The Manchu Dowager Empress was the most effective power behind the Qing throne from 1861 to her death in 1908.
Although she was 73 when she died, her final decline and illness was rather sudden and she certainly acted in matters of state as if she expected to be around longer. What if she had another ten years, at reasonable levels of mental alertness and articulateness, living until the fall of 1918?
A couple things seem to flow from this -
It is a reasonable assumption that assuming the Guangxu Emperor still lives, he is still maintained under the Dowager's control. (widespread, widely believed rumor is she has him poisoned as she saw her days coming to an end). If he dies on schedule, the throne would go to a minor and her effective regency would continue.
Internally, some constitutional reforms would be proceeding, but at a snail's pace. The Dowager had agreed to reforms reluctantly but was skilled at stalling tactics, and the Qing constitutional outline, even if fully implemented, was for a system with less effective parliamentary power than the Japanese system.
In terms of power and personnel, I would assume she would continue to rely on Yuan Shikai, leader of the Peiyang army. His forced retirement after the Dowager's death, and subsequent recall during the terminal Qing crisis of OTL, were key elements of politics, with both the dynasty, which had alienated him, and the revolutionaries appealing to him as an arbiter and offering him executive office.
In the ATL with a longer-lived Dowager I would assume Yuan would remain favored all along, and in turn would remain a Qing loyalist, at least through the Dowager's lifetime.
So, given this outline, is the overthrow of the Qing likely to happen as in OTL 1911, or to be delayed? Might we see Qing rule continue until 1918?
I would think that even if an uprising happens in Wuchang in 1911, the chances of it being suppressed either very quickly or as soon as the capital is alerted to the danger, would be much greater than in OTL. At the same time, there had been many uprisings before Wuchang, and there would probably be many after?
Assuming Qing rule to the outbreak of WWI, separatism in Mongolia and Tibet likely would be less successful.
Would a Dowager-led regime behave differently in WWI?
Although anti-reformist, on aoccassions when she thought it feasible, the Dowager took a hardline against foreigners. Perhaps she would order Peiyang or Shantung troops to beat the Allies to the punch in seizing Germany's vulnerable Qingdao leasehold?
Alternatively, might the Qing declare war on the Entente powers, who had done more extensive injury to China than Germany? In this case, she might regard a coalition with the Germans as a diplomatic version of the magical force of the Boxers which she had embraced at the turn of the century. In OTL, the Ottomans embraced the Germans as "enemy of my enemy" and factions in Iran and Afghanistan considered doing the same, perhaps a more internally stable China might make a similar choice.
Because of military weakness and distance from the Central Powers, this would most likely lead to a curb-stomping of China, mostly carried out by Japan as the Entente's deputy. For an interval, it could be an annoyance and distraction to Russia, and a less serious one for the French and British. If the Chinese are willing to retreat into their interior like Xian or Chongqing rather than quickly settle, they can be a more expensive nuisance for the Entente to deal with however.
Although she was 73 when she died, her final decline and illness was rather sudden and she certainly acted in matters of state as if she expected to be around longer. What if she had another ten years, at reasonable levels of mental alertness and articulateness, living until the fall of 1918?
A couple things seem to flow from this -
It is a reasonable assumption that assuming the Guangxu Emperor still lives, he is still maintained under the Dowager's control. (widespread, widely believed rumor is she has him poisoned as she saw her days coming to an end). If he dies on schedule, the throne would go to a minor and her effective regency would continue.
Internally, some constitutional reforms would be proceeding, but at a snail's pace. The Dowager had agreed to reforms reluctantly but was skilled at stalling tactics, and the Qing constitutional outline, even if fully implemented, was for a system with less effective parliamentary power than the Japanese system.
In terms of power and personnel, I would assume she would continue to rely on Yuan Shikai, leader of the Peiyang army. His forced retirement after the Dowager's death, and subsequent recall during the terminal Qing crisis of OTL, were key elements of politics, with both the dynasty, which had alienated him, and the revolutionaries appealing to him as an arbiter and offering him executive office.
In the ATL with a longer-lived Dowager I would assume Yuan would remain favored all along, and in turn would remain a Qing loyalist, at least through the Dowager's lifetime.
So, given this outline, is the overthrow of the Qing likely to happen as in OTL 1911, or to be delayed? Might we see Qing rule continue until 1918?
I would think that even if an uprising happens in Wuchang in 1911, the chances of it being suppressed either very quickly or as soon as the capital is alerted to the danger, would be much greater than in OTL. At the same time, there had been many uprisings before Wuchang, and there would probably be many after?
Assuming Qing rule to the outbreak of WWI, separatism in Mongolia and Tibet likely would be less successful.
Would a Dowager-led regime behave differently in WWI?
Although anti-reformist, on aoccassions when she thought it feasible, the Dowager took a hardline against foreigners. Perhaps she would order Peiyang or Shantung troops to beat the Allies to the punch in seizing Germany's vulnerable Qingdao leasehold?
Alternatively, might the Qing declare war on the Entente powers, who had done more extensive injury to China than Germany? In this case, she might regard a coalition with the Germans as a diplomatic version of the magical force of the Boxers which she had embraced at the turn of the century. In OTL, the Ottomans embraced the Germans as "enemy of my enemy" and factions in Iran and Afghanistan considered doing the same, perhaps a more internally stable China might make a similar choice.
Because of military weakness and distance from the Central Powers, this would most likely lead to a curb-stomping of China, mostly carried out by Japan as the Entente's deputy. For an interval, it could be an annoyance and distraction to Russia, and a less serious one for the French and British. If the Chinese are willing to retreat into their interior like Xian or Chongqing rather than quickly settle, they can be a more expensive nuisance for the Entente to deal with however.