WI: The Confederacy concentrated in the west and kept minimal in the east?

WI: The Confederacy concentrated in the west and kept minimal in the east?

  • Better Strategy?

    Votes: 14 22.6%
  • Worse Strategy?

    Votes: 48 77.4%

  • Total voters
    62

TFSmith121

Banned
Yep, but don't forget - a big part of why AS Johnston's forces

I'm going to differ from the majority here; a strategy of concentrating forces in the west (meaning between the Mississippi and the Appalachians) while maintaining holding forces in the East and Trans-Mississippi, would serve the Confederacy better than their OTL strategy. The goal here is to keep Tennessee in Confederate hands so as to deny the Union access to Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia from the north.

This does not mean stripping Virginia of troops; as noted, the presence of the Union and Confederate capitols in that theater in close proximity to each other means that the Union will allocate large forces to that theater, which will in turn require a sizable Confederate commitment to keep them at bay. A commitment not much smaller than OTL, in fact. But it does mean maintaining a strictly defensive posture and forgoing any invasion of Northern territory in that theater so as to conserve men and materiel for other theaters.

That said, the best that can be hoped for is to prolong the war sufficiently for a peace candidate to win the US Presidency in 1864, who will then offer a compromise peace which gives the Confederacy its independence. And the chances of that occurring are somewhere between slim and none.

Yep, but don't forget - a big part of why AS Johnston's forces were never much greater than ~45,000 effectives (roughly the size of Grant's force ALONE, never mind Buell) is the rebels also had to (try) and defend the Gulf Coast ports from Pensacola to the Rio Grande from the USN and USA (which launched division+sized amphibious operations as early as 1861), as well as guard some defensive point on the Mississippi, as well as (unless they want to hand the rivers over to the USN) somewhere on the Tennessee and the Cumberland...

And they were still trying to contest Missouri in early 1862 (much less the Indian Territory and New Mexico)...

There just weren't that many rebel troops to go around, which is why every rebel commander from Sibley to Price to McCown to Buckner et al ended up being defeated in the winter-spring of 1862...

3 to 1 odds in population remain 3 to 1 odds.

Best,
 
I'm going to differ from the majority here; a strategy of concentrating forces in the west (meaning between the Mississippi and the Appalachians) while maintaining holding forces in the East and Trans-Mississippi, would serve the Confederacy better than their OTL strategy. The goal here is to keep Tennessee in Confederate hands so as to deny the Union access to Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia from the north.

This does not mean stripping Virginia of troops; as noted, the presence of the Union and Confederate capitols in that theater in close proximity to each other means that the Union will allocate large forces to that theater, which will in turn require a sizable Confederate commitment to keep them at bay. A commitment not much smaller than OTL, in fact. But it does mean maintaining a strictly defensive posture and forgoing any invasion of Northern territory in that theater so as to conserve men and materiel for other theaters.

That said, the best that can be hoped for is to prolong the war sufficiently for a peace candidate to win the US Presidency in 1864, who will then offer a compromise peace which gives the Confederacy its independence. And the chances of that occurring are somewhere between slim and none.

Agreed on all points. Sending some troops west while leaving enough in Virginia for defense would have improved their chances. But that's not what the OP said.
 
Better for whom?:D

Western would probably be better for the Union, but the CSA - if they kept their capital in Montgomery - could last a while. They held out in Texas till June, and keeping hold of the Mississippi if they focus there could really put a crimp in US plans. If they hold New Orleans till 1863 and Vicksburg till 1864, and they keep their hub at Chattanooga going for a while (that's sort of central to me, not east), and the east is knocked out so fast some of the top generals who were in favor of peaceful surrender don't end up able to go west, you could see the CSA go the guerilla warfare route and last about as long as they did OTL.

Different type of war is all that would mean, though. The US was going to win. And, there, the US would at least get North Carolina fast enough to be able to get some cotton through to Britain and make there no chance the British would consider recognizing them. However, if the CSA knows that's not going to happen, the might adopt a guerilla style strategy earlier.
 
The armies would have rebelled - there would be no way to convince the Virginia troops to fight for Mississippi or Arkansas when their own homeland is getting over-run.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
The armies would have rebelled - there would be no way to convince the Virginia troops to fight for Mississippi or Arkansas when their own homeland is getting over-run.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Untrue. Troops from Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and (later) Tennessee continued to fight for the CSA even though their entire states were under Union control. There is no reason to think Virginians would behave any differently.

In any case we were not going to abandon Virginia, just scale back the commitments in that theater to free up resources for the West.
 
We can change it to that if you like.:D What would the results be?

The war would be prolonged. The Union would make more progress in the East without the distraction caused by Confederate sorties into Maryland and/or Pennsylvania, but as long as the Confederates keep Richmond the issue there will still be in doubt. The Confederacy will put up a stiffer fight in the West, possibly delaying the Union seizure of control of the Mississippi and/or Tennessee for a year or more.

That said, unless a peace candidate is elected US President in 1864 and he offers the CSA a compromise peace granting them independence the Confederacy will lose the war and their independence. They simply do not have the means to repel a concerted effort on the part of the Union to conquer them. And the Union will make that effort if either Lincoln or a War Democrat (such as McClellan) is elected president.

A military victory for the CSA is flatly impossible IMO; a political victory is unlikely but possible. Shifting focus from the east to the west with the purpose of holding off Union advances for as long as possible is, IMO, the best way to maximize the CSA's chances of achieving a political victory.
 
Untrue. [1] Troops from Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and (later) Tennessee continued to fight for the CSA even though their entire states were under Union control. [2] There is no reason to think Virginians would behave any differently. [3]

1] True

2] Yes, and also a lot of them deserted...

3] A lot of Virginians deserted during the Seige of Petersburg due to worthless money, starvation, cold, no clothing, no shoes, no shelter, hopelessness, and the simple fact that for many of them their homes were under Yankee occupation, so they didn't know if their families were alive or dead...:(
 
1] True

2] Yes, and also a lot of them deserted...

3] A lot of Virginians deserted during the Seige of Petersburg due to worthless money, starvation, cold, no clothing, no shoes, no shelter, hopelessness, and the simple fact that for many of them their homes were under Yankee occupation, so they didn't know if their families were alive or dead...:(

By the time of the siege of Petersburg it was clear that it was only a matter of time until the Confederacy was defeated, and desertion then became a major problem for the Confederacy. Singling out Virginians is unfair; soldiers from every state in the Confederacy were deserting from every Confederate force, for every reason given above and also that they couldn't see any point in risking their lives when their side was doomed to lose.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
There's also the point that even if a Border Stater volunteered

1] True

2] Yes, and also a lot of them deserted...

3] A lot of Virginians deserted during the Seige of Petersburg due to worthless money, starvation, cold, no clothing, no shoes, no shelter, hopelessness, and the simple fact that for many of them their homes were under Yankee occupation, so they didn't know if their families were alive or dead...:(

There's also the point that even if a Border Stater volunteered to serve the rebellion in 1861, if by 1862 the Richmond government is both:

a) introducing conscription for the duration (most 1861 enlistments were for 12 months); and
b) the same Richmond government is, as a matter of policy, abandoning the Border States:

one has to wonder how many Missourians, Kentuckians, Tennesseans, West Virginians, and Maryland Liners are going to stick around; the decline in enlistments from Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia after 1862 are pretty marked, as is the utter lack of new recruits in the wake of the various rebel invasions of the border states in 1862 and afterward.

It is pretty difficult to conscript men from territory the conscripting power does not hold, for obvious reasons, and it is challenging to keep volunteers in line when they don't see the cause they are volunteering for doing much to actively defend their homes, either.

Best,
 
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Ah I see PGT Beauregard has been reincarnated. and as the other one is now on the 64 election.

Define Minimal.

And when are we talking about?

OTL it takes basically the whole available force to defend against the peninsula offensive. Lil Mac may be slow and not specially aggressive but he is a damn good engineer and unless he is aggressively stopped he will just dig his way into Richmond then south.

As it is Lee is stripping the defenses everywhere else to provide troops.

And even if you that what do you with the troops? In the west you are screwed as soon s you run into a navigable river.
 
This does not mean stripping Virginia of troops; as noted, the presence of the Union and Confederate capitols in that theater in close proximity to each other means that the Union will allocate large forces to that theater, which will in turn require a sizable Confederate commitment to keep them at bay. A commitment not much smaller than OTL, in fact. But it does mean maintaining a strictly defensive posture and forgoing any invasion of Northern territory in that theater so as to conserve men and materiel for other theaters.

My read of the situation is that the ANV needs to be able to credibly threaten raids into Maryland in order to successfully defend Virginia for any length of time. The threat of raids forced the Union to hold back a big chunk of its in-theater forces as garrisons and a strategic reserve.

The usual pattern of Union offensives into Virgina before Grant's Overland Campaign seems to be that they end in one of two ways:
  1. Lee concentrates his forces and defeats the main Union offensive field army after about half of the Union's available in-theater forces have been left behind to cover Maryland, DC, and the advancing army's supply lines.
  2. Lee detaches a big chunk of his army under Jackson or Longstreet to threaten Union rear areas, and the offensive is called off to cover against the threat.
If you reduce the ANV by a significant percentage and have it take a strictly defensive stance, you wind up with roughly the sitatuation that obtained during the Overland Campaign: the Union can secure rear areas with a much smaller portion of its total forces, and Lee's concentrated forces aren't strong enough relative to the main Union field army to force it to retreat. Lee wins some tactical victories that inflict casualties and delay the offensive, but has to steadily give ground and suffer attrition to his own army.
 
My read of the situation is that the ANV needs to be able to credibly threaten raids into Maryland in order to successfully defend Virginia for any length of time. The threat of raids forced the Union to hold back a big chunk of its in-theater forces as garrisons and a strategic reserve.

The usual pattern of Union offensives into Virgina before Grant's Overland Campaign seems to be that they end in one of two ways:
  1. Lee concentrates his forces and defeats the main Union offensive field army after about half of the Union's available in-theater forces have been left behind to cover Maryland, DC, and the advancing army's supply lines.
  2. Lee detaches a big chunk of his army under Jackson or Longstreet to threaten Union rear areas, and the offensive is called off to cover against the threat.
If you reduce the ANV by a significant percentage and have it take a strictly defensive stance, you wind up with roughly the sitatuation that obtained during the Overland Campaign: the Union can secure rear areas with a much smaller portion of its total forces, and Lee's concentrated forces aren't strong enough relative to the main Union field army to force it to retreat. Lee wins some tactical victories that inflict casualties and delay the offensive, but has to steadily give ground and suffer attrition to his own army.

Absolutely true. The idea is to allow the Union to advance in Virginia in order to keep them from overrunning Tennessee. Whether that will work is a different matter; it depends on the Union response. Best case, they hold off the Union long enough to gain a political victory which gains them their independence. Worst case; well, OTL is already pretty much worst case from the CSA point of view. The chance of success is minimal in either case, but marginally better in my scenario IMO.
 
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