There's mud and then there's the Raputitsa. The former did nothing to hinder German operations.
Given the quality of Russian roads mud really did hinder the Germans and that was nearly going on since the start of Taifun.
The latter set in around October 10th.
Between the 7th-10th depending on the area and that was before the pockets had been closed, which hindered the ability of the Germans to do so and wore them down for the advance after the pockets had been resolved.
Nor did the Raputitsa set in evenly across the entirety of Army Group Center. Some locations experienced much drier weather for a longer period of time then others. Yet the German advance even in these areas was still stalled out at the same time and just as rapidly.
Examples please. 2nd Panzer Army had a lot further to travel and had the most worn out troops in AG-Center, so had the most problems and stalled out before the rest of AG-Center. They are exceptional compared to the rest of the attacking Taifun forces, save for 2nd army, which had also taken part in Kiev and used the same weak logistics net as Guderian's forces.
They were breaking down even before the closure of the pockets:
2nd Panzer sure, but as I said above that was based on specific circumstances that did not apply to other armies of AG-Center. The slow down in advance came as a result of the turn of the weather before the pockets closed.
the rate of advance was one of constant decline on a day-by-day basis while the casualties marched upward.
More importantly because of the weather.
This was almost regardless of the weather conditions.
No, the weather got worse every day of Taifun and the slow down tracks very closely with the weather making every step east that much further. Forczyk and Stahel both describe that.
Both before and after the mud set-in, the Germans were able to make gains... but they were destroying themselves in doing so and had been since September 30th.
They were able to make gains for a time, but it was the weather that slowed them down and wore them out. The mud put the parking brakes on and ground the advance down after resistance collapsed for the most part. Logistics breaking down in the mud did more to slow the advance than Soviet resistance. It wasn't the combat losses that were a problem, their losses on the offensive were FAR less than they were on the defensive in front of Smolensk, which in 'Barbarossa Derailed' Glantz calls the worst period of combat loss to AG-Center from June-December 1941.
German supply state around Rzhev in January 1942 was no better then it had been at Kalinin, the Moscow outskirts, or even Kaluga in December 1941, what changed is that the Soviets had strung themselves out in their own counter-offensive which turned the whole thing into a bog. If the Germans stop at Rzhev, then the only real differense is that is where they get hammered and they are still thrown back about as far as they were from the Moscow outskirts. Typhoon was what strung them and caused them all the difficulties they experienced in terms of both advancing and erecting an effective defense.
Actually it was much better at Rzhev than Kalinin, because trains were actually reaching Rzhev in January, but none had reached Kalinin ever. In fact Rzhev was much closer to German logistics hubs than any area you mentioned and was getting some rail supply, which is why it held, but none of the other places you mentioned was getting rail supply in December. Also the weather in January was better than it was in December. Plus of course with the exception of Kaluga the distance by road to the outskirts of Moscow and Kalinin were logistically unsustainable. Kaluga had to be abandoned only due to flank issues with other German armies; 4th Army stood it's ground against all Soviet frontal attacks.
If the Germans stop at Rzhev they aren't worn out on the advance or lose the men they did during the Soviet counteroffensive trying to hold beyond their logistical sustainment abilities. Nor does the Klin bulge and equipment loss happen. So 9th army can dig in while intact and in an area where they can get rail supply as conversions catch up and the VL-Rzhev rail line is repaired. 3rd Panzer army could hold their flank, which given that it wouldn't be worn out on the road to Kalinin and Moscow in October-December would be in fantastic comparative shape by the time the Soviets can attack that winter. Having two months at least in which to do maintenance work and dig in means they could hold the same line they did historically of the Rzhev salient. I'm surprised you think they'd be thrown back further when they aren't all stretched out in worse logistical situations further east and north over a wider front they couldn't cover; they'd have a much shorter front to hold and be far less worn down and not lose a ton of equipment in Kalinin and at Klin during the retreat back to Rzhev in winter. The problem the Germans had wasn't Taifun as an entire operation, it was the wild advance from October 14th-December 5th; everything up until then was sustainable. Kalinin-Klin-Moscow was too far for them and the Soviets took advantage; without wearing themselves out by the 2nd half of the campaign in the Rasputitsa, as well as holding a much longer frontage come December, they wouldn't be in an overextended position to be crumbled at first blow.
Total nonsense. Some of the worst tactical defeats were inflicted upon the Germans on the road to Moscow that October. The most notable example was near Tula, where a Soviet tank brigade utterly savaged the better part of a German panzer division and effectively stopped Guderian Panzer Army completely for a full week.
Logistics stopped Guderian, not one tank brigade. Mud was far more a factor than anything. Besides one tactical engagement does not a campaign make.
As I said, not all the Soviet forces would be wiped out... mainly those in the first line of defense (which is a pretty substantial heft and represents the bulk of Soviet losses). The rest would have to come later, in 1942, when the reconstituted Wehrmacht is able to resume the offensive.
The only major problem with that is what the Soviets would do over the winter until the German offensive season started. Remember the Soviet forces east of Smolensk dealt AG-Center their worst losses of the campaign when they sat on the defensive in late July-September; leaving them intact and reinforced by the December-January mobilizations of further Soviet forces will mean a rough winter for AG-Center.
The Soviet forces the Germans faced at the beginning of Typhoon were pretty devoid of heavy equipment and represented basically the worst trained personnel the Soviets fielded in the entire war.
You mean other than the forces mobilized in October-January. The Soviet forces at the start of Taifun in front of Moscow had been the ones beating at AG-center and inflicting the worst losses they'd experienced of the campaign to that point. Soviet forces were worn down too of course and weren't what they were in August, but were much more formidable than the Soviet units that attacked in December-January IOTL.
The last of the pre-war standing army had been wiped out at Smolensk and Kiev while the next wave of reservist call-ups, who were getting dibs on the heavy gear, were still forming up and training in the strategic reserve. What the Germans faced at the start of Typhoon mainly constituted little more then hastily assembled militia's. Even many of them were still undergoing basic remedial training when Typhoon started. That even such forces were able to inflict the delays and losses upon the Germans as they did is indicative of how the Germans had rolled past their strategic culmination point.
The pre-war army still existed by December. At Mozhiask the 32nd rifle division was a pre-war formation not yet engaged in the fighting and more came later and fought in the December counteroffensive. By October 1st the Soviet troops East of Smolensk were the last of the pre-war troops yet committed to the fighting and were wiped out in the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets with some exceptions. The vast majority of the heavy equipment available in the field was located with these units, who were better equipped than the attacking forces in December-January. Yes, the newly mobilized troops were getting the freshly produced equipment from evacuated industries now starting production again, but even as late as January 1942 2nd Shock army was no gun sights for their artillery when they attacked along the Volkhov and were well short of TOE, which contributed to their destruction in Spring. The forces in front of Moscow in October were more trained and better equipped than the units that attacked later in December-January, which were hastily mobilized militia without training or the majority of their heavy equipment.
The German rail supply net was in a state of total collapse by the start of October from the strain of just trying to support the start of Typhoon. Then the raputitsa's rains washed out the hastily reconstructed rail-beds and then the freeze set in and German locomotive boilers started to explode due to the cold. Even getting enough fuel to run the supply trucks that ran between the rail stations and the depots was impossible. Adding winter and entrenching gear? Total fantasy. Additionally, the Raputitsa and then the freeze meant the Germans found that they couldn't entrench without specialized equipment they didn't have on hand. Just creating something as basic as foxholes required them to improvise by using artillery shells to blow the holes in the ground. If the Germans want to prepare reasonable winter defensive positions and stock up on supplies, the time to do it is before the weather and distance makes it impossible. They can only construct such things as heated prepared positions in the territory they control in September, which precludes trying to hold any land taken in subsequent offensives in October.
The freeze didn't happen in October. There were washouts in Belarus in September, which were a problem, the muds set in around October 7th along with massive rain, but the logistics didn't really become crippling until toward the end of October. The majority of logistical issues you describe happened either before and after the pocket battles, though mud was increasingly a factor as the pockets were being closed and liquidated. The problems really became massive as they exploited after the pockets were destroyed, yet they still advance over 100 miles to the gates of Moscow. Pretty impressive given all of those problems. The train issue with the freeze happened in December-January BTW, not October or even November. The problem wasn't the start of Taifun, it was the continuation of it after the pocket battles.
It's funny though that you still are arguing for the pocket battles, but then withdrawal...it seems the only issue we really disagree on is falling back after doing the pockets. As to digging in, that would be a problem where ever they settled, because the muds/rain would destroy any entrenchment in October. In November the frost still allowed for entrenchment without extraordinary measures that were required in December-January. Then though the Germans just used TNT to blast entrenchments into the ground. That caused the line to hold even in the extreme circumstances IOTL in January 1942. Mid-October is just fine to start entrenching. After liquidating the pockets they can dig in along defensible chose terrain at their leisure and rail extension didn't take long to get to Vyasma and even Rzhev, which IIRC was converted by November and getting train supply.
Yes. Obviously. But then there is also no way either he, or the rest of the German High Command, would have stopped Typhoon either. They were just too committed to defeating the Soviets ASAP. Trying to appeal to the Hitler-factor neatly torpedos both of our ideas and indeed the entire OP. If this conversation is going to continue forward, we have to accept that we are engaging in hindsight strategizing to begin with.
There is more of a case for stopping after the pocket battles and settling in than doing the pocket battles as you suggest and then retreating. As a POD have Hitler incapacitated or killed in October so someone else opted to cut it off as the muds hit.
So this more or less boils down to this:
If the Germans stop after pocketing 1 million Soviets at V&B...
W: they can set up defenses and hold the line no problem
O: they can't set up defenses and will get hammered and pushed back to the same degree as OTL
While the truth may be somewhere in between, I'm more inclined to side with the "Germans can hold out" view on this one.
Just my 2 cents.
Pretty much read my response above. As it was after the pockets of V-B the Soviets planned to sit on the strategic defensive until they finished mobilizing and preparing in January 1942; it was the German advance to the outskirts of Moscow in December that forced an early counterattack. If the advance is cut off on the 14th or so of October as the muddy season hits the Germans have breathing space to sit still, fortify, pick their defensive lines, and rest/repair/replace until January.
For Robert Forczyk's Osprey campaign book on the Battle of Moscow:
Von Bock claimed that Army Group Centre captured 673,098 prisoners, 1,277 tanks and 4,378 artillery pieces within the Vyazma–Bryansk Pockets, and another 300,000 Soviet troops were killed. Tens of thousands more troops were wounded or scattered to the four winds, leaving the Soviets badly outnumbered on the Moscow axis until reinforcements could arrive. It is certain the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts lost 50–80 per cent of their troops, 97 per cent of their armour and 80 per cent of their artillery in the pocket battles. However, it was significant that eight out of nine Soviet cavalry divisions survived.
Some historians have suggested that the Kessel or pocket battles ‘wore out’ the Wehrmacht in a series of attritional battles but German losses during the battle of the Vyazma Pocket were not excessive. Colonel General Ruoff’s V Corps suffered 743 killed, 2,720 wounded and 88 missing during the period 2–14 October (a loss rate of about 7 per cent). During the same period, V Corps captured 19,882 prisoners, 133 tanks, 322 artillery pieces and six Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. At the conclusion of the Vyazma fighting, V Corps still had almost 80 per cent of its personnel. Furthermore, German equipment losses during the Vyazma fighting were negligible.
Even accounting for German over-claiming, in terms of equipment and manpower the forces destroyed during the V-B pockets were critical to the Germans surviving the winter intact if the Moscow offensive was called off by mid-October. Leaving forces like that untouched was not viable. That said having taken them out the last mobilized Soviet forces in 1941 could simply not replace the losses of V-B effectively, which gives the Germans the ability to handle any Soviet offensives if they stop short and spend half of October and all of November and perhaps all of December on the defensive and preparing for Soviet attacks. At no period of the 1941 campaign did the Germans ever have that long to sit unmolested on the defensive, which is hugely important to being able to prepare for the freeze and Soviet winter offensive.