WI: The German Confederation succeeds

[Perfidious Albion]

It's not primarily a question of political judgment but of a personal one.

Bismarck had been Wilhelm's Minister-President for the past year, and had worked for him in other capacities before. So it's reasonable to suppose that he had learned a bit about the latter's mental processes.

So if he thought there was a real possibility that Wilhelm would fall in with the proposed reform, I don't see any obvious reason to doubt him.

And Bismarck, who knew his man (as by your own admission you do not) clearly wasn't prepared to bank on it.

If the success or failure of the Congress had been determined purely by the decisions of Wilhelm I, that argument might well stand. As it is, the argument doesn't (in my opinion). It would be determined by the behaviour of various figures (most prominently Franz Josef and Wilhelm I), how they reacted to each other, the demands of various figures and how they impacted the decision-making of other figures, how persuasively various figures communicated to each other… Bismarck could have known Wilhelm I perfectly and he still wouldn't know the result of the Congress without a keen understanding of how nations viewed their long-term interests, and even with such an understanding it would be difficult to predict the interrelated actions of those various figures. His treatment of France and Russia is sufficient to convince me that he didn't have that keen understanding.

As for personal knowledge of Wilhelm I, by my own admission I indeed do not. But even there, I'm not sure I'm convinced that Bismarck knew him so excellently. When Wilhelm II was growing up Bismarck had far more than a year with him and was in far more of a position of authority and knowledge, but he misjudged Wilhelm II's character so badly that he was sacked and ended up a bitter, respected but powerless old man.

If you are simply arguing that Wilhelm's presence in Frankfurt does not guarantee success, I have no quarrel with that. If FJ pitched his demands too high, he could indeed have yet snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. However, my impression from your messages is that you view failure as a virtual certainty, which afaics the evidence does not support.

I am arguing both. My argument that failure is a virtual certainty comes from the contradicting interests of Austria and Prussia, not from the particular figures involved. I only started speaking of the particular figures involved as a counter-argument to the idea of Wilhelm I personally causing German unity and Bismarck personally denying it, first proposed by Alpha Trion and later taken up by yourself.

 

[Mikestone8]

If the success or failure of the Congress had been determined purely by the decisions of Wilhelm I, that argument might well stand. As it is, the argument doesn't (in my opinion). It would be determined by the behaviour of various figures (most prominently Franz Josef and Wilhelm I), how they reacted to each other, the demands of various figures and how they impacted the decision-making of other figures, how persuasively various figures communicated to each other… Bismarck could have known Wilhelm I perfectly and he still wouldn't know the result of the Congress without a keen understanding of how nations viewed their long-term interests, and even with such an understanding it would be difficult to predict the interrelated actions of those various figures. His treatment of France and Russia is sufficient to convince me that he didn't have that keen understanding.

Not sure what you mean about Russia and France. He dealt with then at least as well as any other German statesman could have done.

Much indeed depends on how Wilhelm I and Franz Josef hit it off at Frankfurt, and yes, FJ could still blow it. However, he seems to have been very keen to get Wilhelm to Frankfurt, which suggests he'd do his best to avoid offending him.

And what specifically would they disagree about? The main disadvantage for Prussia would be the risk of getting drawn into Austrian wars in Italy or the Balkans, where Prussian interests weren't at stake. However, the other German states would probably be equally unenthusiastic about that prospect, so Prussia would almost certainly have been able to defeat such a proposal even under the new rules. Wilhelm might have held out for a legal right of veto on declarations of war, but in a pinch FJ could have conceded that, since it only made de jure a power which Prussia would in any case have had de facto.

As for personal knowledge of Wilhelm I, by my own admission I indeed do not. But even there, I'm not sure I'm convinced that Bismarck knew him so excellently. When Wilhelm II was growing up Bismarck had far more than a year with him and was in far more of a position of authority and knowledge, but he misjudged Wilhelm II's character so badly that he was sacked and ended up a bitter, respected but powerless old man.

You can know things without always being able to do anything about them. Wilhelm II reckoned that he ought to be running the show himself, which just wasn't compatible with the Bismarckian regime. It didn't have to happen quite so fast as it did, but happen it would.

I am arguing both. My argument that failure is a virtual certainty comes from the contradicting interests of Austria and Prussia, not from the particular figures involved. I only started speaking of the particular figures involved as a counter-argument to the idea of Wilhelm I personally causing German unity and Bismarck personally denying it, first proposed by Alpha Trion and later taken up by yourself.

When the states concerned are absolute or near-absolute monarchies, the particular figures involved are hugely important.

I can't see Wilhelm I attacking Austria if not manipulated into it by Bismarck, and if he doesn't want to fight, the only alternative is a Confederation in which Austria is at least the nominal senior partner. So if Wilhelm doesn't do one he at some point may well agree tot he other.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Not sure what you mean about Russia and France. He dealt with then at least as well as any other German statesman could have done.

I doubt it. IOTL Bismarck performed such hugely intelligent moves as lecturing French diplomats about the weakness and untrustworthiness of the French nation during negotiations. As for Russia, he set up an alliance with Russia which, in Russia's eyes, committed him to a level of support for Russia that he ultimately wasn't prepared to give, thus making Russia feel that Germany had betrayed Russia, setting the stage for the end of the Reinsurance Treaty and the Franco-Russian Alliance; in essence, he bluffed and got called on it, with disastrous results for Germany.

That's not to say, of course, that Bismarck had no great achievements; he had several. I'm especially thinking of how he managed to get the states of what would become the German Empire on his side between the Austro- and Franco-Prussian Wars, and, in internal policy, of how he successfully established himself as leader of Prussia and overrode the wishes of both the Landtag and, on at least two occasions (the affair with crowns and titles at the coronation and the proposed march to Vienna), Wilhelm I himself.

But in conclusion, I think that Bismarck was far less competent in foreign policy than he is commonly portrayed; that's not to say that he was atrocious, only that he wasn't the diplomatic genius some present him as and that he made plenty of mistakes, so to assume that, if presented with a foreign policy decision, he would make the right one is, I think, utterly flawed.

Much indeed depends on how Wilhelm I and Franz Josef hit it off at Frankfurt, and yes, FJ could still blow it. However, he seems to have been very keen to get Wilhelm to Frankfurt, which suggests he'd do his best to avoid offending him.

The Germans were eager to form an understanding with the British in the Haldane Mission and, if I recall correctly, the reverse was true as well. The problem was that neither side was prepared to make enough concessions to satisfy the other. For both sides to want an agreement isn't even remotely sufficient for an agreement to occur: necessary, yes, but not sufficient.

And what specifically would they disagree about? [snip]

Prussia has no reason to accept Austrian hegemony in Germany when it is Prussia's goal to make itself more powerful there and able to rival other great powers (and one only needs to look at Wilhelm I's own actions since even before he took the throne to know that Prussian power was of deep concern to him).

You can know things without always being able to do anything about them. Wilhelm II reckoned that he ought to be running the show himself, which just wasn't compatible with the Bismarckian regime. It didn't have to happen quite so fast as it did, but happen it would.

Let's not descend too far into generality. Bismarck had a policy on socialists that differed from Wilhelm II's. Bismarck tried to put forward his policy, and was promptly rendered powerless by Wilhelm II. Unless you're advancing the claim that Bismarck actually cared so much about that particular matter that he would rather lose power than continue to work for the Kaiser and just tolerate defeat on this one issue, I'd say he made a misjudgement about Wilhelm II.

When the states concerned are absolute or near-absolute monarchies, the particular figures involved are hugely important.

I can't see Wilhelm I attacking Austria if not manipulated into it by Bismarck, and if he doesn't want to fight, the only alternative is a Confederation in which Austria is at least the nominal senior partner. So if Wilhelm doesn't do one he at some point may well agree tot he other.

The point about (near-)absolute monarchies is fair, but IOTL the German Confederation dissolved in a blatant case of Prussian aggression and 'might makes right'. It might have dissolved, instead, in a diplomatic impasse where neither Prussia nor Austria was prepared to make enough concessions to satisfy the other. There is no 'only alternative'; Prussia has alternatives other than waging an outright aggressive war against Austria and tame submission to Austria.

 

[Mikestone8]

Prussia has no reason to accept Austrian hegemony in Germany when it is Prussia's goal to make itself more powerful there and able to rival other great powers (and one only needs to look at Wilhelm I's own actions since even before he took the throne to know that Prussian power was of deep concern to him).

[snip]

The point about (near-)absolute monarchies is fair, but IOTL the German Confederation dissolved in a blatant case of Prussian aggression and 'might makes right'. It might have dissolved, instead, in a diplomatic impasse where neither Prussia nor Austria was prepared to make enough concessions to satisfy the other. There is no 'only alternative'; Prussia has alternatives other than waging an outright aggressive war against Austria and tame submission to Austria.

But would the 1863 proposals have amounted to "Austrian hegemony" or "tame submission to Austria"? Afaics, that would only happen if Prussia was so hamfisted that all the lesser states automatically sided with Austria against her, as otherwise they had no reason to do so. After all, their sovereignty, such as it was, depended on the two big boys balancing each other. If either Austria (as OTL) or Prussia were excluded from German affairs, their freedom of action would be a sham.

Franz Josef would need to give some ground about military affairs, probably allowing Prussia a formal veto on declarations of war (though afaics she would have a de facto one anyway) but after all, only six months later he would allow an Austrian army to fight under a Prussian general, so he may well be flexible on this point.

Success in 1863 depends on two monarchs, of "very average" IQs, being able to reach a deal that satisfies the two of them. Not a sure bet, certainly, but equally not by any means ASB.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

But would the 1863 proposals have amounted to "Austrian hegemony" or "tame submission to Austria"? Afaics, that would only happen if Prussia was so hamfisted that all the lesser states automatically sided with Austria against her, as otherwise they had no reason to do so. After all, their sovereignty, such as it was, depended on the two big boys balancing each other. If either Austria (as OTL) or Prussia were excluded from German affairs, their freedom of action would be a sham.

Whether or not the German Confederation would actually be a matter of Austrian dominance, Prussia seems to have thought it was. In the lead-up to the Austro-Prussian War, Prussia thought that the German Confederation's diet was very likely to act in Austria's favour rather than Prussia's. At Olmütz, Prussia accepting Austria's terms and remaining part of the German Confederation was seen as an Austrian diplomatic victory over Prussia. And if Prussia accepts its role as part of the German Confederation, even as an equal to Austria, that means relinquishing its ambitions (held at least since the time of Olmütz) of a Prussian-dominated Kleindeutschland… and Wilhelm I's obsession with making Prussia powerful seems to suggest that he would not have been eager to relinquish this.

Franz Josef would need to give some ground about military affairs, probably allowing Prussia a formal veto on declarations of war (though afaics she would have a de facto one anyway) but after all, only six months later he would allow an Austrian army to fight under a Prussian general, so he may well be flexible on this point.

Fair enough. But would he be prepared to give Prussia full equality to Austria? And would Prussia settle even for that, let alone anything less?

Success in 1863 depends on two monarchs, of "very average" IQs, being able to reach a deal that satisfies the two of them. Not a sure bet, certainly, but equally not by any means ASB.

I don't think that it's ASB; I just think that it's much, much less probable than you're arguing.