WI: The German Government accept the French overtures before Versailles

[Imladrik]

In March 1919 the French delegations for the Versailles treaty were stuck between the Loyd Georges maximalists views and the moralists view of Wilson and started talks with the Germans through French "ambassador" to Berlin. The French were willing to talk about the peace settlement in general (including territorial clauses) but they stressed especially the French Government's intention to discuss financial and economic questions, such as reparation, reconstruction and industrial collaboration. What the French proposed was basically a political arrangement. Those efforts were even followed after the Germans first rejected them, in 1920 and 1922 (far from the sadly far too common view on this board that the French had maximalists aims at the treaty of Versailles). The proposal fell through due to the Germans misunderstanding Wilson's position completely (the guy was actually the one that pushed for the so-called "war guilt clause", not the French who were realists, not moralists like Wilson).
source

So what would happen if Germany accepted ?

 

[Kowita]

Bump for interest.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The Germans would have to realize that Wilson's 14 Points were off the table and that this was a better option than was being negotiated. The Germans were of the opinion that the French were the maximal PoV at Versailles, so they had little reason to negotiate on their terms, as they thought the US was there moderating things. Somehow you'd have to get them to realize that they could get better terms through back channels.

But could you make more clear that differences between what the French were proposing as part of the deal and how that differed from the ToV? I'm not seeing any significant difference.

 

[Imladrik]

The Germans would have to realize that Wilson's 14 Points were off the table and that this was a better option than was being negotiated.

The 14 points were not of the table but misunderstood by the germans as were Wilson goals :

Wilson told to Loyd Georges on June 2 1919 that "he was not willing to change anything in the treaty simply because it was severen; that he wanted this to be a historic lesson, so that people might know that they could not do anything of the sort the Germans attempted without suffering the severest kind of punishment."

The Germans were of the opinion that the French were the maximal PoV at Versailles, so they had little reason to negotiate on their terms, as they thought the US was there moderating things. Somehow you'd have to get them to realize that they could get better terms through back channels.

But could you make more clear that differences between what the French were proposing as part of the deal and how that differed from the ToV? I'm not seeing any significant difference.

Less reparations (and no inclusions of pensions, so the only reparations would be on damage to civilian property (so mostly in France and Belgium) and more importantly that the annuity were to be determined by a commission that Germany was a part of. I don't know if the French were willing to let go of the Military restrictions, but they were willing to talk about the territorial concessions (so probably no Saar mandate, i don't know enough about who pushed for the territorial changes in the east [probably Wilson though]). France would probably refuse unification between Austria and Germany without very solid insurance from the German side.

In fact what the Germans should have realized was that France as the smallest power (outside of Italy) remaining after the first WW wanted only security (and not to rely on the Anglo-Saxon, who were unreliable as was proven afterward), not revenge.

 

[NoMommsen]

Less reparations (and no inclusions of pensions, so the only reparations would be on damage to civilian property (so mostly in France and Belgium) and more importantly that the annuity were to be determined by a commission that Germany was a part of. I don't know if the French were willing to let go of the Military restrictions, but they were willing to talk about the territorial concessions (so probably no Saar mandate, i don't know enough about who pushed for the territorial changes in the east [probably Wilson though]). France would probably refuse unification between Austria and Germany without very solid insurance from the German side.

In fact what the Germans should have realized was that France as the smallest power (outside of Italy) remaining after the first WW wanted only security (and not to rely on the Anglo-Saxon, who were unreliable as was proven afterward), not revenge.

OK, I've read your source now. And tried to find some countercheck, even though its mentioned already that there should be no records of it from german side - what really puzzles me, since rerarations were for the germans a awfull big theme. But I could not find anything in the archives of Reichs-chancellery as well as in the archives of the german foreign office (from 1918 to 1945 they are published).

However, as a german politician I would have been very suspicious about such "overtures".
What guarantees could they give to stand to their word ? ... and being able to push their scheme through ? France wasn't able to decide this issue on itself.
Then the question for discretion and the rather conspirational approach. Nothing in writing, only some words and these not comming or related to the BIG man (Clemenceau) himself.
And beside the possible reduction of reparations (from what sum ? at that moment not known at all) they made no offers, only some very cloudy "maybe"s.
In case there has been such offers by the french (of waht I am not fully convinced yet), I could understand the germans about NOT jumping on them very well.


Other than that, from the knowledge of this source, I would say the french tried again what they couldn't achive in the beging : by taking germany as hostage to move/force Britain and especially the USA into a postwar continuation of interlocked, statecontrolled worldwide economy-block (with swaying away the interallied [french] wardebts), as they established in the latter part of the war.