I'm not, at all, that's specious supposition. I'm in no way inferring deserve or natural justice in historical counter factual analysis.
I'm pointing out that one must contextualise the thinking of the age when looking at the options on the table. To the point where it in reality it actually manifested at a later point in at least one area and we saw activism towards it in others.
Do the French and the British have access to several thousand skilled foreign policy actors who could enact a policy to fragment the German state to make it a. Less of a threat if it refuses to come to the table with terms b. As a form of national policy revenge for the damage WW1 has caused. Of course they do and it would be a growing popular option in the face of both intransigence and partisan insurgency.
This outcome is far more likely than some form of citizen solidarity and war weariness leading to revolution in a victorious Entente.
The British and French are skilled at co-opting elites, existing state apparatus and military institution to reach their foreign policy goals. This isn't zones of occupation this is about X to fight/defend against/stop feeding Y instead of you.
They may not achieve a positive outcome long term (and I'm not arguing that) but looking at the play book of great powers it's on the table and likely the more the situation grinds on.
Moreover the various elite groups were well known to each other in the fluid European aristocratic milieui - and whilst these people were not usually the right person for the job you will see bodies of support for various regional candidates rapidly lead to active canvassing of both the legislative and executive in France, Britain, Italy and Belgium.
Again pre WW2 aristocratic elite influence and guidance of foreign policy was far more pronounced then in the shadow of American Hegemony post WW2 where the elite motivators broadly moved to within government/military industrial complex.