around Stalingrad that's been attributed to Soviet biological warfare. Might a desperate Stalin deploy BW agents?

Stalin didn't panic when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow. I fail to see why he should panic if the Germans suddenly stop.
 

Deleted member 1487

Stalin didn't panic when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow. I fail to see why he should panic if the Germans suddenly stop.
Well he did panic and did order dumb moves like counterattacks along the central axis against German troops in November; it was a desperate panic move that was exactly as he did in throughout the entire campaign despite Zhukov's protests and wore out Soviet defenders for when the German offensive resumed in November. That was a major blunder; I'd even argue that launching the major counterattack against 3rd Panzer Army in early December was a major blunder rather than drawing them in further and wearing them down in bad weather before attacking and wiping them out. The thing was Stalin didn't take the major panic move of evacuating, because he understood that Moscow would probably fall without him there and ruling with an iron fist. But yes Stalin would not panic if the Germans stop, if anything he'd be mystified and order wasteful counterattacks immediately that would be so weak as to do no damage and instead waste even more precious soldiers that they could not spare and weaken the Soviet position for winter. Rather than waiting he'd do what he did IOTL and order small penny packet attacks as soon as possible rather than waiting for a big, coordinated counter strike with limited goals to maximize effectiveness. That is in front of Moscow though.
Leningrad would be a different matter and I could see desperate moves to relieve the city if the shipping routes are cut in October as I suggested earlier. Then Stalin could panic and lose a ton of men in harebrained attacks to save the city and spare AG-Center major attacks over the winter. Then AG-Center could send reinforcements to AG-North.
 
Total nonsense. Some of the worst tactical defeats were inflicted upon the Germans on the road to Moscow that October. The most notable example was near Tula, where a Soviet tank brigade utterly savaged the better part of a German panzer division and effectively stopped Guderian Panzer Army completely for a full week.

The example sure is notable. If it is correct is another question.

With regard to delaying Guderian's Panzer Army for a full week, it would seem that the encircled forces around Bryansk deserves most of the credit for that.

In his diary, von Bock doesn't mention the battle Mtsensk at all on Oct 6 (despite giving an almost two pages account of the days events). However, three days later he writes "Guderian scraping everything together to prevent large-scale escape" (from the Bryansk pocket).

Meanwhile, Halder in his diary does note the attack on the 6th, but on the next day he writes with regards to Second Panzer Army "Capture of Bryansk and encircling of the enemy elements opposite Second Army from the east may yet give them a good deal of trouble". On the 9th, he continues with "Guderian is feeling the increasing pressure on his western flank. He will have to drop his objections for the time and use his tanks against this threat, even though it may delay the next move beyond Orel, against Tula. The eastern flank is free of enemy pressure!"

With regards to the actual battle near Mtsensk, Zetterling in The Drive on Moscow, 1941, spends some time discussing it. He notes that only a small portion of 4th Pz Div took part in the action, that the Soviets had other forces in the area besides the 4th Tank Brigade, and that German casualties were low (Kampfgruppe Eberbach, of which the Mtsensk force was part of, reported losing 10 kia and 33 wia between 4-7 Oct - most of which probably happened around Mtsensk on the 6th) and 9 tank losses (of which 6 irrevocable).

Such casualties doesn't give the impression of an utterly savaged better part of a panzer division. Instead, it gives the impression of yet another Eastern Front myth of old.
 

Deleted member 1487

Such casualties doesn't give the impression of an utterly savaged better part of a panzer division. Instead, it gives the impression of yet another Eastern Front myth of old.
Or grasping at straws to prove a point. Guderian's forces were more hamstrung by the mud and distance than by Soviet resistance, especially in that particular action, which according to Forcyzk resulted in similar casualties to the Soviet in terms of AFVs and men lost, though the Germans lost more artillery and FLAK weapons in the surprise attack. It was a few hours and then over.
 

Wendigo

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The thing was Stalin didn't take the major panic move of evacuating, because he understood that Moscow would probably fall without him there and ruling with an iron fist.
Why was Stalin's presence in Moscow so important?

How would him not being there make the city fall into the hands of the Wehrmacht?
 

Deleted member 1487

Why was Stalin's presence in Moscow so important?

How would him not being there make the city fall into the hands of the Wehrmacht?
He was effectively the center of the state after the purges and Moscow was the geographic center of it, him leaving in the moment of crisis when there were already riots in the streets and looting given the evacuation of government offices from the city and on roomers of Stalin fleeing signaled the reaction of him actually leaving; his choice to stay and crack down with brutal marshal law that saw a lot of people shot dead in the streets put the city back in order. He made it clear he was staying and the public settled down. Had he left it is likely the civil disorder and flight of civilians would have worsened and resistance fallen apart due to supply breaking down behind the defenders of Moscow, as fleeing civilians choked the rail lines.
 
Given the quality of Russian roads mud really did hinder the Germans and that was nearly going on since the start of Taifun.

The roads did not start to breakdown until the 9th. The Bryansk pocket was formed by the 6th and the Vyazma pocket by the 7th.

No, the weather got worse every day of Taifun and the slow down tracks very closely with the weather making every step east that much further. Forczyk and Stahel both describe that.

By your own admission, the first rains didn't start coming down until the 6th. Yet the rate of advance had been collapsing since the 2nd, dropping down to . You keep referring to Stahel, but you don't appear to have actually read him given that he does say a lot of what I say. He describes the German forces after the start of Typhoon as over-extended, under-resourced, and totally exhausted... just like I have been. He notes that the Germans resolutely failed to recover any strength during their brief operational pause in mid-October/late-November, which precludes the idea that they could do so by just sitting still away from their supply sources as opposed to falling back. He talks about Soviet resistance as being a more important factor then mud in stopping the Germans. He notes that local counter-attacks by Soviet And he describes Taifun as being a forlorn effort from beginning to end.

They were able to make gains for a time, but it was the weather that slowed them down and wore them out.
You can underrate both the ferocious Russian resistance, and the extremely strung out and vulnerable nature of the German army at that point, but it does not make it any more true. Weather means nothing without opposition.

Actually it was much better at Rzhev than Kalinin, because trains were actually reaching Rzhev in January, but none had reached Kalinin ever.

And truck columns were reaching Kalinin in November 1941. The problem isn't that supplies weren't getting in at all, with the exception of a multi-week period in November for several of the armies, the problem was that not remotely enough supplies were getting in for any kind of effective military operation, defensive or offensive.

In fact Rzhev was much closer to German logistics hubs than any area you mentioned and was getting some rail supply, which is why it held,

It held because the Soviet assault ran out of steam, having to cross the devastated wasteland. Even then, it barely held. It is entirely conceivable that it might have fallen anyways even under the OTL circumstances had the Soviets managed to a little more success.

trying to hold beyond their logistical sustainment abilities.

Never mind you are proposing they do exactly that.

I'm surprised you think they'd be thrown back further

No, I said they'd be thrown back just as far as they were OTL in terms of overall distance. That this will end up with German lines further west is purely a function of the Soviets being able to begin their offensive from further west, particularly seeing as their logistical infrastructure (most of all, the rail network) between Rzhev and Moscow won't be torn up.

when they aren't all stretched out in worse logistical situations further east and north over a wider front they couldn't cover;

Because you just assume they are less stretched out and in a better logistical situation. Neither assumption withstands scrutiny.

not lose a ton of equipment in Kalinin and at Klin during the retreat back to Rzhev in winter.

Instead, they lose it during the retreat back to Smolensk, which is basically where they reenact Rzhev IATL.

The problem the Germans had wasn't Taifun as an entire operation, it was the wild advance from October 14th-December 5th; everything up until then was sustainable.

Yes, it was and no, it was not. The advances at the start was not sustainable, as the advances from October 14th-December 5th reveals. Had it been sustainable, it would have been kept up. The ability to continue a defined behavior is the dictionary definition of sustainability. You are confusing the result of German overextension with it's cause.

The only major problem with that is what the Soviets would do over the winter until the German offensive season started.

Attack and get smashed? I mean, that's what the Germans tended to do to Soviet attacks in this time period when they weren't overextended and beyond their limits of resupply like they were after the start of Taifun.

Remember the Soviet forces east of Smolensk dealt AG-Center their worst losses of the campaign when they sat on the defensive in late July-September;

Uh... they didn't sit on the defensive. They attacked in July and again in September.

leaving them intact

They won't be intact. Their poor defensive dispositions and terrible quality meant that even local offensives would be enough to pocket and destroy them.

You mean other than the forces mobilized in October-January.

Yes, but those are going to be available whether the Germans go through with local offensives

The Soviet forces at the start of Taifun in front of Moscow had been the ones beating at AG-center and inflicting the worst losses they'd experienced of the campaign to that point. Soviet forces were worn down too of course and weren't what they were in August, but were much more formidable than the Soviet units that attacked in December-January IOTL.

Actually, the Soviet forces at the start of Taifun were much less formidable then those that attacked in December-January IOTL precisely because they had been beaten down during the August-September counter-offensives. They consisted of the burnt-out survivors of those engagements and a whole bunch of effectively militia. All of the replacement equipment and the best manpower were being funneled into the formation of new forces. The fresh armies that had been raised in September had all been deployed south to patch over the losses from the Kiev disaster, absorbing the equipment from that year.

Not that any of this conversation really matters, given that the bulk of those forces get destroyed under my plan as much as they do yours.

The pre-war army still existed by December.

Not any of it that had been west of the Urals. And certainly not any of it that was immediately in front of the Germans.

The freeze didn't happen in October.

I was referring to the whole continuum of the operation, from October to December. That should have been quite obvious from the wording. Work on your reading comprehension.

but the logistics didn't really become crippling until toward the end of October.

The logistics were crippling to begin with. Even at the start of the offensive, there were immense shortages of such important items as motor oil, engines, spare parts, and tires. Even the fuel supplies were inadequate: by the Germans own admission, they would only be enough to last until mid-November without factoring in weather conditions. And indeed, by the time November rolls around, the Smolensk depots were indeed empty and the Panzer Groups were having to send their trucks all the way to Orsha to find fuel.

It's funny though that you still are arguing for the pocket battles, but then withdrawal... it seems the only issue we really disagree on is falling back after doing the pockets.

Well yes. Because falling back after doing the pockets mean the Germans are able to withdraw to positions they have prepared ahead of time within their limits of effective resupply while not falling back means they have to remain beyond the limits of effective resupply and have no means to prepare new positions due to issues of supply and weather. Falling back after doing the pockets also means the Soviet offensive will be substantially weaker by the time it reaches the German MLR while not falling back means it faces the full force and fury of Soviet action. The limited actions would also be over much faster, as the entirety of German focus would be on creating and destroying the pockets instead of being split by attempting to get to Moscow.

As to digging in, that would be a problem where ever they settled, because the muds/rain would destroy any entrenchment in October.

Properly prepared, field works constructed in September would not be affected by the October mud.

That caused the line to hold even in the extreme circumstances IOTL in January 1942.

What caused the line to hold in the extreme circumstances in January 1942 was over extension and exhaustion of Soviet forces after their advances in December. Although even with that factored in, the Soviets did have the paper strength to do it. Their qualitative failings was what undid them given the forces at their disposal. Stalin's premature decision to expand the offensive to the entire front diluted Soviet strength and extinguished any remaining hope of achieving a war-turning result.

As a POD have Hitler incapacitated or killed in October so someone else opted to cut it off as the muds hit.

There is no one else. The German High Command, not just Hitler, was pushing for an advance into Moscow right up until the Soviet counter-offensive broke. Franz Halder was issuing orders to seize positions east of Moscow as late as the end of November. Even some of the operational commanders believed it could still be done, which is what Von Bock (head of AGC) told Franz Halder on November 11th. It really all goes back to the German desire for a short war, which was the cause of most of Germany's strategic ills. They were so fixated on the sucker punch that they repeatedly failed to recognize key culminating points. So the idea that the German leadership as a whole was temperamentally disposed to give up on trying to take Moscow is as much a fantasy as the idea they were temperamentally disposed to not try for Moscow at all. To posit either idea, we have to accept that we are arguing from a position of hindsight and not as the Germans at the time saw it.

If the advance is cut off on the 14th or so of October as the muddy season hits the Germans have breathing space to sit still, fortify, pick their defensive lines, and rest/repair/replace until January.

Which they will never manage, as the supply state over those distances and the weather preclude any ability to regain their strength. The morale blow to German forces from being told that Moscow would not be taken would only compound this, given their hefty mental exhaustion by this stage. What improvements do manage to be derived made are offset by the luxury the Soviets get from being able to prepare and marshal even more forces peacefully for their counter-offensive instead of having to desperately throw them into defensive fighting almost as soon as many of them are raised.

For Robert Forczyk's Osprey campaign book on the Battle of Moscow:

I like the fact that he tries to support a claim that German losses did not wear them out by saying that V Corps took around 7% losses... which basically meant the corps was nearly halfway to combat ineffectiveness as the US Army defines.

In his diary, von Bock doesn't mention the battle Mtsensk at all on Oct 6 (despite giving an almost two pages account of the days events).

With regard to delaying Guderian's Panzer Army for a full week, it would seem that the encircled forces around Bryansk deserves most of the credit for that.

In his diary, von Bock doesn't mention the battle Mtsensk at all on Oct 6 (despite giving an almost two pages account of the days events). However, three days later he writes "Guderian scraping everything together to prevent large-scale escape" (from the Bryansk pocket).

Meanwhile, Halder in his diary does note the attack on the 6th, but on the next day he writes with regards to Second Panzer Army "Capture of Bryansk and encircling of the enemy elements opposite Second Army from the east may yet give them a good deal of trouble". On the 9th, he continues with "Guderian is feeling the increasing pressure on his western flank. He will have to drop his objections for the time and use his tanks against this threat, even though it may delay the next move beyond Orel, against Tula. The eastern flank is free of enemy pressure!"

With regards to the actual battle near Mtsensk, Zetterling in The Drive on Moscow, 1941, spends some time discussing it. He notes that only a small portion of 4th Pz Div took part in the action, that the Soviets had other forces in the area besides the 4th Tank Brigade, and that German casualties were low (Kampfgruppe Eberbach, of which the Mtsensk force was part of, reported losing 10 kia and 33 wia between 4-7 Oct - most of which probably happened around Mtsensk on the 6th) and 9 tank losses (of which 6 irrevocable).

Such casualties doesn't give the impression of an utterly savaged better part of a panzer division. Instead, it gives the impression of yet another Eastern Front myth of old.

The engagement at Mtsensk was not the entirety of the engagement (or rather, series of engagements) between the hodgepodge of forces (foremost of which was the 4th tank brigade) under Katukov and the various elements of Guderian's Panzer Group in the vicinity of Tula. The fights around Tula were all part of a week long running battle which ultimately saw the 4th Panzer division out of action and forced to retire. By contrast, the 4th Tank Brigade would continue to fight on for another two months around Moscow.

Or grasping at straws to prove a point. Guderian's forces were more hamstrung by the mud and distance than by Soviet resistance, especially in that particular action, which according to Forcyzk resulted in similar casualties to the Soviet in terms of AFVs and men lost, though the Germans lost more artillery and FLAK weapons in the surprise attack. It was a few hours and then over.

Forcyzk's numbers are just becoming more and more dubious then. The 4th Panzer Divisions history records 10 tanks knocked out at Mtsensk (6 of them irrecoverable), two 88's, one 100mm, and one 105mm. Soviet records show they lost 2 destroyed and 4 damaged. Total German losses to Katukov's forces comes out to 140 tanks and 50 assault guns, although I don't know the breakdown of irrecoverable vs damaged there. Total Soviet losses are still unknown, but Katukov only had 40 tanks to begin with and, as I already observed, he still had his tank brigade in a combat effective state for another 2 months...

And it was only after the fights along the Orel-Tula corridor that the weather turned really bad. Katukov's stand denied Guderian the chance to move and bought the Russians the time they needed for the weather to turn in their favor. It should also be noted that said weather didn't affect the 4th Tank Brigade all that much - while the 2nd Panzer Group was mired in mud, Katukov conducted a 350 mile road march north to reposition his forces for the defence of Moscow against the northern German pincer.
 
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Had he left it is likely the civil disorder and flight of civilians would have worsened and resistance fallen apart due to supply breaking down behind the defenders of Moscow, as fleeing civilians choked the rail lines.

In order to choke the rail lines, they would first have to be allowed to board trains though, no?

Besides, and this completely irrelevant to the overall discussion, given the nature of the USSR, I have little doubt that Stalin could have indeed relocated 100km east and still kept the impression that he was inside the city, lights turned on in his office (they actually did that..) and all.
 
Why was Stalin's presence in Moscow so important?

How would him not being there make the city fall into the hands of the Wehrmacht?
More and inspiration. Stalin was, to a great extent, the personification of the state. If he leaves then it will seriously worry the lower and mid-ranking bureaucrats, the people who actually ran things,
 
The lack of roads and the Raputitsa followed by a winter for which the Germans were totally unprepared for seem to be the key factors here.

One has to wonder - if Barbarossa could have gotten off even three weeks earlier could more have been accomplished? Given the huge distances involved and the supply situation that seems doubtful...
 

Deleted member 1487

Alright, this is going to be nightmarish to respond to, so I'm going to come back and edit in more responses when I have the time and interest.

The roads did not start to breakdown until the 9th. The Bryansk pocket was formed by the 6th and the Vyazma pocket by the 7th.
Guderian was reporting problems with mud on the 6th. And the formation of pockets meant the mobile elements closing the pocket, not all the pocketing forces in place or the pocket battle really having started to liquidate it. A handful of german forces weren't participating in it and race on, like the 2nd SS division, but even they got hit with mud and weather conditions as they tried to side step the pockets.

By your own admission, the first rains didn't start coming down until the 6th. Yet the rate of advance had been collapsing since the 2nd, dropping down to . You keep referring to Stahel, but you don't appear to have actually read him given that he does say a lot of what I say. He describes the German forces after the start of Typhoon as over-extended, under-resourced, and totally exhausted... just like I have been. He notes that the Germans resolutely failed to recover any strength during their brief operational pause in mid-October/late-November, which precludes the idea that they could do so by just sitting still away from their supply sources as opposed to falling back. He talks about Soviet resistance as being a more important factor then mud in stopping the Germans. He notes that local counter-attacks by Soviet And he describes Taifun as being a forlorn effort from beginning to end.
Snow actually. Mud was a factor within the first week of the offensive, which would be October 6th. The 'rate of advance' you mention is Guderians troops, which I already explained was an exceptional case because he had just conducted the Kiev offensive, had the weakest logistics, most worn down troops, and worst supply on hand situation because after Kiev he had to move immediately to his jump off point and then immediately attack with little to no rest. So his logistical forces were much worse than any other participating force during the offensive. His units aren't representative of the logistic situation, especially when he got hit with the mud first of any Panzer army. Sure, Stahel does say that, which is why it was surprising that the Germans were still able to advance to the gates of Moscow and it proves how badly the Soviets were in comparison if they were able to be rolled by a force like that. During the operational pause in late October-mid November they were stuck in positions FAR in advance of what I'm suggesting they'd stop at after the pocket battles. Had they stopped where I suggested they'd have the ability to supply better and recover a bit, especially because they wouldn't be preparing to advance again. That is the key point you are missing, they didn't fully stop pushing in the October-November 'pause' and were just getting ready to attack again, rather than really recover their forces and prepare to defend. Your point about them not being able to hold what they took actually belies the point, because they will do more moving if they fall back, rather than sit still on defensive lines after the pockets. They have a better chance to recover especially once Vyazma is connected to Smolensk by rail, which is was by November, then by sitting in place where I recommended rather than trying to advance or retreat. Stahel says the mud impacted the logistics, which is why Soviet resistance was able to hold until the mud bought them a major pause and ability to bring up even more reinforcements. By the time that the November attack resumed THAT was when Soviet resistance mattered more than the weather, not in October.

You can underrate both the ferocious Russian resistance, and the extremely strung out and vulnerable nature of the German army at that point, but it does not make it any more true. Weather means nothing without opposition.
I don't underrate it in November, it is just that in October they were destroyed and held out because the weather strangled German logistics to the point that they had to order a 3 week operational pause. Then the Soviets brought in more reinforcements and they checked the German advance from November on until the winter force the strategic order to change to the defensive for winter by OKW. Opposition in the face of Operation Taifun in October would not have been successful without the weather; the weather bought them time to prepare the final defenses, which did indeed hold on their own merits.

And truck columns were reaching Kalinin in November 1941. The problem isn't that supplies weren't getting in at all, with the exception of a multi-week period in November for several of the armies, the problem was that not remotely enough supplies were getting in for any kind of effective military operation, defensive or offensive.
Right, there wasn't a total cut in the supply lines, they were just throttled so that what was getting to Kalinin and the very front lines in November was not enough to sustain the advance, which whittled down the attacking force constantly more than combat. The thing is I'm not suggesting that they continue advance to Kalinin, they shouldn't have gone north of Rzhev,nor much further east. By November they were over 50 miles deeper than that, more in some places.

It held because the Soviet assault ran out of steam, having to cross the devastated wasteland. Even then, it barely held. It is entirely conceivable that it might have fallen anyways even under the OTL circumstances had the Soviets managed to a little more success.
The Soviet advance stopped there because German resistance coalesced on a shorter line, there was a functional rail line getting supplies to the front line, and logistics in general were much shortened. That is even with 3rd Panzer army having lost most of it's equipment near Moscow in December and 9th army having to abandon a lot in the retreat from Kalinin. The Germans were severely weakened in January just in equipment, forget manpower, than they were in October or even November having had to advance to Kalinin and supply that via road from at least Vyazma. Rzhev is half the distance to Kalinin from Vyazma. Not only that, but the Soviets lacked a rail line to supply them from Kalinin to Rzhev, so too had to use the same messed up road system that hobbled the Germans. They'd run out of steam trying to supply the front at Rzhev via roads from Kalinin anyway. Plus the Germans lines would be much shorter, therefore better manned.

Never mind you are proposing they do exactly that.
Clearly we disagree and you don't understand the difference between trying to supply Rzhev and Kalinin.

No, I said they'd be thrown back just as far as they were OTL in terms of overall distance. That this will end up with German lines further west is purely a function of the Soviets being able to begin their offensive from further west, particularly seeing as their logistical infrastructure (most of all, the rail network) between Rzhev and Moscow won't be torn up.
You can't apply the same metric, because German supply had to travel twice as far to get to Kalinin as Rzhev and didn't have a rail line or as good of roads to use. Not only that the line is shorter and the combat forces don't have to travel as far and have defensible terrain to pick to set up on vs. trying to hold the Kalinin bulge surrounded on 3 sides. It isn't even a remotely comparable situation, so trying to say they can be thrown back the same distance misses the fundamental differences in the situation. Soviet supply against Rzhev isn't as good as it was at Kalinin for one thing, plus the German lines are shorter and better supplied, so that changes everything.

Because you just assume they are less stretched out and in a better logistical situation. Neither assumption withstands scrutiny.
Look at a map. The distance between the supply hubs is halved by stopping at Rzhev vs. Kalinin and the front lines are shorter, plus without 3rd Panzer army advancing beyond the river line east of Rzhev 9th army can concentrate on a shorter line from Rzhev to 16th army, which is FAR shorter than it was IOTL at Kalinin. Not only that the line I am proposing at Rzhev was the historical one the 3rd Panzer and 9th army fell back to in January 1941 IOTL and held against much stronger Soviet forces, as 3rd Panzer and 9th army had suffered a lot on the attack and in the retreat, losing most of their heavy equipment. That wouldn't be the case if they stopped at Rzhev.

Instead, they lose it during the retreat back to Smolensk, which is basically where they reenact Rzhev IATL.
Ah no. You're just assuming OTL applies exactly to a totally different situation. That is not how alternate history works. Even the Soviet general staff historical analysis department would fire you for incompetence trying to pull that crap.

Yes, it was and no, it was not. The advances at the start was not sustainable, as the advances from October 14th-December 5th reveals. Had it been sustainable, it would have been kept up. The ability to continue a defined behavior is the dictionary definition of sustainability. You are confusing the result of German overextension with it's cause.
Um you're saying the period of advance after the point I say they should stop proves me wrong? Yes I know that part from October 14th-December 5th was unsustainable, which is exactly what I said they shouldn't do it! That was the period of overextension. We know what was sustainable, the Rzhev line I proposed, because even after 3rd Panzer lost most of its equipment and a bunch of men, much the same with 9th army in the retreat from Kalinin, they held the Rzhev line. Here the Germans forces wouldn't have expended everything from October 15th-January 1942 in the advance and retreat, so would have in a far better position to hold the line they historically held in much worse circumstances.

Attack and get smashed? I mean, that's what the Germans tended to do to Soviet attacks in this time period when they weren't overextended and beyond their limits of resupply like they were after the start of Taifun.
Sure, which would happen on the line I am suggesting considering the German would have attacked and smashed about 1 million Soviet soldiers in 2 weeks and left the Soviets crippled for winter. Leaving 1 million men and their equipment untouched right before winter is begging for a series of very bloody attacks that even though they would be smashed, would be more costly to stop than pocketing them and wiping them out in far more favorable circumstances, rather than letting them sit still, recover, reinforce, and attack on their terms. There is a reason the Germans preferred to seize the initiative and we know what they achieved from September 30th-October 14th. Its amazing what they achieve in those two weeks beyond supply as you claim.

Uh... they didn't sit on the defensive. They attacked in July and again in September.
In July AG-Center formed the Smolensk pocket and had to defend the line against Soviet attacks from the East to keep it shut, then sat there in August. In September Guderian attacked South, not East against the Soviet forces bashing away along the Smolensk axis.

They won't be intact. Their poor defensive dispositions and terrible quality meant that even local offensives would be enough to pocket and destroy them.
So we agree the pockets needed to be fought.

Yes, but those are going to be available whether the Germans go through with local offensives
The OTL pocket battles were local compared to the rest of Typhoon.

Actually, the Soviet forces at the start of Taifun were much less formidable then those that attacked in December-January IOTL precisely because they had been beaten down during the August-September counter-offensives. They consisted of the burnt-out survivors of those engagements and a whole bunch of effectively militia. All of the replacement equipment and the best manpower were being funneled into the formation of new forces. The fresh armies that had been raised in September had all been deployed south to patch over the losses from the Kiev disaster, absorbing the equipment from that year.

Not that any of this conversation really matters, given that the bulk of those forces get destroyed under my plan as much as they do yours.
You realize that the Soviets would have all the winter forces plus the tired 1.25 million men of the Fronts in front of Moscow, so eliminating them would be necessary. Do you have a quote about the Winter forces being better than the Autumn ones, because all I'm seeing is that the winter forces had less equipment than the Autumn ones at Vyazma and were very infantry and cavalry heavy without much else. They were just as much militia or the final regulars left as the Autumn forces.

Not any of it that had been west of the Urals. And certainly not any of it that was immediately in front of the Germans.
The regulars left were on the front line at the start of October, with some divisions yet engaged just coming in as the last ones like the 32nd rifle division in mid-October (which was promptly trashed on the road to Moscow and rendered combat ineffective in days, despite having full TOE and pre-war training).

I was referring to the whole continuum of the operation, from October to December. That should have been quite obvious from the wording. Work on your reading comprehension.
Yeah you have serious problem with over generalizing and implying things about an entire period when you should be breaking them down in to specific months or even weeks during a campaign of the length and scope of Taifun.

The logistics were crippling to begin with. Even at the start of the offensive, there were immense shortages of such important items as motor oil, engines, spare parts, and tires. Even the fuel supplies were inadequate: by the Germans own admission, they would only be enough to last until mid-November without factoring in weather conditions. And indeed, by the time November rolls around, the Smolensk depots were indeed empty and the Panzer Groups were having to send their trucks all the way to Orsha to find fuel.
Sure, yet the Germans destroyed the vast majority of the divisions opposite them at the start of the operation and captured/destroyed their equipment, while then fighting to the gates of Moscow. Their supply situation was better than you claim or the Soviet combat ability was worse. Again as I said they needed to cut the offensive off by mid-October to survive the winter intact. And German estimates need to be taken with a grain of salt, they didn't really know what their requirements would be and were also trying to convince Hitler to cut off the offensive, so could have been overstating the case to convince him to stop the attack.

Well yes. Because falling back after doing the pockets mean the Germans are able to withdraw to positions they have prepared ahead of time within their limits of effective resupply while not falling back means they have to remain beyond the limits of effective resupply and have no means to prepare new positions due to issues of supply and weather. Falling back after doing the pockets also means the Soviet offensive will be substantially weaker by the time it reaches the German MLR while not falling back means it faces the full force and fury of Soviet action. The limited actions would also be over much faster, as the entirety of German focus would be on creating and destroying the pockets instead of being split by attempting to get to Moscow.
The Germans had the breathing room to prepare positions in their new forward zones after the pockets. Plus they can sit still long enough to digest the pockets and pick defensive lines that look good. Before winter they will have converted the rail lines over too and have to do less moving sitting still than retreating in late October when they finished with the pockets. There are pros and cons to the withdrawal, a major con would be that it could only happen in late October when the muds were starting to force the operational pause; retreating during that isn't really a good option.

Properly prepared, field works constructed in September would not be affected by the October mud.
You specifically have mentioned the rains and washout of rails. Having read enough military history mud and rains will impact any prepared position if not constantly maintained, which troops on the attack pocketing Soviet troops could simply not do.

What caused the line to hold in the extreme circumstances in January 1942 was over extension and exhaustion of Soviet forces after their advances in December. Although even with that factored in, the Soviets did have the paper strength to do it. Their qualitative failings was what undid them given the forces at their disposal. Stalin's premature decision to expand the offensive to the entire front diluted Soviet strength and extinguished any remaining hope of achieving a war-turning result.
What caused the Germans to fold in December and January was their overextension on the road to Moscow, cutting it off nearly 100 miles west in October would have solved that problem. Soviet paper strength is only in manpower, it says nothing about supply, communications, artillery, etc. which they were severely lacking in. The qualitative factors of the untrained manpower is on top of the lack of equipment and logistics. No matter what the Soviets brought to the table in December or January it wouldn't matter if the Germans are holding the mid-October lines and never went after Kalinin.

There is no one else. The German High Command, not just Hitler, was pushing for an advance into Moscow right up until the Soviet counter-offensive broke. Franz Halder was issuing orders to seize positions east of Moscow as late as the end of November. Even some of the operational commanders believed it could still be done, which is what Von Bock (head of AGC) told Franz Halder on November 11th. It really all goes back to the German desire for a short war, which was the cause of most of Germany's strategic ills. They were so fixated on the sucker punch that they repeatedly failed to recognize key culminating points. So the idea that the German leadership as a whole was temperamentally disposed to give up on trying to take Moscow is as much a fantasy as the idea they were temperamentally disposed to not try for Moscow at all. To posit either idea, we have to accept that we are arguing from a position of hindsight and not as the Germans at the time saw it.


Which they will never manage, as the supply state over those distances and the weather preclude any ability to regain their strength. The morale blow to German forces from being told that Moscow would not be taken would only compound this, given their hefty mental exhaustion by this stage. What improvements do manage to be derived made are offset by the luxury the Soviets get from being able to prepare and marshal even more forces peacefully for their counter-offensive instead of having to desperately throw them into defensive fighting almost as soon as many of them are raised.


I like the fact that he tries to support a claim that German losses did not wear them out by saying that V Corps took around 7% losses... which basically meant the corps was nearly halfway to combat ineffectiveness as the US Army defines.
US and German combat effectiveness definitiions were quite different in WW2, the Germans were continually able to fight effectively long after what US official estimates would have conceived of. By their definition the German divisions were generally combat ineffective pre-Taifun, yet they wiped out 1 million Soviet troops and pushed to the gates of Moscow. While the losses in the pockets were tough, they weren't crippling, especially for the scale of the victory. Stahel goes too anecdotal to make points about how devastated the Germans were after the pockets, which fails to explain just how they were able to do so well given all the other problems they had until December.


Forcyzk's numbers are just becoming more and more dubious then. The 4th Panzer Divisions history records 10 tanks knocked out at Mtsensk (6 of them irrecoverable), two 88's, one 100mm, and one 105mm. Soviet records show they lost 2 destroyed and 4 damaged. Total German losses to Katukov's forces comes out to 140 tanks and 50 assault guns, although I don't know the breakdown of irrecoverable vs damaged there. Total Soviet losses are still unknown, but Katukov only had 40 tanks to begin with and, as I already observed, he still had his tank brigade in a combat effective state for another 2 months...

Forcyzk's numbers are exactly what you just said for 4th Panzer. He lists much higher numbers of German claims against the Soviets and says they were dubious and probably half of what was claimed. Now though you seem to be using Soviet claims about German losses and attribute them all to one Soviet unit, despite the fact there were a bunch of Soviet units, including armor, that were in the area and as Per70 pointed out already Guderian had to strip armor from his advance on Tula to reinforce the Bryansk pockets, meaning the losses you're attributed to Katukov's forces also came from the Bryansk fighting and other combat units in the area besides Katukov. So again statistical games to push a myth, one very easily disproven. Plus as even you suggest German AFV losses could also be a variety of combat and non-combat breakdowns that were repairable.


And it was only after the fights along the Orel-Tula corridor that the weather turned really bad. Katukov's stand denied Guderian the chance to move and bought the Russians the time they needed for the weather to turn in their favor. It should also be noted that said weather didn't affect the 4th Tank Brigade all that much - while the 2nd Panzer Group was mired in mud, Katukov conducted a 350 mile road march north to reposition his forces for the defence of Moscow against the northern German pincer.
The weather got bad enough to impact supply and combat operations starting on the 6th of October. Things got much worse after that. Plus as I explained yet again up top Guderian's forces had been in continual combat and movement since September and had the worst serviceability rates for AFVs and logistics trucks of any army in the German army in 1941 going into Taifun as a result; they hadn't even had a chance to build up supplies for the advance, so they were hamstrung by logistics from the beginning because they were less ready that anyone in the campaign for it, having just conducted Kiev. Also the Soviets advanced over rail and roads closer to Moscow that weren't impacted by the weather in the area that Guderian had to advance, plus had rail supply for their logistics that Guderian did not.
 
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these sort of discussions branch out into so many different areas that its frankly very hard to keep track of everything unless it's you who's responding, and not really fun either.
 
The engagement at Mtsensk was not the entirety of the engagement (or rather, series of engagements) between the hodgepodge of forces (foremost of which was the 4th tank brigade) under Katukov and the various elements of Guderian's Panzer Group in the vicinity of Tula. The fights around Tula were all part of a week long running battle which ultimately saw the 4th Panzer division out of action and forced to retire. By contrast, the 4th Tank Brigade would continue to fight on for another two months around Moscow.

I'm going by the assumption that what you refer to as the fights around Tula refer to the actions around Mtsensk from Oct 6-12? Am I correct in that, or do you refer to another time period?

When you write about various elements of Guderian's Panzer Group - which elements besides 4th PzDiv are you referring to then? From what I can gather, the rest of XXIV Motorized Corps were busy with other tasks.

Further more (going be Forczyk in Tank warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-42) on Oct 12, the 4th Pz Div did capture Mtsensk, forcing the 4th Tank Brigade to retreat in haste in what seems to be a very successful day from the German standpoint.

Total German losses to Katukov's forces comes out to 140 tanks and 50 assault guns, although I don't know the breakdown of irrecoverable vs damaged there.

Forczyk does put the number of German tank losses at 8 destroyed and 10 damaged in the week long battle (although some of those losses probably occurred against 11th Tank Brigade and others).

What's your source for the loss of 140 tanks and 50 assault guns? And what's the timespan for this claim?
According to Lopukhovsky in the Viaz'ma catastrophe; the 4th Tank Brigade claimed 133 tanks knocked out (and 0 assault guns) in this engament. When your figures seems to be higher than even the Soviets own battlefield claims - and much higher than what the German documents show, I get a bit suspicious. :)

Total Soviet losses are still unknown, but Katukov only had 40 tanks to begin with and, as I already observed, he still had his tank brigade in a combat effective state for another 2 months...

Forczyk puts the number of tanks in 4th Tank Brigade at 60 (7 KV, 22 T-34 and 31 BT-2/5/7).
Lopukhovsky presents a figure of 49 tanks, but doesn't specifically say that that is complete.

The latter puts 4th Tank Brigade's losses at 28 (9 destroyed, 6 missing and 13 damaged and recovered).
In addition to this, we have to add tank losses to the 11th Tank Brigade (which entered the battle with about 50 tanks).

Katukov's stand denied Guderian the chance to move and bought the Russians the time they needed for the weather to turn in their favor.

It should also be noted that the 4th Pz Div had advanced about 250km in a week when they arrived at Mtsensk. I think it's fair to say that the German logistical capacity did not allow any advance beyond that against any determined opposition (or do you disagree with that?) - especially when the German focus was directed elsewhere.

In summary, my main qualm with your post was in regards to your initial claim which could be read as one single Tank Brigade decimating a PzDiv and halting a Panzer Army, when it seems as if one might just as well write a Guards Rifle Corps halting parts of a Panzer Division while inflicting roughly similar casualties on each others.
 
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