WI: The German Confederation succeeds

[JosefStalin]

As the title suggests could the German Confederation (1815-1866) have lasted?

 

[Perfidious Albion]

The main thing necessary for that is to stop the rise of Prussia. The German Confederation was Austrian-led, so you need to remove the rise of an aggressive great power in the GC eager to take control of the GC from Austria. By the time of OTL's Austro-Prussian War, I'd argue, Prussia was already too powerful for the GC to survive; Prussia was almost certain to win, and even if it didn't then it wouldn't be content to remain under Austrian hegemony, so the GC would lose Prussia (and thus an enormous part of its potential power), which I presume would violate the spirit of the OP.

There are two ways, I think, for this to work: enlist Prussia as an equal partner to Austria, and have Austria defeat Prussia. The former is probably more manageable. If Austria can suffer some kind of defeat (perhaps in Hungary or Italy) and Prussia, for some reason, intervenes on its side, that might pull the two powers closer together, thus permitting the GC to become an Austro-Prussian condominium that would dominate the other German states.

An incredibly rough preliminary idea is that a stronger Second French Empire (perhaps it gets kicked in the teeth in the Crimean War, gets rid of its existing military system with mauvais numéros and substitutions and replaces it with universal conscription similar to the OTL Prussian system) achieves a resounding, humiliating victory over Austria in the wars of Italian unification (but not too humiliating or else Prussia won't give Austria any respect) but also gets cocky and starts to get threatening about its expansionist ambitions in the Rhineland (with Napoleon III's astounding lack of tact and diplomatic sense, the extreme stupidity of provoking both Prussia and Austria isn't as impossible as one might think if one made the error of presuming that historical leaders are surely intelligent people). This would get Prussia to achieve a position of leadership among the North German states as their protector, thus satisfying Prussian ambitions within the structure of the GC, and might also bring Prussia and Austria together out of fear of France. Austria's non-German territories, especially Hungary, are the really nasty sticking point that keeps the GC as more like a loose international organisation than a confederation, let alone a unified nation-state, but an independent Hungary in 1848 due to a lack of Russian support might work, especially if the PoD starts off by creating a slightly different Russia (so as to be able to humiliate France in the Crimean War and thus trigger the other changes spoken of in this paragraph).

I don't doubt that scenario is full of holes and I'm perfectly happy for other people to rip it apart and take a much closer look at things, but it's a start.

 

[JosefStalin]

Could a surviving GC centralize into one nation?

 

[MrHaakwood]

Could a surviving GC centralize into one nation?

Nope, all the little dukes and kings dont want to give up their power and even the rich citizens are not powerful enough to really change that. Than you have to get rid of the dual system between Prussia and Austria. An Austria which intrests lie in the Balkans and not the protection of the other German states form France is bound to get kicked out from the other German states. When not from Prussia, certainly from an alliance of the Third Germany.

Hmm, perhaps it could evolve over the time. Sandwiched between Prussia and Austria and the Heritage Enemy could be a good motivation.

 

[JosefStalin]

well that complicates things

 

[SvoHljott]

Austrian victory in the Austro-Prussian War will keep the German Confederation alive, though without Prussia. Austria had no interest in unifying Germany and would much prefer it to be a big confederation of tiny duchies.

 

[JosefStalin]

Could the Liberal Revolution, if it succeeded, had unified Germany?

 

[Mikestone8]

Austrian victory in the Austro-Prussian War will keep the German Confederation alive, though without Prussia. Austria had no interest in unifying Germany and would much prefer it to be a big confederation of tiny duchies.

But there are Confederations and Confederations.

In 1863 Franz Josef made a determined effort to strengthen the Confederation, and Bismarck had the devil of a job keeping Wilhelm away from the Congress. Of course, it might have fallen through anyway, but that is by no means certain. If he and FJ can reach a deal then the smaller states will fall into line.

 

[carlton_bach]

Could a surviving GC centralize into one nation?

Define 'nation'. As far as German partiots were concerned, they were always one nation, and the various states just its constituent parts. A federal government based on that princiopkle and supported by the various sovereigns (as Albion pointed out, that really is the big issue) could easily become strong enough to be considered a 'country' from the outside despite considerable latitude remaining with the individual member states. The Bund managed to create a customs union, sghared military responsibilities, and almost a navy despite being sabotaged by its most powerful members. If there was instead a political incentive towards such unification, it would be easy enough to achieve.

As an analogy, however imperfect, consider the United States of the time. Even today, the states retain a remarkable degree of sovereignty. Still the USA was considered a country even before the ACW. Germany could equally.

Could the Liberal Revolution, if it succeeded, had unified Germany?

It would have been the first thing they'd have done, even before tearfully pardoning their oppressors and begging the generals to remain as arrtogant as ever. The question is, could it have succeeded? I doubt it, at least without outside support to counterbalance the interference of Russia, Prussia and Austria.

Germany at the time was ridiculously Anglophile, BTW. If Britain could have any incentive at all to prop up a West German client state in 1848, it would have been greeted with flowers. As to that incentive - I have no idea what it could be.

 

[Mikestone8]

Austrian victory in the Austro-Prussian War will keep the German Confederation alive, though without Prussia.

Well, without half of it anyway. If defeated Prussia is likely to lose Silesia and its Rhenish Provinces at least - probably other bits as well. It will most likely be just a rump state on the Baltic.

 

[Alpha Trion]

Bismarck not becoming Minister President of Prussia could have preserved the German Confederation. As Mikestone8 mentioned in a previous post, in OTL William I did want to attend the Congress of Frankfurt in 1863 but Bismarck prevented him from doing so. Let us say with a different Minister President in office, William does attend the Congress. William was having problems with the Landtag and was looking for help with his domestic situation. William would have probably asked for some concessions from Francis Joseph before accepting the Reform Act. Francis Joseph could have promised him military support against any domestic insurrection if Prussia accepted the Reform Act. William may have asked that Austria and Prussia share the presidencies of both the Directory and the Bundesrat. William might insist on Prussia always sitting on any military committees and possibly negotiate a “constable” position over the federal army for the kings of Prussia in the event of war. Francis Joseph would not have given William everything he wanted but I believe he would have been able to convince William to approve the Reform Act. In TTL, Prussia and the other German states would not have supported Austria’s ambitions in Poland, Italy, or the Balkans, but Austria would have had the option of a more aggressive foreign policy without having to worry about a war against Prussia.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Well, without half of it anyway. If defeated Prussia is likely to lose Silesia and its Rhenish Provinces at least - probably other bits as well. It will most likely be just a rump state on the Baltic.

I'm curious to see your reasoning for this. IOTL, Austria itself didn't suffer any territorial losses at all in the Austro-Prussian War; the Prussian leadership was worried about foreign intervention and ended the war quickly, rather than taking such a drastic step. Will the Austrian-led German Confederation dare to so greatly weaken Prussia when Russia is still Prussia's ally? I doubt it.

It's actually even worse for Austria than that implies, because the Second French Empire, until Prussia's astonishing victories, expected Austria to win and wouldn't want its great enemy (as Austria was until 1866) to become too powerful. Even if you make Prussia lose to Austria, there are not just one but two other great powers that are likely to intervene on Prussia's side if Austria looks dangerously successful.

Bismarck went to war with Austria at a time that was extremely opportune to Prussia; whether or not anyone chooses to think it was deliberate on his part, I leave to their discretion.

In conclusion: Prussia decisively losing the Austro-Prussian War is a WI of questionable usefulness, since I don't think it could have actually happened; the best I can imagine Austria doing (even if Prussia's army is much weaker than IOTL) is advancing into Prussia, being forced to back down and perhaps taking some of Silesia or a few of Prussia's western territories in exchange for not being dogpiled by the rest of Europe.

Bismarck not becoming Minister President of Prussia could have preserved the German Confederation.

This is one of the cases where, I feel, popular opinion (largely correct) of Bismarck as a political genius translates falsely into "Great Man of History"-style attribution of large-scale historical forces to single men. (Apologies, by the way, for addressing this criticism and quoting only your own post, as it's not just you who've made claims like this.)

As Mikestone8 mentioned in a previous post, in OTL William I did want to attend the Congress of Frankfurt in 1863 but Bismarck prevented him from doing so. Let us say with a different Minister President in office, William does attend the Congress. William was having problems with the Landtag and was looking for help with his domestic situation. William would have probably asked for some concessions from Francis Joseph before accepting the Reform Act.

And this is where. What motivation does Prussia have to accept any loss of Prussian sovereignty to an organisation including, and led by, a great power that was Prussia's major rival? IOTL the Prussian leadership weren't pan-Germanist ideologues, they were pragmatists; they opposed pan-Germanism when it came as Großdeutschland and supported it when it came as Kleindeutschland, because Prussia wanted a Germany where, far from having to give up its own power to another hegemon, it would itself be hegemon, and that was difficult in any Germany including Austria.

Just because Wilhelm went to the Congress wouldn't mean he would agree to anything permanent. Indeed, I strongly suspect he wouldn't—unless we suppose one of his bursts of eccentricity (at one point late in the Austro-Prussian War he wanted to march all the way to Vienna rather than make peace).

Francis Joseph could have promised him military support against any domestic insurrection if Prussia accepted the Reform Act.

Given Austria's (well-proven) vulnerability to domestic insurrection in comparison to the considerably stabler Kingdom of Prussia, such a promise would be somewhere between an insult and a joke.

William may have asked that Austria and Prussia share the presidencies of both the Directory and the Bundesrat.

Any concession giving Prussia at least equality with Austria, if not outright superiority, would be demanded by Prussia and rejected by Austria, which saw itself as (and largely was) the leader of the German states until 1866.

William might insist on Prussia always sitting on any military committees and possibly negotiate a “constable” position over the federal army for the kings of Prussia in the event of war. Francis Joseph would not have given William everything he wanted but I believe he would have been able to convince William to approve the Reform Act.

This strikes me as "Great Man of History" thinking again. Prussian actions were determined by Prussian interests, and it was not in Prussia's interests to subsume itself under an Austrian-led greater Germany. Even if Wilhelm I himself approved it in one of his occasional bizarre impulsive bursts, the aristocratic Prussian reactionaries whom he tended to appoint to high office in government would rip any such thing to shreds, and OTL has proven (e.g. with the aforementioned example of the late Austro-Prussian War) that they were capable of restraining him in those bursts.

In TTL, Prussia and the other German states would not have supported Austria’s ambitions in Poland, Italy, or the Balkans, but Austria would have had the option of a more aggressive foreign policy without having to worry about a war against Prussia.

Yes, it's certainly in Austrian interests to neutralise Prussia as a threat to its hegemony over the German states and put Prussia into a greater Germany in which Austrian interests will largely hold sway. Prussia has no such incentive.

 

[JosefStalin]

So is that a yes?

 

[Mikestone8]

I'm curious to see your reasoning for this. IOTL, Austria itself didn't suffer any territorial losses at all in the Austro-Prussian War; the Prussian leadership was worried about foreign intervention and ended the war quickly, rather than taking such a drastic step. Will the Austrian-led German Confederation dare to so greatly weaken Prussia when Russia is still Prussia's ally? I doubt it.

Russia is not Prussia's ally. She is still recovering from the cost of the Crimean War and the recent Polish revolt, and is in no shape to fight anyone And she certainly won't if doing so risks a Franco-Austrian combination on her Polish border - more sensitive areas than ever at this point.

If the Tsar does anything, it will be to use the situation as an opportunity to denounce the humiliating "Black Sea Clauses" of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, as he would do OTL in 1870. He's not even remotely likely to intervene in the war, esp if his only ally has just been crushingly defeated and so can give him little help.

As for the German Confederation, apart from Saxony its forces have performed miserably. It can only rubber-stamp whatever deal the victor imposes. Not to mention that its principal members will also be looking for cuts of Prussian territory.

It's actually even worse for Austria than that implies, because the Second French Empire, until Prussia's astonishing victories, expected Austria to win and wouldn't want its great enemy (as Austria was until 1866) to become too powerful. Even if you make Prussia lose to Austria, there are not just one but two other great powers that are likely to intervene on Prussia's side if Austria looks dangerously successful.

France had already agreed (see AJP Taylor's Struggle For Mastery) to Austria making gains, so long as these "did not threaten the European balance of power." IOW, it was ok for Austria to take Silesia, so long as in return she gave up Venice and renounced any attempt to recover Lombardy, while the two deposed Habsburg princes received new states in Germany (probably on the Rhine) of similar population to their former ones of Tuscany and Modena.

The only situation in which France was likely to act was if Franz Josef tried to renege on his promise to surrender Venetia, and even then war would have been unpopular. The French Chamber of Deputies had broken out into wild cheers at a false report of an Austrian victory, and French public opinion would have been outraged at the idea of fighting in support of Prussia.

Given Austria's (well-proven) vulnerability to domestic insurrection in comparison to the considerably stabler Kingdom of Prussia, such a promise would be somewhere between an insult and a joke.

Not to Wilhelm. He didn't have our advantage of 20/20 hindsight.

By late 1862 he had convinced himself that his clash with Parliament could end in revolution and a personal fate similar to Charles I or Louis XVI. This may appear laughable in retrospect, but to Wilhelm the danger seemed real. After all it was only 15 years since he had fled the country in 1848.

And the Reform Plan offered him a way out. If the new Federal Government drew up a military service law for Germany, adopting by pure coincidence (<g>) Wilhelm's proposed three year service, then the Prussian Parliament could be bypassed. Wilhelm could just tell them "Sorry, but you gentlemen can't overrule a Federal Law. I must fulfil my obligations as a member of the Confederation". And since, when the chips are down, he can expect Prussian officers and men to obey him rather than some Committee in Frankfurt, he may well feel that he is conceding nothing of substance. That may prove a short-sighted view, but in 1863 it is the short run that is worrying Wilhelm.

Finally, there is always the personal factor. A call from the Princes of Germany, with a King delivering their message, appealed tremendously to Wilhelm's pride. Even Frederick the Great had never received such an honour. And when he got there, all his royal peers - not their delegates or ambassadors but the honest to gosh Kings, Princes and Grand dukes in person - would be looking up at him, awaiting his mighty yea or nay.

And if he says nay, they all go home with nothing accomplished. His big moment ends in an anti-climax. When it comes to the point, even if he had some reservations about the Plan, could he really make himself do that? Maybe but I doubt it.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Russia is not Prussia's ally. She is still recovering from the cost of the Crimean War and the recent Polish revolt, and is in no shape to fight anyone And she certainly won't if doing so risks a Franco-Austrian combination on her Polish border - more sensitive areas than ever at this point.

Only four years after the Austro-Prussian War IOTL, the Tsar threatened Austria that if it (Austria) joined France in war against Prussia then Russia would join in on Prussia's side. Was the situation then so exceedingly different from 1866?

If the Tsar does anything, it will be to use the situation as an opportunity to denounce the humiliating "Black Sea Clauses" of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, as he would do OTL in 1870.

What prevents him from doing this too? Realistically he was going to undo the result of the Crimean War as soon as either France or the UK was weakened or distracted enough for it to be no longer enforceable.

He's not even remotely likely to intervene in the war, esp if his only ally has just been crushingly defeated and so can give him little help.

You think that the GC loyalist powers, with no French help, can achieve a victory large-scale enough over Prussia that Prussia will have been crushingly defeated before Russia an intervene? That sounds like it would require some truly massive military changes, and I don't just mean the conduct of the war, I mean the many years preceding it. For one thing, you probably can't have Wilhelm I on the Prussian throne.

And an Austro-French alliance against Prussia, unlike an internal GC-only war between Prussia and Austria, is precisely the sort of scenario that would provoke Russian intervention, as we know because it was the scenario that Russia issued an ultimatum to prevent IOTL.

As for the German Confederation, apart from Saxony its forces have performed miserably. It can only rubber-stamp whatever deal the victor imposes. Not to mention that its principal members will also be looking for cuts of Prussian territory.

Oh yes, when I say "the German Confederation" it's only to mean that Austria wasn't the only power on the Austrian side of the Austro-Prussian War, in the same way as people sometimes talk about the USSR fighting the invading forces of "the Axis powers" rather than "Germany" even though Germany was by far the most significant part of the Axis forces in Barbarossa.

France had already agreed (see AJP Taylor's Struggle For Mastery) to Austria making gains, so long as these "did not threaten the European balance of power." IOW, it was ok for Austria to take Silesia, so long as in return she gave up Venice and renounced any attempt to recover Lombardy, while the two deposed Habsburg princes received new states in Germany (probably on the Rhine) of similar population to their former ones of Tuscany and Modena.

The only situation in which France was likely to act was if Franz Josef tried to renege on his promise to surrender Venetia, and even then war would have been unpopular. The French Chamber of Deputies had broken out into wild cheers at a false report of an Austrian victory, and French public opinion would have been outraged at the idea of fighting in support of Prussia.

Fair enough, then. I retract the suggestion that France would intervene. Still, Russian threats could potentially keep out France from joining Austria in war against Prussia in this scenario as they kept out Austria from joining France in war against Prussia IOTL.

Not to Wilhelm. He didn't have our advantage of 20/20 hindsight.

By late 1862 he had convinced himself that his clash with Parliament could end in revolution and a personal fate similar to Charles I or Louis XVI. This may appear laughable in retrospect, but to Wilhelm the danger seemed real. After all it was only 15 years since he had fled the country in 1848.

And the Reform Plan offered him a way out. If the new Federal Government drew up a military service law for Germany, adopting by pure coincidence (<g>) Wilhelm's proposed three year service, then the Prussian Parliament could be bypassed. Wilhelm could just tell them "Sorry, but you gentlemen can't overrule a Federal Law. I must fulfil my obligations as a member of the Confederation". And since, when the chips are down, he can expect Prussian officers and men to obey him rather than some Committee in Frankfurt, he may well feel that he is conceding nothing of substance. That may prove a short-sighted view, but in 1863 it is the short run that is worrying Wilhelm.

Ultimately, though, IOTL Wilhelm I was prepared to face down the Landtag on any number of issues. In fact, he was even willing to take steps more extreme and provocative to liberal deputies than the arch-absolutist militarist Roon himself was recommending (in regard to unpopular military service) and—this is the crucial point—that step was on his own initiative. I'm happy to believe you that he was very worried about revolution, but his OTL actions show that he didn't change his course of action to placate the Landtag even if they were furious with him, and that, at least to a great extent, this wasn't something influenced upon him by conservative aristocrats but rather something of his own initiative.

Finally, there is always the personal factor. A call from the Princes of Germany, with a King delivering their message, appealed tremendously to Wilhelm's pride. Even Frederick the Great had never received such an honour. And when he got there, all his royal peers - not their delegates or ambassadors but the honest to gosh Kings, Princes and Grand dukes in person - would be looking up at him, awaiting his mighty yea or nay.

And if he says nay, they all go home with nothing accomplished. His big moment ends in an anti-climax. When it comes to the point, even if he had some reservations about the Plan, could he really make himself do that? Maybe but I doubt it.

I don't know remotely enough about Wilhelm I's personality to comment here.

 

[Mikestone8]

Only four years after the Austro-Prussian War IOTL, the Tsar threatened Austria that if it (Austria) joined France in war against Prussia then Russia would join in on Prussia's side. Was the situation then so exceedingly different from 1866?

One difference was that what with annexations, control of the NGC and alliances with the South German states, Prussia controlled military manpower roughly double that of 1866.

In this situation, while a victorious French army may well take Mainz and even maybe Koblenz, there is no likelihood of it getting anywhere near the Russian frontier. Alexander II can be confident of settling accounts with Austria-Hungary while France is still fighting her way across the Rhine. In 1866, by contrast, the South German states are on the Austrian side, so the French have an open road all the way to the borders of Russian Poland - the most gangrenous of the Tsar's ingrowing toenails. And as already noted, with Prussia beaten (the only case in which the Tsar would need to even consider intervention) he will effectively be fighting alone.

All in all, if Franz Josef has the sense to assure St Petersburg that any territorial settlement will respect the status quo in Poland, he has every chance that Alexander will accept the fait accompli.

I don't know remotely enough about Wilhelm I's personality to comment here.

Then why are you so ready to second-guess the man who did know him - Otto Von Bismarck?

Every account I've read agrees that Bismarck fought like a tiger to stop Wilhelm going to Frankfurt. Why? If, as you assume, the Congress had no chance of succeeding, then within a few days the King would be back in Berlin, in a sour and sulky mood, out of sorts with Austria, and even more resigned to Bismarck as "the only game in town". No harm done. So why would Bismarck risk a quarrel with his Sovereign (on whose favour his own power entirely depended) over something that didn't really matter? Afaics, his behaviour only makes sense if, in his opinion, there was a real "danger" that the Congress would succeed - an event that might well be better for Germany, but which would have the unacceptable side-effect of rendering him surplus to requirements.

 

[Vanity 6]

Perfidious Albion is on the right track. An isolated Austria could cede leadership in North Germany in exchange for Prussian guarantees in Italy and Hungary as well as perhaps associate membership in the Zollverein. Together they would keep out of the Crimean War, reform the Confederation and contain France.

OR

Austria wins the Seven Weeks War. This need not be a crushing defeat. All that is needed is a stalemate. Bismarck falls and Austria offers a peace involving continuation of the Confederation, transfer of Schleswig-Holstein to the Duke of Augustenburg and some other meager compromises. The new government in Berlin is more amenable to cooperative reform of the Confederation and by extension, all of Central Europe.

 

[Mikestone8]

Austria wins the Seven Weeks War. This need not be a crushing defeat. All that is needed is a stalemate.

A stalemate is highly unlikely.

There are mountain barriers surrounding Bohemia, so unless the defeated Prussian Army can work its way out through one of a few mostly narrow passes, it is trapped.

Also, by the time Koniggratz was fought, the Prussian soldiers had had little to eat for the last couple of Days, and would have been retreating over country already stripped by foraging parties on their way down. They are threatened with starvation.

Basically the Bohemian campaign was an "all or nothing" affair. Moltke was aiming for total victory, and to get it he had to risk total defeat.[1] In some ways it rather anticipates 1918, but in 1866 Moltke, unlike Ludendorff, got away with it by a narrow margin.

Geoffrey Wawro The Austro-Prussian War is about the best source on this subject.


[1] This is no doubt what Moltke had in mind when he told the King (who was getting jittery and talking about retreat) that "We are fighting here for the very existence of Prussia".

 

[Perfidious Albion]

One difference was that what with annexations, control of the NGC and alliances with the South German states, Prussia controlled military manpower roughly double that of 1866.

In this situation, while a victorious French army may well take Mainz and even maybe Koblenz, there is no likelihood of it getting anywhere near the Russian frontier. Alexander II can be confident of settling accounts with Austria-Hungary while France is still fighting her way across the Rhine. In 1866, by contrast, the South German states are on the Austrian side, so the French have an open road all the way to the borders of Russian Poland - the most gangrenous of the Tsar's ingrowing toenails. And as already noted, with Prussia beaten (the only case in which the Tsar would need to even consider intervention) he will effectively be fighting alone.

All in all, if Franz Josef has the sense to assure St Petersburg that any territorial settlement will respect the status quo in Poland, he has every chance that Alexander will accept the fait accompli.

Please correct me if I've misunderstood you, but you seem to be suggesting that OTL's situation was attractive for Russian intervention because there was little risk. The problem is that that card—a great power wishing to minimise risk—can be played both ways; only fighting easily defeatable enemies is one way of viewing it, but another way of viewing it is to act pre-emptively against a developing threat (and if the Tsar didn't see an Austro-French alliance as a threat he wouldn't have cared about it in 1870 IOTL).

As for your argument that the Tsar would never even consider intervention unless Prussia was decisively beaten already, I don't think it holds. IOTL, yes, it is of course true that by the time help could have been given to the defeated power (Austria) it was too late, but Prussia's success in battle caught people off-balance; if the expected result (an Austrian victory) were happening, especially if without the great speed of OTL's Prussian victory, reactions might have been faster.

Nonetheless, thank you for the information about Prussian-controlled manpower. Judging by OTL's performances of non-Prussian troops in the Franco-Prussian War I doubt that twice the manpower translates at all to twice the military potential, but nonetheless it's international perception that matters here, so I suppose that the gap in quality between Prussian (and Prussian-inspired) German troops and non-Prussian German troops (the poor Bavarians continually crop up as examples here) might not matter in the context of this discussion.

Then why are you so ready to second-guess the man who did know him - Otto Von Bismarck?

Every account I've read agrees that Bismarck fought like a tiger to stop Wilhelm going to Frankfurt. Why? If, as you assume, the Congress had no chance of succeeding, then within a few days the King would be back in Berlin, in a sour and sulky mood, out of sorts with Austria, and even more resigned to Bismarck as "the only game in town". No harm done. So why would Bismarck risk a quarrel with his Sovereign (on whose favour his own power entirely depended) over something that didn't really matter? Afaics, his behaviour only makes sense if, in his opinion, there was a real "danger" that the Congress would succeed - an event that might well be better for Germany, but which would have the unacceptable side-effect of rendering him surplus to requirements.

Oh no. It appears I'm going to have to wade into more controversial territory.

My response to this can be summed up in a sentence: Just because Bismarck thought something doesn't mean it's true.

Bismarck was a skilled statesman in many regards and achieved many things but the degree of genius that is sometimes attributed to him borders on the farcical. He made many mistakes IOTL: to name the three that were most disastrous for Germany, his lack of a strong objection to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, his willingness to humiliate France (just see what he said at the negotiations, talking about the inherent untrustworthiness of the French nation) and his creation of conflict and overlapping fields, rather than clear distinctions between fields and respect of each for the other's competence in its field, between the military and civilian spheres (see his conflict with the Prussian army, which he started and in which he behaved far more poorly than the army did) which is arguably the main reason behind the German Army taking upon itself decisions with political effects but discounting diplomatic factors in the era leading up to WW1.

Bismarck repeatedly made enormous and far-reaching mistakes IOTL. Therefore, the fact that he believed something (in this case, that it would have been bad for Bismarck or for Prussia if Wilhelm I had attended the Congress) does nothing to convince me that that something is true.

If it is a true fact (as I have been arguing) that the Congress was unlikely to achieve anything major, that does not imply that Bismarck necessarily knew this fact. Statesmen have acted out of fear of heavily exaggerated threats before.

 

[Mikestone8]

My response to this can be summed up in a sentence: Just because Bismarck thought something doesn't mean it's true.

It's not primarily a question of political judgment but of a personal one.

Bismarck had been Wilhelm's Minister-President for the past year, and had worked for him in other capacities before. So it's reasonable to suppose that he had learned a bit about the latter's mental processes.

So if he thought there was a real possibility that Wilhelm would fall in with the proposed reform, I don't see any obvious reason to doubt him.

If you are simply arguing that Wilhelm's presence in Frankfurt does not guarantee success, I have no quarrel with that. If FJ pitched his demands too high, he could indeed have yet snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. However, my impression from your messages is that you view failure as a virtual certainty, which afaics the evidence does not support. And Bismarck, who knew his man (as by your own admission you do not) clearly wasn't prepared to bank on it.