Ah, no. The calorie count for civilians varied throughout the nation, some people still getting 2,000+ (mainly country folks), while the suffering middle class that was not involved in vital war industries was getting between 1,600-1,400 per day. In Hamburg, one city that has statistics taken for all classes, dropped to 60% of prewar consumption at its worst. Much of the propaganda revolving around the British starvation blockade has spilled into historical discourse, which poisons the conversation. In reality there were about 350-420,000 civilian deaths that could be attributed to the blockade and these were mostly small children and the elderly whose families did not have means to buy extra food. 200,000+ more died due to the flu when it came around, which was made worse by nutrition levels, but still not on the order of 800,000. The army still had better rations than the civilian populations, though still not enough.
The winter of 1916-17 was the worst due to a number of factors that did not have to due solely with the blockade. By 1918 the situation was improving significantly, but by that time the population had had enough of the war, especially as it was obviously lost with the deep American manpower reserves still untapped. I suggest you check out "The first world war: an agrarian interpretation" by Avner Offer, who has done an immensely important job of covering the situations in Germany and England as the result of blockades, even touching on the U-boot offensive in an interesting way.
The bottom line: the situation in Germany was desperate solely because of the failure of the military situation. Ludendorff screwed the pooch in a number of ways by his bad policies, including the Hindenburg program that caused much of the food, munition, and morale crisis when it upset the delicate balance that the War Ministry had established. The worst time in the food situation was the direct result of mismanagement and the resulting strikes, which further exacerbated the situation. When that was cleared up, the situation at home got markedly better. The issue remained that the home front collapsed when the military situation collapsed. Though unrest and dissatisfaction with the regime was still present, the pot did not boil over until Germany was defeated in the field, starting with Amiens and the mental collapse of Ludendorff.
That said, AH was still doomed, partly due to the piss-poor communication and relationship between the Central Powers. The southern front could have been salvaged if Germany had had better leaders that convinced the Austrians that the empire was gone and it was time to think solely of Austria. But with the Americans in the war, the jig was up. There was simply no way that the Central Powers could have worked anything out after Wilson declared war in 1917.