Then it is useless because attitudes shifted and changed during the entire period and trying to present what Bock said and did at this one point as affecting this other, widely separated point.
So you have a source which says he didn't believe the same thing earlier?
Yeah, he is. Since we're discussing the Vyazma encirclement and not the Bryansk one here, given that we already settled that.
Since Glantz states the Soviet forces in front of Moscow in September were stronger than in October, the alt-Vyazma might catch more prisoners, which is probably what he is referring to. Nor does he say it certainly would.
2012 actually, going by the back cover stuff.
All that means is that your copy was printed later. Type in "Barbarossa Derailed" into Google and it clearly comes up as "Originally published: 2010."
But you fail to provide the full context. I pointed out that by weakening the German position and enhancing their own, as well as being able to build-up adequate supplies, the Germans enhanced their own position and weakened the Soviets. Therefore, they enhanced their position and by extension their capability of taking Moscow, over the Soviets.
Lost time means little if the time could not be productively used otherwise and he doesn't call the Leningrad diversion useless.
And as I pointed out, Glantz's assessment doesn't go so far, concluding that claims that the Kiev encirclement produced positive results for the Soviet Union are "True in part." Saying that the battle "in no way diminished German hopes for success" is not the same as saying they increased them.
I also did say earlier that I agree on balance the Kiev operation was superior.
Yes, the quote is saying the amount shipped is equal to the standard loads of rations, ammunition, and fuel. It does nothing to state that rations were actually in the amount shipped. Do pay attention.
From page 141. "The actual daily requirement of the Fourth Army's two panzer groups was 2,000 tons of ammunition or four trains, 4,000 tons of POL or eight trains, and 450 tons of rations or one train..."
It's pretty clear that he still believes that the Soviets would be able to mount the counter-offensive in 1941 in Barbarossa Derailed. So that is consistent and thus there is good reason to believe in both cases.
Fair enough. It's not an all-or-nothing issue though, that a counteroffensive would still be possible doesn't mean it wouldn't be hindered by the loss of such an important locality.
Both Martin Van Crewald and David Stahel go into the logistical side of Barbarossa quite extensively in their respective books. If you bother to read them and learn about the subject, as opposed to just selectively quotemining them for debates without actually deepening your understanding of the subject, you'll learn that logistics is a major task which requires considerable planning, forethought, and care. Beyond that there is pretty basic knowledge: you don't build, or rebuild as the case may be, railroads on a whim. Rail conversion and repair is fundamentally a major construction task and you don't ad-hoc major construction tasks. I guess you might not like that as a source and try to reject it, and your free too do so... but reality is that which when you cease to believe in it does not go away.
You made the specific claim "The Germans priorities in rail conversion had already been set long before the Kiev encirclement became a thing," it's up to you to support it rather than saying it's so obvious that I should just agree it's obviously true. If it's so true, you should have no trouble finding quotes to support it.
But which would be utilized to organize the assault against AGC's southern flank.
Which basically means the Soviet rail system is not fairing any worse then OTL, as that is what is required for those series of offensives and counteroffensives.
So the Soviet rail system was on the verge of collapse in OTL?
If he could see them in general, then certainly he could see them for the Sickle Cut plan.
So you have no examples of Hitler imposing limiting ideas in the planning then...
Manstein was the one who briefed and convinced Hitler, not Halder.
Looking through the footnotes to The Myth and Reality of German Warfare, it appears the reference to Halder being the one who introduced Hitler to the concept was a simple misprint and it should have read Manstein, so I obviously concede there. The point about Halder having come to support the plan independently stands though. As far as Hitler's ideas, yes Frieser's analysis does rely on an examination of Hitler's actions, as he says "Just how little Hitler understood the idea behind the Sickle Cut will be described in detail in the analysis of the operation itself," I don't see why this makes the analysis inherently implausible.
A little private grumbling following some rather discouraging reports was characteristic of the German Army. But throughout the actual planning conferences Halder showed a zero doubts about the strategic rationale and outcome to subordinates, superiors, and equals alike both in public and private. So too did the rest of the plotters, this stemmed from confidence in their likelihood of victory and reluctance to reprise the role of doubters they had with Manstein's plan.
Halder didn't show doubts that the USSR could likely be defeated easily. That's not the same thing as actively agreeing with the strategic rationale, which the quote indicates he actually didn't.
Ultimately it becomes a distinction without difference. Not disagreeing with it is no different then agreeing with it. And both still represent a failure of strategic understanding.
There is a difference, in that you have been arguing that they did actually come to enthusiastic agreement. In other words, you believe that if an ASB had turned Germany into a military junta led by Halder sometime before the decision for the eastern war became practically irrevocable, it would still have gone ahead, whereas I believe it wouldn't have.
So basically no evidence the quote is right either, which renders it useless.
It appears in a serious history book which includes citations. That it doesn't appear in other sources which can be easily found with a few Google searches is not evidence that it is wrong, it just means that the party is a relatively obscure event few people have looked into.
Except it does not state that he made that objective for his Army Group, it states he made it the objective for a specific attack by a specific segment of his army group. No where in there is a statement that he abandoned the hopes of taking Moscow or reaching the Kolomna-Orekhovo-Zagorsk-Dmitrov. Furthermore when, 10 days later, it became apparent even to him that the offensive was failing and he wrote to his superiors that the objectives could not be achieved, he continued with the attack anyway despite the fact you have acknowledged he would have been acting within his authority to call it off. As I said earlier, actions speak louder then words.
So on the whole, what Bock actually did remains inconsistent with the Fritz account.
Bock stated that he could reach the Kolomna-Orekhovo-Zagorsk-Dmitrov line "IF THE PREVIOUS NUMBER OF TRAINS IS AUTHORIZED." It is totally obvious that he meant this as a condition for successfully reaching the line and that it couldn't be reached without the supplies he requested. There is no evidence that he set any objectives beyond the river-canal line, except in the general sense that the offensive could be resumed at the future point at which the supply situation improved.
And Hitler had disagreed with it the 1942-43 plan when it was first drawn up. He had already written in 1936 to the economists that the country had to be ready for war within the next 4 years (Tooze talks about this) and in February 1937 had told his generals that the issue of Lebensraum (basically meaning that France and, if necessary, Britain had to be subdued and the Soviet Union to have been conquered) had to be settled by 1943 at the earliest and 1945 at the latest.
So Hitler said the war was to be brought to a successful conclusion in the 1943-45 timeframe, and this is inconsistent with a projected start date in 1942-43 how?
In that latter memorandum, "Hitler was counting on support from his advisers. Their response must have been a shock and a disappointment. In the discussion that followed the Fuhrer's monologue, Blomberg (Wehrmacht Commander in Chief) and Fritsch (Army Commander in Chief) raised serious objections to his plans. They were not moral objections... What disturbed the generals was the possibility that Germany might become embroiled in a war with France and Britain before the Wehrmacht was ready. They disagreed with many specific points of Hitler's analysis, and they cautioned him against moving too quickly."-Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," p.38
Hitler recognized the issue of timing was paramount. His generals don't even appear to have recognized it was an issue at all.
"What disturbed the generals was the possibility that Germany might become embroiled in a war with France and Britain before the Wehrmacht was ready." How exactly does this shows them not caring about timing?
Yeah. And? They were quite welcome of the opportunity to crush Poland, but they were more nervous about fighting Britain and France. That they failed to recognize that fighting Poland would mean fighting Britain and France is just more indication of their failure to recognize Germany's strategic position.
"They welcomed war with Poland, despite the certainty of conflict with Britain and France" means they were in no doubt that war with Poland was the same as war with the Anglo-French.
It was basically a repeat as their attitude over the prospect of war with Czechoslovakia.
The exact opposite, actually. Their objection to war with Czechoslovakia was precisely because it could involve the Anglo-French as well. Your own quote indicates that their views the next year were quite different.
Cute, but the timing is pretty clear. The scheduling of the meeting where Manstein briefed Hitler on the plan and got his approval well predates the wargames by three days. They were quite separate from each other.
As I said, I'm limited as a result of not having the book. Perhaps you could provide the passages where the dates of the wargames are stated?
Last edited: